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SECTION A 
I. Introduction 
In a manner of speaking, for a consumer debtor, a chapter 7 bankruptcy imposes a new 
exchange relationship between the debtor and her creditors. In return for the surrender of 
her present assets· at filing, the debtor is granted a discharge. of personal liability for all 
debts ari~ing prior to the commencement of the case. 1 Because for bankruptcy purposes the 
property comprising the estate excludes the debtor's present capacity to earn income in the 
future,2 the effect of the discharge is to shield post-petition earnings from the statutorily-
imposed new bargain.3 Moreover, not all of the debtor's existing assets must be delivered 
to the trustee for liquidation and distribution to creditors. Just as some property is exempt 
from execution under applicable non-bankruptcy law, so too is some of the debtor's 
property placed beyond the reach of her creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding.4 Exemption 
laws are intended to provide the debtor with the property necessary for his survival and to 
rehabilitate him financially. They also protect the debtor's family from impoverishment and 
effectively impose on the debtor's creditors the burden of providing the· debtor and his 
family with minimal financial support rather than externalizing that cost and responsibility 
onto society at large. This suggests that by doing some advance planning, a debtor can 
maximize her outcome in bankruptcy based on the form in which the debtor's assets are 
held at filing. 
1 11 U.S.C. § 727(b). The effect of the discharge is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 524. Theories of the 
discharge abound. See generally Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral Conversions 
and the Discharge Debate, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 56, 89-103 (1990) (reviewing prevailing theories). 
However, at bottom, both the discharge and the exemptions are animated by the bankruptcy fresh start policy. 
See generally Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970) (the basic purpose of bankruptcy is to give the 
debtor a new start in life). 
2 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1), defining the "property of the estate" as consisting of all legal and 
equitable interests of the debtor in property existing as of the commencement of the case. Thus, the debtor's 
"human capital, " represented by future earning capacity is excluded in liquidation cases. 
3 Of course, in chapter 13, the definition of the property of the estate is expanded to include post-
petition earnings and assets. 11 U.S.C. § 1306. As originally enacted, the Code gave the consumer debtor 
complete freedom to choose between a surrender of non-exempt assets in chapter 7 or the substitution of future 
earnings in chapter 13 as the "price" of the discharge. The addition in 1984 of a need criterion in chapter 7 (§ 
707(b» and the disposable income test in chapter 13 (§ 1325 (b)(1)(B» increased the cost of the discharge to a 
debtor with substantial ability to satisfy her existing debts from future earnings. See generally Hallinan, The 
"Fresh Start" Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. Rich. 
L. Rev 49 (1985); Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 1047 (1987). 
4 However, unlike the approach under the former Act, exempt property is considered part of the estate, 
subject to administration in the bankruptcy court, unless and until the debtor claims the property is exempt and 
any objections to such claims are denied. 11 U.S.C. 522(l). See also H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Congo 1st 
Sess. 368 (1977) (announcing that the new Code has the effect of overruling Lines V. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 
(1970». 
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II. Maximization of Exemptions and "Fraudulent" Bankruptcy Planning 
A. The Statutory Framework 
1. The Exemptions 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 did not contain specific exemptions. Rather, it recognized 
state and other federal non-bankruptcy exemption statutes.5 The legislative his~ory of the 
current Bankruptcy Code evinces a much stronger federal interest in the exemptions and 
exemption policy.6 The 1973 Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the 
United States recommended adoption of a mandatory set of federal exemptions in 
bankruptcy, but this proposal met with c,?nsiderable opposition from the states.7 The 
compromise reached in the Code was to adopt a uniform set of federal exemptions in section 
522(d), but to allow the debtor to choose between the federal exemptions or the exemptions 
permitted by the law of her state of domicile. 8 However, section 522(b) also· permits the 
states to enact specific legislation depriving debtors in their states of that choice, thereby 
limiting debtors in such "opt-out" jurisdictions to the exemptions from execution applicable 
in that state as of the state of filing.9 About two-thirds of the states have passed opt-out 
legislation and it is important to recognize that local exemption laws vary widely from state 
to state. tO A complete compilation of state exemptions prepared by Chief Judge A. Jay 
5 Bankruptcy Act § 6. 
6 See generally, Woodward, Exemptions, Opting Out, and Bankruptcy Reform, 43 Ohio St. L.J. 335, 
342-44 (1982). 
7 See Kennedy, Limitations of Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 45 Iowa L. Rev. 445, 452 (1960) (pointing up 
the problem). Concern was also voiced that the existence of different exemption schemes under state and 
federal law might precipitate strategic bankruptcy fllings by debtors and creditors designed to gain the benefit 
of whichever scheme was considered to be the most advantageous. See generally Vukowich, The Bankruptcy 
Commission's Proposal Regarding Bankrupt's Exemption Rights, 63 CAL. L. REv. 1439 (1975) (detailing the 
arguments pro and con). 
8 11 U.S.C § 522(b). 
9 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1). The constitutionality of the Code's opt out provision has been unsuccessfully 
challenged on several occasions; e.g., In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Lausch, 16 B.R. 
162 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981); and is now no longer an issue. The constitutionality of a similar provision 
under the Act was also found constitutional. Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902) 
(holding that the . uniformity required of the bankruptcy laws by the Constitution is "geographical and not 
personal). See also In re Butcher, 189 B.R. 357 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995) (fmding § 522(b) not only satisfies the 
uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution, but also holding that it meets as well the 
substantive due process requirement of the Fifth Amendment). 
to The wide disparity in state exemption laws can be traced to a variety of historical and political 
reasons. See generally Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 Yale L.1. 1463 (1959). 
There is a Uniform State Exemptions Act, but it has not been widely accepted to say the least. Ordinarily, 
states exempt property by dollar amount, category of property, or some combination of the two. California, 
Florida, and Texas are generally noted for their liberal exemption laws; therefore, many of the reported cases 
dealing with prebankruptcy planning practices come from bankruptcy courts in these jurisdictions. The 
exemption laws of all 50 states are collected in 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed. 1993). 
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Cristol, of the Southern District of Florida, is contained in Appendix I attached to this 
material. 
Recently, Senator Herb Kohl of Wisconsin has introduced legislation (S 530) that would cap 
the state homestead exemption at $100,000. Titled the "Bankruptcy Abuse Reform of 
1997" this provision would principally affect debtors in unlimited homestead jurisdictions, 
like Florida and Texas. Senator Kohl proposed similar legislation in 1995 that was not 
acted upon, and included an amendment in the Bankruptcy Technical Correc40ns Act of 
1996, also not enacted, which would have limited the maximum homestead exemption in 
bankruptcy to $500,000. Somewhat troubling is the fact that neither this bill nor its 
predecessors contain a floor that would ensure a minimum homestead exemption for debtors 
in jurisdictions with very low homestead exemption amounts. The proposal of the National 
Bankruptcy Review Commission on exemptions, discussed below in Part ILl of these 
materials, would rectify that oversight by imposing a floor of $20,000. 
Finally, it bears noting that while the formulation of exemptions in the opt-out jurisdictions 
will be determined under state law, as it was under the prior Bankruptcy Act, the Code 
parts company with the prior legislation by applying federal law to resolve a number of 
ancillary issues relating to the assertion of exemption rights, state and federal, in bankruptcy 
proceedings.l1 For instance, applying the preemptive provision of § 522(c)(1), the Fifth 
Circuit recently ruled that the Texas homestead exemption law is inoperative against the 
debtor's former spouse who is entitled under the Bankruptcy Code to proceed against the 
otherwise exempted property to satisfy her alimony, maintenance, and child support 
judgment. 12 
2. The Discharge 
The bankruptcy discharge is the principal instrument for effectuating the goals of the 
consumer bankruptcy system, chief among them being to provide the "honest but 
unfortunate" debtor a ftnancial fresh start.I3 However, an individual debtor's right to a 
11 The Code's broad defmition of property, for example, includes exempt as well as nonexempt 
property. Similarly, the provisions of § 522(e) (prohibiting enforcement of waiver of exemption claims in 
favor of unsecured creditors) and § 522(f) (permitting avoidance of certain liens that impair an exemption to 
which the debtor a debtor would otherwise be entitled) also affect the application of state exemption in a 
bankruptcy context. See Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 311-13 (1991) (indicating that the purpose of § 522(f) 
is to enlarge exemptions in bankruptcy by permitting the stripping away of liens regardless of whether the lien 
would be enforceable outside of bankruptcy). 
12 Davis v. Davis (In re Davis), 1997 U.S. App. Lexis 12770 (5th Cir. 1997). The bankruptcy and 
district courts in that case had ruled that while the former spouse's judicial lien securing the debt against the 
exempted property was unavoidable, the former spouse was nevertheless precluded from levying upon the 
property to pay the debt. 
13 H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 125 (1977) ("The purpose of straight bankruptcy ... is to 
obtain a fresh start, free from creditor harassment and free from the worries and pressures of too much 
debt. "). See also Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (bankruptcy gives the "honest but 
unfortunate debtor" a new opportunity in life). Of course, the concept of a discharge is not inherent in a 
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discharge of her pre-petition debts is not absolute. In appropriate circumstances, the 
discharge be denied in whole or part. Of particular interest for this topic, section 
727(a)(2)(A) of the -Code provides for denial of discharge to any person shown to have 
transferred, removed, destroyed, or concealed property of the debtor within one year 
prior to the date of filing with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor. 
B. The Problem: Conversion of Non-Exempt Assets to Exempt Form in 
Contemplation of Bankruptcy 
These two core constituents of the fresh start policy -- discharge and exemptions -- have 
come to interact at a critical juncture, and the lack of clear direction on the issue continues 
to generate uncertainty for bankruptcy practitioners and added litigation for bankruptcy 
courts. The question is can the debtor's urge to exempt as much property as possible from 
liquidation in bankruptcy, if indulged, at some point form the basis for an action to deny 
discharge under sections 727(a)(2)14 of the Code or disallowance of exemption claims under 
section 522(b )?15 As discussed below, most courts answer the question in the afflrmative, 
but these decisions fail to articulate a uniform, workable standard. 
A classic example of the uncertainty that attends the law in this area is illustrated by the 
now-famous bankruptcy cases of Drs. Tveten and Johnson. 16 The two doctors were 
partners in, among other investments, failed real estate ventures in which they sustained 
substantial losses. They went to the same bankruptcy attorney for advice and both flIed 
petitions in the District of Minnesota in January of 1986, Dr. Tveten under chapter 11 and 
Dr. Johnson under chapter 7. Prior to flIing, both of the doctors had engaged in rather 
aggressive prebankruptcy planning. 
Dr. Tveten's planning included selling over $700,000 of nonexempt assets and purchasing a 
Lutheran Brotherhood annuity with the proceeds.l7 Dr. Johnson liquidated over $400,000 
bankruptcy system and, in fact, did not become part of American bankruptcy law until 1841. See generally 
Tabb, The Historical Evolution o/the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 Am. Bankr. L.J. 325 (1991). 
14 On occasion, the challenge to the debtor's discharge for such prebankruptcy activities may take the 
form of an objection under § 727(a)(5) for failure to satisfactorily explain the loss of assets, or, to the extent 
the transfer is not properly disclosed in the debtor's schedules, for knowingly and fraudulently making a false 
oath in connection with the case. E.g., Gullickson v. Brown (In re Brown), 194 B.R. 514 (D. Kan. 1996). 
Note also that where assets are required to be listed on the schedules reliance on the advice of counsel for 
fialing to do so ia no defense. See In re Tully, 818 F.2d 106, 111 (1st Cir. 1987). 
15 Other, less frequently sought, remedial responses are discussed infra Part II.H. 
16 Norwest Bank, N.A. v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988) and Panuska v. Johnson (In re 
Johnson), 880 F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1989). The standards established in both cases are also discussed in context 
infra Part ILE. 
17 Ironically, the Minnesota Supreme Court later ruled that the Minnesota statute making annuities and 
life insurance contracts issued by fraternal benefit societies exempt without limitation violated the Minnesota 
state constitution. Hence Dr. Tveten was also unable to claim the exemption. Tveten, 848 F.2d at 873 n.3. 
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of assets and used the proceeds to pay down. the mortgage on his exempt homestead 
residence and purchase other exempt assets. Despite the similarity in their exemption 
planning, the outcome of challenges to this conduct, decided by separate judges in the same 
district, were entirely different. Specifically, Dr. Tevten's discharge was denied under § 
727(a)(2) while Dr. Johnson's discharge was granted. Both decisions were affirmed by 
different district court judges. IS On further appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the court held that 
Dr. Tveten had indeed gone too far in his prebankruptcy planning and that the lower courts 
could reasonably have inferred from his conduct an intent to defraud his creditors.l9 In Dr. 
Johnson's case, a different panel of the Eighth Circuit remanded the proceeding with respect 
to the issue of whether fraud could be established by virtue of the size of the exemption 
sought for newly-acquired assets,20 but, directly contrary to the holding in Tveten, ruled that 
the size of the exemption is not a factor with respect to the homestead exemption.21 These 
two cases demonstrate how difficult it is for counsel to advise clients with respect to these 
matters. 
C. Other Prebankruptcy Asset Protection Strategies 
In addition to selling nonexempt assets and using the proceeds to purchase or reduce the 
encumbrances against exempt assets, some other prebankruptcy planning strategies include: 
IS 
• transferring individually owned real property to a nondebtor spouse as tenants 
by the entirety 
• transferring nonexempt assets to a spendthrift trust 
• transferring nonexempt assets to an ERISA-qualified plan 
• transferring assets to a self-settled trust established in a jurisdiction which 
immunizes such transactions from fraudulent transfer recovery (popular locales 
include Belize, Gibraltar and the Cook Islands off of New Zealand) 
In re Tveten, 82 B.R. 95 (D. Minn. 1988); In re Johnson, 101 B.R. 997 (D. Minn. 1988). 
19 Curiously, on the same date, the same panel on the Eighth Circuit decided Hanson v. First Nat'l Bank 
in Brookings, 848 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1989), in which the court refused to overturn the lower courts' 
determination that the debtors were entitled to claim full exemptions even though in the weeks preceding filing 
the debtors had liquidated approximately $30,000 of nonexempt assets and used the proceeds to acquire 
property for which exemption was sought. See infra Part II.H.3. 
20 lohnson, 880 F.2d at 83, on remand, 124 B.R. 290 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991). 
21 lohnson, 880 F.2d at 83 (refusing to apply Tveten in the case of a homestead claim absent traditional 
evidence of fraud unrelated to the amount of dollars involved). In effect, lohnson applied the standard 
articulated in Hanson (discussed supra note 19) even though the matter at issue was the debtor's entitlement to 
discharge rather than the allowability of claimed exemptions. 
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Depending on the circumstances, each of these enhancement activities may be challenged as 
fraudulent or illegal. Because maximum contributions to ERISA-qualified trusts are limited 
by nonbankruptcy law, this form of planning would appear to be the most innocuous.22 
Nevertheless, there are some cases suggesting that a transfer of assets to a retirement plan 
solely for the purpose of putting those assets beyond the reach of creditors might not satisfy 
the "good faith requirements" of the Bankruptcy Code.23 The proposal of Consumer 
Bankruptcy Working Group of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission on exemptions 
(a copy of which is contained in Appendix IV) would protect without limitation all 
contributions to bona fide retirement plans, whether or not ERISA-qualified. 
Transferring assets to a self-settled spendthrift trust is much more problematic, although 
most states make such dispositions void as against the grantor's creditors anyway.24 The 
exception is Alaska which recently adopted legislation (H.B. 101, a copy of which is 
contained in Appendix II of these materials) that will enforce spendthirft provisions in an 
irrevocable self-settled trust provided that certain conditions are met, including the 
requirements that a portion of the trust assets be invested in Alaska and administered by a 
"qualified person," defined to mean an Alaskan resident or a domestic corporation or 
banking organization. 
A far more viable approach in jurisdictions that permit spouses to hold title to real property 
as tenants by the entirety is for the debtor to transfer individually owned property to the 
nondebtor spouse as tenants by the entirety. Unlike under state law, however, the 
bankruptcy trustee is permitted to sell the debtor's interest without the consent of the other 
spouse.25 However, once such a sale occurs, it is unclear whether the proceeds are 
distributed to only joint creditors or to all creditors. 26 Finally, to further confuse the 
22 See Butler v. Becton, Dickinson and Co. (In re Loomer), 198 B.R. 755 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996) 
(refusing to order disgorgement of prebankruptcy transfers to an ERISA-qualified plan within maximum 
contribution limits). 
23 See, e.g., In re Yuhas, 186 B.R. 381, 386 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995). 
24 See, e.g., Shurley v. Texas Commerce Bank-Austin, N.A. (In re Shurley), 115 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 
1997); see also In re Phillips, 206 B.R. 196 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1997) (assets transferred to self-settled trust 
are just as vulnerable to the claims of creditors as they were before they were transferred); Spenlinhauer v. 
Spencer Press, Inc. (In re Spenlinhauer), 195 B.R. 543 (D. Me. 1996) (holding that a spendthrift trust naming 
the settlor as beneficiary is invalid as against the present and future creditors of the settlor). 
25 See Bankruptcy Code § 363(h) & G); In re Hunter, 970 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1992). q. The Great 
Southern Co. v. Allard (In re Allard), 198 B.R. 715 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (discussing, without ultimately 
resolving, the nature of the relationship between Illinois' tenancy by the entireties statute and the trustee's 
avoiding powers in bankruptcy). 
26 Compare In re Himmelstein, 203 B.R. 1009, 1015 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) and In re Pepenella, 103 
B.R. 299 (M.D. Fla. 1988), rev'g 79 B.R. 76 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987); In re Oberlies, 94 B.R. 916 (Bankr. 
E.D. Mich. 1988) (bankruptcy law should not dilute the rights of joint creditors by making them share with 
other creditors that lacked the ability to receive distribution under state law) with In re Plans, 199 B.R. 211, 
217 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996); In re Cochrane, 178 B.R. 1011 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995); In re Boyd, 121 B.R. 
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picture, recently, the First Circuit has held that "assuming a proper objection by a party in 
interest an entireties exemption is invalid ab initio to the extent there are joint creditors. 
Thereupon, as nonexempt property of the Chapter 7 estate, the entireties property becomes 
[fully] subject to administration. "27 Thus, in some jurisdiction, use of entireties may result 
in total loss of the exemption. 
The use of offshore trusts is particularly troubling and represents a far more dubious 
strategy than routine exemption planning of the sort discussed in this paper. . Unlike a 
conversion in the form in which an asset is held, where the net value of the asset remains on 
the debtor's balance sheet, the transfer of assets. to a trust involves a transfer to another 
entity and the separation of the asset from the estate. The author strongly discourages the 
use of this approach to the protection of assets from creditors as very likely illegal. At a 
minimum, debtors who engage in this tactic face the risk of global loss of discharge under 
§§ 727(a)(2) and (4).28 While there is some argument that there is no fraudulent conveyance 
problem as long as there are no present creditors at the time of transfer,29 since.motivation 
in relation to future as well as present creditors is relevant to the analysis of fraudulent 
intent, insulation from liability is not clear even under those circumstances.30 These tactics 
also present serious ethical problems for the lawyer who participates in their design and 
implementation, a subject to which attention is turned next. 
D. The Dilemma for Counsel 
Both the House and Senate Reports accompanying the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
proivde that is is lawful for a debtor to take advantage of applicable exemptions by 
converting nonexempt property to exempt property in anticipation of bankruptcy.31 
622 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989) (property must be distributed to all creditors pursuant to § 726 without limitation 
to joint creditors). 
27 Edmonston v. Murphy (In re Edmonston), 107 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 1997). But see In re Williams, 
104 F.3d 688, 690 (4th Cir. 1997) ("debtor does not lose all benefits when joint creditor is present, but he 
does not benefit from it to the extent of joint claims. "). 
28 E.g., In re Colburn, 145 B.R. 851 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992) (barring debtor from discharge under § 
727(a)(4) for failing to discharge his reversionary interest in an offshore trust). 
29 The asset protection bar maintains that offshore asset protection trusts are not fruaudulent transfers as 
long as, at the time the trust is established, the transferor is solvent, his current creditors are provided for, and 
he does not expect to incur other and future debt beyond his ability to pay. See, e.g., Krause, Fruadulent 
Transfers in 1 ASSET PROTECTION: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TACTICS (Osborne ed.) ch. 2§ 
2:21 (1995). 
30 In In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996), the court applied New York law to 
invalidate a Jersey Islands trust even though the debtor filed his bankruptcy case more than six years after 
establishing the trust; i.e., after the statute of limitations on fraudulent transfers had expired. The court found 
that the debtor was one of a class of beneficiaries of the trust, that the trustee retained discretion to distribute 
trust assets among beneficaries, and that the debtor retained the power to remove the trustee at will. 
31 The Reports provide: 
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Counsel, therefore, is faced with the difficult task of, on the one hand, advising the client of 
this opportunity to protect additional property, but, at the same time, cautioning against 
engaging in conduct that I?ight later be characterized as a fraudulent and, therefore, result 
in the loss of the discharge as well as loss of the property. The absence of clear standards 
and uniform treatment of this question compounds the problem for counsel since it is 
impossible to predict with certainty when the conversion of assets will be regarded as a 
fraud on creditors or as grounds for disallowing exemptions (supra § ll.B.).32 Counsel 
must also be mindful of his or her general ethical responsibilities as well as the specific 
ethical standards governing members of the bar. 
1. Ethical and Professional Obligations 
Needless to say, an attorney stands in a fiduciary relationship to the client and owes the 
client a duty of fmest loyalty and a duty to maintain client confidences. Additionally, by 
professional standards, the attorney also has a duty to represent the client zealously within 
the limits of the law. In advising debtor's in connection with prebankruptcy planning 
activities, however, counsel needs to take into account several additional considerations 
which derive from the lawyer's position as an officer of the court and the ethical preclusions 
that govern the conduct of lawyers in their professional activities. To begin with, Rule 2.1 
of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct33 (1984) provides 
that: 
In representing a client, a lawyer ... may refer not only to 
law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, 
social, and political factors, that may be relevant to the 
client's situation 
Further, Model Rule 4.4 provides that: 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that· 
have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay 
or burden a third party .... 
As under current law, the debtor will be permitted to convert nonexempt 
property into exempt property before filing a bankruptcy petition .... The 
practice is not fraudulent as to creditors and permits the debtor to make 
full use of the exemptions to which he is entitled under law. 
S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess 76 (1978); H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 
361 (1977) 
32 See generally Ponoroff & Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their Assets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: 
Villains or Victims of the Fresh Start, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 235 (1995). 
33 Nearly 40 states have adopted all or significant parts of the ABA Model Rules. Kentucky is among 
these states. See KENTUCKY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, SCR 3.310 (eff. Jan. 1, 1990). 
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Of perhaps even greater concern are the specific ethical prohibitions regarding a lawyer's 
participation in or perpetration of a fraud. Under the Model Rules, the emphasis is upon 
counseling clients who are or who intend to engage in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. 
In particular, Model Rule 1.2(d) states that: 
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a 
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or 
fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences 
of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may 
counselor assist a client to make a good faith effort to 
determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the . 
law [Emphasis added]. 34 
This standard is more forgiving than the comparable provision in the Code 
of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-102(a)(7) which forbid counsel from 
assisting a client in the commission of "illegal" as well as "fraudulent" 
conduct. Nevertheless, Rule 1.2(d) presents a serious concern for counsel 
who counsel clients in asset protection planning. 
If the lawyer determines that continued representation of the client would place the lawyer 
in violation of Model Rule 1. 2 (d) , the lawyer must withdraw from the representation. 35 
Failure to withdraw may constitute "professional misconduct" within the meaning of Model 
Rule 8.4. It is far less clear whether the lawyer must also disclose the information. Model 
1.6(a), which prohibits a lawyer from revealing client confidences except in instances 
involving as likelihood of imminent death or substantial bodily harm, suggests not. 
2. Disqualification from Representation and Loss of Fees 
In Inre Prince,36 the defendant-law firm had represented the debtor, William Prince, and 
his spouse in an estate planning context and counseled the transfer of $600,000 in property 
from Mr. to Mrs. Prince. Subsequently, Mr. Prince filed for chapter 11 relief and the firm 
was appointed counsel without disclosing the prior representation. The court concluded that 
on these facts the firm labored under a conflict of interest that clearly prejudiced the estate 
inasmuch as the firm was not in a position to independently evaluate the property 
transaction between the Prince's and its effect on the estate. Accordingly, because of the 
firm's failure to disclose its involvement in the prebankruptcy planning, the court held that 
34 In those jurisdictions still operating under the earlier Model Code of Professional Responsibility, an 
analog to Rule 1.2(d) can be found in DR 7-102 (which prohibits a lawyer from assisting a client in the 
commission of conduct which the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent). 
35 See Model Rule 1.16(a). There may also be circumstances where the lawyer feels it necessary to 
withdraw from representation, even though withdrawal is not mandatory, provided that withdrawal can be 
accomplished without material adverse effect on the client's interests. See Model Rule 1. 16(b). 
36 Electro-Wire Prods. v. Sirote & Permutt, P.C., 40 F.3d 356 (11th Cir. 1994). 
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the fInn was disqualifIed from representing the debtor-in-possession and was required to 
disgorge all fees previously received. 37 
3. Disbannent Qy the Bankruptcy Court 
Bankruptcy courts have the inherent power to preclude attorneys who engage in repeated 
lapses of professional ethics from practicing before the court. 38 Therefore, in addition to 
the risk of discipline under the Model Rules, an attorney who is found to have countenanced 
fraudulent conduct by her client faces censure directly from the court in the form of loss of 
privilege to practice before the court. 
4. Sanctions 
Rule 9011 requires an attorney to sign all pleadings and fIlings. Such signature constitutes a 
certifIcate that the attorney has read the document and that, to the best of the attorney's 
knowledge and belief, after reasonable inquiry, the pleading is supported by existing law or 
a good faith argument for an extension, modifIcation, or reversal of existing law. The rule 
prevents an attorney from fIling any pleading for the purpose of delay, harassment, or to 
increase the cost of litigation. Unlike recently-amended Federal Rule 11, Rule 9011 still 
makes imposition of sanctions mandatory when a pleading is determined to have been 
signed in violation of Rule 9011. Even where Rule 9011 is not applicable, the bankruptcy 
court has the inherent power to discipline lawyers appearing before the COurt,39 as well as to 
impose sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 192740 or pursuant to a fInding of contempt.41 
5. . Liability to the Estate 
Theoretically, if counsel for the debtor-in-possession is regarded as a fIduciary to the estate, 
counsel may also to answerable to the estate in damages for failure to reveal or prosecute 
prebankruptcy transactions deemed prejudicial to the estate or --creditors a group. 42 In 
general, the nature of bankruptcy law complicates questions of professional responsibility 
since, in large measure, those rules were developed in the context of a classic adversarial 
mode where their is no ambiguity over the question of to whom the lawyer's duties are 
37 Id. at 360-61. The court also suggested that disbarment proceedings would have been appropriate had 
the actions been performed by a sole practitioner. 
38 See, e.g., In re Danberry, 72 B.R. 874, 886 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987), citing D.H. Overmeyer Co., 
Inc. v. Robson, 750 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1984). 
39 See In re Morz, 65 F.3d 1567 (11th Cir. 1995). 
40 E.g., Knepper v. Skekloff, 154 B.R. 75 (N.D. Ind. 1993). 
41 Bankruptcy judges are generally considered to possess civil, albeit usually not criminal, contempt 
powers. See, e.g., Bartell, Contempt o/the Bankruptcy Court--A New Look, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1. 
42 See generally Everett v. Perez (In re Perez), 30 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 19942 (debtor-in-possession had 
fiduciary responsibility to the estate to propose a plan that complied with all of the confirmation requirements 
of § 1129, regardless of whether those issues were placed in dispute or not during confirmation). 
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owed. The bankruptcy process, while it includes aspects of litigation, is a much broader 
practice. For example, in chapter 11, counsel for the debtor in possession has 
responsibilities not only to the debtor but to creditors and other parties in interest as well. 
6. Civil Liability 
Traditionally courts have respected the right of an attorney to practice law without 
rendering himself or herself subject to liability for damages to non-clients. Moreover, it is 
well established that a violation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct does not itself 
give rise to a cause of action nor does it create a presumption that a legal duty has been 
violated. In recent years, however, courts have increasingly been willing to entertain a 
variety of causes of action by aggrieved third party non-clients for actions committed during 
the course of the attorney's representation of another party.43 This may include a direct 
claim for fraud or negligence, but in this context would be more likely to involve assertion 
of civil conspiracy claims or a charge of aiding and abetting the commission of a fraud. 44 
Often an individual who is planning to engage in fraudulent conduct will seek out the aid of 
his or her attorney to prepare the necessary transfer documents. While most civil claims 
against the lawyer are predicated on the lawyer's knowledge of the client's fraudulent 
purpose, "playing dumb" is equally fraught with peril. In short, it would be a mistake for 
counsel to not to make detailed inquiry into the reasons that the client is taking the proposed 
action and, if the client offers an lawful justification, to document the file accordingly. 
7. The Ultimate Concern: Criminal Prosecution 
In 1993, a proposed amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 152 would have added the "knowing 
fraudulent transfer or concealment of property in contemplation of bankruptcy" to the list of 
offenses constituting criminal bankruptcy fraud. Although that provision was never 
enacted, 18 U.S.C. § 157, added to the Code by the 1994 Act, raises the same possibility.45 
It makes the filing of a bankruptcy petition as part of a scheme to defraud a criminal 
offense.46 Although it is difficult to imagine this provision being construed to cover 
prebankruptcy exemption planning, the language is arguably broad enough to reach such 
conduct if pushed to the limit. In that case, an attorney who counseled or participated in the 
transaction could also be found criminally responsible for aiding and abetting the 
commission of a bankruptcy crime. Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 153, which applies to all 
43 See generally, Hazard, The Privity Requirement Reconsidered, 37 So. Tex. L. Rev. 967 (1996); 
Siegel, Attorney Liability: Is This The New Twilight Zone, 27 Memphis L. Rev. 13 (1996). 
44 See McElhanon v. Hing, 782 P.2d 256 (Ariz. Ct. App.1985) (lawyer who had prepared documents 
necessary to complete a fraudulent conveyance held liable in subsequent action for conspiracy. 
45 
crimes. 
Knowing and fraudulently concealing assets or making a false oath in a bankruptcy case are also 
See 18 U.S.C. § 152(1) & (2). 
46 The legislative history to the 1994 Act states that the giving of a false statement or promise in 
connection with a bankruptcy proceeding would not be a violation of § 157 unless the act was part of a scheme 
to defraud. H.R. Rep. No. 835, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 57-58 (1994). 
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officers of the court, makes the knowing and fraudulent appropriation of property in a 
bankruptcy case, or the secretion or destruction of any document belonging to the estate, a 
criminal offense. 
8. Liability to the Client: The Other Side of the Coin 
Although, as the foregoing illustrates, there is every reason to proceed conservatively in 
advising clients to take maximum advantage of available exemptions, given that ~ome level 
of prebankruptcy planning is generally regarded as legitimate, if the lawyer is too 
conservative in advising the client about how to preserve assets, she risks liability to the 
client for malpractice. 47 Thus, the lawyer must walk a perilous line separating her 
responsibilities to her client from her responsibilities to the court and the profession. 
E. The Basic Standards: When Does Prudent Prebankruptcy Planning Become 
Fraud? 
1. Acquisition of Exempt Property Beyond the Reasonable Needs of the 
Debtor 
This approach,· based on the supposed policy of the exemption laws to permit the debtor a 
fresh start but not a "head start, "48 is illustrated by the bankruptcy court's decision in In re 
Reed.49 In the case, the debtor had sold nearly $50,000 of non-exempt assets and used the 
proceeds to reduce outstanding liens against his residence with the objective of increasing 
his homestead exemption in bankruptcy. Notwithstanding the admonition in the legislative 
history concerning the permissibility of prebankruptcy conversions to shield assets from 
creditors, the court concluded some limitation had to be imposed where the exemption at 
issue "reaches to infInity. "50 Although the bankruptcy court's decision in Reed was 
affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, the court of appeals emphasized the rapid conversion of assets 
and the concealment of these transactions from creditors as evidence of actual intent to 
defraud rather than the size of the exemption claim. However, in the Eighth Circuit 
decision discussed supra § II.B., In re Tveten,51 in which it will be recalled that the debtor· 
converted nearly all of his assets (totaling over $700,000) to exempt form, the Eighth 
47 In Ayers v. Acuff (slip opinion) (C.A. Tenn. Oct. 25, 1984), a debtor sued an attorney for failure to 
claim exemptions. Although the complaint was dismissed, it was only because of the court's fmding that the 
action was time barred. See also In re Collins, 19 B.R. 874 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985) (suggestion of 
malpractice if available exemptions not claimed). 
48 In re Zouhar, 10 B.R. 154, 156 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981). 
49 First Texas Sav~ Ass'n v. Reed (In re Reed), 11 B.R. 683 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981), aff'd, 700 F.2d 
986 (5th Cir. 1983). 
50 Reed, 11 B.R. at 688. Accord, In re Collins, 19 B.R. 874, 877 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); Zouhar, 10 
B.R. at 157 ("'there is a principle of too much; phrased colloquially, when a pig becomes a hog it is 
slaughtered. '"). 
51 Norwest Bank Nebraska, N.A. v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988). 
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Circuit stated that it would be a "perversion" of the purposes of the Code to permit the 
debtor to retain this amount of property free of the claims of his creditors. 52 Recently, in In 
re Carletta,53 a bankruptcy court for the Northern District of New York cited Tveten 
approvingly for the proposition that the amount of nonexempt property converted to exempt 
property is relevant to a Code § 727(a) determination,54 although the court concluded that 
the conduct of the debtors in the case before it did not exceed reasonable prebankruptcy 
planning. 
2. Acquisition of Exempt Property with the Intent of Placing Assets 
Beyond the Reach of Creditors 
A few courts have suggested that the test for determining when discharge may be denied 
under section 727(a)(2) based on the conversion of non-exempt assets to exempt assets 
should focus on whether at least in some part the debtor's motivation for acquiring the 
exempt property was a desire to shield assets from creditors. 55 This approach is difficult to 
defend in light of the legislative history and has not found wide support, particularly in 
more recent decisions. In fact, the general rule seems to be that someone who is insolvent 
may convert property to exempt. form precisely for the purpose of placing that property 
beyond the reach of creditors.56 
3. Prebankruptcy Conversion of Property as Grounds for Denial of 
Discharge When There is Extrinsic Evidence of Fraud 
The majority of cases, particularly among the circuit court opinions, take the view that 
neither the amount of assets claimed exempt nor evidence that the debtor was motivated by 
52 Id. at 876 (distinguishing an earlier decision of the court decided under the Act, Fosberg v. Security 
State Bank, 15 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1926». While acknowledging that the scope of the debtor's exemption 
claim was determined purely by state law, the court justified its decision on the basis that " [ a] debtor's right to 
discharge ... unlike his right to an exemption, is determined by federal, not state, law." Id. at 674, citing, 
Reed, 700 F.2d at 991. 
In a dissenting opinion, 848 F.2d at 877, Judge Arnold took the majority to task for usurping the prerogative 
of the legislative branch. As a result of the majority decision, Judge Arnold pointed up that debtors "will be 
unable to know in advance how far the federal courts will allow them to exercise their rights under state law. " 
Id. at 879. 
53 
54 
189 B.R. 258 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995). 
Id. at 263. 
55 See, e.g., In re Ford, 53 Bankr. 444 (W.O. Va. 1984), affd sub nom. Ford v. Poston, 773 F.2d 52 
(4th Cir. 1985); In re Schwingle, 15 B.R. 291 (W.O. Wis. 1981). See also infra Part II.H.3.a and 
accompanying text, applying a similar test for determining when prebankruptcy asset conversions may be 
grounds for disallowing the debtor's exemption claims. 
56 Panuska v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 880 F.2d 78, 83 (8th Cir. 1989) (refusing to apply Tveten in the 
case of homestead claims absent evidence of extrinsic evidence of fraud unrelated to the amount of money 
involved). See also NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank v. Bowyer (In re Bowyer), 932 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(discussed infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. 
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a desire to protect those assets from creditors is relevant to when discharge may be denied 
based on the conversion of assets prior to bankruptcy. Recognizing the debtor's right to 
take full advantage of lawful exemptions, these courts hold that the discharge may only be 
denied when the debtor is shown to have committed some act or acts extrinsic to the 
conversion which hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.57 The Seventh Circuit, for example, 
applied this standard in In re Smiley, concluding that the bankruptcy court could reasonably 
have inferred from the debtor's concealing his intention to establish residency in another· 
state with more liberal exemption laws-and misrepresenting to his creditors the extent of 
his equity in certain non-exempt assets--that the debtor had endeavored to at least hinder and 
delay creditors.58 
However, in an en bane opinion on rehearing in In re Bowyer,59 the Fifth Circuit refused to 
apply Smiley in order to deny discharge to a debtor who had i) sold non-exempt assets to 
finance homestead repairs and improvements, and ii) withdrawn $24,000 in savings to pay 
down the mortgage on his homestead exempt residence, on the ground that these actions did 
not hinder or delay creditors.60 Instead, the court observed that the sale of assets occurred 
several months before the debtor decided to file bankruptcy, and that the use of non-exempt 
assets to increase the debtor's equity in his homestead constituted legitimate bankruptcy 
planning and was not sufficient to establish intent to defraud. 61 
F. Indicia of "Intent to Defraud" 
While the courts have articulated different standards for gauging when the prebankruptcy 
conversion of assets may be grounds for denying discharge, in point of fact, these tests have 
more in common than not. Virtually all of the decisions discussed above, and others like 
57 The circuit court decisions in both Reed and Ford based their decision on this ground rather than 
factors (respectively, the amount of assets involved and the debtor's motivation for converting assets to exempt 
form) emphasized in the lower court decisions. See also Marine Midland Business Loans, Inc. v. Carey (In re 
Carey), 938 F.2d 1073, 1077 (lOth Cir. 1991); Johnson, 880 F.2d at 83; In re Adlman, 541 F.2d 999, 1004-
05 (2d Cir. 1976) (under the former Act); Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Ellingson (In re Ellingson), 63 
B.R. 271 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986). 
58 Smiley v. First Nat'l Bank of Belleville, 864 F.2d 562,568 (7th Cir. 1988) (because the language of 
the statute is disjunctive, evidence establishing a pattern of concealment and non-disclosure designed to hinder 
or delay creditors is alone sufficient to sustain an objection under § 727(a)(2) without additional proof of actual 
intent to defraud). See also McCormick v. Security State Bank, 822 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1987). 
59 932 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1991). 
60 In the original panel decision, 916 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1990), relying heavily on the Seventh Circuit's 
position in Smiley, the court concluded that the debtor's action went beyond allowable prebankruptcy planning 
and served as extrinsic evidence of an intent to hinder and delay creditors, even though they did not establish 
an intent to defraud them. 
61 Bowyer, 932 F.2d at 1103. Regrettably, the court failed to elaborate on the distinction between 
"legitimate" and "illegitimate" prebankruptcy planning. The court also distinguished the instant case from 
Reed on its facts, observing that the debtor's conduct in Reed was "much more egregious." Id. at 1102 n.3. 
A-14 
them (see infra § II.G.), declare their adherence to the basic directive from Congress that 
the practice of converting non-exempt property to exempt status even for the purpose of 
evading creditor collection efforts is not itself fraudulent. Nevertheless, it is also clear from 
these decisions that the court may infer the requisite intent necessary to satisfy section 
727(a)(2) from actions attendant to the conversion of property, rather than truly extrinsic 
acts that might alone justify denial of discharge. 62 It is helpful, therefore, to cull from the 
cases the factors which the courts have considered relevant in this regard. They include: 
62 
63 
1. Recent change of residence to state with more liberal exemptions. 
2. Concealment from creditors of the transactions in which exempt assets are 
acquired. 
3. Decision to convert assets to exempt form made after or in connection with the 
decision to file for bankruptcy relief. 
4. Conversion occurs immediately after entry large judgment or in apparent 
response to specific creditor collection efforts. 63 
5. New credit acquired in order to finance purchase of exempt assets. 
6. Non-exempt goods purchased on credit with the intention of selling such goods 
and acquiring exempt property with the proceeds. 
7. Exempt assets acquired by debtor in contemplation of bankruptcy in excess the 
"reasonable needs" of the debtor and the debtor's family. 
8. Misrepresentations to creditors concerning the debtor's use and intended use of 
assets. 
9. Volume of assets converted unusually large both as a percentage of total assets 
and in relation to claims against the estate. 
10. Applicable state law provides for generous or even unlimited categories of 
exempt property. 64 
See Devers v. Bank of Sheridan (In re Devers), 759 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1985). 
See In re Schmit, 71 B.R. 587 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987). 
64 See Smiley, 864 F.2d at 568 ("The unlimited homestead exemption ... provides an incentive for debtors 
to keep their creditors in the dark about their conversion activities. "). But see Panuska v. Johnson (In re 
Johnson), 880 F.2d 78, 82-83 (8th Cir. 1989) (in determining eligibility for discharge, federal courts should 
respect the legislative judgment of the states regarding exemption limits and policies); In re Witwer, 148 B.R. 
930, 941 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992) (regardless of inequities that may' result from use of unlimited exemption, 
in the absence of a showing of inequitable conduct, the bankruptcy court cannot disallow a state exemption in 
order to serve the bankruptcy policy of equitable distribution of the debtor's property to creditors). 
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10. Applicable state law provides for generous or even unlimited categories of 
exempt property. 64 
11. Conveyances of property made for less than fair return value. 
The conduct described in paragraph 4 may also be challenged as a fraudulent conveyance 
under section 548(a),65 while conduct described in paragraphs 5 and 6 could separately give 
rise to a claim under section 523(a)(2) for non-dischargeability in favor of the. defrauded 
creditor or seller. 66 
G. Select Other Cases 
The following is a list of citations to other recent decisions addressing this issue, with a 
brief statement of the holding in each case: 
• Gullickson v. Brown (In re Brown), 108 F.2d 1290 (10th Cir. 1997) (denial of 
discharge refused where the only evidence of fraud was debtor's continued 
exercise of control over transferred asset, and the transfer, in the form of 
security interest, was granted in an arms-length transaction). The court in 
Brown relied on its earlier holding in In re Carey, 938 F.2d 1073, 1077 (10th 
Cir. 1991), in which the court held that desire to convert non-exempt assets to 
exempt status is alone insufficient to support an inference of fraud. 
• Reese v. Kulwin (In re Kulwin), 187 B.R. 341 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995) 
(discharge denied where, in the four months preceding bankruptcy, debtor 
converted virtually all of his nonexempt assets into exempt assets for the 
purpose of defeating the claim of a specific creditor). In addition, the court in 
Kulwin noted that" "At the time of he filed bankruptcy, Kulwin did not face 
overwhelming debts or a lack of income . or assets sufficient to pay his 
creditors. Instead, it appears that Kulwin targeted Reese's claim primarily, if 
not exclusively, for discharge and that his decision to file for protection under 
the Bankruptcy Code resulted from an unwillingness, rather than an inability to 
pay his debts. " 
64 See Smiley, 864 F.2d at 568 ("The unlimited homestead exemption ... provides an incentive for debtors 
to keep their creditors in the dark about their conversion activities. "). But see Panuska v. Johnson (In re 
Johnson), 880 F.2d 78, 82-83 (8th Cir. 1989) (in determining eligibility for discharge, federal courts should 
respect the legislative judgment of the states regarding exemption limits and policies); In re Witwer, 148 B.R. 
930, 941 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992) (regardless of inequities that may result from use of unlimited exemption, 
in the absence of a showing of inequitable conduct, the bankruptcy court cannot disallow a state exemption in 
order to serve the bankruptcy policy of equitable distribution of the debtor's property to creditors). 
65 See infra Part II.HA and accompanying text. 
66 11 U.S.C. § 523(a}(2} provides for the nondischargeability of debts determined to have been procured 
on the basis of fraud, fraudulent representations or false pretenses. 
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• Kapila v. Covino (In re Covino), 187 B.R. 773 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995) 
(holding that if a debtor makes a transfer with a particular creditor in mind and 
has removed assets from the reach of the creditor, the debtor's discharge will 
be denied, but if the debtor is merely looking to her well-being, discharge will 
be granted). 
• The First National Bank of Boston v. Smith (In re Smith), 157 B.R. 37 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 1993) (discharge denied where debtor converted non-exempt 
property into exempt property for the specific purpose of placing assets beyond 
the reach of creditors). 
• Clarendon National Insurance Company v. Barrett (In re Barrett), 156 B.R. 
529 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993) (where the record is devoid of sharp dealing or 
fraud, prebankruptcy planning cannot support an objection under section 
727(a)(2». 
• Weissing v. Levine (In re Levine), 139 B.R. 551 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) 
(absent extrinsic evidence of debtor's intent to defraud, mere conversion of 
non-exempt property to exempt property is not fraudulent as to creditors). 
• In re Hosek, 124 B.R. 239 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991) (a state is free to declare 
as exempt such categories of property as it chooses, and the federal courts are 
not free to question such decisions). 
• Gepfrich v. Gepfrich (In re Gepfrich), 118 B.R. 135 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) 
(conversion of non-exempt marital assets into exempt annuity after filing 
warranted denial of discharge). 
• Thompson McKinnon Securities, Inc. v. Hiegel (In re Hiegel), 117 B.R. 655 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1990) (eve of bankruptcy conversion did not justify denial of 
discharge under either section 727(a)(2) or 727(a)(4». 
• Taunt v. Wojtala (In re Wojtala), 113 B.R. 332 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1990) 
(debtor's transfer of property to exempt form in apparent response to 
aggressive creditor collection efforts created a strong presumption that the 
debtor's actions were undertaken with intent to delay or hinder creditors). The 
court in Wojtala also rejected the arguments that reliance on counsel is a 
defense to denial of discharge67 or that concealment of the transactions in 
questions is a necessary element under section 727(a)(2). 
67 The Eighth Circuit in Tveten also held that reliance on an attorney's advice will not protect a debtor 
unless the reliance is reasonable. See also In re Dreyer, 127 F.2d 587, 597 (Banlq. N.D. Tex. 1991) (good 
faith, reasonable reliance on advice of counsel can constitute an excuse for wrongful transfer or concealment 
of property and will prevent denial of discharge). 
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H. Other Remedies 
1. Dismissal of Case as i! Substantial Abuse 
In a chapter 7 liquidation case involving a debtor whose debts are primarily consumer debts, 
section 707 (b) provides that the case may be dismissed by the court sua sponte or on motion 
of the U.S. trustee on the ground that it would constitute a substantial abuse of the 
provisions of the chapter to grant relief to the debtor. At least one bankruptcy' court has 
suggested that section 707(b) may be used to defeat fraudulent bankruptcy planning.68 
2. Criminal Liabilitv 
In theory, prebankruptcy planning can give rise to prosecution under the Bankruptcy Crimes 
provisions of the Federal Criminal Code. 69 Thus far, there are no reported prosecutions 
based on overly aggressive exemption planning alone, as distinguished from the outright 
concealment of assets or knowing making of a false oath. 
3. Disallowance of Exemptions 
Along with challenging the debtor's entitlement to a discharge under section 727(a), the 
most common procedural device for attacking a prebankruptcy conversion of assets is to 
challenge the debtor's entitlement to claim an exemption for the recently-acquired exempt 
property. The debtor's right to a discharge must be determined by federal, not state, law. 
By contrast, except in a jurisdiction that has not opted out of the federal exemptions and 
where the debtor elects to use the federal exemptions, the scope of a debtor's exemption 
claims are determined under state law. 70 Therefore, some courts have. quite properly taken 
the position that an exemption otherwise valid under state law may not be disallowed in 
bankruptcy regardless of whether the exempt asset was acquired in contemplation of filing. 71 
Even under the former Act, however, where exemption issues were relegated strictly to 
state law, exemption claims were sometimes disallowed where the debtor's acquisition of 
68 See In re Schwarb, 150 B.R. 470, 472 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992). See also In re Higgenbotham, 111 
B.R. 955, 964 (Bankr. N.D. Okl. 1990) (suggesting that misuse of exemptions may be grounds for disinissal 
under § 707(b». 
69 See supra Part II.E.6. 
70 First Texas Say. Ass'n v. Reed (In re Reed), 700 F.2d 986,990-91 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Hosek 124 
B.R. 239, 241 (Bankr. W.O. Tex. 1991) (federal courts are not free to question the decisions of the states 
relating to categories of exempt property). 
71 See, e.g., In re Clements, 194 B.R. 923 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996); In re Sumerell, 194 B.R. 818 
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996) (stating that the court should exercise caution before utilizing its equitable powers to 
fashion a remedy for fraud that is not expressly authorized by the Code); Crews v. First Colony Life Ins. Co. 
(In re Barker), 168 B.R. 773 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994); In re Hosek, 124 B.R. 239, 241 (Bankr. W.O. Tex. 
1991) (asserting that the federal courts are not free to question decisions of states insofar as categories and 
entitlement to exemptions are concerned). 
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the exempt property was accompanied by fraudulent conduct and state law permitted 
disallowance of the exemption for fraud.72 Since the enactment of the Code, creditors have 
routinely challenged the practice of converting non-exempt property into exempt property 
on the eve of bankruptcy in the form of objections to the allowability of the debtor's claimed 
exemptions as well as by objecting to discharge, sometimes supported by state law and 
sometimes not.13 In ruling on these objections, two basic standards have emerged. 
a. Moving party must demonstrate extrinsic evidence of fraud 
The traditional view, articulated by several panels from the Eighth Circuit,74 is that the 
exemption may be disallowed only when there is extrinsic evidence that the debtor acted 
with intent to defraud in converting non-exempt assets into exempt assets,75 a test very 
similar in formulation to the standard applied by many courts in determining when the 
prebankruptcy conversion of assets may be grounds for denial of discharge (supra § II. 
E.3.). The sort of factors necessary to find fraudulent use of an exemption include conduct 
designed to materially mislead or deceive creditors about the debtor's financial situation, 
use of credit to purchase exempt property, and conveyances for less than fair 
consideration. 76 On the other hand, because there is greater deference to state law in 
determining entitlement to specific exemptions than is the case with the granting or denial of 
discharge, if state law provides an absolute right to convert non-exempt property into 
certain categories of exempt assets, some courts hold that the bankruptcy court cannot later 
deny the exemption based on proof that the debtor engaged in the conduct with actual intent 
to defraud.17 By the same token, where state law explicitly speaks to the question (i.e., 
72 See, e.g., Kangas v. Robie, 264 F. 92 (8th Cir. 1920); In re White, 221 F. Supp. 64 (N.D. Cal. 
1963); In re Martin, 217 F.2d 937 (D. Or. 1963). 
73 Under Bankruptcy Rule 4003(a), the debtor must ftle a schedule of exempt property within 15 days 
after the commencement of a voluntary· case. If no objection is filed, the property claimed as exempt is 
exempt. 11 U.S.C. § 522(l). Objections to claimed exemptions are governed by Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b), 
which requires that such objections be ftled within 30 days following the first meeting of creditors. Under 
Bankruptcy Rule 4003(e), a party objecting to a homestead exemption claim bears the burden of proving that 
the property does not qualify for the exemption. 
74 Armstrong v. Abbott Bank-Hemingford (In re Armstrong), 931 F.2d 1233, (8th Cir. 1991); Federal 
Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Holt (In re Holt), 894 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1990); Hanson v. First Nat'! Bank in 
Brooking, 848 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1988) (decided contemporaneously with Tveten). 
75 Armstrong, 931 F.2d at 1237. See also Peoples State Bank & Trust Co. v. Saylor (In re Saylor), 98 
B.R. 542 (D. Kan 1989) (affmning bankruptcy court's disallowance of debtor's claim that life insurance policy 
was exempt after remand to establish the presence of sufficient indicia of extrinsic fraud); In re MacKey, 158 
B.R. 509, 512 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993) (although not fraudulent per se, if done with intent to defeat the 
interests of creditors, a prebankruptcy conversion of assets may be sufficient to warrant denial of the debtor's 
claim of exemption). 
76 See Johnson, 880 F.2d at 82; Mueller v. Redmond (In re Mueller), 71 B.R. 165, 168 (D. Kan. 1987), 
affd, 867 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1989). 
77 See Smith v. Moody (In re Moody), 862 F.2d 1194, 1197-98 (5th Cir. 1989) (under Texas law, intent 
is irrelevant in determining the scope and amount of the homestead exemption). See also Tveten, 848 F.2d at 
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makes prebankruptcy asset conversions grounds for denial of exemption claims), the 
bankruptcy court would be obliged as well to apply the state law rule.78 
b. Fraud may be inferred solely from debtor's intent to place assets 
beyond the reach of creditors 
In In re Schwarb,79 the bankruptcy court found that the debtors had engaged in a 
"systematic conversion of assets" following entry of a large judgment in favor of.a creditor 
who had indicated its intent to forcefully pursue collection. In disallowing the debtors 
claimed exemptions, the court specifically acknowledged that it was departing from the rule 
that the conversion of non-exempt property to exempt property is not per se fraudulent. 80 
Instead the court embraced a rule that the conversion of an asset into exempt form for the 
specific purpose of placing the asset out of the reach of creditors is itself sufficient to 
deprive a debtor of her right to claim the property as exempt. 81 A similar approach can be 
found in In re Spoor-Weston, Inc.,82 where the court, following a lengthy discussion of the 
873-74 (distinguishing the right to exempt property from creditor claims and the right to discharge in terms of 
the deference that must be paid to local law). In re Curry, 160 B.R. 813 (Bankr. D. Minn.1993) (relying on 
state law to sustain the trustee's objection to the debtor's homestead exemption claim based on evidence of 
fraud occurring seven years prior to the bankruptcy filing). 
78 See In reAyre, 158 B.R. 123 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1993) (applying an Illinois statute providing that 
property acquired within six months of bankruptcy should be presumed acquired in contemplation of 
bankruptcy and, thus, in fraud of creditors). Iowa has a similar, albeit more limited, restriction applicable to 
exempt payments from a pension, annuity, or similar plan to the extent the payments are attributable to 
contributions made within one year prior to bankruptcy. Iowa Code Ann. § 627.6(8)(e) (1994). In In re 
Phillips, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 249 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1997), the court construed the California law to deny an 
exemption for funds in a "private retirement plan" where the plan was designed and used for non-retirement 
purposes. 
79 150 B.R. 470 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992). 
80 Id. at 473. In Weissing v. Levine (In re Levine), 139 B.R. 551, 553-54 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992), an 
earlier decision also written by Judge Paskay, the court had held that the conversion of non-exempt property to 
exempt property could not be fraudulent per se even when the purpose for the conversion of property was to 
place the property beyond the reach of creditors. See also In re Snape, 172 B.R. 361 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
1994) (same) In re Swecker, 157 B.R. 694 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993) (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993) (extrinsic 
evidence showing serious creditor collection pressure just prior to the conversion may warrant forfeiture of the 
exemption claim). 
81 Schwarb, 150 B.R. at 473. But see In re Elia, 198 B.R. 588 (Bankr. D. Az. 1996) (observing that 
the fact that the debtor is insolvent at the time of conversion and intends to place assets beyond the reach of 
creditors does not necessarily lead to a finding of fraudulent intent); Ameritrust Nat'l Bank v. Davidson (In re 
Davidson), 164 B.R. 782, 787 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that nothing within § 522 permits the court to 
deny an exemption because nonexempt property was converted to exempt property with the intent to hinder, 
delay, or defraud creditors); affd in part, rev'd in part, 178 B.R. 544 (S.D. Fla. 1995); Crews v. Colony Life 
Ins. Co. (In re Barker), 168 B.R. 773 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) (same). See also Kapila v. Beahm (In re 
Beahm), 179 B.R. 329, 334 n.6 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995) (discussing the disagreement between Schwarb and 
Barker). -
82 139 B.R. 1009 (Bankr. N.D. Oklo 1992). 
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legislative history, concluded that the "conversion of assets outside of the usual course of 
business and on the eve of bankruptcy is wrong." 83 
Florida, because of its unlimited homestead exemption, coupled with a salubrious climate 
and an attractive environment for retirement, has always generated a disproportionate 
number of the reported decisions challenging a debtor's prebankruptcy conversion of assets. 
Many of these cases have arisen in the context of a challenge to the debtor's exemption 
claim for assets, including the homestead, acquired on the eve of, and a~legedly in 
contemplation of, filing for bankruptcy relief. In an effort to control the perceived "abuse" 
of its generous homestead law, effective October 1, 1993, Florida amended its exemption 
statutes to provide that any conversion made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a 
creditor is a "fraudulent" conversion.84 Because the federal bankruptcy courts are obliged, 
in opt-out jurisdictions, to follow state law in terms of the allowability of exemptions, the 
intended effect of the new statutory provision was to render the exemption nonallowable in 
bankruptcy in any case to which the statute pertains.85 However, in In re Miller,86 Judge 
Paskay held that the new statute could not operate as a limitation on or exception to the 
homestead exemption because that exemption is created by the Florida Constitution and, 
thus, is subject only to those exceptions expressly provided for by the Constitution. 87 
Nevertheless, the court in Miller did deny the debtor's claimed exemption for the cash value 
of two life insurance policies acquired with the proceeds from the sale of nonexempt 
property on the ground that "the exemption created for annuities is a creature of the 
83 Id. at 1015. 
84 Fla. Stat. ch. 222.30 (1993), applied in In re Thomas, 172 B.R. 673, 674 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) 
(concluding that the debtors' use, after consulting an attorney, of proceeds from the sale of a nonexempt 
automobile to pay down the mortgage on an exempt residence was a fraudulent conversion within the meaning 
fo the statute). See also Fla.Stat. ch. 222.29 (1993) (providing that an exemption is not effective to the extent 
it results from a fraudulent transfer or conveyance). 
85 Several other states have similar provisions in their statutory exemptions schemes. See e.g., Kan. 
Stat. Ann. § 40-414 (1993) (creating an exception to the exemption for life insurance policies where it can be 
shown that the debtor purchased the asset with the intent to defraud creditors); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 42.004 
. (Vernon 1984 and Supp. 1995) (affecting the use of nonexempt property to acquire exempt personal property). 
See also supra note 78. Some states' exemption laws tie the amount of the allowable exemption to the 
"reasonable needs" of the debtor. See In re Esian, 181 B.R. 848, 850, 853 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1995) (describing 
the operation of the South Carolina exemption statute (S.C. Code Ann. § 15-41-30(1l)(c) (1994)) limiting the 
exemption for payments made under a life insurance policy). 
86 Meininger v. Miller, 188 B.R. 302 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995). 
87 Id. at 308, citing Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605 So.2d 56, 61 (Fla. 1992). Accord Bank of Leumi 
Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Lang. 898 F. Supp. 883 (S.D. Fla. 1995); Barbee v. Statner (In re Barbee), 1997 Bankr. 
LEXIS 1330 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997); In re Clements, 194 B.R. 923, 927 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) ("There is 
no question that the disallowance of fraudulent conversions of exempt assets in Fla. Stat. § 229.29 does not 
extend to homestead. "); Ezrol v. Lane (In re Lane), 190 B.R. 125 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995). But see In re 
Bandkau, 187 B.R. 373 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (discussed infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text); In re 
Thomas, 172 B.R. 673 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) (applying the new statutory restriction to a debtor's 
homestead claim). 
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Legislature, it has no constitutional protection, and therefore, may be subject to other 
exceptions, specifically an exception related to the fraudulent transfer of non-exempt 
property into exempt property. "88 
In In re Wilbur,89 Judge Proctor took a different approach than Miller to the issue of 
whether an otherwise valid Florida homestead claim can be disallowed upon a finding that 
the debtor converted the residence from a non-exempt status to an exempt status with the 
purpose of hindering, delaying, or defrauding creditors. Citing In re Brown. and In re 
Frederick, the court determined that it retained authority, without relying on FLA. STAT. 
220.30, to ensure that the exemption did not become the instrunlent of fraud. Thus, the 
court concluded that the if prohibited intent can be shown by inference from extrinsic 
evidence-such as the timing of the conversion or attempts to conceal the transfers-the 
exemption may still be denied.90 Also, the Eleventh Circuit has ruled that where the 
debtors' claimed homestead exceeds the area limitation set forth in the Florida Constitution 
and is indivisible, sale by the trustee and apportionment of the proceeds between the estate 
and the debtor is appropriate and equitable. 91 
c. An alternative approach:. partial denial 
The court in Spoor-Weston, as a remedy for the wrongful conversion of assets, granted the 
trustee an equitable lien on the debtors' homestead in an amount equal to the amount of the 
funds that the court determined had been wrongfully diverted from the estate in 
contemplation of bankruptcy.92 This approach has particular utility in filings by recently-
arrived residents of states with unlimited exemptions for certain types of property. For 
example, in In re Coplan93 the debtor had engaged in the familiar practice of liquidating 
assets and relocating from a state with a limited homestead exemption, Wisconsin, to a state 
with an unlimited homestead exemption, Florida. The issue, according to the court, was 
whether, under all of the circumstances, the debtor's relocation to Florida, and purchase of 
a new residence in that state, "was for the specific purpose of shielding assets from 
creditors." Concluding that the behavior was so motivated by the fact, inter alia, that the 
filing occurred just after the one year anniversary of the move, the court denied the 
88 Miller, 188 B.R. at 308. 
89 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 358 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997). 
90 In the actual case, however, the court found that the trustee had not met the burden of establishing 
disallowance based on fraudulent conversion. 
91 Englander v. Mills (In re Englander), 95 F.3d 1028 (11th Cir. 1996). Several states impose a size as 
well as a dollar value limitation on their homestead exemption. See Appendix I. 
92 Spoor-Weston, 139 B.R. at 1016-17. See also Smiley v. First Nat'l Bank of Belleville (In re Smiley), 
864 F.2d 562, 564 (7th Cir. 1989) (describing lower court action where debtors were relegated to exemptions 
under the laws of the state of their former residence rather than the jurisdiction where they had moved shortly 
before filing for bankruptcy). 




applicable Florida homestead exemption to the extent that it provided a benefit exceeding 
the homestead exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under Wisconsin 
law.94 
In In re Bandkau,95 decided by the same judge that decided Coplan, the debtor purchased a 
veterinary practice in return for cash and an $80,000 promissory note. Subsequently, bad 
blood developed between the buyer and the seller and, according to the court's finding, the 
debtor set out upon a premeditated plan to defeat the seller's claim under the, note. This 
plan consisted of the liquidation of the debtor's old homestead along with various other 
nonexempt assets, followed by the purchase of a new residence for $100,000, 
approximately $66,000 of which was paid in cash and the balance from the proceeds of a 
new mortgage. "Because the debtors used $54,114.22 of nonexempt assets in purchasing 
the home with the specific intent to place those assets out of reach of their only creditor, the 
right to exemption for that portion of the home .. .is forfeit."% Thus, the court granted the 
debtors an exemption equal to 45.9% of their home, leaving 54.1 % subject to 
administration.97 In addition, however, the court ordered that the first mortgage be satisfied 
out of the exempt portion of the homestead, effectively leaving the debtor with a negligible 
homestead claim. As in Coplan, the remedy was fashioned whole-cloth without any basis in 
the Code, producing perhaps an equitable result on the facts of the particular decision but 
creating an unwieldy and potentially dangerous precedent for future cases. 
4. Fraudulent Transfer Law as A Remedy for Conversion of Non.,.Exempt 
Assets 
Section 548(a)(1) grants the trustee the power to avoid any transfers made with "intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors." Section 548(a)(2) sets forth three sets of circumstances 
under which the trustee may avoid transfers made for less than "reasonably equivalent 
value." Unlike a cause under section 548(a)(1), proof of actual intent to prejudice creditors 
is not required under section 548(a)(2). In either case, the transfer must occur within one 
year of filing to be vulnerable under section 548. However, by virtue of the trustee's ability 
to exercise the rights of unsecured creditors under section 544(b) , transfers considered 
94 The Wisconsin homestead exemption had a limit of $40,000, whereas the Florida property had been 
purchased by the debtor for $228,000 in case, virtually all of which had been obtained from the sale of the 
debtor's Wisconsin home. While the result in Coplan may'be appealing as an equitable accommodation of the 
contractual rights of creditors and the protections the Code endeavors to provide to debtors. by fashioning a 
remedy out of whole cloth, the court produced an outcome that is difficult to support under the express 
directives of the Code. 
95 187 B.R. 373 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995). 
96 ld. at 381. The balance of the cash paid at closing, some $11,929.37, came from the proceeds of the 
sale of the debtors' prior homestead and, thus, retained their exempt charcater. 
97 Although the court made no reference to the point. apparently the same division would apply to any 
post-closing appreciation or depreciation in value. 
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fraudulent under state law occurring more than one year before bankruptcy may also be 
recovered for the benefit of the estate. 98 
Ordinarily, a transfer of exempt property cannot give rise to a fraudulent transfer action 
since creditors would have no legal right to look to those assets in the first place.99 Thus, 
the conversion of one exempt asset into another cannot have the effect of delaying, 
hindering or defrauding creditors. lOO On the other hand, the transfer of assets from non-
exempt to exempt form may constitute a fraudulent conveyance upon showing of evidence 
of actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud. lOl Theoretically, the trustee could 
simultaneously pursue actions to "recover" fraudulently transferred assets and to deny 
discharge. 102 A conversion of assets for less than fair return value can also be challenged 
without proof of actual wrongful intent under section 548(a)(2).103 
98 See, e.g., Dehmer Distribs. v. Temple, 826 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1987). 
99 For example, under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, § 1(12) defines a "transfer" as a "transfer 
of assets" and, in § 1(2), the defInition of assets excludes exempt property. See also G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT 
CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 172 (Rev. ed. 1940). In a bankruptcy context, however, § 522(g) which 
precludes the debtor from exempting property recovered by the trustee under § 550 unless the transfer was not 
involuntary. The implication of this provision is that the trustee does have the power to avoid a transfer of 
exempt property either as a preference or a fraudulent conveyance. See, e.g., Kepler v. Weis (In re Weis), 92 
B.R. 816, 820-21 «Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1988). 
100 See, e.g., In re Kimmel, 131 B.R. 223, 229 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991) (use of exempt pension funds to 
purchase exempt insurance policy could not have the effect of hindering, delaying or defrauding creditors). 
101 See, e.g., Govaert v. Strehlow (In re Strehlow), 84 B.R. 241, 245 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (insolvent 
debtor's conversion of non-exempt property to exempt property held a fraudulent transfer under state law); 
Roemelmeyer v. Gefen (In re Gefen), 35 B.R. 368, 372 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (purchase of exempt property with 
exempt funds was a fraudulent transfer since debtor was aware of pending litigation at the time the transfer 
occurred); Shaia v. Meyer (In re Meyer), 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 410 (Bankt. E.D. Va. 1997) (trustee permitted 
to set aside as a fraudulent transfer a prepetition payment made by the debtor, in his individual capacity and 
with nonexempt funds, on a debt owed jointly by him and his spouse and secured by realty which they held as 
tenants by the entirties) See also In re Clements, 194 B.R. 923 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (noting that § 548(a) 
may be available as a remedy in these circumstances). But see In re Miller, 113 B.R. 98, 104 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1990) (debtor's availing himself of an exemption that state law makes available to him is not a 
fraudulent transfer since the very purpose of the homestead exemption is to put the property beyond the reach 
of creditors). 
102 For an example of a case where the trustee did just that, see Rosen v. Bezner, 996 F.2d 1527, 1530 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
103 In re Spoor-Weston, Inc., 139 B.R. 1009, 1015 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1992) (indicating that one of the 
possible remedies for wrongful conversion of assets would be avoidance of the transfer involving the 
conversion of assets as a fraudulent transfer). 
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l. Possible Solutions and Ethical Considerations Revisited 
Several possible solutions to the conversion issue have been proposed in the literature: 104 
1. Make the federal exemptions mandatory for all bankruptcy debtors.10S This 
would prevent· debtors from "loading up" since all of the federal exemption 
have dollar limitations on categories of exempt property. See 11 U.S.C. § 
522(d). It would also cease to make advantageous the move to ~ state with 
more generous exemptions in advance of filing. However, unless coupled with 
additional amendments to defme the exemption solely in dollar value terms, 
rather than by exempt category as well, it would not eliminate the incentive to 
change the form in which assets are held before filing. 
A copy of a proposal along these lines made by the author and Judge William 
Houston Brown to the National Bankruptcy Review Conunission is attached as 
Appendix III to these materials. 106 The actual proposal reconunended by the 
Consumer Bankruptcy Working Group of the Commission, which largely 
follows these reconunendations, is also attached as an Appendix IV. However, 
in a late amendment, the floor on the homestead exemption was dropped from 
$30,000 to $20,000. 
2. Retain the present approach of deferral to state law exemptions, but subject to 
federally-imposed floors and ceilings. The Bankruptcy Technical Corrections 
Act of 1996, which passed by the Senate but not acted on by the House before 
the adjournment of the l04th Congress, contained a variation of this approach 
in the form of a $500,000 cap on the homestead. Recently, Senator Kohl of 
Wisconsin has introduced new legislation (S. 540) which would cap the 
homestead at $100,000. In the author's view, floors and ceilings, represents a 
second best solution. It is second best because it retains most of the 
shortcomings of the present system, principally in the absence of clear 
guidelines, without taking full advantages of the efficiency gains that would be 
. achieved if, for example, the patchwork of state law was replaced with a 
single, mandatory list of uniform federal exemptions. The pending bill ,like 
the one that was proposed last year, is also infirm in that it capped the 
104 For a detailed discussion of these proposals, see Note, Exemption Reform: Examining the Proposals, 
3 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 207 (1995). 
105 See Cowell, Note, The Debtor and Conversion of Nonexempt Assets to Exempt Assets on the Eve of 
Bankruptcy: Astute Bankruptcy Estate Planning or Fraud, 18 Cap. U. L. Rev. 567, 586-89 (1989). But see 
Kennedy, supra note 7, at 485 (concluding that "[f]or all the antiquarianism, diversity, and inadequacies of 
state exemption legislation, there seems to be no impelling need to impress a federal mold on the exemptions 
recognizable in bankruptcy"). 
106 For further detail see Brown, Political and Ethical Considerations of Exemption Limitations: The 
"Opt-Out" as Child of the First and Parent of the Second, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 149 1997); Ponoroff, 
Exemption Limitations: A Tale of Two Solutions, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221 (1997). 
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homestead, regardless of state law, without setting a corresponding minimum 
homestead amount tied to the fresh start aims of the bankruptcy law. The 
attached proposal on exemptions from the Consumer Bankruptcy Working 
Group of the Commission (Appendix IV) retains the floors and ceilings concept 
for the homestead exemption only. 
3. Disallow a debtor's exemptions for assets acquired within 90 days of 
bankruptcy and while insolvent to the extent that such assets .exceed the 
reasonable needs of the debtor and her family. 107 
4. Treat any prebankruptcy conversion of property by an insolvent debtor in the 
same manner that the bankruptcy law treats other prebankruptcy transfers of 
property by insolvent debtors; i.e., as a preference. 108 Like the previous 
suggestion, this approach suffers from the serious' flaw that in operation it 
would almost certainly end up shielding the more sophisticated debtors with the 
savvy enough to plan in advance, while penalizing those less affluent debtors, 
most in need of exemption protection, but who lack routine access to counsel 
and who would in most cases not learn of the opportunity to do effective 
exemption planning until the exigencies of their situation rendered deferring 
filing a non-option. 
5. Permit prebankruptcy conversions without regulation (except as to the 
dischargeability of particular debts incurred by fraud), but permit revocation of 
discharge to the extent that assets so acquired are "reconverted" to non-exempt 
form in the year following entry of the order of discharge. This would respond 
to the criticism that conversions in bankruptcy situations are more harmful than 
under state law because there is no remedy for creditors when and if assets are 
later reconverted into non-exempt form. The obvious problem with this 
approach is the monitoring and litigation costs associated in determining 
whether the debtor has acted in a manner that would give rise to a revocation 
proceeding. 
6. Allow creditors to sell exempt property subject to the debtor's continued right 
of possession for life or some other limited period of time. 109 
107 This proposal was originally made by Alan Resnick in his article, Prudent Planning or Fraudulent 
Transfer? The Use of Nonexempt Assets to Purchase or Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 
31 Rutgers L. Rev. 615, 651 (1979). A serious problem with this approach is that it would penalize the less 
sophisticated debtors who failed to seek counsel in advance of the time when fmancial pressures made 
immediate fIling a necessity. 
108 See Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 953, 993-97 (1981) (the 
presumption should be against conversion). 
109 Vukowich, supra note 7, at 793; Note, supra note 105, at 225-26. One of several problems with this 
approach is that it ignores the effect of the limitation on the needs of the debtor's dependents. 
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Unquestionably, the most promising of these solutions is a mandatory schedule of uniform 
federal exemptions, which would eliminate wasteful litigation over asset conversion and 
debtor relocation. It also ensures that federal fresh start policy is applied consistently and 
rationally, rather than according to the vagaries of state law. It does not solve all problems. 
Issues regarding the character and value of assets claimed as exempt would remain. 
Nevertheless, federalization of exemption policy would be of enormous help to courts, 
counsel, creditors, and debtors alike. 
Of course, any of these solutions requires some form of legislative action, an event not 
certain to occur. For the foreseeable future, therefore, it seems that the issue will continue 
to be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis, even though Code courts have failed to agree 
upon a consistent approach to be taken in these cases. This lack of uniformity and guidance 
promotes uncertainty, meaning that counsel must walk a fine line in advising clients 
between, on the one hand, making them aware of the opportunity for taking maximum 
advantage of exemptions available to them, and, on the other hand, making sure that they 
understand the risks involved, including denial of discharge, in engaging in "fraudulent" 
prebankruptcyplanning. 
In addition, counsel must be attentive at all times to the ethical standards and preclusions 
which govern the profession. Just as the absence of bright line tests presents problems for a 
debtor trying to decide how much property can be converted before she is in jeopardy under 
section 727(a)(2), so too does the lack of clear and definitive guidelines complicate the task 
for counsel in abiding by the ethical norms governing the profession and referred to in more 
detail above. 110 Ultimately, it is the client who must decide how aggressive she intends to 
be in planning for bankruptcy, but if, in making that decision, the client exceeds what 
counsel regards as the permissible boundaries of legitimate prebankruptcy planning, the 
lawyer has an ethical duty and an obligation as an officer of the court not to countenance 
such behavior in the form of continuing representation. Th~ problem, of course, is 
ascertaining the precise location of such boundaries, a task that Congress and the courts 
have complicated many fold by failing to provide clear and consistent standards and 
guidelines. 
III. Recent Developments Concerning Exemptions 
A. Waiver of Exemptions by Creditor Nonaction-herein of Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz 
1. In General 
In Taylor, 503 U.S. 638 (1992), the Supreme Court held that the failure to file a 
timely objection under Rule 4003(b) to a debtor's exemption claim caused those exemptions 
110 See supra § 11.0. 
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to be allowed even though the exemptions were not otherwise proper. Since that case was 
decided there have been a number of decisions seeking to flesh out the scope and limitations 
in that ruling. Quite recently, the Sixth Circuit, in Rogers v. Laurain (In re Laurain), 113 
F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 1997), held that not only must the trustee's (or creditor's) motion for 
extension of time to file an objection be filed before the expiration of the 30-day period in 
Rule 4003(b), but the court must act on the motion before the expiration of such deadline or 
the exemption claim is allowed. The court based its holding on the explicit language in 
Rule 4003(b) (which indeed is phrased somewhat differently from the language in the 
comparable rules governing time for filing discharge objections and complaints objecting to 
dischargeability under Rules 4004(b) and 4007(c» and its conclusion that the time 
limitations in Rule 4003(b) are jurisdictional. This ruling will inevitably place trustees and 
creditors, who obviously cannot control when the court will act, in the unenviable position 
of having to file blanket objections before the expiration of the 30-day period and sort out 
the facts later. III 
Recognizing these undesirable practical consequences, in a dissenting oplll1on in 
Laurain, Judge Conti argued that Congress could not have intended the "nonsensical" 
interpretation adopted by the majority of the court. 113 F.2d at 602. In Barbee v. Statner 
(In re Statner), 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1330 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.), the court adopted the reasoning 
of Judge Conti, concluding, "to hold otherwise would be to create an undue hardship on 
both trustees and the Court." Nevertheless, the language in Rule 4003(b) is problematical. 
Therefore, because the holding in Laurain will tend only to increase the cost and complexity 
of consumer bankruptcy cases, the Rules Committee should consider an amendment to Rule 
4003(b) to make clear that it is only the filing of the motion for extension of time, and not 
entry of the order, which must occur within the 30-day window in order to avoid a waiver 
of the right to object to exemption claims. 
In a case tending to limit the holding in Taylor, the First Circuit held that Rule 
4003(b) does not require the trustee to object to an exemption to which the debtor is fully 
entitled. Williams v. Peyton (In re Williams), 104 F.3d 688 (1st Cir. 1997). In Williams, 
the debtor listed as exempt on her schedules a parcel of property that she owned as a "tenant 
by the entirety" with her husband. The trustee did not object. Thereafter when the trustee 
sought to take possession of the property, the debtor filed a motion to compel abandonment 
111 A rather good example of this strategy can be found in Spenler v. Siegel (In re Spenler), 1997 Bankr. 
LEXIS 1488 (Bankr 9th Cir. 1997), in which the trustee fIled an "objection" to the debtor's list of property 
claimed as exempt apparently for the purpose of conducting further discovery of the debtor. The bankruptcy 
court disagreed, noting that "Customarily, you notice up a 2004 in a timely manner and request an extension 
of time," rather than fIle an objection without supporting documentation. Nevertheless, the court "deemed" 
the trustee's "objection" to be a request for additional time and granted the trustee an extension of time to fIle 
an objection supported by appropriate documentary evidence. On appeal, the debtor argued that because a 
proper objection was not fIled within the 30-day period prescribed by Rule 4003(b), the time for objection 
expired. The Appellate Panel disagreed on the basis that the purpose of Rule 4003(b) is to provide the debtor 
with timely notice that the trustee objects to claimed exemptions and that the trustee's purported "objection," 
which specifically referred to claimed exemptions in two lRAs, served to provide such notice even if treated 
by the court as an request for extension oftime. See also In re Young, 806 F.2d 1303, 1305 (5th Cir 1987). 
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contending that the trustee had no right to sell the property for the benefit of any creditors. 
The court disagreed; noting that the exemption in § 522(b )(2)(B) for property held as a 
g tenant by the entirety only applies to the extent such interest is exempt under state law. 
~ Because applicable local law in this case provided that entireties property is exempt only 
from the claims of individual, but not joint creditors, the trustee was free to administer the 
property for the benefit of joint creditors. The failure to object to the exemption claim 
within the time limitations of Rule 4003(b) did not, according to the court, affect the 
trustee's rights because the debtor had never claimed the property as exempt from the 
claims of joint creditors. It bears noting that other decisions hold, assuming a timely 
objection under Rule 4003(b), that an entireties exemption is simply void to the extent there 
are joint creditors as to whom the exemption does not apply under state law. See 
Edmonston v. Murphy (In re Edmonston), 107 F.3d 74 (1st Cir. 1997). 
The obligation to file an objection also depends on the existence of a proper claim by 
the debtor. Thus, where the debtor fails to file timely schedules, or later amends the 
schedules, the trustee is relieved of the duty to object until there is a list of property to be 
opposed under § 522(1) and Rule 4003(b). See Petit v. Fessenden, 80 F.3d 29, 32-33. (1st 
Cir. 1996); In re Doyle, 209 B.R. 897 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1997) (trustee given 30 days to 
object from the date that debtor amends schedules to describe individual items claimed as 
exempt with greater particularity); In re Harrel, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1043 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 
1997) (debtor could not claim an exemption based on amendment of his schedules, despite 
trustee's failure to object, where the exemption is barred by § 522(g) regarding property 
fraudulent concealed and recovered by the trustee); In re Pugh, 195 B.R. 787 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 1996), a!f'd, 202 B.R. 792 (M.D. Fla. 1996). Also, where the debtor seeks to . 
exclude, rather than exempt, property from the estate, Rule 4003(b) does not apply. 
Spenlinhauer v. Spencer Press, Inc. (In re Spenlinhauer, 195 B.R. 543) (D. Me. 1996), 
a!f'd wlo op., 101 F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 1996) (debtor claimed one-third of interest in corpus of 
spendthrift trust excluded under § 541(c)(2). 
2. Taylor in Chapter 13 
In In re Graznow, 1997 WL 40471, (E.D. Mich. 1997), the debtor designated two 
securities accounts as exempt from inclusion in his bankruptcy estate. A creditor objected 
to confirmation on the basis that the exemptions were not allowable, and that, if the exempt 
property were included in the estate, the creditor would be entitled to full payment of its 
claim under § the confmnation standard in 1325(a)(4). The bankruptcy court refused to 
confmn the plan and the debtor appealed. On appeal, the district reversed, observing that 
several courts have extended the Taylor holding to chapter 13 cases. Therefore, since the 
plan objection was in substance an untimely objection to the debtor's claimed exemption, 
the court concluded that consideration of that aspect of the confmnation objection was 
barred by Rule 4003(b). Along similar lines, in In re Ruggles, 210 B.R. 57 (Bankr. D. Vt. 
1997), the bankruptcy court held that property that was exempted from the estate without a 
timely objection could not be considered in the liquidation analysis for purposes of 
determining if the plan met the best interests of creditors test under § 1325(a)(4). 
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Another case involving application of Taylor in chapter 13 is In re Gamble, 208 
B.R. 598 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1997). In this case, the debtors claimed the equity in their 
residence exempt under the Illinois homestead law. Subsequently, the debtors sought and 
received authority to sell the property, the net proceeds from which were $6,731.22, which. 
the court ordered by held by the chapter 13 trustee until the conclusion of all payments 
called for by the debtors' plan. The debtors filed a motion for turnover of these funds citing 
Taylor for the proposition that, no objection to their exemption claim having been filed, the 
property was not and could never become the property of the estate. Although the court 
agreed that the exempt character of the proceeds had been established, it stated that this did 
not resolve the remaining issue of the appropriate disposition of exempt property during the 
pendency of the chapter 13 case. As to this issue, the court found that while Taylor carved 
the exempt property out of the estate, it did not free it from the claims of prepetition 
creditors until the case is concluded. Therefore, the court ruled that the property should be 
held in suspense pending completion of payments under the debtors' plan, with the proceeds 
to revest in the debtors at that time, but not earlier. .As justification for this holding, the 
court stated: "Debtors have the right to dismiss a Chapter 13 case at any time. To hold 
exempt property revests in debtors at confirmation and allow unfettered use of property 
would, defacto or dejure, potentially result in property being placed beyond the reach of 
creditors prior to the time that debtors' Chapter 13 plan is consummated by distribution of 
the monthly payments of debtor's disposable income. To avoid this injustice, ... the Code 
contemplates the possessory enjoyment of debtors' exemptions be postponed, contingent on 
future payment." Although the language of this holding can certainly be read to support a 
broader application, it appears that the court intended to limit the scope of its holding to 
exempt property that has been converted to cash. 208 B.R. 602 n.1. Without such a 
limitation (and perhaps even with it) this decision would pose a serious threat to the 
integrity of chapter 13, since there would be little incentive to select a repayment plan if the 
debtors were to be deprived of the use and enjoyment of their property during the three to 
five year duration of the plan. 
Finally, in In re Ferretti, 203 B.R. 796 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1997), the debtor 
identified in his schedules as exempt property an "auto accident claim" valued at $1. 00. 
Such property was not exempt as a matter of law, but no objection was filed. Thereafter, 
the debtor settled the auto accident claim for $70,000 and the trustee objected to the 
distribution of the net settlement proceeds to the debtor in excess of the $1.00 that had been 
claimed. Specifically, the trustee argued that Taylor should not apply in chapter 13, and 
that, ill any event, even if it was too late. to challenge the exemption, the court must still 
consider whether the property should be regarded as disposable income for purposes of §§ 
1322 and 1325. In response, the court made the following determinations: (1) the entire 
settlement, and not just the $1.00 scheduled by the debtor, was exempt under the rationale 
of Taylor; (2) Taylor applies in chapter 13; and (3) despite contrary authority, the language 
of § 522(c) which protects exempt property from prepetition debts applies for purposes of 
defining disposable income under § 1325(b)(2). 
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3. Adjournment of the First Meeting 
After Taylor, one technique that trustees have employed has been not to conclude the 
§ 341(a) meeting, but rather to continue it generally. The object is to circumvent the strict 
30-day bar date for filing objections to exemption claims relying on the language in Rule 
4003(b) which states that the objection period terminates "30 days after the conclusion of 
the meeting of creditors." The theory is that there is no need to apply for an extension of 
the objection period if it never expired. Rule 2003(e) states that the § 341(a) m~eting may 
be "adjourned from time to time by announcement at the meeting of the adjourned date and 
time without f~rther notice." The case law on the validity of this approach is mixed. 
In In re Levitt, 137 B.R. 881 (Bankr D. Mass. 1992), decided just prior to the 
Supreme Court's decision in Taylor, the court held (relying on Rule 2003(e» that unless the 
trustee orders a specific adjourned date and time within 30 days of the date on which the 
meeting is held, the meeting will be deemed to have concluded on the last meeting date. Id. 
at 883. Taking a somewhat different tact, in Petit v. Fessenden, 182 B.R. 59, 63 (D. Me. 
1995), a!f'd on other ground, 80 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 1996), the district court ruled that in 
cases involving an indefinite continuance, the determination of whether or not the objection 
to the debtor's exemption claim was timely filed depends on whether the time of filing the 
objection was "not unreasonable under the circumstances presented. " 
Several other reported decisions permit a general continuance, although with some 
limitations on the trustee's ability to act arbitrarily. In Bernard v. Coyne (In re Bernard), 
40 F.3d 1028, .1031 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1695, the court upheld the 
trustee's right to continue the creditors' meeting if he believes that the purposes of the 
meeting have not been fulfilled. See also In re Havenac, 175 B.R. 920 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
1994) (Rule 2003(e) impliedly authorizes general continuances). In In re DiGregorio, 187 
B.R. 273 (Bankr. N.D. lli. 1995), the court rejected the "bright line" approach in Levitt, 
but also refused to simply sanction general adjournments. Instead, the court put the burden 
on the debtor to move the court for an order concluding the meeting. Id. at 276. In In re 
Flynn, 200 B.R. 481 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996), the court adopted the reasoning of the 
DiGregorio, but reserved the question of whether the debtor's motion to strike the objection 
should be granted "only if the debtor has objected to the continuance and the adjournment is 
found to arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion." Id at 486. 
4. Conversion 
Does Taylor preclude an objection beyond the 30-day period where the case is 
converted from chapter· 11 or 13 to chapter 7? Again the case law is in some disarray on 
this issue. In re Brown, 178 B.R. 722 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1995), was initially filed as a 
chapter 11 case. The trustee failed to make timely objections to exemption claims and the 
case was subsequently converted to chapter 7. The trustee argued that the objection period 
should be revived upon conversion, but the court disagreed, following the rationale of In re 
Halbert, 146 B.R. 185 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992), to the effect that once property leaves the 
estate as exempt, conversion does not restore it. In contrast to these authorities, in In re 
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Havenac, 175 B.R. 920 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994), which also involved a conversion from 
chapter 11 to chapter 7, the court found that "the realities of bankruptcy administration 
militate in favor of ·finding a new objection period after the case is converted to chapter 7." 
Id. at 925 A contrary rule was described as an encouragement of "the potential for debtor 
abuse." Id. It bear noting, however, that in Havenac the U.S. Trustee had adjourned the § 
341(a) meeting indefinitely prior to the conversion of the case. 
The conversion problem is a significant one because, ordinarily, creditors. in chapter 
11, 12 and 13 proceedings focus on the proposed terms of repayment and the feasibility of 
the debtor's plan, and not on exemptions. See, e.g., Alderman v. Martinson (In re 
Alderman), 195 B.R. 106, 109 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1996) (observing that exemptions are of 
lesser importance in chapter 13 than chapter 7). Thus an individual, perhaps aware of this 
tendency to overlook exemptions, might set out to take advantage of the situation by filing 
under chapter 11 or 13, intending all along to convert as soon as the exemption objections 
window has closed. Of course, to counsel such behavior might raises ethical concerns for 
the lawyer, and a debtor who can be shown to have deliberately engaged in such a course of 
conduct risks sanctions and perhaps dismissal on bad faith grounds. Nonetheless, the better 
solution would be one that automatically reopens the objection window for a limited time 
after conversion. This would eliminate wasteful "precautionary" objections while the 
reorganization case is pending. Moreover, if the debtor is not attempting to claim improper 
exemptions, there is no harm to the debtor as well as a result of reopening the objection 
period. 
5. Lien Avoidance 
If an exemption claim, although improper, is deemed allowed because of the failure 
to timely object, can the debtor thereafter also avoid a judicial lien or nonpossessory, 
nonpurchase money security interest that impairs that "exemption" pursuant to § 522(f)(1)? 
Again, the cases are split. In In re Liston, 206 B.R. 235 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1997), the 
debtor included on her list of exempt property a computer and treadmill, neither of which 
was in fact exempt under applicable law. No objection was filed by the trustee or any 
creditor within the time required by Rule 4003(b). Thereafter, the debtor moved to avoid 
the lien of Beneficial Oklahoma, Inc. under § 522(f)(1)(B). Beneficial Oklahoma objected 
on the ground that the items were not exempt under applicable law. The court sustained the 
objection, ruling that a debtor who files a voluntary bankruptcy petition must meet the 
requirements of both § 522(b) and § 522(f)(1)(B) in order to avoid a creditor's security 
interest. More to the point, the court held that "a literal reading of § 522(f)(1)(B) leads to 
the conclusion that in order to avoid a lien under this section, it is not enough that the 
property is deemed exempt by operation of Rule 4003(b) and Taylor. Debtor must be 
entitled to exempt the property under § 522(b) , and the property must fall within one or 
more of the categories described in § 522(f)(1)(B)(i), (ii), or (iii)." Id. at 237. The 
bankruptcy court in In re Franklin, 210 B.R. 560 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997), reached a similar 
conclusion under § 522(f)(1)(A), noting that "whether an exemption arises by default under 
§ 522(1) is not dispositive; the debtor must show a substantive entitlement to exemption 
under § 522(b)." See also Canelos v. Mignini (In re Canelos), 1997 212 B.R. 249 (Bankr. 
A- 32 
I 
D. Md. 1997) ("This Court holds that a creditor may contest the amount of an exemption 
for the fIrst time in defending against a motion to avoid lien, not to attack the exemption 
itself, which is inviolate, but to contest the amount of the exemption for the purpose of 
limiting the amount of the lien to be avoided, pursuant to Section 522(t). "). 
By contrast, in In re Mollon, 205 B.R. 321 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996), the court held 
that a creditor that had failed to challenge the debtor's claim of exemption under Rule 
4003(b) could not object to the debtor's attempt to avoid a judicial lien against such 
property on the ground that the exemption claim was improper. Similarly, in The Great 
Southern Co. v. Allard, 202 B.R. 938 (N.D. Ill. 1996), the court stated that a creditor that 
had failed to assert a challenge to the exempt status of the debtor's property in a timely 
manner could not avoid the "devastating effect" of Taylor by challenging avoidance of its 
judicial lien against such property based on the nonexempt status of the property. Finally, 
in In re Vasquez, 205 B.R. 136 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997)~ the creditor attempted to block the 
debtor's lien avoidance action on the basis that its claim was nondischargeable under § 
523(a)(17). However, because the creditor had not timely objected to the debtor's 
exemption claim in the property, the court found that it was too late to challenge the 
exemption in any form. Moreover, because debts falling within § 523(a)(17) are not among 
the types of nondischargeable debts from which exempt property is made liable under § 
522(c)(1), the court also concluded that the creditor's only recourse was to pursue an 
adversary proceeding to have its debt determined to be nondischargeable, but that regardless 
of the outcome in that action, the debtor's right under § 522(t)(1)(A) to avoid the judicial 
lien securing that debt was unaffected. Id. at 139. 
B. State Defined Limitations of Exemptions-herein of Moreland and § 522(c) 
In Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991), the Supreme Court ruled that the states 
carinot, by defIning exempt property in such a way as to specifIcally exclude property 
encumbered by certain liens, "achieve a similar exclusion from the Bankruptcy Code's lien 
avoidance provision [in § 522(t)]." Many people believed, at that juncture, that the Sixth 
Circuit's decision in In re Dixon, 885 F.2d 327 (6th Cir. 1989) was nO longer good 
authority. In Dixon, the court had ruled that under the Ohio homestead exemption statute-
which by its terms only applies in execution situations-a judicial lien could not be deemed 
to impair the debtor's exemption absent an attachment or other involuntary disposition of 
the property. However, in In re Moreland, 21 F.3d 102 (6th eir. 1994), the court surprised 
the bar, ruling that Dixon was still good law. SpecifIcally, the court held that although 
Owen reflected a policy against permitting the states to circumvent the. federal lien 
avoidance provisions, it did "not hold that the states may impose no limits on lien avoidance 
in the context of impaired exemptions." The court in Moreland proceeded to distinguish the 
Florida law under scrutiny in Owen from Ohio's homestead exemption law, observing that 
operation of the Florida laws at issue would have permanently deprived the debtor of his 
homestead exemption. In contrast, the Ohio statute only deferred the time when and 
circumstances under which the exemption could be claimed. In light of this distinction, the 
court reasoned (without ever quite explaining its logic) that its earlier holding in Dixon, was 
still good authority. On the facts of Moreland, because no judicial sale was pending at the 
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time of the bankruptcy filing, the court ruled that there was simply no exemption to be 
impaired by the creditor's judicial lien, and, therefore, reversed the orders of the 
bankruptcy and district courts granting the debtor's motion to avoid the defendant's judicial ~ 
lien against her residence. ;; 
In a lengthy and typically well-reasoned decision, Judge Lee demonstrated why, in 
fact, the Ohio statute should properly be construed as making the exemption available on the ~ 
date of bankruptcy, and not the later date' of execution. In re Lynch, 187 B.R. 536, 548 
(E.D. Ky. 1995). Lynch also articulates why the Ohio exemption statute does not, as the 
court contended in Moreland, merely postpone a debtor's right to exemptions, and why, 
even if so interpreted, the statute is no less pernicious than the Florida statute struck down 
in Owen. Id. at 49. Moreland has been further cast into doubt by the 1994 amendments to 
§ 522(f)(2) which set out a mathematical formula for determining the extent to which a lien 
impairs an exemption for purposes of § 522(f)(1). By focusing on the dollar amount of the 
exemption rather than the more ambiguous question of whether the property is itself 
exempt, the new definition of impairment negates the view that a judicial lien on property 
cannot impair an exemption where applicable state law only provides for an exemption 
when and if the property is the subject of an involuntary execution. New § 522(f)(2) 
underscores the point made in Owen that while state law identifies and quantifies the 
property the debtor may exempt in opt-out jurisdictions, the Code neither adopts nor is 
bound by any built-in limitations which the state imposes on the right to the exemption. See 
In re Davis, 105 F.3d 1017, 1022-23 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Miller, 198 B.R. 500 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio 1996) (holding, based on the legislative history to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1994, that it is evident that Moreland and Dixon were contrary to Congress' intent); In re 
Jakubowski, 198 B.R. 262 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996) (holding that Moreland and Dixon 
habve been overruled by the 1994 Amendments). In effect, regardless of state law, the lien 
survives only if, at the time of the bankruptcy filing,the debtor's property has sufficient 
value to satisfy all liens on the property, including the judicial lien, and, at the same time, 
to give effect to the full value of the debtor's exemption in the property.1l2 But see In re 
Colston, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1647 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997) (ruling that: "A change in the 
method of calculating impairment under § 522(f) does not affect the state law issue, and thus 
Dixon and Moreland still govern"). 
One might predict, therefore, that, when next presented with the issue, the Sixth 
Circuit will [mally see its way clear to overrule Dixon and Moreland. Disturbingly, 
however, occasional decisions from courts in other circuits giving effect to the content of 
state exemption law continue to creep up. A perfect example is the bankruptcy court's 
decision in In re Fracasso, 210 B.R. 221 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997). In this case, the debtor 
112 But see Federal Dep. Ins. Corp. v. Finn (In re Finn), 211 B.R. 780 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1997) (holding 
that underwater liens are not necessarily avoided in their entirety, but rather, only that portion of the lien that 
exceeds a debtor's equity in the property, taking into account nonjudiocial liens and the debtor's exemptions, 
may be avoided). 
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claimed a homestead exemption for the equity in her residence. The amount of that equity 
exceeded the sum of unsecured claims against her. Under Massachusetts's law, a 
homestead exemption is granted in the amount of $100,000, but acquisition of the 
homestead status requires the filing of a declaration with the county Registry of Deeds, and 
the statute makes the exemption ineffective against debts contracted prior to the recording of 
this declaration. As it happened, in this case, all of the debtor's debts were incurred prior 
to the recording of her declaration of homestead. Thus, the trustee objected to the asserted 
exemption, claiming that the debtor's residence was subject to administration. The debtor 
contended that, pursuant to § 522(c), state created exceptions to state exemptions are 
prohibited. Parting with prior district precedent (In re Boucher, 203 B.R. 10 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1996), the court held that neither Owen nor § 522(c) restrict the right of the state, "as 
reserved to the state by Congress, to craft its Homestead Statute with an exception for 
prehomestead debts." It should be noted, however, that in In re Whalen-Griffen, 206 B.R. 
277 (D. Mass. 1997), the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts upheld the reasoning in 
Boucher, concluding t.~at exempt property, whether exempted under state or federal law, 
can only be liable for the types of debt set forth on § 522(c). That is, while a state can 
place limits on the dollar amount of an exemption, it can no more define the exemption with 
reference to obligations not identified in § 522(c) than it can exclude certain obligations 
from the exemption for purposes of § 522(f)(1). This is consistent with the Supreme 
Court's finding in Owen that there is no basis for treating the state and federal exemptions 
differently, and, if it is a correct interpretation of Owen, it also suggests that Moreland 
cannot stand. 
C. Section 522(f) (3) 
At the same time that Congress clarified the confusion over whether a lien impairs 
an exemption, by providing a statutory definition in § 522(f)(2), it also adopted § 522(f)(3), 
which represents the worst sort of special interest legislation. To make matters worse, it is 
couched in convoluted and obscure language that renders its application an exercise in pure 
guesswork. Section 522(f)(3) purports to place a $5,000 cap on the debtor's ability to avoid 
the fixing of a lien that constitutes a nonpurchase money, nonpossessory security interest in 
the debtor's tools of the trade, professional books, farm animals or crops. This limitation is 
only applicable when the requirements of both subparts (f)(3)(A) and (f)(3)(B) are met. To 
further confuse the issue, both of those subparts contain two alternatives, satisfaction of 
either of which will render that subpart applicable to a particular debtor. Subpart (A) 
requires that state law must either (1) permit the voluntary waiver of the right to claim 
federal exemptions; or (2) prohibit a debtor from claiming those exemptions. While (2) 
apparently is intended to refer top states that have adopted opt-out legislation, it is not at all 
clear what (1) pertains to since no state permits a debtors to waive the § 522(d) exemptions 
and, in any event, such a waiver would be unenforceable under § 522(e). Presumably, then 
it can only be read to refer to circumstances where the state has not opted out and the debtor 
has elected her state exemptions. See In re Zimmel, 185 B.R. 786 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995). 
One can hardly imagine, however, a more awkward way to express the idea. Subpart (B) 
applies where state law either (1) permits the debtor to claim an unlimited exemption, 
except to the extent that the debtor has permitted the fixing of a consensual lien on any 
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property; or (2) prohibits avoidance of a consensual lien on property. What does this 
mean?? 
In one of the few reported decisions to address § 522(f)(3), In re Ehlen, 202 B.R. 
742 (Bankr. D. Wis. 1996), aff'd, 207 B.R. 179 (D. Wis. 1997), the debtors sought to 
avoid a lien against business and farm property in which they each claimed a $7,500 tools of 
the trade exemption under state law. Under the formula in § 522(f)(2), it was clear that the 
lien impaired to the full extent of the exemption, or $15,000. The creditor objected, 
however, on the ground that although its lien was nonpurchase money and nonpossessory, § 
·522(f)(3) limited the debtors from avoiding more than $10,000 of that lien. Despairing of 
attaching any sane meaning to the language of the statute, the court looked to the 
circumstances surrounding enactment of § 522(f)(3) in an effort to divine congressional 
intent. This inquiry revealed that many credit industry representatives were concerned by 
the Supreme Court's decision in Owen, which overruled prior Fifth Circuit precedent that 
had recognized state-created limitations on the ability of Texas and Louisiana debtors to 
avoid liens against small business and agricultural collateral. The first portion of subpart 
(B) was apparently aimed at Louisiana, which grants an unlimited exemption for debtors' 
tools of the trade, but excepts from that exemption property upon which the debtor has 
granted a consensual lien. The second portion of subpart (B) was apparently intended for 
the benefit of Texas lenders because Texas' $60,000 per family personal property 
exemption specifically prohibits avoidance of any lien against such property whether created 
by operation of law or a valid security interest in the property. In Ehlen, the court reasoned 
that the applicable Wisconsin statute bore no similarity to either the Texas or Louisiana 
statutes, and, therefore, refused to apply § 522(f)(3). 
Assuming that subparagraphs (A) and (B) are both satisfied, and the collateral at 
issue consists of implements, professional books, tools of the trade, farm animals or crops, 
§ 522(f)(3) provides that the debtor may not avoid a consensual lien, even though 
determined to impair an exemption, "to the extent that the value of such collateral exceeds 
$5,000." The provision is nearly unintelligible and, not surprisingly therefore, replete with 
interpretive uncertainty. To begin with, does the $5,000 threshold apply to each item of 
qualifying collateral, each category of qualifying collateral, or all qualified collateral? Since 
the last sentence in subsection (f)(3) connects the various kinds of collateral with the 
inclusive conjunction "and," the roost rational conclusion is that the collateral is bundled for 
valuation purposes, as long as all such property is subject to the same security interest. 
However, early in the same paragraph a verbal distinction is drawn between the 
trade/professional collateral, on the one hand, and the farm collateral, on the other. 
Therefore, one might also reasonable infer that they are to be separated for valuation 
purposes so that the debtor can protect up to $5,000 in each type of collateral, even if all of 
the collateral is subject to a single creditor's nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security 
interest. The issue is not as hypothetical as it might seem since although most nonfarmers 
are unlikely to both own and encumber both types of collateral, just the opposite is true for 
most farm borrowers. Further complicating the picture is the fact that the rationale for 
including farm collateral in the first place is unclear. 
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Doubtless, Congress' aim in restricting application of subsection (f)(3) to property 
with a value in excess of a specified amount was to ensure that a minimum amount of 
collateral was "freed up" for the debtor's fresh start, regardless of this restriction on lien 
avoidance. The problem is that by focusing on the dollar value of the collateral, rather than 
the amount of the liens or the exemptions, applying section 522(f) now requires controlling 
for multiple, inconsistent values, an approach calculated to create havoc in the courts. 
Consider, for example, a debtor who has granted a nonpossessory, nonpurchase money 
security interest in her exempt professional books, valued at $7,500. Assume th~t at filing 
the debt is $11,000 and that applicable state law provides a tools of the trade exemption for 
$7,500. It is apparent that under the formula in subsection (f)(2), the entire lien impairs. 
and, therefore, can be avoided subject to the limitation in subsection (3). Subsection (3), in 
tum, preserves the lien to the extent that value of the property exceeds $5,000. But what 
does that mean? 
Perhaps the most extreme view would be that since the value of the property exceeds 
$5,000, the requirement in subsection (3) is met and the entire lien survives. This 
construction hardly seems consistent with the articulated reason behind the limitation, but it 
is not entirely fanciful given the language employed. Another view might be that only 
$6,000 of the lien can be avoided, because that is the amount of the debt that exceeds the 
$5,000 threshold, but that conclusion ignores the fact that the value of the property not the 
amount of the claim controls. A somewhat related approach would be to permit avoidance 
only to the extent of $5,000, leaving $6,000 rather than $5,000 of the lien intact. Of 
course, in addition to having done nothing for the debtor, this technique relates the $5,000 
to something other than the value of the property. A more sensible, but not immediately 
obvious, interpretation is that since the value of the property exceeds $5,000 by $2,500, the 
lien is only avoidable to the extent of $7,500, which is to say that $2,500 of the impairing 
lien is preserved. Thus, at least on these facts, the debtor exits bankruptcy with $5,000 of 
equity in the exempt property, which seems to be consistent with the compromise Congress 
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STATE OPTION1 HOMESTEAD PERSONAL PROPERTY2 VEHICLE3 WAGES" PENSIONs 
FED. §522d 15,000 8,400(S)\l,OOO(g)6 2,400 F yes 
Ala. S 5,000 3,OOO(g) \ ?? F no 
"necc."(s) 
Alask un- 54,000 4,OOO(s) 3,000 350 / yes 
clear wk 
Ariz. S 100,000 4,OOO(g) \ 1,5007 F yes 
3,OOO(s) 
Ark. S 8008 500 (g) \ \ 800 (8) 9 1,200 25 / yes 
wk 
Cal. SID 50,000 11 "necc. " (g) 12 \ 1,900 F yes 
5,000 (s) 
15,000 necc. (g)\l,800(s) 2,400 no yes 
Colo. S 30,000 3,800(s) 1,000 F yes 
Conn. B 75,000 "necc."(s) 1,500 F yes 
I---
Del. S -0- 5,OOO(g) ?? 85% no 
D.C. B -0- 13 700 (g) 14 500 F yes 
Fla. S UnlimitedlS l,OOO(g) 1,000 100% yes 
Ga. S 5,000 3,900(g) 
500 (s) 16 \ 
1,000 F yes 1i 
Haw. B 20,000 18 "necc. " (g) \ 1,000 F yes 19 I l,OOO(s) 
Idaho S 50,00020 4,OOO(g) \ 1,500 F yes:1 
l,850(s) 
Ill. S 7,500 "necc." (g)22 1,200 l' yes 
Ind. S 7,500 4,100(S)23 ?? no yes 
Iowa S Unlimited 4,OOO(s) 5,000 F yes 
Kan. S Unlimited "necc. (g) \ 20,000 F yes 
l,OOO(s) 
Ky. S 5,00024 $4,OOO(g) 2,500 F yes I 
La. S 15,000 5,OOO(g) -O- F yes 
M 15 e. S 12,50026 6,OOO(s) 2,500 F yes 
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MOTOR PRIVATE 
STATE OPTION HOMESTEAD PERSONAL PROPERTY VEHICLE WAGES PENSION 
Md. S 5,500 3,00'0 (g) \ 500 (5) ?? F yes 
Mass B 100,00027 3,775(g) \ 725 (5) 700 125. / yes 
wk 
Mich. B 3,500 l,OOO(g) \1000(5) -O- F yes 
Minn. B 200,00028 4,500(g)29 2,00030 F yes 
Miss. S 75,00031 10,000 ?? F yes I 
Mo. S 8,000 l,OOO(g)\ 1,000 F yes 
1,750(5)32 
Mont. S 40,000 4,500(5) 1,200 F yes33 
Neb. S 10,000 l,500(g)34 -0- 100%-35 yes 
Nev. S 125,000 4,500(g) 1,000 F no 
N.H. S 30,000 4,300(g)\900(s) 4,000 F no 
N.J. B -0- 2,OOO(g) -0- no no 
~.M. B 30,00036 500(g)\2,500(s)TI 4,000 F yes 
5,OOO(g) 2,400 F N.Y. S 10,000 yes 
N.C. S 10,000 3,500 (g) 38 1,50039 100%-40 no 
N.D. S 80,00041 2,500 (g)42 1,200 no yes 
Ohio S 5,000 2,000(5) 1,000 F yes I 
Okla. S 5,00043 4,OOO(g) 3,000 F yes 
Or. S 25,00044 6,800(g)\l,OOO(s) 1,700 no yes 
Pa. B -0- "necc." (g)\400(s) -0- 100%-45 yes 
P.R. B 1,500 650(g)\"necc."(s) -0- no no 
R.I. B -0- l,300(g)\100(s) -0- no no 
S.C. S 5,000 2,500(g)\500(S)~ 1,200 100%- no 
S.D. S unlimited 4,000 (g) 47 -O- F yes Ii 
Tenn. S 5,00048 4,000 (g) \misc. (s) ?? F yes 
I 












OPTION HOMESTEAD PERSONAL PROPERTY VEHICLE WAGES PENSION 
S 8,00052 "necc." (g) 
\1,500(s) 
1,500 F yes 
B 30,000 2,500(g)\misc. (s) 2,500 F· yes 
B 30,000 "necc." (g) -O- F no 
S 5,00053 5,000(g) \ 2,00054 F yes 
6,000(s) 
B 30,00055 3,700 (g). \ 2,500 F yes 
1,500(s) 
S 7,500 1,00O(g) \ 500(s) 1,200 F yes 
B 40,000 5,000(g) 1,200 F yes 
S 10,000 3,000(g)S6 2,000 F yes 
per occupant 
1. (S)tate or (B)oth 11 U.S.C. §522(d) or state's exemption scheme. 
2. The category "Personal Property" varies dramatically between the 
states. this chart represents the author's best effort to compare 
each state's treatment of exemptions in this area. For 
consistency, "Personal Property" includes typical household items 
appearing in several state schemes including: personal wearing 
apparel, family books, pictures, a sewing machine, military 
uniforms, and various quantities and varieties of livestock. Where 
a state provides an exemption in dollar amount only, or specifies 
that the exemption is (g) enerally applicable to these types of 
typical household items "(g)" appears. Where a state (s)pecifies 
what items are to be exempt "(s)" appears with the total dollar 
amount of (s)pecified items. 
3. Virtually all states provide exemptions for motor vehicles used 
as tools of the trade. In order to make this column more 
meaningful, the only reference is to non-tool of the trade vehicle 
exemptions. The"??" symbol indicates that the state does not 
provide a specific vehicle exemption, but it may be implied from 
the state's general personal property exemption. 
4. (F)ormula used to determine the amount of wages exempt. 
5. Virtually all states exempt pensions for public or civil 
service. The pension column therefore indicates only whether 
privately funded pensions are at all exempt. 
6. Federal Exemption Scheme provides for additional personal 
property exemptions up to $7,500 of un-used homestead. 
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7. Upon request the court may increase the exemption for injuries 
or disabilities. The exemption may also be increased to $550/wk 
where the debtor is the sole support of the household. 
8. If an Arizona debtor is "maimed or crippled" the motor vehicle 
exemption increases from $1,500 to $4,000. 
9. If married, an Arkansas debtor may increase the homestead, 
exemption from $800 to $1,250 plus $2,500 of land. 
10. California makes available two alternative sets of exemptions 
in bankruptcy cases. 
11. Amount depends on category of debtor -- $50K, $75K (family), or 
$100k ("poor" & over 55yrs; over 65; or disabled.) 
12. Debtor may exempt ordinary and necessary household items 
however proceeds from execution sale of items of extraordinary 
value are exempt in the amount determined by the court to be 
sufficient to purchase ordinary and necessary replacement. . 
13. Escrow deposits for residential condominiums are exempt in D.C. 
14. D.C. exempts $300 clothing per family me~er & $700(g). See 
D.C. Code Ann. §15-501,-503 and 29-1128. 
15. Floridians may exempt their homestead with no value limit. Up 
to 1\2 acre inside municipalities and 160 acres outside. 
16. No individual item (g) enerally exempted may exceed $400. 
Debtor may apply un-used homestead to personal property. 
17. Georgia private pensions are only exempt to the extent 
necessary for debtor'"s and dependents' support. 
18. Hawaii debtors over 60 yrs or disabled may increase homestead 
exemption from $20,000 to $60,000. 
19. Contributions made more than 3 years prior to bankruptcy are 
exempt in Hawaii. 
20. Includes unimproved lots upon which homestead is to be built. 
21. Up to $350/mo in annuity payments are exempt. 
22. Illinois Debtors may exempt the certificate of title to motor 
and sail boats over 12 feet in length. 
23. P"rovided that the total homestead and personal property 
exemption does not exceed $10,000. 
A-44 
24. Kentucky debtors may exempt $1,000 for any personal or real 
property. The $4,000 listed under "Personal Property" includes 
this $1,000 instead of counting it under homestead. 
25.0n consumer credit sales or supervised loans, if the amount 
financed is $2,000 or less and the creditor has possession of the 
collateral, the consumer and any surety are not liable for any 
deficiency. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 9-A, § 5-103. 
26. Maine debtors over 60 yrs. or disabled may exempt $60,000 for 
homestead. 
27.Massachusetts debtors 65yrs or disabled may increase homestead 
exemption to $150,000. Also $200/mo. rent is exempt in lieu of 
homestead exemption. 
28. $500,000 if agricultural. Minn. Stat. Ann. §510.01 & .02 and 
550.37(12). 
29.Minnesota's personal property exemption is indexed to the 
implicit price deflator for G.N.P. as compiled by The Dept. of 
Commerce. Minn. Stat. Ann. §550.37(4a). 
30. Disabled Minnesota-debtors may exempt a motor vehicle valued up 
to $32,000 if it has been modified at a cost of at least $1,500 to 
accommodate a physical disability. 
31. Mississippi debtors over 60 yrs. may also 
32. Plus $250 additional for each unmarried dependent child under 
18. 
33.Amounts in excess of $350/mo. are subject to garnishment unless 
a court finds them necessary for support. 
34. Debtors without a homestead may exempt $2,500. 
35. Heads of household may exempt 100% wages. Others may exempt 
wages under a formula. 
36. Jointly owned properties entitles each owner to $30,000 
exemption. 
37. Plus additional $2,000 for debtors without a homestead. 
38. Debtor may exempt an additional sum not to exceed $3,000 for 
dependents at a rate of $750 per dependent. 
39. Except if purchased within 90 days of bankruptcy. 
40. Up to 10-0% is necessary to support family. 
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41. Debtors without homesteads in North Dakota may exempt $7,500. 
42. Heads of household may exempt $5,000(g) 
43. Outside a municipality, there is no dollar limit but the 
homestead may not exceed 160 acres. 
44. $33,00 if two debtors are members of same household. 
45. If in hands of employer. 
46. Plus $1,000 for de~tors without a homestead. 
47. South Dakota offe~s debtors three choices: $4,000 (g) -OR-
$1,250 in farming tools, $200 in books &musical instruments, $200 
in household furnishings, various livestock and one year's feed for 
them. Debtor's who are not heads of households may exempt $2,000. 
48. Joint Debtors may exempt $7,500 in a shared home in Tennessee. 
49. In Texas, rio mortgage, trust deed, or other lien on the 
homestead shall ever be valid except for a debt described in Tex. 
Const.· art. 16 §50 which essentially prohibits liens against 
homesteads foranythir:g other than purchase-money-related-liens 
i.e. home improvements, re-finance, partition of entirety. It has 
come to this autho:::-' s at.tention that Texas is currently 
contemplating a constitutional amendment to increase the scope of 
authorized liens against homesteaded property in that state. 
50. $60,000(g) for a family. 
51. A motor vehicle may be exempted as part of the overall $30,000 
personal property exemption for each adult family member. 
52. In ptah the homestead exemption is increased by $2,000 for a 
spouse and $500 for each other dependent. 
53. In Virginia, $5,000 for any property is exempt olus $500 for 
each dependent. Virginia also provides that profits derived from 
the homestead property are exempt subject to certain liens. 
54. Up to $2,000 of Virginia's $5,000(g) exemption may be for a 
motor vehicle unless used as a tool of the trade. 
55. or the value of the homestead, whichever is less. 
56. No item is exempt from purchase money debt. 
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APPENDIX n 
ALASKA HOUSE BILL 101 
An act relating to certain irrevocable transfers in trust, to the jurisdiction governing a 
trust, to challenges to trusts or property transfers in trust, to the validity of trust 
interests, and to transfers of .certain trust interests 




HOUSE BILL NO. 101 
IN THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 
TWENTIETH LEGISLATURE - FIRST SESSION 
BY REPRESENTATIVES VEZEY, Bunde 
Introduced: 1131197 
Referred: Labor and Commerce 
A BILL 
FOR AN ACT ENTITLED 
"An Act relating to certain irrevocable transfers in trust. to the jurisdiction I:!overninl:! a trust. to 
challenges to "trusts or property transfers in trust. to the validity of trust interests. and to transfers of 
certain trust interests; and providing for an effective date." 
BE IT ENACTED BY THE STATE OF ALASKA: 
* Section 1. AS 13 .12.205 (2) is amended to read: 
(2) property transferred in any of the following forms by the decedent during marriage: 
(A) an irrevocable transfer. including an irrevocable transfer in trust with a transfer restriction 
under AS 3~.40.110 (a). in which the decedent retained the right to the possession or enjoyment of, or 
to the income from, the property, if and to the extent the decedent's right terminated at or continued 
beyond the decedent's death; the amount included is the value of the fraction of the property to which the 
decedent's right related. to the extent the fraction of the property passed outside probate to or for the 
benefit of a person other than the decedent's estate or surviving spouse; 
(B) a transfer in which the decedent created a power over the income or property, exercisable by the 
decedent alone or in conjunction with another person, or exercisable by a nonadverse party, to or for the 
benefit of the decedent,. the decedent's creditors, the decedent's estate, or creditors of the decedent's 
estate; the amount included with respect to a power over property is the value of the property subject to 
the power, and the amount included with respect to a power over income is the value of the property that 
produces or produced the income, to the extent the power in either case was exercisable at the decedent's 
death to or for the benefit of a person other than the decedent's surviving spouse or to the extent the 
property passed at the decedent's death, by exercise, release, lapse, default,. or otherwise, to or for the 
benefit of a person other than the decedent's estate or surviving spouse; if the power is a power over both 
income and property and the preceding provision defining the amount included produces different 
amounts, the amount included is the greater amount; and 
.. Sec. 2. AS 13.36.035 (a) is amended to read: 
(a) The court has exclush'e jurisdiction of proceedings initiated by interested parties concerning the 
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(a) The court has exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings initiated by interested parties concerning the 
internal affairs of trusts, including trusts covered bv (cl of this section. Except as provided in (cl and 
(d) of this section, proceedings that [. PROCEEDINGS WHICH] may be maintained under this section 
are those concerning the administration and distribution of trusts, the declaration of rights~ and the 
determination of other matters involving trustees and beneficiaries oftrusts. These include [, BUT ARE 
NOT LIMITED TO,] proceedings to 
(l) appoint or remove a trustee; 
(2) review trustees' fees and to review and settle interim or final accounts; 
(3) ascertain beneficiaries, determine any question arising in the administration or distribution of any 
trust including questions of construction of trust instruments, instruct trustees, and determine the 
existence or nonexistence of any immunity, power, privilege, dutys or right; and 
(4) release registration of a trust. 
* Sec. 3. AS 13.36.035 is amended by adding new subsections to read: 
(c) A provision that the laws of this state govern the validity, construction, and administration of the 
trust and that the trust is subject to the jurisdiction of this state is valid, effective, and conclusive for the 
trust if 
(1) some or all of the trust assets are deposited in this state and are being administered by a qualified 
person; in this paragraph, "deposited in this state" includes being held in a checking account, time 
deposit, certificate of deposit, brokerage account, trust company fiduciary account, or other similar 
account or deposit that is located in this state; 
(2) a trustee is a qualified person who is designated as a trustee under the governing instrument or by a· 
court having jurisdiction over the trust; 
(3) the powers of the trustee identified under (2) of this subsection include or are limited to 
(A) maintaining records for the trust on an exclusive basis or a nonexclusive basis; and 
(B) preparing or arranging for the preparation of, on an exclusive basis or a nonexclusive basis, an 
income tax return that must be filed by the trust; and 
(4) part or all of the administration occurs in this state, including physically maintaining trust records in 
this state. 
(d) The validity, construction, and administration of a trust with ~ state jurisdiction provision are 
determined by the laws of this state, including the 
(1) capacity of the settlor; 
(2) powers, obligations, liabilities, and rights ofthe trustees and the appointment and removal of the 
trustees; and 
(3) existence and extent of powers, conferred or retained, including a trustee's discretionary powers, the 
powers retained by a beneficiary of the trust, and the validity ofthe exercise of a power. 
(e) In (d) ofthis section, "settlor" means a person \\iho transfers property in trust; "settlor" includes a 
person who furnishes the property transferred to a trust even if the trust is created by another person. 
* Sec. ·t AS 13.36.045 (a) is amended to read: 
(a) The court will not, over the objection of a party_ entertain proceedings under AS 13.36.035 involving 
a trust registered or having its principal place of administration in another state. unless 
A- 50 
a trust registered or having its principal place of administration in another state, unless 
(I) all appropriate parties could not be bound by litigation in the courts of the state where the trust is 
registered or has its principal place of administration; [OR] 
(2) the interests of justice othemise would serioUsly be impaired; or 
(3) the trust satisfies AS 13.36.035 (c). 
• Sec. 5. AS 13.36 is amended by adding new sections to read: . 
Sec. 13.36.310. Challenges to trusts. Except as provided in AS 34.40.110, a trust that is covered by AS 
13.36.035 (c) or that is othernise governed by the laws of this state, or a property transfer to a trust that 
is covered by AS 13.36.035 (c) or that is otheI'\\ise governed by the laws of this state, is not void, 
voidable, liable to be set aside, defective in any fashion, or questionable as to the settlor's capacity, on 
the grounds that the trust or transfer avoids or defeats a right, claim, or iriterest conferred by law on a 
person by reason of a personal or business relationship \\ith the settlor or by way of a marital or similar 
right. In this section, "settlor" means a person who transfers property in trust; "settlor" includes a person 
who furnishes the property transferred to a trust even if the trust is created by another person. 
Sec. 13.36.390. Definitions. In AS 13.36. 
(1) "qualified 1>'''<;on'' means 
(A) an individt::~ who, except for brief intervals, military service, attendance at an educational or 
training institutIon, or for absences for good cause sho\\n, resides in this state, whose true and 
permanent home is in this state, who does not have a present intention of moving from this state. and 
who has the intention of returning to this state when away; 
(B) a trust company that is organized under AS 06.25 and that has its principal place of business in this 
state; or 
(C) a bank that is organized underAS 06.05. or a national banking ass0ciation that is organized under 12 
U.S.C. 21 - 216d, if the bank or national banking association possesses and exercises trust powers and 
has its principal place of business in this state; 
(2) "state jurisdiction provision" means a provision that the laws of this state govern the validity, 
construction, and administration of a trust and that the trust is subject to the jurisdiction of this state. 
• Sec. 6. AS 34.27.050 (a) is amended to read: 
(a) A nonvested property interest is invalid unless 
(I) when the interest is created, it is certain to vest or terminate no later than 21 years after the death of 
an individual then alive; [OR] . 
(2) the interest either vests or terminates within 90 years after its creation; or 
(3) the interest is in a trust and all or part of the income or principal of the trust mav be 
distributed, in the discretion of the trustee, to a person who is living when the trust is created. 
• Sec. 7. AS 34.40.010 is amended to read: 
Sec. 34.40.010. Invalidity generally. Except as provided in AS 34.40.110 , a [A] conveyance or 
assienment. in \\Titine or othem·ise. of an estate or interest in land. or in eoods. or thinl!s in action. or of 
rents or pro·fits issuing from them or a charge upon land. goods, or· things-in action, or ~pon the rents or 
profits from them. made with the intent to hinder, delay. or defraud creditors or other persons of their 
lawful suits. damages, forfeitures. debts. or demands. or a bond or other evidence of debt gi\"en. action 
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lawful suits, damages, forfeitures, debts, or demands, or a bond or other evidence of debt given, action . 
commenced, decree or judgment suffered, with the like intent, as against the persons so hindered, 
delayed, or defrauded is void. * Sec. 8. AS 34.40.110 is repealed and reenacted to read: 
Sec. 34.40.110. Restricting transfers of trust interests. (a) A person who in writing transfers property 
in trust may provide that the interest of a beneficiary of the trust may not be either volu,ntarily or 
involuntarily transferred before payment or delivery of the interest to the beneficiary by the trustee. In 
this subsection, 
(1) "property" includes real property, personal property, and interests in real or personal property; 
(2) "transfer" means any form of transfer, including deed, conveyance, or assignment. 
(b) If a trust contains a transfer restriction allowed under (a) of this section, the transfer restriction 
prevents a creditor existing when the trust is created, a person who subsequently becomes a creditor, or 
another person from satisfying a claim out of the beneficiary's interest in the trust, unless the 
(1) transfer ,vas intended in whole or in part to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or other persons under 
AS 34.40.010 ; 
(2) trust provides that the settlor may revoke or terminate all or part of the trust without the consent of a 
person who has a substantial beneficial interest in the trust and the interest would be adversely affected 
by the exercise of the power held by the settlor to revoke or terminate all or part of the trust; in this 
paragraph, "revoke or terminate" does not include a power to veto a distribution from the trust, a 
testamentary special power of appointment or similar power, or the right to receive a distribution of 
income, corpus, or both in the discretion of a person, including a trustee, other than the settlor; 
(3) trust requires that all or a part of the trust's income or principal, or both, must be distributed to the 
settlor; or 
(4) at the time of the transfer, the settlor is in default by 30 or more days of making a payment due under 
a support judgment or order for a child of the settlor. 
(c) The satisfaction ofa claim under (b)(l) - (4) of this section is limited to that part ofthe trust to which 
(b)(l) - (4) of this section applies. 
(d) Not, .. ithstanding a provision in the trust instrument to the contrary, when a distribution is declared by 
and payable from a trust, the child support enforcement agency established under AS 25.27 may enforce 
the support obligations of a beneficiary, including a trust settlor who is a beneficiary, of the trust against 
the portion of the distribution to which the beneficiary is entitled. 
(e) In this section, "settlor" means a person who transfers real property, personal prope:.y, or an interest 
in real or personal property, in trust. 
* Sec. 9. This Act does not apply to a trust unless the trust is created on or after the effective date of this 
Act. 
* Sec. 10. This Act takes effect immediately under AS 01.10.070 (c). 
HBOIOI 
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IN THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 
TWENTIETH LEGISLATURE - FIRST SESSION 
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TWENTIETH LEGISLATURE - FIRST SESSION 
BY THE HOUSE LABOR AND COMMERCE COMMIITEE 
d I Offered: 2/12/97 
Referred: Rules 
Sponsor(s): REPRESENTATIVES VEZEY, Bunde, Therriault 
A BILL 
FOR AN ACT ENTITLED 
n An Act relating to certain irrevocable transfers in trust, to the jurisdiction governing a trust, to 
challenges to trusts or property transfers in trust, to the validity of trust interests. and to transfers of 
certain trust interests; and providing for an effective date." 
BE IT ENACTED BY THE STATE OF ALASKA: 
* Section 1. AS 13 .12.205 (2) is amended to read: 
(2) property transferred in any of the follo\\'ing forms by the decedent during marriage: 
(A) an irrevocable transfer. including an irrevocable transfer in trust with a transfer restriction 
under AS 34.40.110 (a), in which the decedent retained the right to the possession or enjoyment of. or 
to the income from, the property, if and to the extent the decedent's right terminated at or continued 
beyond the decedent's death; the amount included is the value of the fraction of the property to which the 
decedent's right related, to the extent the fraction of the property passed outside probate to or for the 
benefit of a person other than the decedent's estate or surviving spouse; 
(B) a transfer in which the decedent created a power over the income or property, exercisable by the 
decedent alone or in conjunction with another person, or exercisable by a nonadverse party, to or for the 
-benefit of the decedent, the decedent's creditors. the decedent's estate. or creditors of the decedent's 
estate; the amount included \\ith respect to a po\ver over property is the value of the property subject to 
the power~ and the amount included \\ith respect to a power over income is the value of the property that 
produces or produced the income, to the extent the power in either case \vas exercisable at the decedent's 
death to or for the benefit of a person other than the decedent's surviving spouse or to the extent the 
property passed at the decedent's death, by exercise, release, lapse, default, or othemise, to or for the 
benefit of a person other than the decedent's estate.or surviving spouse; if the power is a power over both 
income and property and the preceding provision defining the amount included produces different 
amounts, the amount included is the greater amount; and 
* Sec. 2. AS 13.36.035 (a) is amended to read: 
(a) The court has exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings initiated by interested parties concerning the 
internal affairs of trusts. including trusts covered b\' (c) of this section. Except as provided in (cl and 
(d) of this section. proceedings that [. PROCEEDINGS WHICH] may be maintained under this .. section 
are those concerning the administration and distribution of trusts, the declaration ofrightss and the 
determination of other matters involving trustees and beneficiaries of trusts. These include [, BUT ARE 
NOT LIMITED TO,] proceedings to 
(l) appoint or remove a trustee; 
(2) review trustees' fees and to review and settle interim or final accounts; 
(3) ascertain beneficiaries, determine any question arising in the administration or distribution of any 
trust including questions of construction of trust instruments. instruct trustees. and determine the 
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trust including questions of construction of trust instruments, instruct trustees, and detennine the 
existence or nonexistence of any immunity, power, privilege, duty~ or right; and 
(4) release registration ofa trust. 
'" Sec. 3. AS t 3.36.035 is amended by adding new subsections to read: 
(c) A provision that the laws of this state govern the validity, construction, and administration of the 
trust and that the trust is subject to the jurisdiction of this state is valid, effective, and conclusive for the 
trust if 
(1) some or all of the trust assets are deposited in this state and are being administered by a qualified 
person; in this paragraph, "deposited in this state" includes being held in a checking account, time 
deposit, certificate of deposit, brokerage account, trust company fiduciary account, or other similar 
account or deposit that is located in this state; 
(2) a trustee is a qualified person who is designated as a tmstee under the governing instrument or by a 
court having jurisdiction over the trust; 
(3) the powers of the trustee identified under (2) of this subsection include or are limited to 
(A) maintaining records for the trust on an exclusive basis or a nonexclusive basis; and 
(B) preparing or arranging for the preparation of, on an exclusive basis or a nonexclusive basis, an 
income tax return that must be filed by the trust; and 
(4) part or all ofthe administration occurs in this state, including physically maintaining trust records in 
this state. 
(d) The validity, construction, and administration of a trust with a state jurisdiction provision are 
determined by the laws of this state, including the 
(1) capacity of the settlor; 
(2) powers, obligations, liabilities, and rights of the trustees and the appointment and removal of the 
trustees; and 
(3) existence and extent of powers, conferred or retained, including a trustee's discretionary powers. the 
powers retained by a beneficiary of the trust, and the validity of the exercise of a power. 
(e) In (d) of this section, "settlor" means a person who transfers property in trust; "settlor" includes a 
person who furnishes the property transferred to a trust even if the trust is created by another person. 
'" Sec. 4. AS 13.36.045 (a) is amended to read: 
(a) The court will not, over the objection of a party, entertain proceedings under AS t 3.36.035 invoh'ing 
a trust registered or having its principal place of administration in another state, unless 
(1) all appropriate parties could not be bound by litigation in the courts of the state where the trust is 
registered or has its principal place of administration; [OR] 
(2) the interests of justice othemise would seriously be impaired; or 
(3) the trust satisfies AS 13.36.035 (c). 
'" Sec: 5. AS t 3.36 is amended by adding new sections to read: 
Sec. 13.36.310. Challenges to trusts. Except as provided in AS 34.40.110 . a trust that is covered by AS 
13.36.035 (c) or that is otherwise governed by the laws of this state. or a property transfer to a trust that 
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13.36.035 (c) or that is otherwise governed by the laws of this state, or a property transfer to a trust that 
is covered by AS 13.36.035 (c) or that is othernise governed by the laws of this state, is not void, 
voidable, liable to be set aside, defective in any fashion, or questionable as to the settlor's capacity, on 
the grounds that the trust or transfer avoids or defeats a right, claim, or interest conferred by law on a 
person by reason of a personal or business relationship with the settlor or by way of a marital or similar 
right. In this section, "settlor" means a person \vho transfers property in trust; "settlor" includes a person 
who furnishes the property transferred to a trust even if the trust is created by another person. 
Sec. 13.36.390. Definitions. In AS 13.36. 
(1) "qualified person" means 
(A) an individual who, except for brief intervals, military service, attendance at an educational or 
training institution, or for absences for good cause sho\\-TI, resides in this state, whose true and 
permanent home is in this state, who does not have a present intention of moving from this state, and 
who has the intention of returning to this state when away; 
(B) a trust company that is organized under AS 06.25 and that has its principal place of business in this 
state; or 
(C) a bank that is organized under AS 06.05. or a national banking association that is organized under 12 
U .S.c. 21 - 216d, if the bank or national banking association possesses and exercises trust powers and 
has its principal place of business in this state; 
(2) "state jurisdiction provision" means a provision that the laws of this state govern the validity, 
construction, and administration of a trust and that the trust is subject to the jurisdiction of this state. 
* Sec. 6. AS 34.27.050 (a) is amended to read: 
(a) A nonvested property interest is invalid unless 
(1) when the interest is created, it is certain to vest or terminate no later than 21 years after the death of 
an individual then alive; [OR] 
(2) the interest either vests or terminates \\ithin 90 years after its creation; or 
(3) the interest is in a trust and all or part of the income or principal of the trust may be 
distributed, in the discretion of the trustee, to a person who is living when the trust is created. 
* Sec.". AS 34.40.010 is amended to read: 
Sec. 34.40.010. Invalidity generally. Except as provided in AS 34.40.110, a [A] cOI.\·eyance or 
assignment, in writing or otherwise, of an estate or interest in land, or in goods, or things in action, or of 
rents or profits issuing from them or a charge upon land, goods, or things in action, or upon the rents or 
profits from them, made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or other persons of their 
la\\-ful suits, damages, forfeitures, debts, or demands, or a bond or other evidence of debt given, action 
commenced, decree or judgment suffered, \\-ith the like intent, as against the persons so hindered, 
delayed, or defrauded is void. * Sec. 8. AS 34.40.110 is repealed and reenacted to read: 
Sec. 34.40.110. Restricting transfers of trust interests. (a) A person who in \\Titing transfers property 
in trust may provide that the interest of a beneficiary of the trust may not be either voluntarily or 
involuntarily transferred before payment or delivery of the interest to the beneficiary by the trustee. In 
this subsection, 
(1) "property" includes real property, personal property, and interests in real or personal property; 
(2) "transfer" means any form of transfer, including deed. conveyance. or assignment. 
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(b) If a trust contains a transfer restriction allowed under (a) of this section, the transfer restriction 
prevents a creditor existing when the trust is created, a person who subsequently becomes a creditor, or 
another person from satisfying a claim out of the beneficiary's interest in the trust, unless the 
(1) transfer was intended in whole or in part to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or other persons under 
AS 34.40.010 ; 
(2) trust provides that the settlor may revoke or terminate all or part of the trust without the consent of a 
person who has a substantial beneficial interest in the trust and the interest would be adversely affected 
by the exercise of the power held by the settlor to revoke or terminate all or part of the trust; in this 
paragraph, "revoke or terminate" does not include a power to veto a distribution from the trust, a 
testamentary special power of appointment or similar power, or the right to receive a distribution of 
income, corpus, or both in the discretion of a person, including a trustee, other than the settlor; 
(3) trust requires that all or a part of the trust's income or principal, or both, must be distributed to the 
settlor; or 
(4) at the time of the transfer, the settlor is in default by 30 or more days of making a payment due under 
a support judgment or order for a child of the settlor. 
(c) The satisfaction of a claim under (b)(1) - (4) of this section is limited to that part of the trust to which 
(b)(l) - (4) of this section applies. 
(d) Not\vithstanding a provision in the trust instrument to the contrary, when a distribution is declared by 
and payable from a trust, the child support enforcement agency established under AS 25.27 may enforce 
the support obligations of a beneficiary, including a trust settlor who is a beneficiary, of the trust against 
the portion of the distribution to which the beneficiary is entitled. 
(e) A person may not bring an action with respect to a claim allowed under (b)(l) of this section if the 
person 
(l) is a creditor when the trust is created unless the action is brought within the later of 
(A) four years after the transfer is made; or 
(B) one year after the transfer is or reasonably could have been discovered by the person; or 
(2) becomes a creditor subsequent to the transfer unless the action is brought within four years after the 
transfer is made. 
(f) In this section, "settlor" means a person who transfers real property, p'!!sonal property, or an interest 
in real or personal property, in trust. 
* Sec. 9. This Act does not apply to a trust unless the trust is created on or after the effective date of this 
Act. 
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Dear Professor Warren: 
Lawrence Ponoroff 
Professor of Law 
Direct Dial (504) 865-5976 
FAX (504) 862-8859 
As you know. we both have urged the National Bankruptcy Review Commission to adopt 
in its final report a recommendation that Congress eliminate the present -opt-out" and 
"election- arrangements in § 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code in favor of a single list of 
mandatory, uniform bankruptcy exemptions. The justification for this position includes 
recognition that the fresh start in bankruptcy is a matter of federal. not state. concern. It 
is also premised on our observation that the present approach to exemption policy has 
introduced an enormous level of uncertainty into the consumer bankruptcy system. That 
uncertainty has eroded public confidence in the system. increased the costs of 
administering bankruptcy cases. and. in many cases, undermined the ability of the system 
to afford effective relief to debtors and creditors alike. These points are developed in 
much greater detail in the papers we each have authored for publication in the American 
Bankruptcy Law Journal. copies of which have previously been made available to the 
Commission. 
Up until this time. in the interest of seeing if we could achieve consensus on the principle 
that federal bankruptcy exemptions are preferable to state law deferral. we have 
deliberately refrained from venturing any opinions concerning the dollar levels at which 
the uniform federal exemptions ought to be set under the Bankruptcy Code. You have, 
however. asked that we give you our collective thoughts on just that issue to provide a 
basis for further discussion and deliberation in both the Consumer Bankruptcy Working 
Group and. eventually, at the full Commission level. This letter is a response to that 
request. We will begin by sharing with you a few guiding principles that influenced our 
specific recommendations: 
First. with respect to most categories of property, we believe that the exemption ought to 
be stated in a single. lump-sum cash value allowance rather than by particular type of 
property. This would have the benefit of eliminating any incentive to change the form in 
which assets are held prior to filing a bankruptcy case. and also would allow individual 
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debtors to protect those assets most essential to their fresh stan in a manner that 
parentalistic. predetermined categories. limited by individual dollar maximums. could not. 
This approach also wo.uld permit imponant regional differences to be reflected in national 
exemption policy. For example. it would allow the Alaskan fisherman to protect his 
fishing license and the Minnesota homeowner to protect her snowblower-items that 
would be difficult (albeit not impossible) to protect under the,present bankruptcy 
exemption scheme contained in § 522(d) of the Code. 
Second. and operating as a qualification on the first principle. we believe that the 
homestead. cenain special categories of personalty (such as prescribed medical aids and 
appliances) and income, as distinguished from asset, exemptions should each be treated 
separately. This is generally consistent with the pattern now found in the § 522(d) 
exemptions as well as the exemption laws of most states. We also believe that the 
underlying policy reflected in current § 522(d)(5) should be retained in order to avoid 
unfair discrimination against non-homeowning debtors. 
Third. while we are less concerned than some about the potential for a uniform system of 
federal exemptions to operate unfairly because of regional differences in cost of living. we 
believe that t~e problem would be adequately addressed by adjusting the exemption levels 
by regional CPI in much the same manner that § l04(b) of the Code now adjusts aggregate 
exemption levels every three years based on national CPl. If the Commission were to 
adopt that approach. you should consider the specific dollar amounts referenced below as 
the base to which the CPI adjustments could be made. 
Fourth. we should mention that in formulating our proposal regarding mandatory federal 
bankruptcy exemptions we were to some extent influenced by a desire to simplify for 
courts and litigants the operation of § 522(0 concerning avoidance of liens impairing 
exemptions. Thus. these proposals 'WOUld obviate the need for the current limitation on 
the debtor's avoiding power under § 522(0(3), and also eliminate the continuing confusion 
in the case law over the extent to which the states can control the definition of when a lien 
impairs an exemption after the Supreme Court's decision in Ol .. :en \'. Oll'en. 500 U.S. 305 
(1991). 
Finally, in setting specific dollar amounts. our bias was to select levels that were more-or-
less on the high side of "average" among the states. That effort was complicated. of 
course. by the wide variation among the states. but our thinking was that. on the one hand. 
keeping the federal bankruptcy exemptions within range of most states would minimize the 
threat that uniform exemptions would increase the absolute number of bankruptcy case 
filings. voluntary and involuntary. On the other hand. we believe that the high-end is 
appropriate because specific federal policies. panicularly fresh start. obviously are 
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Against the backdrop of this conceptual iramework, our preliminary suggestions for the 
Commission's consideration follow: . 
1. Homestead We recommend an individual homestead exemption, applicable 
also to an interest by the debtor as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant, of 
$40,000 (more than twice the current level) for d;biors with no dependents. 
Like the proposal offered by the first National Bankruptcy Review 
Commission, however, we think this number should be adjusted upward by 
$3000 to $5,000 for each dependent supported by the debtor to a maximum of 
$55,000. While we recognize that this number may seem high to some (arid 
perhaps low to others), in point of fact few debtor are likely to have this much 
equity, over and above the sum of nonavoidable liens, in their home. 
However, we think the ability to retain one's regular dwelling, or at least have 
the downpayment to purchase something almost comparable; is an important 
pragma.tic and psychological component of the fresh start. By the same token. 
the level is more than low enough to prevent the kinds of abuses that have 
caught the attention of the popular press. Finally, we would note that we see 
no particularly compelling reason to limit, by acreage. the size of the 
homestead that can be exempted so long as the aggregate dollar limitation is not 
exceeded. 
2. Tangible Personal Propertv We recommend a single lump sum cash 
allowance of $15,000 for tangible personal property of any kind (including cash 
and deposit accounts) to be selected by the debtor at the time of filing. ~ote 
that a debtor would have to use this exemption to preserve the cash value of an 
unmatured life insurance policy-presently exempt without limitation under the 
Code-as well as to exclude from administration any motor vehicle. We also 
intend that this "bushel-basket" exemption might include property rights 
represented by an symbolic or essential writing, such as stock certificates and 
other types of negotiable instruments. 
3. Additional Exemption for Unused Homestead We urge continuation of the 
approach taken in current § 522(d)(5) of the Code to allow up to one-half of the 
unused amount of the homestead exemption to be applied by the debtor to any 
other property interest. real or personal. While this provision would primarily 
be aimed at the non-homeowning debtor. as under present law. it would not be 
so limited. However. because of the recommendation regarding a lump sum 
allowance for personalty there would be no need to retain the the 5800 wildcard 
unrelated to use of the homestead amount. 
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4. Special Kinds of Personalty We recommend an unlimited exemption for 
prescribed. health aids and durable medical appliances 'more-or-less along the 
lines of current § 522(d)(9) of the Code .. We also believe that a "burial plot'" 
exemption of some sOrt may be justified, not to exceed a specified amount. 
5. Income Exemptions We recommend continuation of the income-based 
exemptions in current § 522(d)(10) & (11), subject to the following 
modifications. We propose a significant increase. if not elimination. of any 
dollar limitation on a payment in respect of a personal injury claim. The 
current limitation is $15,000. See § 522(d)(11)(D). In addition, note that the 
exemption for a payment under a stock bonus, pension, pr~fitsharing, etc. plan 
may need to be reworked as a combination asset/income exemption depending 
on whether the Commission decides to recommend that Congress overrule 
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992) (essentially excluding the corpus of 
most retirement plans from the propeny of the estate). In that event, a portion 
of the debtor's interest in or rights under such as plan may require independent 
exemption protection in order to make the exemption for payments under the 
plan meaningful. In addition, even if the Patterson exclusion is continued. 
because of uncertainty as to the scope of that decision as it relates to non-
ERlSA and other kinds of plans, a separate exemption for rights under a 
retirement or similar benefit plan may be appropriate, even if potentially 
redundant in some cases. 
We would reiterate that we propose these exemptions as a "closed" system in bankruptcy 
cases. in lieu of both state and other non-bankruptcy federal exemptions. As under current 
law. however. in a joint case each debtor would be entitled to his/her own exemptions. Of 
course. there would no longer be any issue over the question of "stacking" state and 
federal exemptions. now precluded by § 522(b) of the Code. 
We wish to stress that the above proposals are very preliminary in nature. probably still 
incomplete to some extent. and certainly in need of further refinement before amenable to 
adoption in final form. We hope that they do provide a basis for further discussion and 
study of this important issue. 
Sincerely. 
William H. Brown 
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge 
Western District of Tennessee 
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Re: Expanded Proposal on Uniform Federal Exemptions 
National Bankruptcy Review Commission 
One Columbus Clrcle N.E., SUite 5-130 ~ Washington, D.C. 20544 ~ 202-273-1813 ~ Fax: 
202-273-1 048 ~ e-mail:nbrchg(a!.erols.com 
Web Site: www.nbrc.gov 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: All Commissioners 
Advisors, National Bankruptcy Review Commission 
Staff, National Bankruptcy Review Commission 
Interested Persons 
FROM: Elizabeth Warren, Reporter, NBRC 
Melissa Jacoby, Staff Attorney, NBRC 
DATE: April 11, 1997 
RE: Expanded Proposal on Uniform Federal Exemptions 
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission has discussed the possibility of recommending changes 
in the structure of property exemptions since the issue was raised during its day-long session on 
consumer bankruptcy in May 1996. Following two meetings devoted specifically to the subject of 
exemptions, the Consumer Bankruptcy Working Group circulated a draft outline of a proposal for 
uniform federal exemptions and invited feedback from all those interested in the consumer bankruptcy 
system. At its meeting in February, the Commission tentatively endorsed the approach taken in that 
outline. This expanded draft has heen developed on the basis of the discussion at the meeting of all 
Commissioners and the comments received from a wide audience. 
The Working Group gratefully acknowledges the help of many attomeys, judges and other parties who 
participated in the Working Group meetings or who submitted written comments. Professor Lawrence 
Ponoroff and The Honorable William Brown have been especially generous in giving their time to help 
develop the initial discussion papers on property exemptions. 
Outline of Proposed Changes to Section 522 
No Opt Out 
A consumer debtor 'U'ho has filed a petition for relief under the Bankruptcy Code should be allowed to 






The debtor should be able to exempt the debtor's aggregate interest as a fee owner, a joint tenant, or a 
tenant by the entirety, in real property or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor 
uses as a residence in the amount determined by the laws of the state in which the debtor resides, but not 
less than [525,000/ 530, 000/540, OOOJ and not more than 5100,000. Subsection (m) should be revised to 
reflect that all exemptions except for the homestead exemption shall apply separately to each debtor in a 
joint case. 
Rights to Receive Benefits and Payments 
All funds held directly or indirectly in a trust that is exempt from federal income tax pursuant to sections 
408 or 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code should be exempt. 
Rights to receive future payments, e.g., social security benefits, life insurance, should be exempt, and the 
debtor's right to receive an award under a crime victim's reparations law or payment for a personal 
bodily injury claim of the debtor or her dependent should be exempt. ' 
All Other Property 
With respect to property of the estate not othenvise exempt by the provisions listed above, a debtor 
should be permitted to retain up to S25,000 in value in any form. A debtor who claims no homestead 
exemption should be permitted to exempt an additional 515,000 of property in any form. 
All professionally-prescribed medical devices and health aids necessary for the health and maintenance 
of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor should be exempt. 
Background and Reasons for the Change 
In virtually every collection scheme involving individual debtors, the law reserves some property for the 
debtor and puts it beyond the reach of creditor collection activities. [FN: The historical antecedents of this 
approach are well established. According to one commentator, Roman law provided property exemptions to maintain an 
adequate tax flow: "The public interest was thought to be serviced by those early exemptions because destitute persons were 
unlikely to pay taxes or produce wealth that could be taxed. " William J. Woodward, "Exemptions, Opting Out, and 
Bankruptcy Refonn, " 43 Ohio St. L. 1. 335,337 (1982). See also Joseph McKnight, "Protection of the Family Home from 
Seizure By Creditors: The Sources and Evolution ofa Legal Principle, " 86 S.W. Hist. L. Q. 364 (1983) (Tracing history of 
Texas exemptions). The homestead exemption meant family preservation. "The Nebraska Homestead, " 3 Neb. Bull. No.2 
112 (1924).] Whether the creditor collects under state law or federal law, no debtor can be stripped of all 
property and reduced to destitution. . 
The policy reasons underlying exemption laws are basic. Debtors cannot go to the workplace without 
clothes, nor can they do their jobs without the tools of their trade. Early exemptions for personal 
property protected plows and cattle. In a society of farmers, craftspeople, artisans, and other 
entrepreneurs, protection for farm machinery and tools was protection of the debtor's future ability to 
earn. As more people became wage earners, exemption laws dealt less with the tools needed to earn a 
living and more with the need to exempt future wages in order to assure the worker's incentive to 
continue to work, to work longer hours or under more adverse conditions, and to be a productive, 
tax-paying member of society. Protecting property so that each person can be a productive member of 
society, able to earn a living and to avoid becoming a public charge, has been the mainstay of this 
country's exemption laws. Creditors are not permitted to eliminate either the ability or the incentive to 
earn. The laws exempt money saved for retirements to encourage all citizens to make adequate 
provisions rather than risk becoming public charges in their post-employment years. Similarly, laws 
shield disability payments so the government need not supplement its grants to provide a basic standard 
of living for its disabled citizens. 
Another rationale underlies exemption policy. Some items of property, such as clothes or household 
goods, have little resale value for creditors who would seize and liquidate the property to satisfy an 
outstanding debt. Although the items would yield little when sold, loss of the property would be 
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devastating for the debtor. For some types of property, such as bedding and dishes, replacement costs 
would far exceed the value gained by the creditor. For other items, such as family pictures or heirlooms, 
no replacement is possible. In such circumstances, property seizure enhances leverage, not economic 
:3 recovery. Hence, exemptions often protect personal property that is not directly necessary to earn a 
=! living. [FN: See, e.g. , Ala. Code §6-IO-6 (exempting familyportraits or pictures).] 
Brief History of Exemption Laws In Bankruptcy 
Congressional authorization to establish uniform laws of bankruptcy is drawn from the Constitution, but 
there were no bankruptcy laws in place for most of the Nineteenth Century. Each of the ~ee short-lived 
acts predating the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided federal bankruptcy exemptions. The Bankruptcy 
Act of 1800 established exemptions for necessary apparel, bedding, and a percentage of the estate keyed 
to the amount of creditor distributions. [FN: Charles Jordan Tabb, "The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the 
United States, "3 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 5, 14 (1995).] Having a slightly different focus, the Bankruptcy Act of 
1841 offered a wider range of exemptions. It protected more clothing, household goods, and other 
"necessaries" worth up to $300. The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 exempted even more items within these 
categories of property, and also reflected contemporary events by exempting military arms, uniforms, 
and equipment. More significantly, this Act permitted debtors to avail themselves of the state law 
exemptions as well. Altogether, federal bankruptcy laws were in force fewer than seventeen years. For 
the remainder of the century, state laws filled the gaps to protect property deemed essential from creditor 
process. [FN: See Paul Goodman, "The Emergence of Homestead Exemption in the United States: Accommodationand 
Resistance to the Market Revolution, 1840-1880, " 80 J. Am. Hist. 470 (Sept 1993) (recounting history of state homestead 
exemptions).] 
Unlike its predecessors, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 did not provide a set of federal bankruptcy 
exemptions and relied on state exemptions. [ FN: Nonbankruptcy federal exemptions also were available. For a list 
of currently applicable nonbankruptcy federal exemptions, see 14 Collier on Bankruptcy at Fed-l - Fed-16 (Rev. 15th Ed. 
1996).] Thus, one's right to retain property in a federal bankruptcy proceeding would depend on the 
exemption laws of each of the states. The Supreme Court in Hanover National Bank v. Moyses [FN: 186 
U.S. 181 (1902) . This case was brought by a creditor chaUenging the constitutionality of the system, noting its apparent lack 
of uniformity despite the constitutional mandate to establish "uniform laws of bankruptcy."] upheld the constitutionality 
. of the 1898 Act, declaring that the scheme yielded "geographical uniformity." [FN: The court's reasoning 
partly was derived from two decisions upholding the constitutionality of the 1867 Act. In re Beckerford, 3 F. Cas. 26 
(C.C.D. Mo. 1870) (state exemptions variety did not compromise uniformity requirement, for creditors in any state only were 
entitled to receive distribution from available portion of debtors 'assets); In re Deckert, 7 F. Cas. 334 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1874) 
(rejecting attack to law on basis of geographical diversity). Hanover, in tum, has been used for subsequent chaUenges to the 
1978 Code.] 
As the Bankruptcy Act weathered the evolution of debtor-creditor relations throughout the Twentieth 
Century, the goals of the consumer bankruptcy system, particularly the goal of providing a fresh start, 
matured and diverged more sharply from those of state law creditor collection statutes. Reliance on state 
law exemptions, geared toward a different end, becameincreasingly unsatisfactory for bankruptcy 
purposes. [FN: See Woodward, supra note 1, at 340.] Although it is important that exemptions not be overly 
generous, grossly insufficient state exemptions were inconsistent with rehabilitating failing families and 
encouraging work and self-sufficiency. The problems of relying on state laws were compounded by the 
fact that many state exemption laws had become outdated, so that once-adequate exemptions were 
laughable in a modem economy. 
Mindful of these concerns, in its 1973 Report the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United 
States proposed that Congress enact a set of uniform federal exemptions. [FN: Report of the Commission on 
the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, Part 1,170 (1973).] To that end, the 1973 Commission provided a draft 
statute with exemptions that conceivably would be appropriate for bankruptcy purposes. The 
Commission sought to eliminate both the excessively generous and exceedingly miserly exemptions. It 
also specifically aimed to reduce litigation over exemptions. Taking a slightly different approach, the 
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges recommended federal bankruptcy exemptions but proposed 
that all debtors be permitted to choose between the state exemptions and those to be found in the new 
bankruptcy statute. [FN: H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).] 
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During the debates over what became the 1978 Code, Congress considered proposals for uniform federal 
exemptions. The House endorsed the NCB] approach and thus would have permitted debtors in 
bankruptcy to choose between federal and state exemptions. The Senate, however, preferred exclusive 
use of state exemptions. Late in the process, Congress adopted a provision that offered a slate of federal 
exemptions but also allowed states to "opt out," precluding their residents from using federal exemptions 
when they filed for bankruptcy. [FN: Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, "Debtors Who Convert their 
Assets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the Fresh Start?" 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 235, 254 (1995).] The 
provision permitted debtors in non-opt-out states to elect either the state or the federal exemptions. 
Subsequent amendments to section 522 clarified some issues and adjusted the amounts of the federal 
exemptions, [FN: Several matters were clarified in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judges Act of 1984. For 
example, it resolved the question of whether debtors filing jointly could "stack" federal and state exemptions by having one 
filer pick the state exemptions while the other picked the federal exemptions. In addition, Congress reduced the size of the 
"pourover exemption. " The 1994 Amendments doubled the amounts of the federal exemptions, essentially raising the 
exemptions "floor" in the non-opt-out states.] but the fundamental structure of the exemptions system did not 
change. 
Implications of the Current System 
Although little public debate centered on this part of the new Code when initially enacted, the exemption 
provisions subsequently have provoked much commentary and have yielded a large body of conflicting 
. case law. The compromise measure in section 522 has been described as a failure to "define, enact, and 
effect a fresh start policy in bankruptcy." [FN: See e.g., James B. Haines, Jr., "Section 522's Opt-Out Clause: 
Debtors' Bankruptcy Exemptions In a Sorry State, " 1983 Ariz. St. L. J. 1,9.] Litigants have attacked the provision 
as lacking the uniformity required by the Constitution, as an impermissibly broad delegation of power to 
state legislatures, and as a violation of the Supremacy Clause. As is self-evident, the opt-out clause has 
survived such challenges. [FN: See, e.g. ,In re Storer, 58 F.3d 1125 (6th Cir. 1995) (opt out does not violate 5th 
Amendment due process or equal protection rights); In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1982) (rejecting impermissible 
delegation argument), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 992 (1982). But see Judith Schenck Komer, "The Bankruptcy Clause and 
Exemption Laws: A Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, " 58 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 22 (1983).] While 
bankruptcy law purportedly controls the claiming, safeguarding, and sometimes entitlement to 
exemptions, the incomplete delegation of exemption law and policy has caused confusion, requiring 
reconciliation of state and federal laws. [ FN: See In re Davis, 95-1112, 1997 WL 20734 (5th Cir. Feb. 12, 1997) 
(Bankruptcy Code exception to scope of exemption superseded state homestead protection from levy).] 
As a result, the bankruptcy exemption system is a complex structure in which variation is the norm. In 
all of the bankruptcy cases in the majority of states that have opted out of the federally-provided 
bankruptcy exemptions, the federal exemptions in section 522( d) are simply inapplicable, leaving the 
determination of post-petition property to the various state schemes. [FN: See Appendix A for the states that 
have opted out.] In "debtor's choice" states that have not opted out of the federal exemption scheme, 
debtors can choose either federal or state exemptions to protect the greatest amount of value. In cases 
involving joint debtors, each spouse can claim a separate set of exempt property, effectively doubling up 
on some exemptions. If exemption laws reflected regional variations, such as protection of farmland in 
farm regions or higher homestead exemptions when houses were more expensive, the state law 
variations might be sensible. Instead, however, the disparities often have little rhyme or reason. No 
regional cost variation explains why California has very generous exemption laws while New York does 
not. Kansas permits its citizens to exempt up to $20,000 in a vehicle while Missouri exempts only 
$1,000 and Nebraska has no automobile exemption at all. [FN: In Nebraska, any equity in an automobile can be 
exempted only within the $1500 wildcard exemption or as a "tool of the trade. "Oliver B. Pollak, David G. Hicks, " 'Please 
Sir, I Want Some More, ' - Loopholes, Austerity and the Cost of Living - Nebraska Exemption Policy Revisited, "73 Neb. L. 
Rev. 298, 312 (1994). Note, "Bankruptcy Exemptions: A Full Circle back to the Act of 1800?" 53 Cornell L. Rev. 663, 669 
(1967 -68) (discussing exemptions for fishing and oyster equipment and unpaid milk proceeds). ] Moreover, some states 
predicate the right to use an exemption in bankruptcy on filing deeds of exemption in advance, which 
can be traps for the unwary. [FN: See 1 Ginsberg & Martin on Bankruptcy §6.01[D](3), 6-9 (1997) (citations omitted). 
In re Wing , ~5 B.R. 91 (Bankr. D. Col. 1985) (permitting dismissal and refiling to comply with homestead deed filing 
requirement). The 1973 Commission also was concerned about the loss of state exemptions through mistake or inadvertence. 
Commission Report, supra note 9, at 171.] 
Several significant repercussions flow from this system. First, the system does not deal fairly with its 
users -- debtors or creditors. Depending on the comparative benefits of the state exemptions, parties are 
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affected adversely. Some states have more restrictive exemptions than the federal exemptions, while 
others give much wider latitude to debtors to exclude property from their creditors' reach. Although 
there has been significant revision in state exemption statutes since 1978, state exemption laws tend to 
have some archaic remains. [FN: See generally, Haines, supra note at 13, at 10.] Some states had more generous 
exemptions in actual dollars in the mid-Nineteenth Century than other states do now. As a result, debtors 
with roughly equivalent economic profiles and similar property receive vastly dissimilar treatment 
through the federal bankruptcy system. Their creditors face the same disparities when they operate 
within multiple jurisdictions. 
In addition, in its deference to state law exemptions, the current system multiplies the opportunities for 
forum shopping and pre-bankruptcy asset conversion without authorizing or proscribing these activities 
or even establishing whether state or federal laws should be controlling. [FN: See, e.g. , Ponor-off & 
Knippenberg, supra note II. Alan N. Resnick, "Prudent Planning or Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of Nonexempt Assets to 
Purchase or Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, "31 Rutgers L. Rev. 615 (1978).] According to most 
commentators, Congress intended that the system permit debtors to maximize the use of exemptions. [ 
FN: See, e.g. Lynn M. LoPucki, "The Death of Liability, " 106 Yale L. J. 1,32 (1996) ("Congress was concerned with 
equity between those already judgment proof and those who sought to become so on the eve of bankruptcy.); The legislative 
history of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 suggests that pre bankruptcy asset conversion was not intended to be prohibited, for 
it was not fraudulent to make full use of exemptions to which he is entitled under the law. H.R. Rep 595 95th Congo 1st Sess. 
1977, etc. see Brown, p. 82. However, this type of pre bankruptcy planning has not been met with uniform acceptance and 
has been the subject of much litigation and discussion. Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 11.] Case law development 
has not yielded coherent rules on what constitutes appropriate prebw_1crJJptcy planning, sometimes 
leading to decisions holding that debtors have overreached in their efforts to maximize the value of their 
exemptions. [FN: See In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983) (affIrming lower court's denial of discharge under 
section 727 for transferring property less than two weeks before bankruptcy to maximize homestead exemption) ; In re 
Smiley, 864 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1989) (denying discharge after debtor originally residing in Illinois encumbered assets to buy 
home in state with unlimited homestead exemption, even though court already had limited debtors' homestead to $7,500, the 
Illinois exemption). In re Tveten , 848 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying Minnesota exemption law, denying discharge to 
doctor with $19 million in debts for prebankruptcy planning). Judge Arnold's dissent in Tveten criticized the majority's 
attempt to legislate where the legislature had not: "A debtor's right to make full use of statutory exemptions is fundamental 
to bankruptcy law. " Id But see In re Johnson, 880 F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1989) (under similar facts to Tveten , upheld district 
court and bankruptcy court's approval of discharge); In re Hanson, 848 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying North Dakota 
exemption law, finding that debtor's prebankruptcy planning was not fraudulent behavior); In re Sholdan, 96-1836, 1997 
WL 190286 (8th Cir. March 13, 1997) (findings that debtor intended to hinder and delay by prebankruptcy conversion are 
not sufficient under Minnesota law without evidence that debtor intended to defraud); See also In re Coplan, 156 B.R. 88 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993) (after debtor transferred homestead from Wisconsin to Florida, permitted debtor to take only 
Wisconsin exemption amount). See generally Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 11.] As a consequence, some 
debtors unwittingly risk losing entitlement to exemptions, having transactions unwound, or losing their 
discharges altogether, while others engage in similar behavior and successfully protect substantial sums 
of property. 
The enhanced opportunities for pre bankruptcy planning activity also have generated a problematic 
onslaught of attacks on the integrity of the bankruptcy system in the context of high-visibility debtors. 
People with no other familiarity with the bankruptcy system can cite celebrities who have shielded 
ample assets in an expensive homestead in certain states, a behavior that has become attributable to the 
bankruptcy system. [FN: See, e.g ., Sandra Ward, "Bailing Out: Bankruptcy, Once a Disgrace, Has Become As 
American as the Fourth of July, " Barron's, at 17 (July 17, 1996); David Barstow, "In Florida, Simpson May Find a 
Financial Haven, " S1. Petersburg Times, October 19, 1995 ("Were Simpson to move to Florida and file for bankruptcy, 
creditors couldn't touch his home, no matter how lavish, bankruptcy lawyers say. Conceivably, Simpson could sell 
Brentwood, sell his New York apartment, sell his Bentley and sink his money into a spread of up to 160 acres of prime 
Florida real estate, declare bankruptcy a week later, and all of it would be untouchable ").] These events yield public 
outrage. This reaction may, in fact, stem from the perception that a celebrity debtor seems too wealthy to 
discharge her debts in bankruptcy, not because a debtor exercised her legal right to take full advantage of 
exemptions. Regardless of the cause, this fact pattern invokes calls for the constriction of the availability 
of bankruptcy relief. Many of the suggested restrictions would have a serious adverse impact on the 
majority of debtors who truly are in financial distress, but would do little to curb the activities of those 
dealing with substantial assets, who can find other means to shield their assets through the variety of 
state law exemptions. 
The bankruptcy system was designed to deal with the consequences of financial failure and to reorganize 
the honest but unfortunate debtor, a fundamental tenet that should be reflected in a national bankruptcy 
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policy. Until the bankruptcy system sets its own carefully balanced exemption policy, the integrity of the 
system remains at risk, with serious repercussions for all debtors and creditors. 
No Opt Out: Why Bankruptcy Warrants Its Own Set of Exemptions 
Exemption policy is a fundamental component of consumer bankruptcy. [FN: See, e.g. , Vern Countryman, 
"For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, " 14 Rutgers L. Rev. 678 (1960); Frank R. Kennedy, "Limitation of 
Exemptions in Bankruptcy, "45 Iowa L. Rev. 445 (1960); Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 11.] Exemptions, along 
with the discharge, are so central to bankruptcy that they are not waivable, [ FN: See Thomas H. Jackson, 
"The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, .. 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1393 (1985). "In order to justify nonwaivability, it must be 
shown that individuals systematically misjudge (or ignore) their own interests and that this bias leads them t9 consume too 
much and save too little. I will also argue that societal intervention in the decisions of individuals to consume credit may be 
justified by the negative effects that those decisions may have on third parties. " Id. ,at 1045. Some states permit their 
citizens to waive exemptions. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. §44-13-41.] and yet current exemption policy is channeled 
away from bankruptcy policy-makers toward a variety of state legislatures. Some states that have opted 
out have enacted sets of exemptions designed exclusively for bankruptcy. [ FN: See, e.g. , Del. Code Ann. tit. 
IO §4913.] Exemptions certainly have important roles in state law. Variations among states in approaches 
to exemptions could be related to distinctions in other collection laws and state exemptions may be more 
or less generous depending on other policy judgments the state has made about local debt collection 
powers. 
Nothing in a bankruptcy proposal for uniform federal exemptions usurps the power or the influence of 
the states in integrating their exemption laws with their other collection laws. For the debtors who 
remain under the jurisdiction state law and for the creditors who pursue their rights through state law, 
state exemptions still would apply. For debtors who want the protection and unique attributes offederal 
law, such as the automatic stay and the discharge, it is appropriate to require adherence to federal 
exemptions. Such exemptions can be crafted in light of the particular policies and special features of 
bankruptcy law. 
The Benefits of a Lump Sum Property Exemption 
This proposal is premised on the belief that it is well within Congress' province to set a uniform 
standard of how much property should be retained through bankruptcy. The essential attributes of 
applicable exemptions are equally relevant to all debtors who come through the bankruptcy system, 
regardless of their domiciles. Debtors' economic profiles are strikingly similar throughout the country, [ 
FN: Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, "The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty 
Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, .. 17 Harv. J. L. Pub. Pol 'y 801 (1994).] warranting roughly 
equal entitlement to exemptions. To this end, the Commission's proposal provides a lump sum property 
exemption that can be used for many different kinds of necessary items. The advantages to this approach 
are manifold. 
Equality of treatment depends in part on uniformity in the applicable laws, but, as a practical matter, 
parity in outcomes cannot be accomplished without considering the variety among debtors and creditors. 
Specific property needs may be vastly different, both inter- and intra-region. The Commission has heard 
repeatedly that there are great differences in local conditions that should not be coaxed into a uniform 
mold by a rigid federal statute. [FN: See, e.g. , Henry E. Hildebrand, III, "Uniformity Meets Reality, " 15 Aug. Am. 
Bankr. Inst. J. 16, 17 (1996)( characterizing consumer bankruptcy debates before Comm iss ion ).] Indeed, in determining 
the parameters of the exemptions, no legislature -- federal or state -- can know exactly what types of 
property would optimally facilitate the rehabilitation of a debtor. The variety in cultures, trades, and 
climate yields diversity that makes it inappropriate to predetermine overly-specific categories of 
property. 
Recognition of this tremendous nationwide variety can be accomplished through a single system with 
sufficient internal flexibility to accommodate regional, local, and idiosyncratic needs. By permitting 
debtors to determine what property they will keep within very broad outlines, this approach vitiates the 
need for policy-makers to presuppose what assets look like for debtors in bankruptcy. Debtors are in a 
superior position to know what items are most essential to their own fresh starts. [FN: "Only an individual 




at 1439. "Society could formulate a relatively short list of assets considered vital to the typical individual's well being ... 
There is another option that might better reflect the individual's subjective belief about his needs for various assets in the 
future. Society could allow the debtor to exempt a specific amount (say, S25,000 worth) of existing assets (over and above 
human capital and, perhaps, wage substitutes) and leave the individual to decide which of his existing assets to exempt. " Id. , 
at 1435, citing Countryman, supra note 24, at 746.] Narrow and inflexible categories prevent the kind of 
efficiency that the debtors' own decision-making adds to the process. The bankruptcy system and its 
users are best served by setting a level of property exemption that is fair and reasonable to both debtors 
and creditors in light of the goals of the bankruptcy system, without delineating each piece of property 
that will be instrumental for the reorganization of each debtor. "While the debtor would still 'pay' for 
discharge (by turning over unprotected assets), his ability to shelter the ones precious to him would 
reduce the debtor's (without increasing the creditor'S) cost of discharge." [FN: Jackson, supra,note 25, at 
1434, n. 134.] 
The lump sum approach also is superior in its actual implementation. Such an approach would decrease 
litigation over whether property qualifies for a certain exemption. [FN: See, e.g. , In re Johnson, 14 B.R. 14 
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981) ("Is a bus a bus, or is it a car? "); In re Hall, 169 B.R. 732 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1994) (denying 
debtor's attempt to claim tractor-Iawnmower as "household furniture ").] The need to forum shop and pre-plan for 
bankruptcy would be sharply curtailed by the limitation of regional disparity and the broad, blunt 
categorization of exemptions. The issue of pre-exemption planning -- by which the carefully-advised 
debtor preserves large amounts of property while his poorly-advised counterpart loses similar property --
would become largely irrelevant. Time consumingquestions relating to the exemption of the proceeds of 
otherwise exempt property no longer will be at issue. [FN: See, e.g., In re Williams, 171 B.R. 451 (D. N.H. 
1994) (upholding exemption of workers compensation benefits that were converted to another use).] By taking these 
issues off the table, the lump sum exemption would provide flexibility and equitable results for all 
debtors and their creditors. 
There is an additional benefit to the lump sum property exemption. In preventing further tears in the 
social fabric, it is equally important to discourage the practice of using items of little economic value, 
but tremendous idiosyncratic value, to wield undue leverage. Outside of bankruptcy, a creditor might 
gain advantage by threatening to levy on a piece of personal property that is nearly worthless but is not 
among the specifically-enumerated categories of exempt property. This type of activity, which has no 
place in a collective bankruptcy proceeding, ceases under this proposal. If an item has nominal 
liquidation value, and is exempted in the allowable cash value lump sum exemption, the inquiry ends. 
The proposal recommends setting the lump sum exemption at $25,000 worth of property in any form. 
The $25,000 cap represents only a slight increase over the amount of capped property one presently can 
exempt under section 522(d). [FN: Adding together the present section 522(d) exemptions yields a total 0[$21,700. 
This includes the exemptions for a motor vehicle (S2,400), household items (S8,000, none of which to exceed S400), jewelry 
(SI,OOO), wildcard (S800), professional tools (SI,500), and accrued dividend or interest in unmatured life insurance contract 
($8,000). The homestead equalization exemption would be doubled over its current maximum allowable amount but would 
be available in fewer cases, e.g., when there was no home equity to be exempted at all.] At the same time, by imposing 
a value cap at $25,000, the proposal would prevent specific property exemptions from being exploited in 
ways not originally contemplated by state legislatures. Thus, for example, a debtor would no longer be 
able to keep a race horse worth six figures under an exemption protecting "one horse" from levy. [FN: 
See, e.g., In re Freedlander, 93 B.R. 446 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988) (Virginia exemption statute that permitted exemption of 
horse for agricultural purposes included race horse potentially worth S640,000).] The petition date is the relevant date 
for property valuation. 
The proposal would carve out only one specific personal property exemption: professionally prescribed 
health aids for a debtor or dependent would be exempt independently and ~thout limitation. Items 
falling into this category can be exceedingly expensive. A family's need for professionally prescribed 
health aids is in addition to, and not in place of, other types of property. It would be antithetical to the 
rehabilitative goals of bankruptcy, and generally contrary to public policy, to require a debtor to choose 
between retaining household goods, tools of the trade, and a wheelchair for a disabled child. Similarly, a 
prescribed health aid should not become an object of leverage for general creditors. 
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The Homestead Exemption 
Throughout the Twentieth Century, governmental entities have created incentives and have employed 
various means to enable families to become homeowners. For most Americans, a home not only 
provides family shelter but it is also the most significant and valuable fmancial asset they will own. [FN: 
u.s. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1990 Housing Highlights Financial Facts, Table 1 State and Regional 
Ranking by Median Home Value: 1970-1990 (June 1992).] American families hold a substantial proportion of 
their net worth in their homes. Once a person becomes a homeowner, the person is likely to remain a 
homeowner through retirement; the vast majority of Americans over the age offifty live in their own 
homes. [FN: Data from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, Phase n, 1991, reported in Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth 
Warren, Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Fragile Middle Class (forthcoming).] 
For many Americans, home equity is a form oflong-term savings and an informal retirement plan. To 
the extent that families make this long-term investment to provide for their future needs rather than 
spending their incomes on consumable goods, governmental policy generally favors that choice. 
Nonetheless, home ownership, in itself, is neither an insurance policy against financial distress nor a 
badge of solvency. Homeowners tend to be more financially secure than renters, but they are not 
immune from economic troubles or the need for bankruptcy. Rather, homeowners represent almost one 
half of bankruptcy filers. [FN: Id .] The great majority of homes held by debtors in bankruptcy are 
encumbered by at least one mortgage, and often two or three. 
To promote debtor rehabilitation and to advance other governmental policies, there is adequate cause to 
establish exclusive homestead exemption policies for bankruptcy. At the same time, states traditionally 
have had an especially strong interest in the homestead and the rights related thereto. The modern 
conception of a homestead exemption has been present for over one hundred years, and its roots run 
deeper. Some states, such as Florida, Texas, and Oklahoma, provide homestead protection in their state 
constitutions. 
Not all states are equally protective, either iIi terms of the value or the scope of the exemption, and they 
have taken divergent views on the importance of sheltering a homestead. Homeowners in some states are 
not entitled to the homestead exemption, while others enjoy nearly unlimited homesteads, and there are 
multiple variations in between these two extremes. [FN: See Appendix A.] The variations have led to both 
national ridicule [FN: See, e.g., Larry Rohter, "Rich Debtors Find Shelter Under a Populist Florida Law, "N.Y. Times, 
July 25, 1993.] and the efforts of debtors to find both literal and figurative shelter in generous states. 
The differences among the states are difficult to justify on grounds other than historical artifact. Little 
else could explain the fact that the Nebraska Territory had a more generous exemption in 1883 than 
Arkansas does in 1997. [FN: Goodman, supra note 4, at 472. The Nebraska Territory provided a $2000 exemption, as 
compared with Arkansas' current $800 single/$1250 married homestead exemption. Ark. Code Ann. §16-66-21O.] A 
comparison of state homestead exemptions and the relative cost of living in those states reveals that state 
homestead exemptions do not reflect a relative cost ofliving assessment. For example, in 1991, Rhode 
Island had the fifth highest median home value in the country and yet had a homestead exemption of 
zero; conversely, Iowa had the third lowest home value in the nation and had an unlimited homestead 
exemption. [FN: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1990 Housing Highlights Financial Facts, Table 1 
State and Regional Ranking by Median Home Value: 1970-1990 (June 1992).] More significantly, because state 
exemption laws generally do not take into account the vast intrastate variations in the cost of living, they 
may not, in fact, address local needs at all. [FN: See, e.g ., Raymond C. Marier, Note, "Bankruptcy Exemptions: A 
. Full Circle Back to the Act of 1800?" 53 Cornell L. Rev. 663, 682 (1967-68) (implying that states contain many 
economically distinct regions, giving rise to greater impetus for national solution).] Housing costs in upstate New 
York and Manhattan, for example, differ greatly, but they are equally subject to a single state exemption. 
Thus, while.it is extremely important to give deference to the states' longstanding interest in setting the 
parameters of homestead protection, the bankruptcy system's recognition of the homestead exemptions 
must reflect other factors. Providing no homestead exemption at all is flatly inconsistent with the fresh 
start goal of the bankruptcy system, the numerous federal policies promoting home ownership (e.g., 
federally insured mortgages, tax deductibility of interest on home mortgages), and the prevalent and 
widely-accepted use of the home as a long-term savings plan. At the same time, permitting unlimited 
homestead exemptions plainly violates bankruptcy's goal to liquidate and ratably distribute assets 
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among the creditors when a debtor seeks a personal discharge from all outstanding debts. 
To reconcile state law interest in the homestead with bankruptcy policy considerations, the 
Commission's proposal treats homestead exemptions differently than other property exemptions. The 
proposal would permit state law to determine the character of property to which a homestead exemption 
would attach. In addition, state law would determine the amount of the homestead exemption, within a 
permissible range. 
A variety of factors are relevant in determining the appropriate floor, such as the number of states with 
exemptions at that level, a comparison of the proposed floor with the current federal exemption, policy 
reasons for protecting the homestead, and the level of flexibility that the system affords fo~ families to 
enhance homestead exemptions. At the last Commission meeting when this proposal initially was 
endorsed, the Commission was working with a $40,000 floor, but expressed interest in setting the level 
that was most justifiable considering the above-listed factors. For purposes of this discussion, three 
possible alternatives are explored: $40,000, $30,000, and $25,000. In many of the opt-out states with 
homestead exemptions lower than the floor, it is undisputed that the homestead exemption floor using 
any of these options would be more generous than what currently is available. While some might be 
concerned about the implications of more generous exemptions in bankruptcy, empirical evidence 
generally refutes the assertion that larger exemptions, or more liberal bankruptcy laws generally, directly 
. have caused increases in bankruptcy filings. [FN: See, e.g. , Ian Domowitz and Thomas L. Eovaldi, "The Impact of 
the Bankruptcy Refonn Act of 1978 on Consumer Bankruptcy, .. 2 J. L. & Econ. 803, 805 (1993) ( "Code cannot be 
established as the cause of any major increase in the number of nonbusiness bankruptcies "); Kim J. Kowalewski, "Personal 
Bankruptcy: Theory and Evidence, n Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Economic Review 1-29 (1982); Charles A. Luckett 
"Personal Bankruptcy" (1988); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, Jay Lawrence Westbrook, As We Forgive Our 
Debtors; Bankruptcy and Consumer Credit in America (1989). But see Richard L. Peterson and Kiyomi Aoki, "Bankruptcy 
Filings Before and After Implementation of the Bankruptcy Refonn Law, " Journal of Economics and Business 95-105 
(1984).] 
It is important to remember that a homestead exemption protects only the debtor's equity in a home. 
Notwithstanding the fact that home values might be quite high, most debtors have encumbered their 
homes with large mortgages, so that the amount they need to protect is quite modest. The median home 
equity for homeowners in bankruptcy is far below this amount. [FN: The median equity is $5,500. Sullivan, 
Warren & Westbrook, Fragile Middle Class, supra note 36.] Under ariy of the three scenarios, not many 
homeowners in bankruptcy will have equity that meets or exceeds the floor. On the other hand, setting 
the floor any lower would discriminate against elderly homeowners and frustrate their savings efforts, 
because they are more likely to have built up a greater portion of equity than their younger counterparts 
who have greater earning potential ahead. The floor must reflect the fact that the homestead is both a 
physical shelter and a long-term savings device. . . -
Some states vary their exemptions by marital status, number of occupants or dependents, age of debtors, 
and location of homestead. To simplify the comparison of the proposed floors with the presently 
applicable exemptions, this discussion will presume that the debtors are jointly-filing spouses under 
sixty years of age with two dependent children and reside in a non-rural area. 
The first draft of the Commission's proposal recommended a $40,000 floor. Approximately nineteen 
states have exemptioris of $40,000 or more for a family of four, and itwould increase the exemption for 
the remainder. [FN: See Appendix A.] This floor would provide $10,000 more in potential homestead 
protection for joint filers and $25,000 more for single filers than the current federal exemption. Although 
some people have suggested that exempting $40,000 of equity is an insufficient floor for rural areas, 
other commentators have suggested that it is unnecessarily generous. 
On the other end of the spectrum, if the floor were set at $25,000, twenty-five states would be above the 
floor for the paradigm family. Although this floor would raise the exemption by $10,000 for single 
filers, joint 'filers would get less protection than they currently receive under the federal exemptions. 
For the aforementioned family offour, twenty-five states also have homestead exemptions at or above 
$30,000. Thus, this floor is consistent with a large proportion of the state exemptions while it also 
comports with the federal homestead exemption currently available for joint filers. [FN: However, this floor 
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would be equally applicable whether the debtor filed singly or jointly. The same would be true for the ceiling.] Although 
twenty five states and the District of Columbia have homestead exemptions ofless than $30,000 for a 
family offour, six states with the most meager homestead exemptions have not opted out of the federal 
exemptions. Thus, assuming that homeowner debtors in these states generally choose the federal 
exemptions, this functionally brings the number of states with bankruptcy homestead exemptions at or 
above $30,000 to thirty-one. 
To a certain extent, any of these three floors would narrow the tremendously wide gap in treatment of 
economically similar debtors in states with disparate views of the homestead and brings their treatment 
into accordance with the bankruptcy system's view of the role of the homestead in the reorganization of 
a debtor. The level that is chosen should reflect the use of the home as a savings and retirement plan and 
should make bankruptcy policy consistent with other federal policies promoting home ownership. 
Quite a few states allow debtors to exempt over $100,000 in home equity or impose no monetary cap on 
the homestead. [FN: See Appendix A.] The $100,000 ceiling would restrict the homestead exemption in 
some states, freeing more property for creditors in cases involving high-asset consumer debtors. 
Individuals with ample means still might use homesteads to judgment-proof themselves outside of 
bankruptcy, but they would forfeit this ability once they sought the benefits of federal bankruptcy relief. 
Although some have argued that a $100,000 cap on exemptions is needlessly high, the cap is consistent 
with legislation introduced by Senator Herbert Kohl CD-WI) in the U.S. Senate in 1995 during the 104th 
Congress, and is significantly lower than the proposed cap of $500,000 in S.1559 that passed in the 
Senate and was referred to the House Committee on theJudiciary in 1996. [FN: Bankruptcy Abuse Reform 
Act of 1995, S. 769; Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 1996, S. 1559, §28.] The majority of states do not have 
such high homestead exemptions, and thus a $100,000 cap would be an issue in only a few states. Even 
in those states, it still would represent a significant restriction on the bankruptcy exemption currently 
permitted. 
Although they are capped, the exemption provisions allow some flexibility for debtors: for the debtor 
who needs to exempt an additional $10,000 or so of equity beyond the homestead exemption, that debtor 
might choose to use part of the lump sum exemption to do so. Thus, debtors who are willing to strip 
down their other assets and make them available to their creditors may protect a somewhat larger 
homestead than they could otherwise. 
The floor-and-ceiling approach is a compromise that preserves some of the state variation while it 
narrows the range of differences to eliminate the most serious concerns about unprotected and 
overprotected homeowners. 
Homestead Exemption Based on Households 
In some states, a standard homestead exemption applies equally to single people and married couples, 
while in other states the homestead is available for each debtor as a separate claim. Some states provide 
enhanced exemptions for a married couple, and still others give slight increases for dependents. The 
present set of federal exemptions provides each individual debtor a homestead exemption of $15,000, 
but gives $30,000 to a married couple filing jointly. 
The need for a homestead may be based more on the formation of a household than on whether one or 
two adults live in the home. Single parents or widows or widowers may need a homestead exemption 
that is as large as if they lived with spouses. [FN: In some cases applying state law, widows get no protection at alL 
See In re Henry, 91-41972 (Bankr. D. Neb. Jan. 15, 1996), cited in Pollak & Hicks, supra note 17, at 330 n. 218.] This 
proposal recognizes that fact by recommending that the homestead floor and ceiling apply equally to a 
debtor filing singly or to jointly-filing debtors. The property exemption would apply to the interest of 
either the single debtor or the married couple without distinction. As a result, it would not permit a 
married couple to "stack" exemptions, thereby doubling the amount available that would have been 
available to a single filer. If a husband and wife filed separately, each could claim a $30,000 exemption 
in the homestead; in such cases, however, the calculation of the exemption, coming immediately after 
applicable mortgages, would protect the same $30,000 in value in the home. Neither bankruptcy defers 
to or accounts for the other bankruptcy. If the couple files jointly, the exemption would remain the same. 
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This would not change the states'· ability to enhance the amount ofan exemption based on family size 
within the federal floor and ceiling. 
Homestead Equalization Exemption 
Similar in principle to the current section 522(d)(5), a homestead equalization exemption of$15,000 
would reduce discrimination against debtors who rent their residences. It also would provide some 
balance for the one quarter of homeowner debtors who have no equity in their homes at all. [FN: Sullivan, 
Warren & Westbrook, Fragile Middle Class, supra note 36.] Because some non-homeowners use other means for 
long-term .savings, this equalization provision permits them to reserve necessary value free from creditor 
attachment. 
Without a homestead equalization exemption, economic discrepancies among homeowners and 
non-homeowners would be exacerbated. The effort to rehabilitate all debtors, not just homeowners, 
would be undercut. 
Establishing the appropriate homestead equalization amount can depend on a number of factors. Because 
saving a home is not at issue, the attendant concerns over the larger costs and social implications of 
forcing a family to move and the variations in valuation are not present. Originally, this proposal 
contemplated a homestead equalization bonus of half the amount of the unused homestead exemption, 
but this calculation would invoke needless confusion iri conjunction with the floor and ceiling approach 
to homestead exemptions. In addition, the bonus would have protected a disproportionately high amount 
of personal property for debtors whose state laws otherwise would have entitled them to a $100,000 
homestead exemption. There is little justification for variation of this exemption among debtors in 
different jurisdictions, making a uniform equalization amount appropriate. 
Retirement and Pension Funds 
Few would refute the sound reasons to protect pension and retirement plans from the reach of creditors. 
According to the Federal Reserve, families in all economic sectors report increased retirement savings. [ 
FN: "Family Finances in the U.S.: Recent Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, " 83 Federal Reserve Bulletin at 
5,10 (January/February 1997).] Retirement funds are the largest single type of financial asset held by 
American families, constituting over 25% of the financial assets held by families in 1995, and the 
percentage of families in almost every demographic group holding retirement accounts grew between 
1992 and 1995. [FN: /d] 
Although Americans, and more particularly debtors in bankruptcy, invest significantly less money in 
retirement funds than they put into homes, [FN: Ownership of non-home assets, such as stocks, mutual funds, rental 
property or a business, vehicles, other real estate, IRAs and KEOGH plans, etc. each comprised 7% or less of to till assets. 
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Brief, Household Wealth and Asset Ownership: 1991.] public policy demands that 
people not bediscouraged from saving for their later non-income producing years when they otherwise 
might become a drain on the public fisc. [FN: This rationale has motivated some state legislatures, such as that of 
Massachusetts, to grant a larger homestead exemption for citizens past retirement age. Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 188 § I A.] 
Far from signifying excessive wealth, retirement funds have become a middle-class necessity, especially 
in light of the diminishing adequacy of social security funds and other deferred benefits. Similar to the 
considerations regarding the homestead, bankruptcy should not discourage what other federal policies 
and common sense encourage. 
Protection of retirement fund contributions should not be boundless. It would be improper to permit a 
debtor to make extraordinary contributions in contemplation of bankruptcy, only to withdraw these 
monies after receiving discharge from all debt. Retirement funds should not become a vehicle for clever 
debtors to hide money temporarily in contemplation of bankruptcy. The means of controlling debtors' 
retirement fund exemptions vary at present. Current federal exemptions rely on subjective judicial 
determinations of what would be "reasonably necessary" for that debtor to support herself and 
dependents, similar to some state law exemptions. [FN: For example, in Ohio, IRA and KEOGH plans are exempt 
when necessary for support. Nebraska has a similar limitation on profit sharing plans. Missouri imposes the same 
requirement, assuming the plan met applicable tax restrictions, as do Iowa and Georgia.] This fact-based test can lead 
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to excessive litigation or intrusive and time-consuming inquiries. [FN: For example, some courts go through· 
the following analysis to determine whether a retirement fund is reasonably necessary for the Debtor's support: (1) Debtor's 
present and anticipated living expenses; (2) Debtor's present and anticipated income from all sources; (3) Age of the debtor 
and dependents; (4) Health of the debtor and dependents; (5) Debtor's ability to work and earn a living; (6) Debtor's job 
skills, training and education; (7) Debtor's other assets, including exempt assets; (8) Liquidity of other assets; (9) Debtor's 
ability to save for retirement; (10) Special needs of the debtor and dependents; (II) Debtor's financial obligations, e.g., 
alimony or support payments. In Re Flygstad 56 B.R. 884, 890 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1997).] States have employed 
myriad other methods to determine the extent to which retirement funds should be exempt. Some state 
laws effectively exclude certain types of plans from the bankruptcy estate, i.e., if they qualify as 
spendthrift trusts, or exempt plan contributions that are federal tax-protected, while other states exempt 
pension fund contributions only in limited circumstances, such as for public employees. [FN: Some 
examples include Indiana, District of Columbia, Nevada, Rhode Island, Delaware, and New Jersey. 14 Collier on Bankruptcy 
(Rev. 15th Ed. 1996).] Some states employ look-backperiods and apply special rules for eve-of-bankruptcy 
contributions, [ FN: For example, Alaska law provides that tax qualified plans are exempt, excluding contributions made 
120 days prior to bankruptcy. Likewise, otherwise exempt contributions made within a year of the bankruptcy filing are non-
exempt in Louisiana and Mississippi. In Montana, tax qualified stock plans are exempt except for contributions made within 
I year of bankruptcy in excess of 15% of debtor's income for that year. Id] while others impose specific monetary 
caps. [FN: E.g., In re Barshak, 96-1423, 1997 WL 50616 (3d Cir. February 10, 1997) (Pennsylvania restricted to $15,000 
per year in certain employer sponsored plan contributions). Other states with monetary limitations, either in total or on yearly 
contributions, include Vermont, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Idaho. 14 Collier on Bankruptcy (Rev. 15th Ed. 1996).] 
This proposal does not contemplate making any significant policy shifts in this area. Pension plans 
containing anti-alienation provisions would continue to be excluded from property of the estate 
altogether. [FN: Patterson v. Shumate, 1125 S. Ct. 2242 (1992). The Supreme Court found that pension plan assets in a 
qualified pension plan with an anti - alienation provision were not includable in the debtor's bankruptcy estate pursuant to 
the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA; the plan's anti-alienation provision was a "restriction on transfer 
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law" under section 541(c)(2). Approximately thirty-seven states have 
exemptions applicable to ERISA-regulated pensions. See Collier on Bankruptcy at CasHi-37 (Rev. 15th Ed. 1996).] At the 
same time, the Commission declines to promote disparate treatment of various types of pension plans, 
yielding less protection to those who were not savvy planners or whose employers do not offer them the 
"right" plans. Nor does the Commission wish to provide more retirement protection for the citizens of 
one state than for the citizens of another. A uniform approach to retirement funds, with as little change to 
upset past retirement planning, seems appropriate. 
The proposal relies on the federal tax restrictions for plans that are not otherwise subject to 
anti-alienation provisions, making retirement funds exempt property in bankruptcy so long as they are 
exempt under federal tax laws as well. By exempting all funds held indirectly or directly in a trust t.hat 
are exempt under sections 408 or 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, the debtor would be able to 
protect self-employed KEOGH plans and individual defined benefit plans, as well as other plans that 
have federal tax protection. This permits the bankruptcy laws to employ the developed supervision of the 
Internal Revenue Code to evaluate what kinds of plans and what kinds of contributions are encouraged 
as a matter of public policy. Because these provisions limit the amount of contributions in a single year, 
a debtor would not be able to make an extraordinary contribution to shield assets temporarily from 
creditors. The integrity of the system would be best served by this limitation that precludes exemption of 
excessive and improper contributions. 
Rights to Payments 
Certain rights to payment are especially important to the rehabilitation of a debtor in bankruptcy. They 
consistently have been. declared outside the reach of creditors under federal bankruptcy law. The current 
policies are endorsed by the Commission's proposal. Future wageswould not be property of the estate. [ 
FN: 11 U.s.c. §541 (a)(6)."This reservation of future earnings exclusively and inalienably to the debtor is the 'fresh start ' 
that has been a driving tradition of American bankruptcy law. The system provides a fresh start at least partly because of the 
difficulty of denying it. Debtors who could neither pay nor discharge their debts might adopt a judgment - proof lifestyle, 
adopt a new identity, or join the underground economy. Both debtor and creditor might spend considerable efforts on a 
struggle that yielded less for the creditor than it cost the system in the aggregate. " LoPucki, supra note 21.] Debtors 
would continue to be able to exempt unmatured life insurance contracts, [FN: 11 U.s.c. §522(d)(7).] 
although cash value would have to be exempted under the $25,000 lump sum exemption. The debtor 
also would retain the right to receive undistributed and unaccumulated social security, unemployment 
compensation, public assistance, veterans' benefits, and disability, illness or unemployment benefits. [ 
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FN: Id §522(d)(10).] In addition, the right to receive a crime victim's reparation award or a personal injury 
award would be exempt. [FN: Id §522(d)(II).] Although the current federal exemptions provision caps 
personal injury award entitlements at $15,000, many states do not impose such a limitation. There is 
little evidence that this type of exemption is a likely or frequent subject of scrutiny or abuse and)ittle 
=:: justification for the cap. 
Competing Considerations 
If uniform bankruptcy exemptions were more restrictive than state law exemptions, creditors might 
develop a greater interest in bringing more involuntary consumer bankruptcy cases. To prevent a creditor 
from filing an involuntary petition simply to deny the debtor the protection of state exemption laws, it 
might be necessary to make a slight adjustment to the standard for involuntary petitions against 
consumer debtors: an involuntary petition would require a showing that the filing was not made solely 
for the purpose of entitling the creditor to a less generous federal exemption. Only a handful of 
involuntary petitions are filed against consumers under the current system, which means that the 
predicted impact of this change would be minimal. 
An argument has been made that nothing, including this proposal, can stop pre-bankruptcy planning. 
This proposal vitiates most of the need for the conversion of assets from one form to another because the 
proposal does not establish multiple categories of personal property that will be necessary to a debtor's 
fresh start. It also would take away the main tools: categories of property with no value limits. While it 
would be possible to enhance exemptions by converting some assets from personalty to a homestead, the 
floor and cap on the homestead exemption reduce the impetus to purchase homesteads solely in 
anticipation of bankruptcy. Because the safeguards against excessive exemptions are accomplished 
through the caps identified here, there is no need to put further restrictions on pre-bankruptcy planning, 
and the statute could make explicit that a debtor may transfer property to take advantage of the 
exemptions identified here. Such a provision would eliminate unnecessary litigation and clarify the law 
for debtors who are unsure about how much help they can receive in arranging their financial affairs. Of 
course, any pre-bankruptcy planning that runs afoul of other laws, such as fraudulent conveyance 
provisions, would remain voidable in bankruptcy. 
Some believe that this proposal does not go far enough in establishing a federal exemption policy 
because it does not provide a uniform homestead exemption. In so doing, this proposal does not resolve 
all of the difficulties in applying state property laws to a federal bankruptcy proceeding. [FN: See, e.g. , In 
re Kretzinger, 103 f.3d 943 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying state law to determine whether leased agricultural property can 
qualifY for homestead exemption); In re Davis, 95-1112,1997 WL 20734 (5th Cir. Feb. 12, 1997) (Bankruptcy Code 
exception to scope of exemption superseded state homestead protection from levy).] 
Some critics argue that each state legislature is better suited to determine the appropriate level of 
exemptions for their citizens in the context of the federal bankruptcy system and that this proposal does 
not take regional differences sufficiently into account. For many of the reasons already discussed, this 
proposal does not adopt that view. Exemptions in bankruptcy involve somewhat different considerations 
than exemptions in state law collection actions, demanding a greater need for uniformity and more 
considered choices that focus on the discharge and fresh start. These reasons may justify centralized 
policy choices. State law exemptions cannot be said, as a whole, to be based on the cost of living relative 
to other states. State law exemptions also do not address the very significant intrastate distinctions that 
often overshadow interstate distinctions. If there is true concern about disparities in cost of living that 
Congress ultimately decides must be taken into account, then regional adjustments could be made to the 
federal exemptions, which would provide more parity than ceding responsibility for exemption policy to 
the states. 
Appendix A 
State Homestead Exemptions Order of Value As Applicable to Joint Debtors Under Sixty Years of 
Age with Two Dependents in Non-Rural Region [FN: The amounts listed generally do not include "wildcard" 
exemptions that may be applicable to real property. The acreage limitations imposed in some states also have not been listed. 
Although reasonable efforts have been expended to ensure the accuracy of this information, consultation with selected state 
statutes and several secondary sources sometimes provided ambiguous or conflicting accounts of the amounts of the 
exemptions.] 
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State Exemption Opt-Out? 
Florida Unlimited $ Amount Yes 
Iowa Unlimited $ Amount Yes 
Kansas Unlimited $ Amount Yes 
South Dakota Unlimited $ Amount Yes 
Texas Unlimited $ Amount No 
Minnesota $200,000 No 
Nevada $125,000 Yes 
Arizona $100,000 Yes 
Massachusetts $100,000 No 
North Dakota $80,000 Yes 
California $75,000 Yes 
Connecticut $75,000 No 
Mississippi $75,000 Yes 
New Mexico $60,000 ($30,000 per joint tenant) No 
Alaska $54,000 AmbiguouslProbably Yes 
Idaho $50,000 Yes 
Montana $40,000 Yes 
Wisconsin $40,000 No 
Wyoming $40,000 ($10,000 per "occupant") Yes 
Oregon $33,000 Yes 
Colorado $30,000 Yes 
Hawaii $30,000 No 
New Hampshire $30,000 No 
Vermont $30,000 No 
Washington $30,000 No 
Indiana $15,000 ($7,500 per debtor) Yes 
Louisiana $15,000 Yes 
Maine $12,500 Yes 
Utah $11,000 (wi spouse and dependents) Yes 
A-78 
Alabama $10,000 ($5,000 per debtor) Yes. 
Georgia $10,000 ($5,000 per debtor) Yes 
~ -- Nebraska $10,000 Yes it ,... 
New York $10,000 Yes 
North Carolina $10,000 Yes 
South Carolina $10,000 (if co-owners) Yes 
Missouri $8,000 Yes 
Illinois $7,500 Yes 
Tennessee $7,500 Yes 
West Virginia $7,500 Yes 
Virginia $6,500 (with 3 dependents; can be used for Yes 
personal property too) 
Kentucky $5,000 Yes 
Ohio $5,000 Yes 
Oklahoma $5,000 (unlimited for rural) Yes 
Michigan $3,500 No 
Arkansas $2,500 No 
District of Columbia None (except condo escrow deposits) No 
Delaware None (but provides $10,000 lump sum exemption Yes 
that may be applicable) 
Maryland None (but provides $5,500 wildcard exemption Yes 
for property of any kind) 
New Jersey No Homestead Exemption No 
Pennsylvania No Homestead Exemption No 
Rhode Island No Homestead Exempti~n No 
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Seminole Tribe and Its Impact in Bankruptcy Cases 
December 5, 1997 
Lexington, Kentucky 
I UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 11TH AMENDNfENT I 
The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any,writ in 
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another 
state, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 
SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA, Petitioner, 
v. 
-FLORIDA et aL 
No. 94-12. 
Supreme Court of the United States 
116 S.Ct. 1114(1996) 
Chief Justice REHN'QUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. * 
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act provides that an Indian tribe may conduct certain 
garning activities only in conformance with a valid compact between the tribe and the State in 
which the gaming activities are located.... The Act, passed by Congress under the Indian 
Commerce Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, imposes upon the States a duty to negotiate in 
good faith with an Indian tribe toward the formation of a compact, ... and authorizes a tribe to 
bring suit in federal court against a State in order to compel performance of that duty .... We hold 
that notwithstanding Congress' clear intent to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity, the Indian 
Commerce Clause does not grant Congress that power, and therefore ... [the statute] cannot grant 
jurisdiction over a State that does not consent to be sued .... 
I 
Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988 in order to provide a 
statutory basis for the operation and regulation of gaming by Indian tribes .... 
In September 1991, the Seminole Tribe ofIndians, petitioner, sued the State of Florida 
* A substantial portion of the majority opinion and almost all of the dissenting opinions have 
been omitted. - Ed. 
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and its Governor, Lawton Chiles, respondents. Invoking jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. § 
271 O( d)(7)(A), as well as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1362, petitioner alleged that respondents had 
"refused to enter into any negotiation for inclusion of [certain gaming activities] in a tribal-state 
compact," thereby violating the "requirement of good faith negotiation" contained in § 
2710(d)(3). Petitioner's Complaint 1 24, see App. 18. Respondents moved to dismiss the 
complaint, arguing that the suit violated the State's sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. 
The District Court demed respondents' motion, 801 F.Supp. 655 (S.D.Fla.1992), and the 
respondents took an interlocutory appeal of that decision .... 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision of the District Court, 
holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred petitioner's suit against respondents. 1-1 F .3d 1016 
(1994). The court agreed with the District Court that Congress in § 2710(d)(7) intended to 
abrogate the States1 sovereign immunity, and also agreed that the Act had been passed pursuant 
to Congress' power under the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The court 
disagreed with the District Court, however, that the Indian Commerce Clause grants Congress 
the power to abrogate a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit, and concluded 
therefore that it had no jurisdiction over petitioner's suit against Florida .... 
Petitioner sought our review of the Eleventh Circuit's decision, and we granted certiorari, 
513·U.S. ---, 115 S.Ct. 932, 130 L.Ed.2d 878 (1995), in order to consider two questions: (1) 
Does the Eleventh Amendment prevent Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes against 
States for prospective injunctive relief to enforce legislation enacted pursuant to the Indian 
Commerce Clause?; and (2) Does the doctrine of Ex parte Young permit suits against a State's 
governor for prospective injunctive relief to enforce the good faith bargaining requirement of the 
Act? We answer the first question in the affirmative, the second in the negative, and we therefore 
affirm the Eleventh Circuit's dismissal of petitioner's suit. 
The Eleventh Amendment provi.des: 
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any 
suit in law or < . /, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." 
Although the text of the . .c\mendment would appear to restrict only the Article III 
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, "we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to 
stand not so much foz v,hat it says, but for the presupposition ... which it confirms." Blatchford 
v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779, 111 S.Ct.2578, 2581, 115 L.Ed.2d 686 (1991). 
That presupposition, fIrst observed over a century ago in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 
504~ 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890), has two parts: fIrst, that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal 
system; and second, that" '[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the 
suit of an individual without its consent.'" Id., at 13, 10 S.Ct., at 506 (emphasis deleted), ~ 
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quoting The Federalist No. 81, p. 487 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). See also Puerto 
Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, supra, at 146 ("The Amendment is rooted in a recognition 
that the States, although a union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty, including sovereign 
immunity"). For over a century we have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over suits against 
unconsenting States "was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial 
power of the United States." Hans, supra, at 15, 10 S.Ct., at 507. 
Here, petitioner has sued the State of Florida and it is undisputed that Florida has not 
consented to the suit. See Blatchford, supra, at 782, 111 S.Ct., at 2582 (States by entering into 
the Constitution did not consent to suit by Indian tribes). Petitioner nevertheless contends that its 
suit is not barred by state sovereign immunity. First, it argues that Congress through the Act 
abrogated the States' sovereign immunity. Alternatively, petitioner maintains that its suit against 
the Governor may go forward under Ex parte Young, supra. We consider each of those 
arguments in tum. 
II 
Petitioner argues that Congress through the Act abrogated the States' immunity from suit. 
In order to determine whether Congress has abrogated the States' sovereign immunity, we ask 
two questions: first, whether Congress has "unequivocally expresser d] its intent to abrogate the 
immunity," Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68, 106 S.Ct. 423, 426,88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985); and 
second, whether Congress has acted "pursuant to a valid exercise of power." Ibid. 
A 
Congress' intent to abrogate the States' immunity from suit must be obvious from "a clear 
legislative statement." Blatchford, 501 U.S" at 786, 111 S.Ct., at 2584. This rule arises from a 
recognition of the important role played by the Eleventh Amendment and the broader principles 
that it reflects. See Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238- 239, 105 S.Ct. 
3142,3145-3146, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985); Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 
1147, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979). In Atascadero, we held that "[a] general authorization for suit in 
federal court is not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh 
Amendment." 473 U.S., at 246, 105 S.Ct., at 3149; see also Blatchford, supra, at 786, n. 4, 111 
S.Ct., at 2585, n. 4 ("The fact that Congress grants jurisdiction to hear a claim does not suffice to 
show Congress has abrogated all defenses to that claim") (emphases deleted). Rather, as we said 
in Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989), 
"To temper Congress' acknowledged powers of abrogation with due concern for 
the Eleventh Amendment's role as an essential component of our constitutional 
structure, we have applied a simple but stringent test: 'Congress may abrogate the 
States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by 
making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.''' Id., at 
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227-228, 109 S.Ct., at 2399-2400 .... 
Here, we agree with the parties, with the Eleventh Circuit in the decision below, 11 F.3d, 
at 1024, and with virtually every other court that has confronted the question that Congress has in 
§ 2710(d)(7) provided an "unmistakably clear" statement of its intent to abrogate .... 
B 
Having concluded that Congress clearly intended to abrogate the States' sovereign 
immunity through § 2710(d)(7), we tum now to consider whether the Act was passed "pursuant 
to a valid exercise of power." Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S., at 68, 106 S.Ct., at 425-426. Before 
we address that question here, however, we think it necessary first to define the scope of our 
mqurry. 
Petitioner suggests that one consideration weighing in favor of finding the power to 
abrogate here is that the Act authorizes only prospective injunctive relief rather than retroactive 
monetary relief. But we have often made it clear that the relief sought by a plaintiff suing a State 
is irrelevant to the question whether the suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., 
Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85,90, 102 S.Ct. 2325, 2329, 72 L.Ed.2d 694 (1982) ("It would be a 
novel proposition indeed that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit to enjoin the State 
itself simply because no money judgment is sought"). We think it follows a fortiori from this 
proposition that the type of relief sought is irrelevant to whether Congress has power to abrogate 
States' immmiity. The Eleventh Amendment does not exist solely in order to "preven[t] federal 
court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury," Hess v. Port Authority Trans-
Hudson Corporation, 513 U.S. ----, -, 115 S.Ct. 394, 404, l30 L.Ed.2d 245 (1994); it also 
serves to avoid "the indignity of SUbjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at 
the instance of private parties," Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, 506 U.S., at 146, 
113 S.Ct., at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted) .... 
Thus our inquiry into whether Congress has the power to abrogate unilaterally the States' 
immunity from suit is narrowly focused on one question: Was the Act in question passed 
pursuant to a constitutional provision granting Congress the power to abrogate? See, e.g., 
Fitzpatrick v. B_itzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2669-2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976). 
Previously, in conducting that inquiry, we have found authority to abrogate under only two 
provisions of the Constitution: In Fitzpatrick, we recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment, by 
expanding federal power at the expense of state autonomy, had fundamentally altered the balance 
of state and federal power struck by the Constitution. Id., at 455,96 S.Ct., at 2671. We noted 
that § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contained prohibitions expressly directed at the States and 
that § 5 of the Amendment expressly provided that "The Congress shall have the power to 
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." See id., at 453,96 S.Ct., at 
2670 (internal quotation marks omitted). We held that through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
federal power extended to intrude upon the province of the Eleventh Amendment and therefore 
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that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed Congress to abrogate the immunity from suit ill guaranteed by that Amendment. 
In only one other case has congressional abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity been upheld. In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2273, 105 
L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), a plurality of the Court found that the Interstate Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, 
cl. 3, granted Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity, stating that the power to 
regulate interstate commerce would be "incomplete without the authority to render States liable 
in damages." Union Gas, 491 U.S., at 19-20, 109 S.Ct., at 2284. Justice White added the fifth 
vote necessary to the result in that case, but wrote separately in order to express that he "[did] not 
agree with much of [the plurality's] reasoning." Id., at 57, 109 S.Ct., at 2296"(White, l, 
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
In arguing that Congress through the Act abrogated the States' sovereign immunity, 
petitioner does not challenge the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that the Act was passed pursuant 
to neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Interstate Commerce Clause. Instead, accepting " 
the lower court's conclusion that the Act was passed pursuant to Congress' power under the 
Indian Commerce Clause, petitioner now asks us to consider whether that clause grants Congress 
the power to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity. 
Petitioner begins with the plurality decision in Union Gas and contends that "[t]here is no 
principled basis for finding that congressional power under the Indian Commerce Clause is less 
than that conferred by the Interstate Commerce Clause." Brief for Petitioner 17. Notingthat the 
Union Gas plurality found the power to abrogate from the "plenary" character of the grant of 
authority over interstate commerce, petitioner emphasizes that the Interstate Commerce Clause 
leaves the States with some power to regulate, see, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 
U.S. 186, 114 S.Ct. 2205, 129 L.Ed.2d 157 (1994), whereas the Indian Commerce Clause makes 
"Indian relations ... the exclusive province of federal law." County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian 
Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 234, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 1251,84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985). Contending 
that the Indian Commerce Clause vests the Federal Government with "the duty ofprotect[ingJ" 
the tribes from "local ill feeling" and "the people of the States," United States v. Kagama, 118 
U.S~ 375, 383-384, 6 S.Ct. 1109, 1113-1114,30 L.Ed. 228 (1886), petitioner argues that the 
abrogation power is necessary "to protect the tribes from state action denying federally 
guaranteed rights." Brief for Petitioner 20 .... 
Following the rationale of the Union Gas plurality, our inquiry is limited to determining 
whether the Indian Commerce Clause, like the Interstate Commerce Clause, is a grant of 
authority to the Federal Government at the expense of the States. The answer to that question is 
obvious. If anything, the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power 
from the States to the Federal Government than does the Interstate Commerce Clause. This is 
~ clear enough from the fact that the States still exercise some authority over interstate trade but 
3 have been divested of virtually all authority over Indian commerce and Indian tribes. Under the 
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rationale of Union Gas, if the States' partial cession of authority over a particular area includes 
cession of the immunity from suit, then their virtually total cession of authority over a different 
area must also include cession of the immunity from suit. See Union Gas, supra, at 42, 109 
S.Ct., at 2303 (SCALIA, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C.I, and O'CONNOR and KENNEDY, JI, 
dissenting) (" [I]f the Article I commerce power enables abrogation of state sovereign immunity, 
so do all the other Article I powers"); see Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 
1428 (C.A.10 1994) (Indian Commerce Clause grants power to abrogate), cert. pendirig, No. 94-
1029; Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273,281 (C.A.8 1993) (same); cf. 
Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539, 546-547 (C.A.5 1995) (After Union Gas, Copyright 
Clause, U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8, must grant Congress power to abrogate). We agree ~ith the 
petitioner that the plurality opinion in Union Gas allows no principled distinction in favor of the 
States to be drawn between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause. 
Respondents argue, however, that we need not conclude that the Indian Commerce 
Clause grants the power to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity. Instead, they ·contend that if 
we find the rationale of the Union Gas plurality to extend to the Indian Commerce Clause, then 
"Union Gas should be reconsidered and overruled." Brief for Respondents 25. Generally, the 
principle of stare decisis, and the interests that it serves, viz., "the evenhanded, predictable, and 
consistent development of legal principles, ... reliance on judicial decisions, and ... the actual and 
perceived integrity of the judicial process," Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 
2597,2609, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), counsel strongly against reconsideration of our precedent. 
Nevertheless, we always have treated stare decisis as a "principle of policy," Helvering v. 
Hallock, 309 U~S. 106, 119,60 S.Ct. 444, 451,84 L.Ed. 604 (1940), and not as an "inexorable 
command," Payne, 501 U.S., at 828, 111 S.Ct., at 2609. "[W]hen governing decisions are 
unworkable or are badly reasoned, 'this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.' " 
Id., at 827, 111 S.Ct., at 2609 (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,665,64 S.Ct. 757, 765, 
88 L.Ed. 987 (1944)). Our willingness to reconsider our earlier decisions has been "particularly 
true in constitutional cases, because in such cases 'correction through legislative action is 
practically impossible.' II Payne, supra, at 828, 111 S.Ct., at 2600, (quoting Burnet v. Coronado 
Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407, 52 S.Ct. 443, 447, 76 L.Ed. 815 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting)). 
The Court in Union Gas reached a result without an expressed rationale agreed upon by a 
majority of the Court. We have already seen that Justice Brennan's opinion received the support 
of only three other Justices. See Union Gas, 491 U.S., at 5, 109 S.Ct., at 2275-2276 
(MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ.,joined Justice BRENNAN). Of the other 
five, Justice WHITE, who provided the fifth vote for the result, wrote separately in order to 
indicate his disagreement with the majority's rationale, id., at 57, 109 S.Ct., at 2296 (WHITE, J., 
concurring in judgment and dissenting in part), and four Justicesjoined together in a dissent that 
rejected the plurality's rationale. Id., at 35-45, 109 S.Ct., at 2298-2304 (SCALIA, J., dissenting, 
joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR and KENNEDY, JJ.). Since it was issued, 
Union Gas has created confusion among the lower courts that have sought to understand and 
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apply the deeply fractured decision. See, e.g., Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, supra, at 543-545 
("Justice White's concurrence must be taken on its face to disavow" the plurality's theory); 11 
F.3d, at 1027 (Justice White's "vague concurrence renders the continuing validity of Union Gas 
in doubt"). 
The plurality's rationale also deviated sharply from our established federalism 
jurisprudence and essentially eviscerated our decision in Hans. See Union Gas, supra,' at 36, 109 
S.Ct., at 2299 ("IfHans means only that federal-question suits for money damages against the 
States cannot be brought in federal court unless Congress clearly says so, it means nothing at 
all") (SCALLA.., J., dissenting). It was well established in 1989 when Union Gas was decided that 
the Eleventh Amendment stood for the constitutional principle that state sovereign immunity 
limited the federal courts' jurisdiction under Article III. The text of the Amendment itself is clear 
enough on this point: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend 
to any suit .... " 'And our decisions since Hans had been equally clear that the Eleventh 
Amendment reflects "the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity [that] limits the grant of 
judicial authority in Article III," Pennhurst 'State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 
97-98, 104 S.Ct. 900, 906, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); see Union Gas, supra, at 38, 109 S.Ct., at 
2301, (" '[T]he entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to 
entertain a suit brought by private parties against a State without consent given ... ' ") (SCALIA, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497, 41 S.Ct. 588, 589, 65 L.Ed. 1057 
(1921»; see also cases cited at n. 7, supra. As the dissent in Union Gas recognized, the 
plurality's cbnclwion--that Congress could under Article I expand the scope of the federal courts' 
jurisdiction under k-ticle III--"contradict[ed] our unvarying approach to Article III as setting 
for..h the exclusive catalog of permissible federal court jurisdiction." Union Gas, 491 U.S., at 39, 
109 S.Ct., at 2301.. .. 
In the five years since it was decided, Union Gas has proven to be a solitary departure 
from established law. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 
506 U.S. 139, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993). Reconsidering the decision in Union Gas, 
we conclude that none of the policies underlying stare decisis require our continuing adherence 
to its holding. The decision has, since its issuance, been of questionable precedential value, 
largely because a majority of the Court expressly disagreed with the rationale of the plurality. 
See'Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, ---, 114 S.Ct 1921, 1927, 128 L.Ed.2d 745 (1994) 
(the "degree of confusion following a splintered decision ... is itself a reason for reexamining that 
decision"). The case involved the interpretation of the Constitution and therefore may be altered 
only by constitutional amendment or revision by this Court. Finally, both the result in Union 
Gas and the plurality's rationale depart from our established understanding of the Eleventh 
Amendment and undermine the accepted function of Article III. We feel bound to conclude that 
Union Gas was wrongly decided and that it should be, and now is, overruled. 
The dissent makes no effort to defend the decision in Union Gas, see post at 1145, but 
nonetheless would find congressional power to abrogate in this case. Contending that our 
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decision is a novel extension of the Eleventh Amendment, the dissent chides us for "attend[ing]" 
to dicta. We adhere in this case, however, not to mere obiter c;iicta, but rather to the well-
established rationale upon which the Court based the results of its earlier decisions. When an 
opinion issues for the Court, it is not only the result but also those portions of the opinion 
necessary to that result by which we are bound. Cf. Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County 
of Marin, 495 U.S. 604,613, 110 S.Ct. 2105, 2112, 109 L.Ed.2d 631 (1990) (exclusive basis ofa 
judgment is not dicta) (plurality); Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater 
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 668, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 3141, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) ("As a 
general rule, the principle of stare decisis directs us to adhere not only to the holdings of our 
prior cases, but also to their explications of the governing rules oflaw.") (KENNEDY, 1., 
concurring and dissenting); Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,490, 106 S.Ct. 3019, 
3057, 92 L.Ed.2d 344 (1986) ("Although technically dicta, ... an important part of the Court's 
rationale for the result that it reachers] ... is entitled to greater weight ... ") (O'CONNOR, 1., 
concurring). For over a century, we have grounded our decisions in the oft-repeated 
llilderstanding of state sovereign immunity as an essential part of the Eleventh Amendment. In 
Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 54 S.Ct. 745, 78 L.Ed. 1282 (1934), the 
Court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred a suit brought against a State by a toreign state. 
Chief Justice Hughes wrote for a unanimous Court: 
"[N]either the literal sweep of the words of Clause one of § 2 of Article III, nor 
the absence of restriction in the letter of the Eleventh Amendment, permits the 
conclusion that in all controversies of the sort described in Clause one, and 
omitted from the words of the Eleventh Amendment, a State may be sued without 
her consent. Thus Clause one specifically provides that the judicial power shall 
extend 'to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws 
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
Authority.' But, although a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the 
United States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be 
prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens .... " 
"Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the words of § 2 of 
Article III, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the 
restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States. Behind the words of the 
constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control. There is the 
essential postulate that the controversies, as contemplated, shall be found to be of 
ajusticiable character. There is also the postulate that States of the Union, still 
possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immllile from suits, without their 
consent, save where there has been a 'surrender of this immunity in the plan of the 
convention.' " 
Id., at 321-323,54 S.Ct., at 747-748 (citations and footnote omitted); see id. at 329-330, 
54 S.Ct., at 750-751; see also Pennhurst, 465 U.S., at 98, 104 S.Ct., at 906-907 ("In short, the 
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principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power 
established in Art. III"); Ex parte New York, 256 U.S., at 497,41 S.Ct., at 589 ("[T]he entire 
judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought 
by private parties against a State without consent given ... "). It is true that we have not had 
occasion previously to apply established Eleventh Amendment principles to the question whether 
Congress has the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity (save in Union Gas). But 
consideration of that question must proceed with fidelity to this century-old doctrine. ' 
The dissent, to the contrary, disregards our case law in favor of a theory cobbled together 
from law review articles and its own version of historical events. The dissent cites not a single 
decision since Hans (other than Union Gas) that supports its view of state sovereign immunity, 
instead relying upon the now-discredited decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L.Ed. 
440 (1793). See, e.g., post, at ---- n. 47. Its undocumented and highly speculative extralegal 
explanation of the decision in Hans is a disservice to the Court's traditional method of 
adjudication. See post, at 1154-1156. 
The dissent mischaracterizes the Hans opinion. Tnat decision found its roots not solely in 
the common law of England, but in the much more fundamental" 'jurisprudence in all civilized 
nations.''' Hans, 134 U.S., at 17, 10 S.Ct., at 508, quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527, 529, 
15 L.Ed. 991 (1858); see also The Federalist No. 81, p. 487 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) 
(sovereign immunity "is the general sense and the general practice of mankind"). The dissent's 
propositiori that the common law of England, where adopted by the States, was open to change 
by the legislature, is wholly unexceptionable and largely beside the point: that common law 
provided the substantive rules oflaw rather than jurisdiction. Cf. Monaco, supra, at 323, 54 
S.Ct., at 748 (state sovereign immunity, like the requirement that there be a "justiciable" 
controversy, is a constitutionally grounded limit on federal jurisdiction). It also is noteworthy 
that the principle of state sovereign immunity stands distinct from other principles of the 
common law in that only the former prompted a specific constitutional amendment. 
Hans--with a much closer vantage point than the dissent--recognized that the decision in 
Chisholm was contrary to the well-understood meaning of the Constitution. The dissent's 
conclusion that the decision in Chisholm was "reasonable," post, at 1148, certainly would have 
struck the Framers of the Eleventh Amendment as quite odd: that decision created "such a shock 
of sUrprise that the Eleventh Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Monaco, supra, at 
325,54 S.Ct., at 749. The dissent's lengthy analysis of the text of the Eleventh Amendment is 
directed at a straw man--we long have recognized that blind reliance upon the text of the 
Eleventh Amendment is '~ 'to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction never imagined 
or dreamed of.''' Monaco, 292 U.S., at 326,54 S.Ct., at 749, quoting Hans, 134 U.S., at 15, 10 
S.Ct., at 507. The text dealt in terms only with the problem presented by the decision in 
Chisholm; in light of the fact that the federal courts did not have federal question jurisdiction at 
the time the Amendment was passed (and would not have it unti11875), it seems unlikely that 
much thought was given to the prospect of federal question jurisdiction over the States. 
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That same consideration causes the dissent's criticism of the views of Marshall, Madison, 
and Hamilton to ring hollow. The dissent cites statements made by those three influential 
Framers, the most natural reading of which would preclude all federal jurisdiction over an 
unconsenting State. Struggling against this reading, however, the dissent finds significant the 
absence of any contention that sovereign immunity would affect the new federal- question 
jurisdiction. Post, at 1165-1169. But the lack of any statute vesting general fed~ral question 
jurisdiction in the federal courts until much later makes the dissent's demand for greater . 
specificity about a then-dormant jurisdiction overly exacting. 
In putting fOlward a new theory of state sovereign immunity, the dissent develops its own 
vision of the political system created by the Framers, concluding with the statement that "[t]he 
Framer's principal objectives in rejecting English theories of unitary sovereignty ... would have 
been impeded if a new concept of sovereign immunity had taken its place in federal question 
cases, and would have been substantially thwarted if that new immunity had been held 
untouchable by any congressional effort to abrogate it." [FN14] Post, at 1172. This sweeping 
statement ignores the fact that the Nation survived for nearly two centuries without the question 
of the existence of such power ever being presented to this Court. And Congress itself waited 
nearly a century before even conferring federal question jurisdiction on the lower federal court.s. 
[FN15] 
FN14. This argument wholly disregards other methods of ensuring the States' compliance 
with feder3ll~w: the Federal Government can bring suit in federal court against a State, 
see, e.g., United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 644-645, 12 S.Ct. 488, 493, 36 L.Ed. 285 
(1892) (finding such power necessary to the "permanence of the Union"); an individual 
can bring suit against a state officer in order to ensure that the officer's conduct is in 
compliance with federal law, see, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123,28 S.Ct. 441, 52 
L.Ed. 714 (1908); and this Court is empowered to review a question of federal law 
arising from a state court decision where a State has consented to suit, see, e.g., Cohens v. 
Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821). 
FN15. Justice STEVENS, in his dissenting opinion, makes two points that merit separate 
response. First, he contends that no distinction may be drawn between state sovereign 
immunity and the immunity enjoyed by state and federal officials. But even assuming 
that the latter has no constitutional foundation, the distinction is clear: the Constitution 
specifically recognizes the States as sovereign entities, while government officials enjoy 
no such constitutional recognition. Second, Justice STEVENS' criticizes our prior 
decisions applying the "clear statement rule," suggesting that they were based upon an 
understanding that Article I allowed Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity. His 
criticism, however, ignores the fact that many of those cases arose in the context of a 
statute passed under the Fourteenth Amendment, where Congress' authority to abrogate is 
undisputed. See, e.g., Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 
(1979). And a more fundamental flaw of the criticism is its failure to recognize that both 
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the doctrine requiring avoidance of constitutional questions, and principles of federalism, 
require us always to apply the clear statement rule before we consider the constitutional 
question whether Congress has the power to abrogate. 
In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfIrm that the background principle of state 
sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate 
when the subject of the suit is an area, like the regulation ofIndian commerce, that is under the 
exclusive control of the Federal Government. Even when the Constitution vests in Congress 
complete law- making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents 
congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States. [FN16] The 
Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used 
to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction. Petitioner's suit 
against the State of Florida must be dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction. 
FN16. Justice STEVENS understands our opinion to prohibit federal jurisdiction over 
suits to enforce the bankruptcy, copyright, and antitrust laws against the States. He notes 
that federal jurisdiction over those statutory schemes is exclusive, and therefore 
concludes that there is "no remedy" for state violations of those federal statutes .... 
That conclusion is exaggerated both in its substance and in its significance. First, Justice 
STEVENS' statement is misleadingly overbroad. We have already seen that several 
avenues remain open for ensuring state compliance with federal law .... Most notably, an 
individual may obtain injunctive relief under Ex parte Young in order to remedy a state 
officer's ongoing violation of federal law .... 
Contrary to the implication of Justice STEVENS' conclusion, it has not been widely 
thought that the federal antitrust, bankruptcy, or copyright statutes abrogated the States' 
sovereign immunity. This Court never has awarded relief against a State under any of 
those statutory schemes; in the decision of this Court that Justice STEVENS cites (and 
somehow labels "incompatible" with our decision here), we specifically reserved the 
question whether the Eleventh Amendment would allow a suit to enforce the antitrust 
laws against a State. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 n. 22, 95 
S.Ct. 2004,2015 n. 22,44 L.Ed.2d 572 (1975). Although the copyright and bankruptcy 
laws have existed practically since our nation's inception, and the antitrust laws have been 
in force for over a century, there is no established tradition in the lower federal courts of 
allowing enforcement of those federal statutes against the States. Notably, both Court of 
Appeals decisions cited by Justice STEVENS were issued last year and were based upon 
Union Gas. See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539 (C.A.5 1995); Matter of 
Merchants Grain, Inc., 59 F.3d 630 (C.A.7 1995). Indeed, while the Court of Appeals in 
Chavez allowed the suit against the State to go forward, it expressly recognized that its 
holding was unprecedented. See Chavez, 59 F.3d at 546 ("we are aware of no case that 
specifically holds that laws passed pursuant to the Copyright Clause can abrogate state 
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· . ") unmuruty ...• 
It is so ordered. 
Justice STEVENS, dissenting. 
This. case is about power--the power oft.lJ.e Congress of the United States to create a 
private federal cause of action against a State, or its Governor, for the violation of a federal right. 
In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793), the entire Court--including Justice 
Iredell whose dissent provided the blueprint for the Eleventh Amendment-assumed that 
Congress had such power. In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504,33 L.Ed. 842 (1890)--
a case the Court purports to follow today--the Court again assumed that Congress had such 
power. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976), and 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,24, 109 S.Ct. 2273, 2287, 105 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) 
(STEVENS, 1., concurring), the Court squarely held that Congress has such power. In a series of. 
cases beginning with Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238-239, 105 S.Ct. 
3142,3145-3146,87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985), the Court fonnulated a special "clear statement rule" to 
detennine whether specific Acts of Congress contained an effective exercise of that power. 
Nevertheless, in a sharp break with the past, today the Court holds that with the narrow and 
illogical exception of statutes enacted pursuant to the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Congress has no such power. 
The importance of the majority's decision to overrule the Court's holding in Pennsylvania 
v. Union Gas Co. cannot be overstated. The majority's opinion does not simply preclude 
Congress from establishing the rather curlous statutory scheme under which Indian tribes may 
seek the aid of a federal court to secure a State's good faith negotiations over gaming regulations. 
Rather, it prevents Congress from providing a federal forum for a broad range of actions against 
States, from those sounding in copyright and patent law, to those concerning bankruptcy, 
environmental law, and the regulation of our vast national economy. [FNl] 
FNl. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2273, 105 L.Ed.2d 
1 (1989) (holding that a federal court may order a State to pay clean-up costs pursuant to 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980); 
In re Merchants Grain, Inc., 59 F.3d 630 (C.A.7 1995) (holding that the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a 
State under the Bankruptcy Code); Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539 (C.A.5 
1995) (holding that a state university could be sued in federal court for infringing an 
author's copyright). The conclusion that suits against States may not be brought in 
federal court is also incompatible with our cases concluding that state entities may be 
sued for antitrust violations. See, e.g, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791-
792,95 S.Ct. 2004,2015-2016,44 L.Ed.2d 572 (1975). 
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As federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under these federal laws, 
the majority's conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment shields States from being sued 
under them in federal court suggests that persons harmed by state vioiations of feder~ 
copyright, bankruptcy, and antitrust laws have no remedy. See Harris & Kenny, Eleventh 
Amendment Jurisprudence After Atascadero: The ~Coming Clash With Antitrust, 
Copyright, and ·Other Causes of Action Over Which the Federal Courts Have l?xclusive 
Jurisdiction, 37 Emory L.J. 645 (1988). 
There may be room for debate over whether, in light of the Eleventh Amendment, 
Congress has the power to ensure that such a cause of action may be enforced in federal court by 
a citizen of another State or a foreign citizen. There can be no serious debate, however, over 
whether Congress has the power to ensure that such a cause of action may be brought by a citizen 







SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA v. FLORIDA: 
ISSUES/QUESTIONS: 
I. The 11 th Amendment: 
A. Bars suits against nonconsenting states in federal court 
B. Is a constitutional limitation on subject matter of jurisdiction of federal courts 
C. Exclusions: 
1. Suits which seek prospective injunctive relief--Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 
123 (1908) 
2. Federal court can have jurisdiction if Congress has validly abrogated 
sovereign immunity or state has waived it 
II. Congress' power to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity-§5 of 14th Amendment--intent 
must be "unmistakenly clear in language of statute". 
A. Former §1 06(a) unconstitutional because intent to abrogate unclear 
U.S. v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30,112 S.Ct. 1011 (1992) 
Hoffman v. Conn. Dept. of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 109 S.Ct. 2818 
. (1989) 
B. §106 amended with the B'cy Reform Act of 1994 to cure these infirmities--see 11 
U.S.C. §106 (1994) 
C. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996)--Congress cannot use 
Article I powers to abrogate 11th Amendment immunity and therefore, §106(a)'s 
purported abrogation perArticle I (and not §5 of 14th A) is not constitutional. In 
re Tri-City Turf Club, Inc., 30 B.C.D. 81 (Bkrtcy E.D. Ky. 1996) 
III. The Seminole Decision 
A. The facts--it's not a bankruptcy case. Gaming Act (federal law) authorized Indian 
tribes to bring suit against state in federal court to force a "compact" (and good 
faith negotiations) regarding gaming activities within the state. 
B. The holding--11th Amendment prevents Congress, pursuant to Article I, from 
subjecting nonconsenting states to suits by private parties in federal court--
provision in Gaming Act which permitted such a suit was unconstitutional. 
1. Majority read 11 th Amendment as a limitation on judicial power conferred 
in Article III 
2. Dissent--common-Iaw doctrine subject to congressional override 
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IV. Seminole Impact on Section 106 (11 U.S.C. § 106) 
A. §106 undisturbed as to: 
1. All governmental units (11 U.S.C. §101(27)) other than states 
2. §106 validly waives suit against federal government, foreign governments, 
counties and municipal agencies 
3. Consenting states--see generally, Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 
473 U.S. 235, 105 S.Ct. 3142 (1985) 
B. §106 unconstitutional as to suits against unconsenting states in federal court 
which appear to be authorized by Article I. Prohibition exists irregardless of: 
1 . Remedy sought 
2. Jurisdictional basis of suit 
3. Which Article I power is being exercised 
C. Effect of invalidity--Inequality--only states have this special protection--
undermines bankruptcy of a single forum for all claims/issues 
1. Immunity only exists in federal court suits--not in state court 
2. Immunity is only for a non-consenting state 
3. Immunity does not always extend to state officials 
4. No immunity for suits against states by federal officials 
V. . Remedies Alive 
A. Bankruptcy Courts have non-exclusive jurisdiction over suits which arise in, under 
or relate to title 11 cases (28 U.S.C. § 1334); therefore, state courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction. 
1. Issues: longer to try?, less convenient?, less (any?) expertise in 
bankruptcy?, bias against debtors? 
2. Does state have to consent? 
a. If not, Congress can create a federal remedy against states in state 
court, i.e., create federal remedies against non-consenting states; 




b. § 106 can be read to be a congressional act creating a federal 
remedy against state if brought in state court; i.e., a clear statement 
by Congress of intent to impose monetary liability on states. 
Cf. In re: Wilkerson (Bank One. Lexington v. Mark Wayne Wilkerson), 
Case No. 93-10015(1)(7), Adv. No. 96-1020 (Bkrtcy. W.O. Ky. 1996) 
(Stay violation action couched in terms of malicious prosecution which was 
removed to bankruptcy court is remanded in deference to plaintiff's choice 
of state law remedies) 
VI. ConsentlWaiver--11th Amendment "shield" only applies to non-consenting states 
1. Consent to suit in state court is not consent to suit in federal court 
2. 11 th Amendment cannot be waived by inaction--can be raised for first time 
on appeal because of subject matter jurisdiction (but see, State of Maryland 
v. Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating Trust, 1997 W.L. 523681 (4th Cir. (Md.)); 
Cf. In re: Kish, 1997WL 4719.11 (D.N.J.) (no jurisdiction over 
nondischargeability action against state agency even though state agency 
appeared in the adversary proceeding, sought and received summary 
judgment). 
3. Recoupment--11 th Amendment waived to offset state's claim made in 
federal court arising out of same event. See e.g., In re: Koehler, 30 B.C.D . 
. 176 (Bkrtcy. D. Minn. 1997) 
A. Asserted in defensive posture 
B. No affirmative recovery 
C. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 106(b)--permits affirmative recovery 
D. Cf. 11 U.S.C,. § 106(c)--not limited to same evenUtransaction 
4. Filing proof of claim--constructive consent? (state is deemed to consent to 
suit in federal court if it voluntarily engages in some activity that Congress 
has said could lead to liability of state in federal court, i.e., § 106(b) and 
(c)) 
a. Is filing a proof of claim really a voluntary act? 
1. Bar date 
2. No other forum 
5. Filing Proof of Claim--immunity waived as to compulsory counterclaims? 
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6. 
a. How "related" do claims have to be? -- FRCP 13(a) standard? 
1. State's attempted collection of taxes v. Debtor's action for 
violation of discharge injunction-yes-waiver (In re: Burke, 29 
B.C.D. 870 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ga. 1996)) 
2. Collection of taxes v. debtor's eligibility for state benefits from 
environmental fund--yes--waiver 
(In re: Lazar, 29 B.C.D. 888 (Bkrtcy. C.D. Cal .. 1996)) 
3. POC for sales/withholding taxes v. Trustee's preference 
action based on payment of income taxes--no waiver 
(In re: Creative Goldsmiths of Washington. D.C .. Inc., 31 
B.C.D. 218 (4th Cir. 1997)) 
Who has the authority to waive 11th Amendment Immunity, i.e., does the 
state agency/actor which filed the Proof of Claim or entered the 
appearance have the authority to effectuate a waiver? Compare, In the 
Matter of Midland Mechanical Contractors. Inc., 200 B.R. 453 (Bkrtcy. N.D. 
Ga. 1996) with In re: Headrick, 200 B.R. 963 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ga. 1996). 
7. Suit against state officials (instead of the state) 
a. No suit against state actor is his/her "official capacity" as it will 
impose damages on the state agency he/she represents 
b. Ex parte Young exception: suits against state officials for 
prospective relief 
1. But Seminole's holding against the governor for injunctive 
relief was barred. 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1133 (Gaming Act 
allowed limited liability against the state and the Court 
concluded that Congress did not intend to impose greater 
liability on the state actor) 
2. Can a trustee seek injunctive against state tax collector to 
prevent collection of discharged taxes? Remedial scheme in 
Bankruptcy Code is much broader than that in the Gaming 
Act--Seminole's result can be distinguished (or did the 
Supreme Court intend to abrogate entire Ex parte Young 
exception?). See e.g., In the Matter of Guiding Light Corp., 
(Bkrtcy E.D. La. 1997). 






Debtor's confirmed Chapter 11 plan provides that substantially all of Debtor's property 
must be transferred to Trust for liquidation as rapidly as market conditions will allow. State 
wishes to impose real estate transfer taxes on all transfers from Debtor to the trust and from the 
trust to subsequent purchasers. Accordingly, State files suit in state court against both the trust 
and purchasers to recover unpaid transfer and recording fees. Trust removes this action to the 
U.S. District Court. 
Trust next moves to dismiss State's claims, arguing that the imposition of all taxes is 
prohibited both by statute and by the express terms of the confIrmed reorganization plan. At this 
point, State, relying on Seminole, argues that it is not bound by the terms of the confIrmed plan 
and requests that the litigation be remanded to state court. Assume that State had notice of, and 
did not participate in, the confirmation hearing. Assume also that the terms of the plan are 
authorized by §1123(c)(6) as an "appropriate provision" andlor §1146(c), How should the court 
rule? Cf State o/Marylandv. Antonelli Liquidating Trust, 123 F.3d 777 (4th Cir. 1997) . 
., 
,.,. 
Following the commencement of Chapter 13 Proceedings, State decertifies Debtor as a 
DBE (disadvantaged business enterprise) with special eligibility to bid on state highway projects. 
Debtor's Attorney believes that the state action violates both §525(a) and §362(a)(3). Do you 
agree? If Attorney is right, what type of legal action is appropriate? Cf Wyoming Dept. 0/ 
Transportation v. Straight (In re Straight), 209 B.R. 540 (D.C.D. Wyo. 1997). 
3. 
Following the receipt of a Chapter 7 discharge, Debtor sought restoration of her driver's 
license which had been suspended after her failure to (1) pay motor vehicle surcharges for an 
~lcohol related conviction under state law and (2) fmes for other municipal offenses. The driving 
lIcense was restored but the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) has continued to demand 
payment of the surcharges. Debtor now seeks (1) a declaratory judgment that her insurance 
surcharges are discharged, (2) a declaratory judgment that the post-discharge collection attempts 
violated §524 and the discharge injunction, (3) an injunction prohibiting any further collection 
activity by either the D!vfV, the administrator of the state-created insurance fund, or the 
municipalities. What relief, if any, if appropriate? Cf Kish v. Verniero (In re Kish), 212 B.R. 
808 (D.C.D.N.J., 1997). 
4 . 
. Trustee commences an adversary proceeding seeking to avoid the allegedly preferential 
payment of state income taxes within 90 days of bankruptcy. While State has not filed a claim 
for these taxes, it has filed a claim for unpaid sales and withholding taxes. State moves for 
dismissal, arguing that the preference action is barred by the 11 th Amendment. Trustee responds 
that State has waived its immunity by fIling its proof of claim. What result? Cf Schlossberg v. 
State o/lvlaryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths o/Washington, D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140 (4th Cir. 
1997), . . 
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5. 
Review the facts of Hypothetical #1. Assume that the District Court has granted State's 
motion to remand the litigation to state court. Debtor would like to discourage State from 
assessing taxes on future sales by Trust. Any suggestions concerning strategy? 
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THE THEORY, REALITY AND PRAGMATISM 
OF 
CORPORATE GoVERNANCE IN BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATIONS 
Christopher W. Frost* 
INTRODUCTION 
Governing a corporation during a Chapter 11 reorganization presents a special case 
of the age old problem of the separation of ownership and control. 1 Critics of Chapter 11 
have long pointed to the insulation provided by the automatic stay to managers of the 
business as one of the causes of bankruptcy inefficiency. 2 Protected from the nonnal 
contractual and market forces that restrain the behavior of managers of healthy companies, 
managers of fInns in bankruptcy, the harshest critics charge, use delay and other strategies 
to enrich themselves and the shareholders at the expense of the firm's creditors. 
These charges echo those leveled in corporate law debates about the responsiveness 
of managers to the concerns of shareholders3 and, more recently, about the behavior of 
• Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law, BBA 1983, J.D. 1986, University 
of Kentucky. I thank Cynthia Woolverton, Saint Louis University School of Law, Class of 1998, 
for her able assistance in the preparation of this article. 
1 The phrase "separation of oWnership and control" was coined by Adolph Berle and 
Gardiner Means in their classic work, ADoLPH A. BERLE, JR.& GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (1932). 
2 See, e.g., Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case jor Chapter 11, 
101 YALEL.J. 1043, 1076 (1992) ("Filing a Chapter 11 petition, in effect, is a way to keep control 
of the :finn free from the intrusive monitoring of creditors, thereby permitting management to extract 
wealth from the firm's various security holders.") 
3 See, e.g. Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs and the Rhetoric oj 
Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1403, 1406 (1985)("To be sure, there is room to debate the extent to 
which management engages in such diversion or shirking; but there is not doubt that the structural 
arrangements under which management is selected and governed permit it to do both more than 
trivially.") Classic articles examining this problem from an economic perspective include Eugene 
Fama and Michael Jensen, Separation oj Ownership and Control, 26 J. LAW & ECON. 301 (1983), 
and Michael Jensen and William Meckling, Theory oj the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
<0 Christopher W. Frost, all rights reserved. 
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corporate managers of companies involved in leveraged buyouts.4 Disputes over the 
constituencies that managers should serve and the efficacy of such institutional controls as 
fiduciaty duties, contract, and the market in controlling managers behavior continue 
unabated, resulting ina rich literature of corporate governance that accounts for a wide range ~ 
of views. Drawing from this literature, many bankruptcy scholars have turned their attention 
to the unique corporate governance problems that Chapter 11 raises. ~ By examining the 
economic principles underlying the non-bankruptcy governance structure, these 
commentators have propounded theories that seek to align the Chapter 11 governance 
structure with its non-bankruptcy counterpart. 
As compelling as such theories may seem outside of bankruptcy, they tend to fall 
apart in the context of a Chapter 11. The financial reverses precipitating the filin& the need 
to attend to the day to day business problems and the desire for a speedy and inexpensive 
resolution of the problems often render the bankruptcy governance structure ineffective, 
resulting in a free-for-all in which strategic behavior is the order of the day. This specter is 
more likely in small bankruptcies where the creditors have so little at stake that the 
traditional methods of control- creditors' committees, motions to convert to Chapter 7 or 
to appoint a Chapter 11 trustee, termination of debtor exclusivity and the like - are 
impractical. In many cases, there is no one with the time and the incentive to assure that 
managers are not milking the case for their own benefit. 
Bankruptcy lawyers and judges are a pragmatic lot, however. Status conferences, 
expedited procedures in small bankruptcies, the judicious use of examiners and, perhaps 
most importantly, control over the fees awarded debtor's attorneys are pragmatic responses 
to the difficulties inherent in governing a corporation undergoing a Chapter 11 
reorganization. In addition, the recent report of the National Bankruptcy Review 
4 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role 0/ a Target's 
Management in responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1168-73 (1981); William W. 
Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time 0/ Restructuring, 1989 Duke L.J. 
92, 165-70 (1989); John C. Coffee, Jr., The MandatorylEnabling Balance in Corporate Law: An 
Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1618, 1662-64 (1989). 
S See, e.g., Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter 11 Reorganizations: RedUCing Costs, 
Improving Results, 73 B.U.L. Rev. 581 (1993), Thomas G. Kelch, Shareholder Control Rights in 
Bankruptcy: Disassembling the Withering Mirage o/Corporate Democracy, 52 MD. L. REv. 264 
(1993); Christopher W. Frost, Running the Asylum, Governance Problems in Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations, 34 ARIz. L. REv. 89,91-94 (1992) (hereinafter, "Running the Asylum") i Thomas 
G. Kelch, The Phantom Fiduciary: The Debtor in Possession in Chapter 11, 3 8 WAYNE L. REv. 
1323 (1992); Lynn LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy 
Reorganization 0/ Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PENN. L. REv. 669 (1993); David Arthur 
Skee~ Jr., The Nature and Effect o/Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. 
L. REv. 461 (1992). 
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Commission' includes practical recommendations that are intended to reduce the managerial 
autonomy that has plagued small business cases. 
Further complicating questioIis of bankruptcy governance, however, is the fact that 
governance questions are inextricably bound up in broader policy question regarding the 
goals Chapter 11 should seek to promote. Leaving managers in control of reorganizing 
businesses not only benefits the managers and the shareholders, it may also provide indirect 
benefits to such non-investor constituencies as employees, customers, suppliers and the 
surrounding community. To the extent the Chapter 11 process introduces delay in the 
ultimate liquidation of businesses without a realistic chance of reorganization, the benefits 
are shared by these stakeholders. Thus a governance system that errs in favor of attempting 
reorganization may be justifiable as a means through which redistributions from creditors to 
these stakeholders might be effected. 
We are far from a consensus on the appropriate goals underlying Chapter 11. In 
general, we seem to expect that the process of rehabilitation will serve both the goals of 
maximizing the value of the business assets, thereby maximizing creditors' returns, and 
restoring businesses to health so that they can continue to provide benefits to employees and 
other non-investor stakeholders. The problem is that meeting these two goals is often 
impossible when liquidation is the choice that maximizes the value of the business assets. 
This conflict, coupled with the usua1lack of clarity regarding the likelihood that the business 
does have a positive going concern value, forces us to choose between a governance system 
that is biased in favor of liquidation and one that is biased in favor of reorganization. 
This paper addresses the financial economic theories of corporate governance and 
isolates some of the principles underlying the non-bankruptcy corporate governance structure 
that bear on the problem of corporate governance in Chapter 11. Having established those 
theories as a basis for discussion, the paper then examines the practical limitations on the 
bankruptcy process resulting from creditor indifference and a lack of consensus regarding 
the goals of Chapter 11. The paper next examines some of the ways courts have responded 
to the intractable problems of running a Chapter 11 debtor focusing on their use of case 
management techniques, examine~s and control over attorney's fees. The paper concludes 
with a discussion of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission Report and 
Recommendations, discussing both the Commission's practical governance recommendations 
and the Report's evidence of a continued tension over the appropriate goals of Chapter 11. 
n. THE THEORY OF BANKRUPTCY GoVERNANCE 
, BANKRUPTCY1HENEXT 20 YEARS: NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION FINAL 
REPoRT (October 20, 1997) available at <http://www.nbrc.gov> (hereinafter, "NBRC REPoRT"). The 
first 4S pages of the Report contains more than 170 recommendations These recommendations will 
be referred to as ''NRBCREcOMMENDATIONS.'' 
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In its broadest sense, the term "corporate governance" refers to the regulation of 
decision making within the firm. Economic theoty views the corporation as the central party 
to a set of contracts among providers of inputs to production.7 Corporate managers monitor 
compliance with these contracts and make decisions that fall within the inevitable gaps in the 
contracts.' Thus at this high level of generality, the basic principle of corporate governance 
is simply that managers control most of the decisions that are not the subject of explicit 
contract. 9 
It is here that the analysis starts to get interesting. Managers monitor the contractual 
relationships that comprise the firm but they themselves are in a contract relationship with 
the frrm and, therefore must themselves be monitored.10 This observation raises two 
fundamental questions. First, who is in the best position to monitor managers - that is for 
whom do managers work? Second, how should that group accomplish and enforce its 
monitoring role? Passing familiarity with corporate law provides the commonplace answers. 
Managers owe their allegiance to the shareholders of the firm who effectuate their 
monitoring through their right to remove managers and through their enforcement of 
managers' fiduciaty duties. This section examines the reasons underlying these two 
propositions and then looks at the effect the bankruptcy process has on those rationales. 
A. The Non-Bankruptcy Corporate Governance Structure 
The non-bankruptcy corporate governance structure is designed to resolve conflicts 
between the participants in the firm. The most basic of these conflicts arise from the 
differences in incentives that emerge once a corporation divides the claims to its assets 
between debt and equity. Issuing debt divides the claims on earnings and assets between 
fixed and residual claimants. Creditors trade a claim to the business' upside potential for a 
fixed, priority claim on the assets and the income stream. After the interest rate on the debt 
is fixed, creditors prefer that the corporation avoid projects that increase the risk of the 
7 The seminal paper on this "nexis of contracts" theory is 1 ensen and Meckling, supra note 
3. 
, If parties could account for all contingencies in their contracts there would be no need for 
discretion. It is because contracting is costly that managers must exercise discretion over some 
corporate decisions. See Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 Yale L.l. 1197, 1199 (1984) 
(''Matters would be vastly simplified iffirms were small and if contracts between the corporation and 
each of its constituencies satisfied the paradigm of contracting within discrete markets, where each 
exchange can accurately be described as 'sharp in by clear agreement; sharp out by clear 
performance"'). 
9 See DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 141; REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. §§ 8.01 and 8.25. 
10 See Stephen M Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARv. 1.L. & PuB. 
POLly 671, 676-77 (1995). 
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income stream since they bear some of the risk of failure but receive none of the higher 
returns. Shareholders, on the other hand, prefer projects that increase the risk of the 
corporation because they will. capture all of the higher returns and are protected on the 
downside by the limited liability doctrine. 11 
Managers playa central role in the mediation of this conflict.· Their control over the 
selection of business projects enables them to choose between satisfying the shareholders' 
appetite for risk and observing the creditor's distaste for such projects. The non-bankruptcy 
cOIpOrate governance structure is designed to provide a mixture of contractual, market and 
fiduciary constraints on managers' choices. The following discussion examines this structure 
and the economic principles supporting it in an effort to illuminate the tensions and 
principles underlying the bankruptcy governance structure. 
1. Managerial Allegiance 
The differences in their respective claims on corporate income create inherent 
conflicts between creditors and shareholders. Thus, the question of managerial allegiance 
is of more than theoretical interest. The existing law provides an allocation of control and 
allegiance that forms the backdrop against which participants in capital markets develop 
expectations and negotiate contracts. As a general rule creditors derive their protection 
against managerial and shareholder opportunism solely through contract. Shareholders have 
protections that are less specific but occasionally more powerful than those granted the 
creditors. 12 
Historically, the allocation of control rights is most likely due to the differences in the 
legal source of claims of shareholders and creditors. Characterized as the true owners of the 
corporate enterprise, shareholders lay claim to the equitable principles that underlie trust 
law. 13 Since credit claims arise from contract, there is little room for a fiduciary analysis. 
11 See Morey McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 1. CORP. LAW 205, 225-30 
(1988) (providing an excellent summary of the literature discussing this phenomenon). 
12 This allocation of control rights has been the subject of substantial scholarly criticism. 
Commentators have questioned the wisdom of the shareholder wealth maximization principle that 
underlies the rules that direct managers to resolve conflicts between the interests of shareholders and 
creditors in favor of the shareholders. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. Corporate Fiduciary 
Principles/or the Post-Contractarian Era, 23 FLA. STATEL. REv. 561,599-606 (1996); Bratton, 
supra note 4, at 149-151; McDaniel, supra note 11, at 265-309. 
13 See Harvey R Miller Corporate Governance in Chapter J J: The Fiduciary Relationship 
Between Directors and Stockholders 0/ Solvent And Insolvent Corporations, 23 Seton Hall 1467, 
1473 (1993) (hereinafter, "Corporate Governance") ("This relationship of trust between directors 
and the corporation and its stockholders 'springs from the fact that directors have the control and 





Ec~nomic analysis of the firm provides an alternative explanation that better illuminates the 
special problems involved in translating general principles of corporate governance into the 
bankruptcy forum. 
In the ; solvent corporation the allocation to shareholders of control rights and 
managerial allegiance is justified by the status of shareholders as the residual claimants on 
the corporation's cash flow. So long as the corporation is solvent, business decisions made 
by managers directly affect the income of the shareholders. Shareholders stand to gain or 
lose depending on the efficacy of the managers. Thus, shareholders stand in the best 
economic position to monitor the decisions of managers. They have the most to gain or lose 
by managerial decisions. I4 
The beauty of this simple explanation of the managerial allegiance aspect of corporate 
governance is that it also provides an explanation of ways in which managerial allegiance 
shifts when the corporation becomes insolvent. In a growing number of cases, courts hold 
that managerial allegiance must shift to the creditors when the corporation approaches 
insolvency. U Upon insolvency, the residual claims of the shareholders become economically 
worthless. I6 Creditors who will go unpaid in the event of complete financial failure now 
occupy the position of residual owners. Thus it is not surprising that managerial allegiance 
should depend upon the fortunes of the business. . 
2. Enforcement of Control Rights 
Of course, it is one thing to require managers to pursue the business of the firm for 
the benefit of the shareholders but quite another to put such a guiding principle into practice. 
Again, passing familiarity with corporate law provides the commonplace methods of 
stockholders."'} (quoting Ashman v. Miller, 101 F.2d 85~ 91 (6th Cir.1939)}. 
14 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE EcONOMIC SlRUCTIJRE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 67-70 (1991) (discussing the importance of residual claims in corporate 
governance). 
15 Two recent cases from the Delaware courts make clear that the fiduciary duties of 
managers extend to creditors when the corporation becomes or approaches insolvency. See Geyer 
v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992); Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe 
Communications, No. Civ. A 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30 1991). The implications 
of this extension of fiduciary duties outside of the bankruptcy context are explored in Remesh K.S. 
Rao, David Simon Sokolow & Derek White, Fiduciary Duty a 1a Lyonnais: An Economic 
Perspective on Corporate Governance in a Financially Distressed Firm, 22 IOWA J. CORP. L. 53 
(1996) and Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporations Obligations to its Creditors, 17 
CARDOzoL. REv. 647 (1996). 
16 Although the bankruptcy system may provide shareholders with holdup value. See infra 




enforcing managers allegiance to the shareholders. Shareholders may enforce manager's 
fiduciary duties through derivative suits and retain the ability to oust managers through 
voting rights. But, while shareholder voting rights and fiduciary duties may constrain 
managerial behavior in the most egregious circumstances these methods are unlikely to be 
effective in completely assuring managerial allegiance. In addition, these methods are 
inadequate to assure creditors that managers will not take actions that result in insolvency 
of the firm. To get a complete vision of the governance structure, therefore, one has to 
further examine the role of contract and the market in policing managers and mediating 
conflicts between creditors and shareholders. 
The limitations of the fiduciary duty principle as a method of policing managerial 
misconduct are well known. The principle subsumes two related axioms. First, managers 
owe shareholders a duty of undivided loyalty. The duty of loyalty assures shareholders that 
managers will exercise their discretion free from the taint of self dealing. Second, managers 
owe shareholders a duty of care and diligence. In theory, these axioms should be sufficient 
to enforce shareholder's expectations of managerial allegiance. In practice, however. the 
business judgement rule limits the efficacy of the fiduciary principle in all but the most 
obvious cases of confliCt. l7 
The limitations on the fiduciary principle relegate it to a secondary role in the 
corporate governance structure - effective in checking only the most egregious conflicts and 
management failures. The non-bankruptcy governance structure places relatively more 
reliance on the shareholder's contractual right to remove managers. Voting rights operate as 
the basic governance mechanism by giving shareholders the ability to replace managers who, 
through miscalculation, bad judgment, or shirking, have failed to maximize the value of the 
firm.ll Again, however, shareholder voting rights may provide less than complete protection 
against managerial misbehavior. This is particularly problematic in large firms. The wide 
dispersion of shares necessitated by investors' desire for diversification19 often results in 
individual shareholders having too little at stake to justify their monitoring managers to 
assure that they are doing a good job. This, coupled with managerial control over the proxy 
17 See Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director's Duty of 
Independence, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1351, 1361-62 (1989) ("Courts accord near-complete deference to 
corporate decisions untainted by interest. .. "). Easterbrook and Fischel provide an explanation of 
the business judgement rule that highlights the likelihood that a negligence standard would result in 
managerial risk aversion that would be inconsistent with the goal of shareholder wealth maximization. 
EASlERBROOK AND FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 98-100. 
111 Easterbrook and Fischel characterize shareholder voting rights as the second most 
distinctive feature (after limited liability) of corporate law. Id at 63. 
19 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 
85 MICH. L. REv. 1, 17-20 (1986). 
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apparatus, enables managers to control the outcome of corporate elections.2O 
This problem leaves the market as the ultimate backstop against the limitations 
inherent in the fiduciary principle and shareholder voting rights. Given that the difficulty 
with voting rights is the wide dispersion of shareholders with each holding small claims, 
transactions that aggregate voting power in the hands of larger investors provide a remedy.21 
This is the typical justification for the merger and acquisition activity that became so rampant 
in the 1980's.22 
As noted above, when a corporation is solvent, creditors do not enjoy a claim to 
managerial allegiance enforced through the fiduciary duty principle or through voting 
rights.23 Creditors do, however, need protection against actions that decrease the 
creditworthiness of their borrower.24 Thus a complete view of corporate governance must 
consider the contractual limitations on managerial conduct that are inherent in the firms 
credit relationships.2S Consider first the firm's long term credit relationships. Such 
relationships are governed by contracts that often provide detailed protection against specific 
managerial actions that unduly increase the risk of the enterprise. These covenants strike 
a negotiated balance in the creditor/shareholder conflict. Actions that violate the covenants 
result in default and a consequent withdrawal of capital from the firm. In the absence of 
bankruptcy, such a withdrawal of capital would likely result in the replacement of the 
managers. 26 
Short term lenders may also exercise a form of control over the behavior of managers. 
While short term credit contracts do not usually contain the detailed covenants characteristic 
of longer term debt, the revolving nature of these arrangements can be a significant 
constraint Managers who take actions that unduly increase the risk of the business may find 
their sources of short term credit dIying up which in tum can result in a cash flow crisis that 
triggers defaults in other credit arrangements. 
20 See Lucian A Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan, A Framework/or Analyzing Legal Policy 
towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1071, 1079-82 (1990). 
21 See EAsTERBROOK AND FIscHEL, supra note 14, at 113-14; Henry G. Manne, Mergers and 
the Market/or Corporate Control, 72 J. Pol. Econ. 110 (1965). 
22 See Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation, 9 YALE 
J. REG. 119, 129-31 (1992). 
23 Creditors may be granted voting rights, see DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 221, so this is more 
a matter of practice than an immutable corporate law·rule. 
24 See,e.g. Campbell, supra note 12, at 599-606. 
25 See George G. Triantis and Ronald 1. Daniels, The Role 0/ Debt in Interactive Corporate 
Governance, 83 CALIF. L. REv. 1073 (1995). 
26 Id at 1084-85. 
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3. Summary: An Integrated Corporate Governance Structure 
As illustrated above, corporate governance is accomplished through a complex but 
integrated structure of contract, market and fiduciary principles. Each element of the 
structure complements the others resulting in a system that attempts to mediate conflict 
between shareholders and creditors and that binds managers to behave in the interests of the 
stakeholders. The corporate governance system is also sensitive to the financial condition 
of the firm. During solvency, the system vests discretionary authority in managers and 
relegates creditors to the position of contracting parties. As the corporation begins to 
approach insolvency, the creditors' contractual controls become effective to grant them a 
larger voice in the management of the firm. Finally, when the firm reaches insolvency, 
creditors contracts grant them more direct authority over managers and corporate law 
requires managers to shift their allegiance from the shareholders to the creditors. 
B. Trar.slating Corporate Governance Principles to the Bankruptcy Forum. 
In theory, general principles of corporate governance should work well in the 
bankruptcy context. Both inside and outside of Chapter 11 governance issues present the 
basic problem of how to regulate the behavior of managers who might have an incentive to 
take actions that are not in the interest of their constituents. This requires some method of 
determining who those constituents are and a system to bind the managers to pursue the 
interests of those constituents. Abstracting from the sense of urgency and heightened 
emotions of the participants, the basic decisions confronted in a bankruptcy case are not all 
that different from decisions encountered in running a solvent corporation. While some 
components of the non-bankruptcy system require adjustment to accommodate the particular 
needs of a collective judicial proceeding, the basic theory remains applicable inside 
bankruptcy. 
1. Evaluating Business Decisions in Chapter 11 
Governance in the reorganization context requires a decision-making structure capable 
of handling problems ranging from the mundane day-to-day decisions involved in running 
a :fum to the basic liquidation/reorganization decisions that lie at the very heart of a Chapter 
11 case. While the Code provides detailed standards for reaching such decisions, at bottom, 
these decisions should be judged by the standard applicable to all businesses. Most business 
analysts agree that the quality of decisions big or small is a function of the expected cost of 
the decision compared to the present value of the expected return from that decision. At first 
blush, this proposition appears unremarkable and unlikely to be particularly controversial. 
On further examination, however, the proposition raises two important points about business 
decision-making generally and its applicability to the reorganization context. 
The fITst of these points is the fact that our general standard for business decisions 
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says absolutely nothing about who should reap the gains or bear the losses of the decision. 
Thus this standard adopts the goal of allocative efficiency which does not account for the 
distributional consequences of-a particular decision. To the extent one sees the purpose of 
the reorganization process as the maximization of the value of the business assets,'rI the fact 
thata decision is being made in the bankruptcy context is irrelevant All that insolvency does 
is change the beneficiaries of business decisions. 
The second of these points is that decisions can be evaluated only on the basis of 
expected costs and expected returns. Business decisions of all sorts entail possibilities of 
gain and risks of loss. The fact that a loss instead of a gain materialized in a given case does 
not mean that the decision resulting in that loss was, at the time the decision was made, 
objectively wrong.2I Perhaps more importantly, decisions inside bankruptcy or out, involve 
such a wide array of competing possibilities and probabilities that it makes little sense to 
discuss business decisions in tenns of their "correctness." Instead, the focus must be on the 
process through which such decisions are made - the governance structure. This 
proposition underlies the business judgment rule.29 Courts recognizing the complexity of 
business decisions and their inherently subjective qualities require nothing more than that the 
decision maker be free of obvious conflicfo and be well informed about the consequences 
of the decision.31 
2. Adjusting The Governance Structure to Account for the Special Needs of the 
Bankruptcy Process 
Of course, one cannot simply apply the non-bankruptcy governance strUcture in 
bankruptcy cases. The automatic stay and the need to deter strategic uses of the structure in 
an effort to achieve favorable treatment require that the structure be adjusted to account for 
the particular needs of the reorganization process. The automatic staf2 deprives creditors' 
of their contractual controls over managers by prohibiting them from withdrawing capital 
from the business. Shareholder meetings called in an effort to displace managers who are 
thought to have failed to protect adequately shareholder interests must be scrutinized closely 
27 The effect of the relaxation of this assumption is considered infra notes 71-82 and 
accompanying text. 
21 See EAs'IERBROOKANDF'IsCHEL, supra note 14, at 98 ("To observe that things turned out 
poorly ex post, perhaps because of competitors' reactions, or regulations, or changes in interest rates 
or consumers' fickleness, is not to know that the decision was wrong ex ante."). 
29 Id at 98-100. See also PalriUter, supra note 17, at 1373. 
30 Id at 1361. 
31 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
32 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994). 
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to assure that they are not simply delay tacticS.33 Market discipline is not likely to be of 
much use. Markets for the securities of small bankrupt firms are likely to be thin. Even in 
those situations in which an active market exists, managers are unlikely to respond to the 
market when they are fighting for the very existence of the business. 
This leaves the fiduciary principle as the sole swviving element of the non-bankruptcy 
cotpOrate governance structure. Courts often note that the debtor in possession is a fiduciary. 
Moreover, because the corporation is usually insolvent in bankruptcy, that fiduciary duty 
extends to the creditors of the business. But, as noted above, the fiduciary principle works 
only as a backstop to the contractual and market components of the non-bankruptcy 
governance structure. The difficulty in evaluating business decisions leads courts to abstain 
from directly examining the quality of business decisions. Instead, outside of bankruptcy, 
the fiduciary principle is limited to an examination of obvious conflicts and egregious 
failures on the part of managers. Thus, the fiduciary principle alone cannot be expected to 
provide an answer to the difficult problems involved in governing a bankrupt entity.34 
The Chapter 11 process is not without its own governance structure, however. The 
judicial controls over the entire process provide a replacement for the contractual and market 
controls that exist outside of Chapter 11. The court's authority to appoint a trustee,35 end 
debtor exclusivity,36 or convert or dismiss37 a case can all be thought of as elements of the 
33 See In re lohns-Manville Corp., 52 B.R. 879 (Banke. S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 60 B.R. 842 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 801 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1986), on remand, 66 B.R. 517 (Banke. S.D.N.Y. 
1986). In Manville, the bankruptcy court issued an injunction prohibiting a shareholders' meeting at 
the instance of the debtor's management and several creditor constituencies. The bankruptcy court 
found that the express purpose of the meeting would be to replace the existing board with one that 
would be more sympathetic to shareholders' interests. The district court affirmed but the Second 
Circuit reversed stating that enjoining the meeting would require a showing that the Equity 
Committee was acting in bad faith by showing a "willingness to risk rehabilitation altogether to win 
a larger share for equity. 801 F.2d at 60. The Second Circuit did, however note that if Manville were 
insolvent, "denial of the right to call a meeting would likely be proper ... " ld. at 65, n.6. On 
remand, the bankruptcy court supplemented its findings to include the required showing and again 
entered the injunction. 66 B.R at 542. The Manville case, as well as other cases addressing this issue 
are thoroughly discussed in Michael A Gerber, The Election of Directors and Chapter 11: The 
Second Circuit Tells Stockholders to Walk Softly and Carry a Big Lever, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 295, 
321-41 (1987). 
34 The business judgement standard governs the courts review of managements' decisions in 
bankruptcy as well. See Frost, Running the Asylum, supra note 5, at 120. The fiduciary principle 
is further limited as a tool of bankruptcy governance by the fact that managers duties run to both the 
creditors and the shareholders. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
35 11 U.S.C. § 1104{a) (1994). 
36 11 U.S.C. § 1121{c) (l994). 
37 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1994). 
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reorganization governance structure. In addition, the Code requires judicial approval of 
specific managerial decisions that can have the effect of prolonging or shortening the case.31 
Creditor committees39 supplement this structure by assuring that widely dispersed creditors 
have a representative with enough at stake to justify the costs of monitoring the debtor and 
participating in bankruptcy decision-making.40 
While this governance structure is facially complete, it provides a less than 
satisfactory substitute for the contract and market controls that are eliminated by the filing 
of a bankruptcy petition.41 Outside of bankruptcy, managers are beholden to a group of 
claimants that has actual money at stake in the business decision under consideration. This 
economic incentive is non-existent in a Chapter 11 since the ultimate decision-maker is the 
31 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (1994). Elsewhere I have analyzed the limitations of these elements of 
the bankruptcy governance structure. See Frost, Running the Asylum, supra note 5, at 120-29. 
39 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(I) (1994) requires the appointment of a creditors committee in evey 
case. In practice, however, creditors' committees are appointed in only about 15% of all cases. See 
NBRC REpORT, supra note 6, at 642, citing SUMMARY BY CIRCUIT OF CREDITOR 
COMMITIEE DATA, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF UNITED STATES TRUSTEES (February 21, 
1996). 
40 These collective action problems are similar to those facing shareholders in large, publically 
held finns. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
41 Dissatisfaction with the bankruptcy governance structure is at the heart of the many calls 
for reform of Chapter 11. Much of the reform literature seems to be concerned with managers' use 
of the inadequate controls over them to prolong the bankruptcy case, benefitting shareholders and 
themselves at the expense of creditors. Many of these reform proposals call for market resolutions 
to the problems of financial distress in an effort to preclude this type of behavior. See, e.g., David 
A Skee~ Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law andBanJa-uptcy Law, 72 TEx. L. REv. 471 
(1994); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig" supra note 2; Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's 
Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEx. L. REv. 51 (1992); Barry E. Adler, 
Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 459 (1992); Barry E. Adler, Financial and 
Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 311 (1993); Philippe 
Aghion, et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 1. LAW, EeON. & ORG. 523 (1992); Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARv. L. REv. 775 (1988); 
Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case/or Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEG. STUD. 127 (1986); 
Mark 1. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. 
REv. 527 (1983). 
It seems fairly clear that these proposals are unlikely to gamer support, however. Thus the 
challenge is to work within the existing structure in an effort to improve corporate governance in 
Chapter 11. Several commentators have suggested ways in which the general principles of corporate 
governance might be further incorporated in Chapter 11 to improve results in Chapter 11. See 
authorities cited supra note 5. 
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bankruptcy judge.42 In addition, the bankruptcy judge can only act on infonnation and 
transactions that are presented to her. Managers' infonnational advantages coupled with 
:. their control over the initiation of business decisions may allow them to manipulate the 
~ decision-making apparatus to their benefit. 43 
But, by incorporating the economic principles underlying the non-bankruptcy 
governance structure, we can improve the performance of the reorganization process. 
Elsewhere I have suggested one potential solution.44 When evaluating a particular decision, 
bankruptcy judges should attempt to discover the views of the group that stands at the margin 
of solvency - the economic residual claimants. This approach recognizes the fact that 
insolvency shifts the residual interest in business decisions from the shareholders to the 
creditors and is therefore consistent with non-bankruptcy decisions that extend fiduciary 
duties to creditors when the company approaches insolvency. This economic shift in the 
residual interest places creditors in the position of gaining or losing from the business 
decision. From a process perspective, this group of investors is likely to hold the correct 
incentives to make decisions that maximize the value of the corporation's assets. 
This solution is subject to a conceptual difficulty. The accurate use of this method 
requires an answer to the very question that bankruptcy resolves - the value of the business 
assets. If the value of the business assets were readily ascertainable, there would be no need 
for a judicially supervised reorganization process. New claims to the assets could be 
generated automatically by an application of the absolute priority rule. It is therefore the 
vagaries of business valuation that create the need for the reorganization process.45 
This problem present an insurmountable obstacle to the full realization of such a 
theoretically neat solution. But residual claim analysis may still provide a means through 
which we can improve bankruptcy decision-making. Even in cases in which valuation 
42 In the words of the Seventh Circuit: 
[S]elfinterest concentrates the mind, and people who must back their 
beliefs with their purses are more likely to assess . . . value . . . 
accurately than are people who simply seek to make an argument. 
Astute investors survive in competition; those who do not understand 
the value of assets are pushed aside. There is no similar process of 
natural selection among expert witnesses and bankruptcy judges. 
In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1072-73n.3 (7th Cir. 1987) .. 
43 See Barry L. Zaretsky, Trustees and Examiners in Chapter 11,44 S.C.L. REv. 907, 914 
(1993) ("Although the Code requires that a court approve various business decisions made by the 
debtor-in-possession, the debtor maintains the ability to determine, to a considerable extent, which 
issues are placed before the court.") 
44 See Frost, Running the Asylum, supra note 5, at 135-38. 
45 Id at 137. Note also that valuation probably also requires an evaluation of the business 
decision itself leading to circularity in the decision-making process. 
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difficulties preclude a precise location of the residual claimants, bankruptcy judges may be 
able to identify claimants that certainly are not residual claimants. For example, in cases in 
which the corporation is hopelessly insolvent, the judge may discount the claims of 
shareholders who have nothing at stake in the decision under consideration. Similarly in 
evaluating the views of a senior creditor secured by collateral with a liquidation value far in 
excess of the creditor's claim, the bankruptcy judge should pay little heed to arguments that 
the business decision at issue should be decided in a way that would shorten the case. Thus 
while residual claim analysis cannot provide a clear rule of decision, it can be used to 
evaluate competing positions. Rather than simply ask whether a proposed business decision 
is correct, this approach asks the judge to take account of the incentives of those advocating 
or contesting the decision. 46 
3. An Example of Residual Claim Analysis: Litigation Settlements 
One categOIY of cases that courts occasionally examine under this rubric consists of 
cases in which the principal asset of the estate is a lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit opinion in 
Matter o/Central Ice Cream47 provides the best example. In Central Ice Cream, the court 
considered three appeals regarding the district courts decisions on sanctions and attorneys 
fees. The heart of the case was the trustee's handling of a suit by the debtor against 
McDonald's Corp. Central Ice Cream had won a $52 million verdict against McDonald's. 
Pending the trial courts decision on the verdict, McDonald's offered Central Ice Cream $15.5 
million to settle the case. The bankruptcy Judge approved this settlement over the objection 
of the shareholders. 48 
After attorney's fees, the settlement provided more than enough money to pay all of 
Central Ice Cream's creditors. The bankruptcy court approved the settlement stating, "To 
seek a greater return for the shareholders at risk to the creditors would be most unfair.,,49 
While not called upon to overturn the bankruptcy court's approval of the settlement, Judge 
Easterbrook's opinion seemed to differ with the bankruptcy court regarding the appropriate 
resolution of the conflict: 
Central Ice Cream had assets sufficient to pay all creditors. This made the 
shareholders the residual claimants; each additional dollar would go to them. 
It is true, as the bankruptcy judge wrote, that spuming the settlement would 
expose the creditors to risk, but this parallels the risk creditors face outside of 
the bankruptcy process as firms try to maximize the expected value of the 
46 Id 
47 836 F.2d 1068 (7* Cir. 1987). 
48 The true status of the objecting parties was an issue in the case. The court noted that these 
objecting parties held more than 300% of the common stock of the debtor. Id at 1069. 
49 Id at 1070, quoting Matter of Central Ice Cream Co., 59 B.R 476 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985). 
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enterprise. 50 
The court also noted that while creditors outside of bankruptcy are not entitled to challenge 
the corporation's decisions, inside of bankruptcy they may do so because "they are 
(presumed to be) the principally affected persons, the new residual claimants. "51 
The Central Ice Cream case is unusual, not only because the court presumed that the 
debtor was solvent, but also because the court so explicitly adopted an analysis focusing on 
the desires of the residual claimants. Other courts have considered settlement offers using 
a similar analysis, however. In In re Bowman,'2 for example, a Chapter 7 debtor sought to 
convert her3 case to a Chapter 11 so that she could pursue litigation that the Chapter 7 
trustee proposed to settle. The $500,000 settlement offer was sufficient to cover 
nondischargeable tax claims but was likely insufficient to provide a distribution to the 
debtor. 54 The court noted that the evaluation of a settlement offer in the context of an 
insolvent Chapter 7 estate is straightforward because the creditors· take precedence. In a 
Chapter 11 case or in a case in which there is a potential that the estate is solvent, however, 
the court stated that the evaluation becomes more difficult. 55 
In making this more difficult analysis, the court adopted the approach of the 
bankruptcy court in the Central Ice Cream case without discussing Judge Easterbrook's 
analysis. The court stated: 
If creditors could be paid to a certainty, regardless of the outcome of litigation, 
there might be a strong argument for a debtor to proceed. In the instant case, 
however, there is no guaranty, just a potential for a larger sum of money that 
will only benefit the Debtor. The creditors do not benefit from pursuing the 
litigation further, although they have most of the risk. The creditors may 
receive less than they would with the settlement, but there is no chance that 
they would receive more than they are owed. It would distort the bankruptcy 
process to pennit the Debtor to shift the risk of loss to the creditors while 
retaining all the potential benefit for herself, particularly over the objections 
50 Id at 1072. 
51 Id at 1073. 
52 181 B.R. 836 (Banke. D. Md. 1995). 
S3 The fact that Bowman involved an .individual debtor does not change the analysis. In this 
situation, the debtor occupies a role similar to that of a shareholder of a corporate debtor. In a 
subsequent opinion, the court rejected the debtor's claim that the suit was exempt. In re Bowman, 
1996 Banke. LEXIS 925; 78 AF.T.R.2d (P-H) 5890 (Banke. D. Md. 1996). 
'4 Id at 840. 
55 Id at 844. 
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of creditors. 56 
Thus, the court in Bowman, like the bankruptcy court in Central Ice Cream, was unwilling 
to find that the continued pursuit of the litigation would not place creditor recoveries at risk. 
In re SpeilJogel,57 involved another individual debtor, this time in Chapter 11. The 
Chapter 11 trustee proposed to enter into a global settlement to which the debtor objected. 
The court distinguished Bowman stating that that case involved an insolvent debtor in a 
Chapter 7. sa Instead, citing the Seventh Circuit opinion in Central Ice Cream, the court 
searched the record for some indication that the trustee had considered the interests of the 
debtor in the residuary interest in the settlement. Finding no such consideration, the court 
proceeded to "balance the equities" rejecting the settlement because "The court believes that 
if the litigation proceeds, the creditors will ultimately receive a substantial portion, if not 
1000/0, of their claims, whereas if the settlement is approved, the Debtor will receive nothing 
and lose any possibility of a residual distribution. "59 
Both Bowman and the bankruptcy cowt's opinion in Central Ice Cream illustrate both 
the residual claim analysis and the limitations of that approach. In both cases, the continued 
prosecution of the litigation would not only potentially benefit the stockholders but also 
would expose creditors to a risk of loss. The results in those cases show a sensitivity to the 
fact that the stockholders might not truly be the residual claimants. The question of who 
occupies that position turns on an analysis of the position of the creditors in the worst case 
scenario. If the debtor's rejection of the settlement creates a non-trivial chance of creditor 
losses, the process must account for their views. 
Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Central Ice Cream recognized the difficult valuation 
problems that inhere in his approach but suggested an alternative approach to the problem. 
The opinion suggests that the risk to the creditors could be eliminated by putting the firm up for sale 
with a S15.5 million reserve price. If the settlement amount were less than the expected value of 
rejecting the settlement, the market (or perhaps the objecting shareholders) would recognize the value 
56 Id The court also considered the ability of Bowman as debtor in possession to act as a 
fiduciary for the estate, concluding that the conflict between her interests and the interests of her 
creditors could not be reconciled. Id at 845. Accordingly, the court granted the debtor's motion 
to convert but immediately granted the motion of the IRS to reconvert the case to Chapter 7. The 
court also authorized the trustee to accept the settlement. Id at 848. 
57 211 B.R. 133 (Bankr. E.n.N.Y. 1997). 
sa Id at 144-45. This reading of the Bowman arguably renders it consistent with the Seventh 
Circuit opinion in Central Ice Cream, but the reading in contestable. The Bowman made no specific 
finding that the debtor was insolvent. Instead, the court simply noted that the settlement would result 
in a substantial payment to the creditors and that, while success in the litigation might result in a 
recovery for the debtor, all of the risk oftoss would be born by the creditors. 181 B.R. at 844. 
59 211 B.R. at 146-47. 
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and would bid more than the settlement amount. 60 
4. Summary: An Integrated Bankruptcy Governance Structure 
Because the bankruptcy process addresses the unique problems arising from financial 
disaster, the non-bankruptcy governance structure cannot simply be transferred into the 
bankruptcy context. Nonetheless Chapter 11 sets out its own structure that, when 
supplemented by the residual claim approach to decision-making, appears calculated to 
achieve results that would be obtained outside of bankruptcy. This integrated structure 
replaces the non-bankruptcy contractual and market controls over managerial behavior with 
creditor representation and judicial oversight. Creditors' committees composed of large 
claimants and represented by counsel and other professionals, have both the wherewithal and 
the incentive to monitor managerial behavior. The Code's requirement that managers obtain 
judicial approval of significant transactions and the Code provisions allowing the court to 
appoint a trustee or examiner, or to convert or dismiss a case, provide ample opportuPjties 
to test managerial competence and loyalty. 
Of course, the bankruptcy governance process generates controversies. Creditors' 
committees may not be fully representative of the broad array of their constituents. 
Managers and members of creditors' committees may take actions that violate their fiduciary 
duties to estates and their members. The point here is not that the process is self executing 
and inevitably correct, but instead that the process seems calculated to isolate such problems 
and to respond to them in a rational way. 
TIl THE REALITY OF BANKRUPTCY GoVERNANCE 
Unfortunately, this well intentioned and theoretically complete approach to 
governance in Chapter 11 unravels in many (perhaps most) cases. One of the principle 
culprits in this unraveling is the collective action problem facing widely dispersed creditors 
each holding small claims. Because small creditors have so little at stake in the bankruptcy 
process, they often adopt a posture of rational indifference toward the debtor, its 
management and the bankruptcy case. Another problem which is easy to overlook is the 
possibility that a strict application of the bankruptcy governance structure may conflict with 
perceived normative commitments that underlie the Bankruptcy Code. This section 
addresses these two practical limitations on the ability of the bankruptcy governance 
structure to police adequately the behavior of managers of the debtor. 
A. Creditor Indifference 
60 Id at n.3. 
C -17 
Recent studies oflarge Chapter 11 cases have provided some cause for optimism that 
the governance structure established by the Code actually works to police management 
behavior. Several studies of large cases have provided evidence that bank creditors often are 
successful in ousting incumbent management. 61 In the most detailed of these studies, 
LoPucki and Whitford concluded that the management's loyalty to creditors or shareholders 
was "clearly a function of the company's solvency. The managements of solvent compan~es 
never aligned with creditors, while the managements of insolvent companies did so 
frequently.,,62 Thus, while Chapter 11 may not provide the best and cheapest means of 
governing an insolvent firm, one cannot say that managers are universally well entrenched. 
In contrast, the few studies of small business bankruptcies tell a tale of virtual 
management autonomy.63 In his 1983 study of small business bankruptcies, LoPucki 
concluded that "the debtors studied were able to continue in complete control of their 
businesses while they were under the jurisdiction of the COurt."64 This problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that in terms of numbers of cases, small cases far outweigh the cases 
involving large, publically held debtors,os and the fact that the vast majority of such cases do 
not result in a confirmed plan.66 
One of the difficulties with small business bankruptcies is that the procedures set out 
in Chapter 11 are too costly and cumbersome to provide an effective reorganization 
framework for these cases.67 While the governance difficulties encountered in these cases 
61 See Stuart R. Gilson and Michael R. Vetsuypens, Creditor Control in Financially 
DistressedFirms: EmpiricalEvidence, 72 Wash. U.L.Q. 1005, 1011-15 (1994) (summarizing recent 
studies). 
62 Lynn M. LoPucki and William C. Whitford, , supra note 5, at 75. 
63 Kerkman, The Debtor in Full Control - A Case for Adoption of the Trustee System, 70 
MARQ. L. REv. 159 (1987), LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control: Systems Failure Under Chapter 
11 of the Bankruptcy Code? - First Installment, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99 (1983) (hereinafter" Debtor 
in Full Controlf'); LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control: Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code? - Second Installment, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247 (1983). 
64 LoPucki, Debtor in Full Control I, supra note 64, at 120-2l. 
6!l See NBRC REPoRT, supra note 6, at 632 (concluding that defining small business 
bankruptcies as involving debtors with debtor less than $5,000,000 would include within that 
definition 85% of all of the Chapter 11 cases filed). 
66 See NBRC REPoRT, supra note 6, at 610-11 citing studies that indicate that as few as 10-
12% of all Chapter 11 cases result in an effective reorganization. 
67 NBRC REPoRT, supra note 6, at 614-15, quoting Hon. Alexander L. Paskay & Frances 
Pilaro Wolstenholme, Chapter 11: A Growing Cash Cow: Some Thoughts on How to Rein in the 
System, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 331 (1993) ("It takes no elaborate empirical study to justify 
the conclusion that the problems facing a publicly held corporation facing a mass-tort problem, are 
quite removed from a "mom-pop" corporation running a shoe repair shop .... "). 
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may to some extent be related to this problem, there is another important element that 
distinguishes small from large Chapter II cases .. In small caSes, creditors are unlikely to 
have an interest in closely monitoring managers.68 The size of their claims and the remote 
chance that they will receive anything close to a full payout on their claims, limit individual 
creditors' incentive to take an active interest in the case.69 In the vast majority of cases it is 
difficult to find creditors with enough at stake in the case to be willing to serve on a 
creditors' committee. Studies indicate that creditors' committees are formed only in around 
15% of all Chapter 11 cases.70 
This lack of creditor participation leaves the course of the reorganization to the 
debtor's management and to the secured creditors (ifany). The views of the vast middle-
who are likely to occupy the position of the residual claimants in the case - are likely to be 
effectively silenced in the process. In cases in which there is no significant secured creditor, 
the lack of a committee creates the conditions necessary for managerial entrenchment and 
delay. 
B. The Connection Between Bankruptcy Policy and Governance 
Apart from the cases involving claim settlement, there has been no trend in the 
reported decisions to adopt a residual claim approach to governance questions in Chapter 11. 
Of course, that does not mean that courts are insensitive to the solvency or lack thereof in 
the cases that they confront. There is every reason to believe that bankruptcy judges have 
always looked to the incentives that might underlie various claimants positions -- even if they 
do not memorialize that examination in their written opinions. Still, the lack of an explicit 
use of such an approach outside of the settlement context requires an explanation. As the 
68 The court in In re Bayou Self, 73 B.R. 682 (Bankr. W.O. Louisiana) recognized this 
problem in the following passage: 
In most Chapter 11 cases, particularly the smaller ones, creditors, particularly 
unsecured creditors, are inactive. The debtor's obligations are so spread among a 
multitude of creditors that frequently no creditor, or creditors' committee ifther is 
one, has a sufficient stake to pursue its interests. Yet, the creditors collectively over 
a number of cases can sustain substantial and needless losses if measures are not taken 
to insure that prompt efforts are taken to rehabilitate the debtor, if possible. 
Id at 683. 
69 In addition, unsecured creditors likely recognize that the benefits of any special interest that 
they take in the case will have to be shared with other unsecured creditors. This creates a classic free-
rider problem that results in inadequate monitoring of the managers actions. See Skeel, supra note 
5, at 520-22. 
70 See NBRC REPoRT, supra note 6, at 642, citing SUMMARY BY CIRCUIT OF 
CREDITOR COMMITTEE DATA, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF UNITED STATES TRUSTEES d (February 21, 1996) . 
. = 
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following discussion suggests, one reason for the absence of such analysis may be found by 
examining the complex normative commitments underlying Chapter 11. 
In addition to the practical problems resulting from creditor indifference, one of the 
principal difficulties in applying general principles of corporate governance in the 
reorganization context is the lack of a clear consensus regarding the goals of the bankruptcy 
process. For example, general governance principles dictate that the views of shareholders 
regarding the viability of the business enterprise be devalued in most cases. Shareholders 
of a hopelessly insolvent enterprise put nothing at risk in the business decision to reorganize 
rather than liquidate. Since it is probably a safe empirical assumption that most bankruptcies 
involve hopelessly insolvent enterprises, it is tempting to go one step further and suggest that 
shareholders be completely disabled from participating in the Chapter 11 case. It is possible 
that a blanket rule that prohibited shareholders from participating in any Chapter 11 
distribution would eliminate the holdup power shareholders exercise in the case.71 While 
such an approach might create difficulties retaining the continued involvement of 
shareholders who are critical to the viability of the business, it may well be LlIat the losses 
from reorganizations that fail for lack of continued management involvement would be more 
than offset by the gains from improved governance.72 
Commentators have advocated such proposals, but none have garnered widespread 
support. Perhaps one of the reasons for this lack of support is suspicion regarding the 
claimed efficiency gains of such proposals. A more fundamental reason is our national 
ambivalence regarding the purposes of Chapter 11. As a general matter, we see Chapter 11 
as a means of maximizing creditor recovery through the preservation of going concern value. 
At the same time, Chapter 11 is hailed as a method of preserving jobs and communities that 
are affected by financial failure. 73 These goals are sometimes complimentary; but, perhaps 
71 See Skee~ supra note 5, at 510-13 (suggesting that shareholders be disabled from holding 
elections during Chapter 11 and proposing a relaxed ''for cause" standard that would enable creditors 
to replace the board of directors in more cases); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, 
Preemptive Cram Down, 65 AM. BANKR. L.1. 625, 633 (1991) (proposing a "preemptive cramdown" 
that would extinguish the claims of a class upon a showing that claims of the senior classes clearly 
exceed the value of the debtor). 
72 Various proposals for the repeal or radical reform of the process would create such a 
result. The simplest such proposal, first suggested by Douglas Baird, is the repeal of the 
reorganization provisions of Chapter 11 and the use of Chapter 7 to conduct an auction for the 
business as a going concern. The proceeds from the auction could then be distributed among the 
claimants in accordance with the absolute priority role. Baird, supra note 41. The auction would end 
equity's participation in the case if the proceeds were insufficient to satisfy all of the claims. 
73 The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code states, "The purpose of a business 
reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to restructure a business's finances so that it may 
continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its 
stockholders." See H REP. No. 595, 95th Congo 2d Sess. 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N., pp. 
c - 20 
more often, they are directly conflicting. 
When a company has real going concern value - that is when the value of the 
company as an operating entity exceeds the liquidation value of the company - the goals 
of preserving jobs and communities and maximizing creditor values are entirely consonant. 
To the extent that the reorganization process keeps firms together that should be kept 
together everyone benefits.74 Where the asset values that might be achieved in an orderly 
liquidation exceed those of the firm as a going concern, however, the interests of the 
creditors and those of the non-creditor stakeholders of the firm diverge.7s Of course, if we 
could be certain regarding going concern value or the lack thereof: the conflict would present 
a straightforward policy question that would be ripe for debate and resolution. But in the 
real world of uncertainty, the system does not explicitly resolve the conflict and ambivalence 
reIgns. 
This ambivalence manifests itself in the reorganization governance structure. The 
continued participation of managers in the running the corporation creates a bias in favor of 
reorganization.76 Shareholders and managers of insolvent companies have every reason to 
desire an attempt at reorganization regardless of the efficiency of such an attempt. 77 The bias 
inures not only to the benefit of the shareholders and managers but also to the benefit of 
other corporate stakeholders. Employees, suppliers and the surrounding community benefit 
5963, 6179. A number of commentators have stressed the importance of considering the effect of 
bankruptcy on constituencies other than the investors. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 
54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 785-789 (1987) ; Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an 
Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REv. 336, 352-360 (1993) [hereinafter Warren, Imperfect World]; 
Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 
717, 766-768 (1991); Donald R. Korobkin, Contract arianism and the Normative Foundations of 
BanJa-uptcy Law, 71 TEx. L. REv. 541, 545-547 (1993); Karen Gross, The Need to Take Community 
Interests into Account in BanJa-uptcy: An &say, 72 WASH. U.L.Q. 1031 (1994); David Gray Carlson, 
Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1341 (1987). 
74 Warren, Imperfect World, supra note 73, at 354-56. 
7S See Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits of the 
Judicial Process, 74 N.C.L. Rev. 75, 94-99 (1995) (hereinafter, Redistributive Policies). 
76 See Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk Allocation, 
forthcoming TuLANE L. REv. 
77 See LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 5, at 685 (liThe holders of 
undelWater claims and interests often have reason to oppose liquidation until the distributions to them 
under the reorganization plan have been fixed); see also Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon 
Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Director's Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1496 
(1993) ("Shareholders [ofan insolvent firm] are highly motivated to overinvest in risky projects and 
to under-invest in stable ones. Shareholders are also likely to delay liquidation, even if this strategy 
causes further loss to the firm. "). 
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from the continued operation of the debtor" as well as from the possibility (albeit remote) 
of a turnaround in the business fortunes.79 
While the Code does not explicitly take account of these stakeholder interests, the 
structural bias in favor of reorganization may reflect a normative commitment that goes 
beyond that of efficiency. Recall that the standard for judging business decisions set out 
above is neutral regarding the distributional effect of the decision.1O In that economic 
analysis, business decisions are judged against a value maximizing standard. Distributional 
concerns such as the effect of the decision on non-creditor stakeholders find no place in such 
an analysis. 
Thus, the simple economic model of bankruptcy governance fails to capture what is 
really going on in bankruptcy cases. Rather than focusing solely on,value maximization, 
there is a complex array of considerations including, perhaps first and· foremost, a desire to 
maximize for creditor recovery, but also including a general sense that every corporate debtor 
deserves at least a chance at reorganization - if not for the sake of the corporation itself: 
at least for the sake of the corporations dependents. Regardless of the desirability of this 
policy,11 the nonnative commitments underlying the approach seem to be reflected in the 
Code and therefore have a real effect on the governance structure. 
This observation also provides an explanation for the use of residual claim analysis 
in the litigation settlement cases12 and its absence in courts' analysis of other types of issues. 
In the abstract, the question of whether to settle litigation is no different from the decision 
to continue an attempt at reorganization, to invest in a new plant or any other economic 
decision. A decision to forego a settlement offer represents an investment of the settlement 
proceeds in the litigation. A litigant seeking to maximize his or her wealth will reject a 
settlement only if the present value of the expected returns from the litigation exceed the 
present value of the settlement offer. The settlement cases generally do not implicate any 
concerns about non-investor stakeholders in the business, however. Thus the residual claim 
approach provides a way in which the court may analyze the settlement offer to the end of 
maximizing the value of the estate without concern over how the decision might affect those 
interests. 
In sum, the principal effect of the complex normative commitments underlying 
71 See Roundtable Discussion, What Constitutes Success in a Chapter 11, 2 AM. BANKR. 
INsT. L. REv. 229, 233-37 (1994). 
79 The company could strike oil. The point here is not that companies often strike oil during 
a reorganization, however, Instead it is that the possibility of some huge business success, however 
remote, is of value to the stakeholders. 
10 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
II I have stated elsewhere that I find this more expansive view of the reorganization process 
flawed. See Frost, Redistributive Policies, supra note 75, at 112-38. 
12 See supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text. 
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· Chapter 11 is to make impossible the distillation of bankruptcy governance to a single 
principle. The competing concerns the bankruptcy process addresses create conflicts that 
cannot be resolved by a simple rule of decision. Instead, bankruptcy governance involves 
a flexible structure that includes the allocation of responsibility for conflict resolution 
coupled with a respect for local customs and judicial attitudes. The structure is adaptable 
-. changing to meet the facts of the situation at hand. It is also pragmatic - responding to 
problems using the resources at hand. 
N. THE PRAGMATISM OF BANKRUPTCY GoVERNANCE 
Expanding the range of constituencies, the interests of whom the bankruptcy system 
must consider, exacerbates the governance problems inherent in Chapter 11. Reconsider the 
question of fiducial)' duties. To the extent that the Chapter 11 process is intended to benefit 
the shareholders of the company as well as the creditors, one cannot take too literally the 
notion that fiduciary duties should benefit creditors when the corporation is insolvent. 
Shareholders are also worthy of managers' consideration. The need to serve two masters 
with conflicting interests require that managers strike some balance between the two. 83 One 
commentator has suggested that the underlying principle of bankruptcy governance is that 
the debtor-in-possession may, and perhaps must, 84 make an effort to reorganize the debtor 
(notwithstanding the contrary desires of the creditors) unless that attempt appears to be 
83 While a conflict of obligation creates an uncomfortable legal 
environment that lacks clarity, the officers, directors, and managers of 
the DIP owe obligations of care, honesty, and reason to both the 
creditors of the bankrupt and its owners. The DIP thus operates in an 
inherent conflict. The DIP's obligation is to resolve that conflict in a 
reasoned, balanced and honest manner. 
Raymond T. Nunmer and Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance: Fiduciary Duties, 
Business Judgment, Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 BANKR. DEV. 1. 1, 33 (1989). Professor Campbell 
points out that outside the bankruptcy context managers often represent "multiple masters, including 
majority common shareholders, minority common shareholders and preferred shareholders. See 
Campbell, supra note 12, at 593. 
84 Congress intended to make it clear that, even if insolvency may render 
the shareholders' continued economic interests in the corporation 
problematical, shareholders nevertheless retain their ownership 
interest. Therefore, it would be anomalous to interpret the Bankruptcy 
Code to mean that once a corporation is insolvent directors no longer 
owe any fiduciary duty to shareholders. 
Miller, Corporate Governance, supra note 13, at 1495. 
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hopeless." While this principle appears to provide a standard against which managerial 
actions might be judged, in practice, the idea, standing alone grants managers broad 
discretion that is very difficult to limit. 86 
As noted above,87 outside of bankruptcy, the fiduciary principle is but a component 
of a broader governance structure that includes contract and market elements. The special 
problems addressed by bankruptcy require that the contract and market elements of the non-
bankruptcy structure be curtailed. In addition, the expansion of the scope of beneficiaries 
to whom managers owe duties of care and loyalty further weaken the fiduciary principle as 
a means of control over managerial misbehavior. Our normative commitments preclude an 
approach to the supervision of management that focuses simply on the interests and desires 
of the residual claimants to the assets. Add in a dash of rational disinterest from a widely 
dispersed creditor body and you have a recipe for nearly unfettered discretion by possibly 
opportunistic managers. 
Of course, one must not forget that bankruptcy decisions take place in the context of 
a judicial proceeding. Bankruptcy judges serve as the ulthllate defense against managerial 
self-aggrandizement. Most important decisions require judicial approval. 88 Bankruptcy 
judges have the power to displace managers through the appointment of a trustee.89 They can 
declare futile an attempt to reorganize through their authority to convert or dismiss the case.90 
They can move cases along by shortening (or refusing to extend) the exclusivity period. 91 
But their ability completely to control the case is subject to an inherent limitation caused by 
the very source of their authority. Bankruptcy judges are judges and thus are by nature 
limited to a judicial role. They decide disputes that are brought before them, they can act 
only on the information submitted to them. They are required to be above the fray, not in 
the middle of it. 
8S Miller, Corporate Governance, supra note 13, at 1496 ("[I]t seems that when the financial 
condition of a corporation is "hopelessly" insolvent, such that there is little or no chance that 
stockholders would have any equity interest in the corporation, a debtor's directors no longer have 
any duty to pursue actions that may prejudice the debtor, its business, and the interests of senior 
classes. "). 
86 This problem has plagued advocates of corporate constituency statutes that enable 
managers to consider the interests of non-shareholder constituencies in responding to takeover 
attempts. See Campbell, supra note 12, at 622 ("Constituency statutes ... provide an obfuscation 
opportunity that facilitates [managerial opportunism]"). 
87 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
88 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (1994) (requiring judicial approval of transactions outside of the 
ordinary course of business). 
89 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1994). 
90 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1994). 
91 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d) (1994). 
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Notwithstanding this limitation, bankruptcy judges have devised ways in which 
managerial discretion might be checked. Judges have taken a more active role in case 
administration. They have made use of examiners and mediators in an effort to resolve 
conflicts over plan development Perhaps more significantly - at least to debtor~s counsel 
- courts have placed some of the burden on the attorneys involved in the case to monitor 
the actions of managers and to exercise some control over the reorganization process. The 
following discussion addresses these methods and some of the problems that they create. 
A. Case Management 
Bankruptcy judges have shown a remarkable creativity in developing case 
management techniques that preserve their role as impartial adjudicators while insuring that 
Chapter 11 cases do not languish. These solutions range from the systematic application of 
a "fast track" procedural system for small Chapter 11 's to the ad hoc use of status 
conferences and scheduling orders and sua sponte heari-.ngs designed to move parties swiftly 
toward the resolution of the case. 
In 1987, Judge Thomas Small of the Eastern District of North Carolina introduced a 
fast track procedure for small bankruptcy cases.92 The approach involves an accelerated 
schedule for the filing of the plan, and conditional approval of the disclosure statement with 
the court approving both the plan and the disclosure statement in one hearing.93 If the debtor 
fails to comply with the deadlines, the Bankruptcy Administratoz-94 files a motion requiring 
the debtor in possession to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. Other Judges 
have followed Judge Small's lead in instituting fast track procedures.95 
While the fast track system is widely touted as a method of reducing the costs of 
Chapter 11 thus making reorganization available to small debtors, the approach also has 
significant governance benefits. Managers recognizing that a day of reckoning is close at 
hand will have less incentive to delay the case in hopes of a turnaround in the debtor's 
business fortunes. The data regarding fast track procedures certainly shows that the 
procedure moves cases through Chapter 11 more quickly. A study of Chapter 11 cases 
before and after Judge Mund of the Central District of California instituted a fast track 
procedure show substantial reduction in the median time to confirmation (24.1%), conversion 
92 See generally, Hon. A Thomas Small, Small Business Bankruptcy Cases, 1 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REv. 305 (1993) (discussing the fast track procedure). 
93 Id at 309. 
94 The Bankruptcy Administrator is counterpart to the trustee in the judicial districts in 
Alabama and North Carolina. 
9S See NBRC REPoRT, supra note 6, at 615, n.1569. 
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(44.1%), dismissal (53.5%) and the total days in Chapter 11 (45.4%).96 
We cannot always equate acceleration of the process with improved governance. 
Managers still retain information and initiation advantages that allow them to continue to 
exercise wide discretion. But, the fast track procedures do reduce the ability of managers 
to use delay to petpetuate their employment and to extract concessions from creditors. The 
stricter requirements of the fasttrack procedures provide creditors with some assurance that 
there will be an outside limit to the delay they will experience. 
The 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code added provisions that permit a 
business with debts under $2 million to elect fast track treatment.97 These provisions limit 
the exclusivity period to 100 days and require that all plans be filed within 160 days. An 
increase in the 100 day period requires that the debtor show that the need for an increase is 
"caused by circumstances for which the debtor should not be held accountable.,,91 In 
addition to the limitation on the exclusivity period, the small business amendments allow the 
disclosure hearing to be combined with the confirmation hearin~ and grant the court 
discretion to dispense with the requirement that a creditors' committee be appointed. loo 
As an approach to corporate governance, the 1994 statutory incorporation of the fast 
track approach leaves much to be desired, however. While the small business definition 
captures a . majority of Chapter 11 cases,IOI small business treatment is only applicable to 
those debtors who elect such treatment.102 The procedures adopted by Judge Small and 
Judge Mund are not so limited. Neither approach employs a dollar limitation. Instead, the 
Judges base their decision regarding fast track status on their own experience with 
96 Hon. Samuel L. Bufford, Chapter 11 Case Management and Delay Reduction: an 
Empirical Study, 4 AM. BANKR.lNST. L. REv. 85, 101 (1996). 
97 See 11 U.S.c. § 101(51)(C) (1994) (defining "small business as having noncontingent 
unliquidated debts ofless than 52 million). 
91 11 U.S.C. § 1121(e) (1994). 
99 11 U.S.C. § 1125(f) (1994). 
100 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(3) (1994). 
101 Statistics compiled by the NBRC indicate that 72% of all debtors fall within the 52 million 
debt limitation. NBRC REPoRT, supra note 6, at 630-31. 
102 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(e) (1994) The only real incentives to elect such treatment are the 
streamlined procedures for approval of the disclosure statement and the elimination of the mandatory 
creditors committee. These incentives are likely to be inadequate to ensure a widespread election of 
smaIl business treatment for two reasons. First the combination of the disclosure statement and plan 
approval processes may seNe only to compress the time within which the debtor is expected to 
confirm a plan. Second, statistics indicate that creditors' committees are rarely appointed in small 
_. 
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In addition to this structural approach to case management, the 1994 amendments 
~ explicitly grant bankruptcy judges the authority, on their own motion or on the motion of a 
~ ~ party in interest, to hold a status conference and to enter detailed scheduling orders. 1M Judge 
Fenning of the Central District of California recently authored an article in which she noted: 
Two kinds of chapter 11 cases come through the bankruptcy judge's door: 
Debtors that may be able to confinn a plan, and those that are hopeless. The 
two types call for different case management approaches. The problem is 
telling them apart at the beginning of the case. No simple litmus test is 
available, but most experienced bankruptcy judges find it relatively easy to 
sort about 90 percent of all chapter 11 cases into those two categories after just 
one or two hearings. lOS 
Judge Fenning believes that early status conferences provide a method through which she can 
identify "zombie cases" and terminate them quicldy.106 In a similar vein, Judge Clark of the 
Western District of Texas has written of the practice of judges in Texas to enter scheduling 
orders that respond to motions for relief from the automatic stay in single asset real estate 
cases.107 These orders require the debtor to achieve confinnation of a plan by a date certain 
or face foreclosure or case dismissal. 101 
One potential concern with this more active role for bankruptcy judges is that it may 
conflict with their role as impartial adjudicators.109 The 1978 Code went to some lengths to 
remove bankruptcy judges from the day-to-day administration of cases. 110 Prior to the 
103 Bufford, supra note 96, at 99; Small, supra note 92, at 307. Judge Small also seeks the 
recommendation of the Bankruptcy Administrator. Id 
~el~ 104 11 U:'S-.C Sec.-l05(d) (1994). Many judges held conferences and entered such orders 
beforeThe enactIlietit of the statutory authorization. Of course, one benefit of the explicit authority . 
of the court to enter into detailed scheduling orders validates one of the key components of the fast 
track approach. 
lOS Hon. Lisa Hill Fenning, Judicial Case Management Is No Hostile Takeover, ABI J., 
September 1996 at 35. 
106 Judge Fenning also suggests that Bankruptcy Judges should use their authority to mediate 
fundamental disputes in an effort to arrive at a consensual plan. Id at 36-37. 
107 Hon. LeifM. Clark, Chapter II-Does One Size Fit All?, 4 AMBANKR.lNsT. L. REv. 
167, 191 (1996). 
101 Id. At 191-92. 
109 See John D. Ayer, How to Think About Bankruptcy EthiCS, 60 AM. BANKR. L.l 355, 397 
(1986) ("The extent to which a judge may, in fact, act sua sponte is a measure of how much he is a 
participant, and how much a mere decider ofissues."). 
110 See Id ("It seems clear that a dominant purpose of the 1978 Code was to reduce the 
judge's sua sponte role."); see also, Harvey R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A 
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enactment of the Code, bankruptcy judges took an active role in supeTVlsmg and 
administering cases - two roles that the Congress believed placed the judge in an "untenable 
position of conflict that compromises his impartiality as an arbiter of bankruptcy disputes."lll 
Active case management is a far cry from the administrative duties formerly placed 
on bankruptcy judges, however. l12 Federal and state judges have increasingly taken an active 
role in managing cases to assure that they move toward completion.1l3 Also, as one 
commentator has pointed OUt,1l4 Congress evidenced an intent to provide judges more latitude 
in controlling cases by adding language to Section 105 in 1986 making explicit the authority 
of bankruptcy judges to issue sua sponte orders. us 
This change has increased substantially the ability of bankruptcy judges to actively 
manage cases. Prior to the 1986 amendments, Section 1112(b) allowed only a "party in 
interest" to move for a conversion or dismissal of a Chapter 11 case. The legislative history 
surrounding the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code shows that the restriction of Section 
1112(b) to parties in interest was a conscious choice on the part of the Code's drafters that 
Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as Producer, Director, and Sometimes Star of the 
Reorganization Passion Play, 69 AM. BANK. L.J 431, 433-34 (1996) (hereinafter Changing Face). 
III H. REP. No. 595, 95th Congo 2d Sess. 89. 
112 Of particular concern was the bankruptcy judges' involvement in the appointment and 
supervision of trustees who were involved as litigants in the cases. See Miller, Changing Face, supra 
note llO, at 434. 
113 See, e.g., MANuAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION THIRD, at 14-15 (1995) (characterizing 
effective judicial management as active, substantive, timely, continuing, firm but fair, and carefully 
prepared). The Fifth Circuit has drawn a similar analogy: 
We do not believe, however, that Congress thereby intended to relieve the bankruptcy 
judge of the responsibility of managing the cases before him in such a way as to 
promote the objective and goals of the Bankruptcy Code. Our conclusion in this 
respect is strengthened by the fact that the bankruptcy court is an adjunct of the 
district court. District court judges function under Fed.R.Civ.P. 16 with full power 
and responsibility to manage their cases and with the directive to move their cases in 
such a way as to promote fairness to the parties and judicial economy. 
In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates Ltd., 808 F.2d 363, 373-74 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) 
(footnote omitted), aff'd 484 U.S. 365 (1988). 
114 Miller, Changing Face, supra note 110, at 435-36. 
us See 11 U.S.C. Section 105(a) (1986) (" No provision of this title providing for the raising 
of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any 
action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders 
or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.") This language was added by the Bankruptcy Judges, 
United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986; Pub. Law 99-554 Section 203. 
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evidenced their concern with "excessive judicial entanglement in administrative matters"1l6 
This histOIY, coupled with the plain meaning of Section 1112(b) led most courts considering 
the question to conclude that they were without the power to dismiss or convert cases sua 
sponte1l7 unless there was a showing that the case was filed with an "intent to abuse the 
judicial process with a hope of delaying creditors."Il. 
The 1986 amendment to Section 1 05 (a) frees bankruptcy courts from the constraints 
imposed by Section 1112.119 The legislative history is sparse, however, Senator Hatch's 
statement in support of the amendment indicates that the change was intended to allow 
bankruptcy judges more latitude in managing their cases. l20 As further support for a more 
active bankruptcy judiciary, several cases have cited the admonition of the Fifth Circuit in 
In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates Ltd: 
Early and ongoing judicial management of Chapter 11 cases is essential if the 
Chapter 11 process is to smvive and if the goals of reorganizability on the one 
hand, and creditor protection, on the other, are to be achieved. In almost all 
cases the key to avoiding excessive administrative costs, which are borne by 
the unsecured creditors, as well as excessive interest expense, which is borne 
by all creditors, is early and stringent judicial management of the case. 121 
The court's opinion in In re Tax ShOpl22 provides an example of such judicial 
116 In re Gusam Restaurant Corp., 727 F.2d. 274, 277 (2d Cir. 1984). The Gusam opinion 
collects the legislative history underlying Section 1112(b) as originally enacted. Id at 276-77; see 
also, In re Moog, 774 F.2d. 1073, 1076 (111h Cir. 1985). 
117 See, Gusam, 737 F.2d at 277, see also, In re Warner, 30 B.R. 528 (9th Cir. B.AP.1983). 
118 See Moog, 774 F.2d at 1076-77 (collecting cases). 
119 See, e.g., In re Finney, 992 F.2d 43,44 (41h Cir. 1993); In re, Argus Group 1700, Inc., 206 
B.R 757 (E.D. Pa 1997); Pleasant Pointe Apartments, Ltd. v. Kentucky Housing Corporation, 139 
B.R 828 (W.D. Ky. 1992); In re Petit, 189 B.R 2'1,7 (Bankr. D. Me. 1995); In re Great American 
Pyramid Joint Venture, 144 B.R. 780 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1992); In re Tax Shop, 173 B.R. 605 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994); In re B & B West 1641h Street Corp., 147 B.R 832 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
1992); In re Daily Corp., 72 B.R. 489 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). 
120 "This bill also allows a bankruptcy court to take any action on its own, or to make any 
necessary determination to prevent an abuse of process and to help expedite a case in a proper and 
justified manner. 132 Congo Rec. 28610 (October 3, 1986) (statement of Senator Hatch) (emphasis 
added). 
121 808 F.2d at 373-74. See In re Tax Shop, 173 B.R. at 608 (quoting Timbers); In re Public 
Service Company of New Hampshire, 84 B.R 1,2 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988) (same); In re Bayou Self: 
Inc., 73 B.R. at 684 (same); In re Daily Corp., 72 B.R at 494 (same). See also, Miller, Changing 
Face, supra note 110, at 435. 
122 173 B.R 605. 
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management in the context of a fast track case. In Tax Shop, the court refused to reinstate 
a case that he had dismissed for debtor's failure to comply with his fast track scheduling 
order. As in many smaIl cases, the creditors showed no interest in the case.123 Tax Shop 
illustrates the efficacy of the sua sponte motion for dismissal for these smaIl cases. 
In re Great American Pyramid Joint Venture,124 provides an example of the use of a 
sua sponte order in a more complex case. Great American Pyramid involved the Chapter 11 
cases of six entities that were involved in the development of an entertainment and sports 
arena (in the shape of pyramid) in Memphis. Despite the involvement of creditors and other 
parties in interest, the court issued a sua sponte order to show cause why the cases should 
not be converted or dismissed. l25 Before the hearing was held on the court's order, the City 
and County filed their own Section 1112(b) motions. l26 While it is difficult to determine 
what would have happened absent the court's order, it is likely that the order had the effect 
of spurring the creditors to action. 127 
This case illustrates one of the benefits of a sua sponte order. Motions to dismiss or 
convert require the debtor to provide some evidence of the likelihood of a reorganization. 
They provide a means through which the reality of the debtors efforts to reorganize might 
be examined. Making such a determination can be a complex undertaking, however, and 
creditors may be reluctant to bring a Section 1112(b) motion prematurely. Sua sponte orders 
might act as a form of judicial signal to the parties in interest that the judge would be 
receptive to a Section 1112 motion which might in turn overcome creditor reluctance and 
place the issue squarely before the judge. 
Short of outright dismissal, several bankruptcy courts have used their authority under 
Section 105(a) to order the appointment of a bankruptcy trustee. In In re Bibol2s the Ninth 
Circuit approved the bankruptcy court's use of its sua sponte authority to appoint a trustee 
when, on a motion to approve management fees, the court found documentation that 
established a kickback scheme involving a principal of the debtor. l29 The Ninth Circuit held 
that" [t]he statute plainly gives the bankruptcy judge authority to appoint a trustee sua 
123 The court held a status conference at which no creditors appeared, fd. at 606, and held 
a show cause hearing that no one attended. fd at 607. 
124 144 B.R. 780. 
125 Id. at 782. 
126 fd at n.2. 
127 The court converted 5 ofthe 6 cases under consideration and placed the remaining case 
on a ''fast track" fd at 794. 
1211 76 F.3d 256 (9th Cir. 1996) 
129 fd at 257. 
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sponte, "130 and further held that the evidence established cause to appoint a trustee.131 Finally 
the ninth circuit rejected the principal's claim that the bankruptcy court denied him due 
process by denying him a continuance prior to the hearing on the court's motion.132 The 
Ninth Circuit held that the notice and hearing the principal received were "appropriate in the 
circumstances" given the clear evidence of fraud and the consequent threat to the estate. 133 
Of course, such judicial management techniques only have the effect of enabling the 
judge to consider the substantive issues involved in the case. They provide no indication of 
how to resolve those problems. In Great American Pyramid, the court recognized the 
difficult substantive issues as it framed the issue: 
Quexy, what is a reasonable breathing spell and fair opportunity for a chapter 
11 debtor to seek rehabilitation before pulling the reorganization plug? The 
ultimate questions for judicial determination here, considering the realities of 
these case administrations at this time, is whether reorganization is now 
visionary only or hopeless and whether liquidation or dismissal is the only 
appropriate solution under the existing circumstances?134 
Case administration provides no answer to this dilemma and our ambivalence over the 
purposes of Chapter 11 precludes an easy answer. 
This observation points up one of the principal dangers of active judicial case 
management While status conferences, fast track procedures and sua sponte orders may be 
efficacious means of framing issues and assuring that management is not using the protection 
of Chapter 11 merely to perpetuate itself in office, quick resolution of bankruptcy cases 
should not be an end in and of itself. Take for example the decision in In re Petit. 13S Petit 
involved an individual Chapter 11 debtor whose principal asset was a cause of action against 
130 Id at 258. 
131 Id 
132 Upon the bankruptcy court's discovery of the documentation and examination of one 
witness, the court granted a short recess so that the principal could consult with counsel for the 
debtor. Id at 257. After consulting with counsel, the debtor requested a continuance. The court 
denied the request, stating: 
Id 
I want someone to take over all the assets of the debtor today. I do not want Mr. 
Fukutomi or Ms. Fukutomi to have access to any of the assets of this estate 
hereinafter from the moment they walk out the door until all this case is resolved one 
way or another. 
133 Id. at 259. See also, Matter of Embrace Systems Corp., 178 B.R. 112 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. 1995) (sole employee of debtor in possession lack of disinterestedness basis for sua sponte 
appointment of a trustee). 
134 Id at 789. 
~ 
3 13S 189 B.R. 227. 
~ 
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Key Bank. All of the counts in the complaint had been dismissed or disposed of through 
summary judgment against the debtor. One count remained on appeal, however, and at least 
one expert testified that the debtors damages were in excess of $30 million.136 Despite the 
fact that the debtor, the creditors, the trustee and the U.S. Trustee believed that the issue on 
appeal should keep the reorganization alive,137 the court sua sponte converted the case to a 
Chapter 7.138 
It is difficult to tell from the opinion precisely why the Petit court was deter;, "d 
to convert the case in the face of opposition from every constituency. The court in, ,e-s 
its belief that the debtor may have duped the creditors by holding out the possibility 01 ",uch 
a large return.139 This reading of the case is cause for concern. To the extent bankruptcy 
courts use judicial case management to substitute their judgement for that of the interested 
parties, they may step beyond the bounds of impartial decision-maker and into the role of 
active participant in the case. 140 
The court's opinion in Matter of Mother Hubbanf41 is an example of the sensitivity 
required when a bankruptcy court is exercising its authority to act sua sponte. In Mother 
Hubbard, the president and sole shareholder of the debtor proposed a plan that sought to 
contribute a late filed unsecured claim as new value.142 After denying the president's motion 
to deem the claim timely filed and after permitting an unsecured creditor to file a competing 
plan, the court considered sua sponte whether to hold a hearing to consider the appointment 
of a Chapter 11 trustee.143 In its discussion of the issue, the court noted the danger of 
involvement with administrative matters and stated its belief that the impetus for such a 
motion must come from the record. l44 While the court expressed its concern regarding the 
136 Id at 228. 
137Id 
138 Id at 229. 
139 Id at 227 ("It is a fact of life, however that while there is no statutory requirement that 
creditors be realistic or reasonable in their expectations of success, the Court does not enjoy such 
latitude and neither may we permit the Debtor to fantasize indefinately."). 
140 It is possible that the courts decision might be justified on the grounds that the Chapter 
11 process could achieve nothing that a could not be achieved more expeditiously in a Chapter 7. 
If this were the case, considerations of judicial economy coupled with a lack of benefit from judicial 
efforts might warrant conversion. The opinion is devoid of such analysis, however. 
141 152 B.R. 189 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1993). 
142 Id at 191. 
143 Id at 196-197. 
144 Id at 197 ("This judge also strongly believes it is improper to sua sponte raise such an 
issue unless persuasive evidence comes to the court's attention on the record which may lead to a 
conclusion that cause exists or an abuse of process is occurring.") 
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goals and motives of the debtor's president and sole shareholder, it noted that the unsecured 
creditor, who was also the proponent of a competing plan, and the creditor's committee had 
"sufficient incentive to monitor the Debtor's business (and [the president's] business 
judgment). "145 Accordingly, the court declined to order a hearing but admonished the 
president regarding the conduct of the business during the confumation processl46 and invited 
parties in interest with knowledge of facts constituting cause to file a motion. 147 
In sum, while case management alone cannot provide substantive solutions to the 
complex questions presented in a Chapter 11 case, it can assure the parties that the court will 
address the question in a timely manner. A necessary prerequisite to improved governance 
in Chapter 11 is a system that periodically frames the issues for the ultimate decision-maker. 
As studies of small business reorganizations have found, small bankruptcy cases often leave 
managers in full control of the process because creditors have little incentive to become 
actively involved in the cases. l48 Active case management can provide a counterbalance to 
the control managers assert over these cases. 
B. Flexible Use of Examiners 
Even with active ~ase management, bankruptcy judges suffer an informational 
disadvantage vis-a-vis managers which impairs the ability of the bankruptcy governance 
structure to provide adequate checks on managers. The case load of bankruptcy judges is 
ever increasing as new bankruptcy filings reach record heights. 149 The resulting time 
limitations, coupled with the limits of the adjudicative role allow managers to restrict the 
information available to the parties and the judge. 
Of course, the Code requires that managers provide some information to the other 
participants in the case. The Code requires the debtor in possession to file periodic reports 
and summaries of operation of the business with the court, the United States trustee, and 
taxing entities and to respond to requests for infonnation by parties in interest. ISO In addition, 
creditor's committees, in those cases in which they are appointed, are charged with 
consulting with the debtor in possession concerning the administration of the case and 
145 Id 
146 Id ("Van Zoeren shall act in accordance with his fiduciary obligations, as contrasted to 
his personal desires, to assure a 'level playing field' is maintained until the conclusion of the 
confirmation hearings on the competing plans.") 
147 Id at 198. 
148 See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text. 
149 Total bankruptcy filings reached a record high of 1,178,555 in 1996. 1997 BANKRUPTCY 
YEARBOOK AND ALMANAC 32 (1997). Thus even though the Chapter 11 caseload is about half of 
the peak years 1985-86 and 1990-93, Id, the bankruptcy system is strained. 
ISO 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(8), 1106(a)(I) (1994). 
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investigating the debtor and its management. 151 
While these provisions assure that the debtor's managers are subject to broad 
oversight, they may be inadequate to highlight more subtle information that managers hold 
about the prospects for reorganization. Only involvement in the day-to-day operations of the 
debtor will provide the detail required to make an accurate assessment of those prospects. 
In addition, the acquisition of knowledge about alternatives to reorganization, requires that 
one take the initiative to explore those alternatives. While an active creditors' committee in 
a large case, may take that initiative,152 in smaller cases, there may be no one to do so but the 
judge who, of course, must look to managers for suggestions. 
Commentators have suggested that courts make flexible use of the provisions of 
Chapter 11 allowing the court to appoint an examiner to counteract this difficulty.1s3 
Traditionally, examiners have been appointed in cases in which there has been some need 
to investigate the pre-bankruptcy conduct of the :firm managers or shareholders. But, in 
several large cases, courts have charged examiners with mediating disputes, bringing suits 
and operating the debtor's business. l54 Courts could also use examiners to provide the court 
an unbiased review of specific decisions thus alleviating, somewhat, the information 
monopoly held by the managers. m 
Section 1104 provides the necessary authority for such a flexible use of examiners. 
The statute authorizes the court to appoint an examiner to "conduct such investigation as is 
appropriate" if the appointment is in the best interests of the creditors, equity holders and 
other interests in the estate.156 Section 11 04( c) provides a list of the subjects of such an 
151 11 U.S.C. §§ 11 03 (c) (1994). 
152 Even in large cases, the creditors committee may be at a severe disadvantage. Zaretsky 
questioned the ability of creditors committees to control the management of the debtor: 
[A] committee is not involved in the day-to-day operations of the debtor and is often 
in the position of responding to initiatives generated by the debtor. Its information 
comes primarily form the debtor and may reflect the debtor's sumetimes unduly 
optimitstic assessments. Accordingly, a committee usually cannot set the direction 
of the busieness or the tone of the operations. 
Zaretsky, supra note 43, at 914. 
153 Id at 940-61; Frost, Running the Asylum, supra note 5, at 132. Professor Adams has 
proposed the more radical solution under which the debtor in possession would share decision-
making authority with prepetition managers. See Adams, supra note 5, at 620-23. 
154 See Zaretsky, supra note 43, at 940-61 (discussing the various uses to which courts have 
put examiners). 
155 Id at 955 ("[S]ome bankruptcy courts have employed examiners as the 'eyes and ears' 
of the court .... "). 
156 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) appears to require the court to appoint an examiner when the 
debtor's debts exceed $5 million. Several courts have denied appointment of examiners in such cases, 
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investigation that seems to require that there be some allegation of fraud, dishonesty, or 
incompetence, but the provision makes clear that the list is illustrative only.l" 
A few courts have made use of this flexible authority, typically coupling specific 
informational charges with a general charge to mediate the case. For example, the courts 
charge to the examiner in the Apex Oil Company Chapter 11 included taking, "any necessary 
and appropriate actions in furtherance of assisting the Court and parties in bringing these 
proceedings to ajust, prompt and economic disposition."m This broad charge required the 
examiner to undertake, for example, extensive monitoring of the debtor's efforts to stabilize 
its business post-petition;lS9 mediation of a number of disputes;16Oand an investigation into 
the good faith of asset purchasers for purposes of Section 363(m).161 
The court in In re Public Service of New Hampshire162 appointed an examiner to 
resolve a somewhat more specific problem. The parties in Public Service had reached a 
difficult point in negotiations that revolved around the arcana of utility rate making. In 
addition to the desirability of a third party mediator, the court noted that it needed assistance 
"in understanding some of the rather arcane concepts employed in the utility rate-setting 
regulatory world in order to properly perform its duties."163 
Finally, in In re Big Rivers Electric Cooperative, 164 the court appointed an examiner 
specifically to address allegations that the management was violating its fiduciary duty to 
maximize the value of the estate regarding a long term lease of substantially all of its 
generating assets.16S The examiner's investigation revealed the existence of a ''No Shopping" 
clause in the lease and concluded that the debtor had "failed to develop bids submitted by 
however. See Zaretsky, supra note 43, at 938-39. The National Bankruptcy Review Commission 
has recommended that the mandatory language in Section 11 04( c) be deleted. NBRC 
REcOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 23. 
1S7 11 U.S.C. § 102(3) ("includes" and including are not limiting). In re Public Service 
Company of New Hampshire, 99 B.R. 177, 182 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989) ("The Debtor's strict 
interpretation of "examiner" as merely an investigator of fraud and other irregularities is 
unwarranted. "). 
1S8 In re, Apex Oil Company, III B.R. 235, 237 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990); rev'd, 132 B.R. 
613 (E.D. Mo. 1991); aff'd in part, rev'd in part (960 F.2d 728 (81b Cir. 1992). 
1S9 Id. at 238 
160 Id at 24l. 
161 Id at 24l. 
162 99 B.R. 177(Bankr. D.N.H. 1989). 
163 Id at 182. 
164 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1368 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1997). 
16S Id at 7-9. 
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parties other than [the proposed lessee]."I66 The court, noting its duty to maximize the value 
of the estatel67 as well as the duty of the debtor to do the same,168 subsequently ordered an 
auction of the assets resulting in a binding commitment for $50 million more than offered 
by the original proposed lessee.l69 Thus, through the use of an examiner, the court was able 
to penetrate the informational monopoly held by management. The combination of the 
investigative functions of the examiner with a mediation function provides governance 
benefits in addition to the expected economies associated with alternative dispute 
resolution. 170 The requirement that the examiner/mediator file a report with the court may 
deter managers or shareholders from taking strategic positions in the negotiations simply to 
delay the ultimate resolution of the case.171 In addition, involvement in the negotiations may 
provide the examiner an opportunity to obtain information about the prospects of the 
business and the managers' operation of the business that would not otherwise come to light. 
Of course, examiners are not without costs and the economics of many small cases 
will not support the luxmy of third party involvement. Thus, it is not swprising that most 
of the reported cases in which courts have used examiners as described here have involved 
large debtors with active creditors' committees and complex issues. But, if the task of the 
examiner is narrowly defined to the investigation of the viability of the enterprise or the 
desirability of a particular course of action, the court may keep the costs in check. In 
addition, examiners need not be bankruptcy professionals. l72 If the examiner's task is to 
evaluate a business decision, the analysis might be most appropriately accomplished by 
someone knowledgeable in the field. 
In addition to cost, the flexible use of examiners may give rise to concerns regarding 
the adjudicative function of the bankruptcy judge. To the extent bankruptcy judges use 
examiners as a surrogate judge with the ability to achieve results that they themselves might 
166 Id at 16. 
167 Id at 47. 
168 Id at 24. 
169 Id at 27. 
1'70 The requirement that the examiner file a report may, however,impair the ability to reach 
a settlement because the parties cannot be assured that their communications with the examiner will 
remain confidential. Mabey, Tabb, and Dizengoff note that, "an examiner as mediator is not classic 
mediation. Rather, the examiner is clothed with judicial authority .... " Ralph R. Mabey, et. al., 
Expanding the Reach 0/ Alternative Dispute Resolution in Bankruptcy: The Legal and Practical 
Bases/or the Use o/Mediation and the Other Forms 0/ ADR, 46 S.C.L. REv. 1259 (1995). Thus, 
the use of an examiner as an "investigative mediator" may involve a tradeoff between governance and 
ADR benefits. 
171 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(4) (1994). 
172 See NBRC REPoRT, supra note 6, at 658 (discussing the Licensed Insolvency Officer 
concept used in the United Kingdom in which accountants are used to administer insolvency cases). 
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be prohibited from accomplishing, their role as impartial adjudicators of disputes might be 
called into question. As noted above,l73 the Bankruptcy Code was intended to relieve 
bankruptcy judges from the duty of administering cases in an effort to assure that the judges 
could exercise their adjudicative powers free from any appearance of partiality. To this end, 
Bankruptcy Rule 9003 prohibits ex parte communication by an examiner unless otherwise 
authorized by applicable law.174 This prohibition assures that the judge remains above the 
fray as an adjudicator of facts developed through the normal operation of the adversary 
system. 
C. Attorney Compensation 
One way that bankruptcy judges have found to improve governance is to look to the 
professionals already involved in the case for assistance in policing managers. In large 
reorganizations, this burden is shared by the wide range of professionals employed by the 
debtor in possession, the committees, and other significant creditors.175 In smaller cases, 
which are marked by the absence of committee and large creditor involvement, a large share 
of the governance burden often rests with the attorney for the debtor in possession. In what 
is doubtless an alarming trend for bankruptcy debtor's counsel, bankruptcy courts have 
increasingly used their authority over fee applications as a method of policing managerial 
and shareholder behavior in Chapter 11 cases. 
Outside of bankruptcy, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct enjoin attorneys 
retained by "organizations" (including corporations) to remember that they represent "the 
organization acting as through its duly authorized constituents"176 and require that conflicts 
between their client and the individuals running the client (including the person who signs 
the attorney's check) are to be resolved in favor of the client!77 The Model Rules provide 
173 See notes 109-111, supra, and accompanying text. 
174 FED. R BANKR. PRoc. 9003(a). In Big Rivers, the court held that its earlier uncontested 
final order authorizing ex parte communications by the examiner constituted "applicable law" for 
purposes of Rule 9003(a). 1997 Bankr. Lexis 1368,41-42. In addition, the court held that the failure 
to object to the order rendered subsequent motions to disqualify the judge and to remove the 
examiner untimely. Id at 29-36. 
m See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 
176 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13. 
177 If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or 
other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, 
intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation 
that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a 
violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the 
organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the 
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some guidance to attorneys regarding the appropriate response to actions by corporate 
officers and employees that the lawyer believes are not in the best interest of the corporation 
- including, as a last resort, resignation from the relationship.171 
"While corporate representation sometimes results in some discomfort for attorneys, 
the ethical obligations of an attorney representing the debtor in possessionl79 present 
difficulties that go well beyond those facing corporate lawyers outside of the bankruptcy or 
insolvency context. The attorney's obligation to the "estate" requires more vigilance than 
is required of corporate attorneys outside of bankruptcy. ISO In bankruptcy, as one court put 
it, 'lhe duty to advise the client [the DIP] goes beyond responding to the client's request for 
advice. It requires an active concern for the interests of the estate and its beneficiaries"111 
This enhanced obligation, coupled with the role of DIP counsel as an officer of the court, 
ensures that the attorney is at the center of Chapter 11 governance controversies. Not only 
do attorney's fiduciary obligations extend to all who are interested in the estate, the attorney 
has a duty to preserve the integrity of the bankruptcy process.182 The obligation of DIP 
counsel includes the duty to "carefully monitor each case and encourage conversion or 
dismissal without delay when it becomes apparent that reorganization is no longer feasible 
or that wrongdoing is taking place.,,113 Not only must the DIP counsel be vigilant in advising 
the DIP's managers regarding their fiduciary obligations, DIP counsel has an affirmative duty 
to inform the court of the managers' lapses. 114 
Of course these enhanced duties create what Jay Westbrook has referred to as 
''unavoidable conflicts inherent in the representation ofDIPs."IBs The essence of this conflict 
organization, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in 
the best interest of the organization. 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b}. 
171 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(c). 
179 Counsel for the debtor in possession is herein referred to as "DIP Counsel." This 
reference is used to draw attention to the fact that the attorney technically represents an entity that 
has duties to the estate. Neither the Code nor courts are scrupulous about the distinction between 
the debtor and the debtor in possession because, when a Chapter 11 trustee has not been appointed, 
there is no distinction. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1} (1994). 
180 See Ayer, supra note 109, at 387-90. 
111 In re Wilde Horse Enter., Inc., 136 B.R. 830, 840 (Bankr. C.D. Calif. 1991). 
112 In re JLM, Inc., 210 B.R. 19, 26 (2d Cir. BAP 1997) 
113 In re Pacific Forest Ind., Inc., 95 B.R. 740, 744 (Bankr. C.D. Calif. 1989). 
114 In re JLM, Inc. 210 B.R. at 26 (collecting cases). 
liS Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Fees and Inherent Conflicts of Interest, 1 AM. BANKR.lNST. 
L. REv. 287 (1993). See also, C. R. Bowles and Nancy B. Rapoport, Has the DIP's Attorney 
Become the Ultimate Creditor'S Lawyer in Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, 5 AM. BANKR.lNST. 
C - 38 
lies in the divergence of incentives held by the various participants in the case. Because the 
shareholders and managers are likely to have interests that differ radically from those of the 
creditors, a conflict is unavoidable. The DIP's attorney is therefore thrust into the eye of the 
storm and must avoid the urge to view the shareholders and managers as her principal 
constituency. 186 
By far the most notorious case addressing these inherent conflicts is In re Kendavis 
Ind. Int'l, Inc. l87 Kendavis involved a large reorganization in which the creditors' committee 
and certain individual creditors moved for a disgorgement of fees paid to DIP counsel 
(Locke, Purnell, Boren, Laney and Healey).188 The gravamen of the movants' allegations 
was that Locke Purnell represented both the DIP and its controlling shareholders (the Davis 
family) and had taken actions designed to benefit only the Davis family.l89 The court noted 
that correspondence among Locke Purnell, the Davis family and other professionals involved 
in the case indicated that the Davis family believed that Locke Purnell represented them.l90 
In addition the court looked to the actions of Locke Purnell during the proceeding.191 The 
L. REv. 47 (1997) (discussing the inherent conflicts involved in representing a DIP); Ayer, supra note 
109, at 387-95 (discussing the overlapping roles ofall of the attorneys in the case). Cf. Bruce A 
Markell, The Folly of Representing Insolvent Corporations: Examining Lawyer Liability and Ethical 
Issues Involved in Extending Fiduciary Duties to Creditors, 6 1. BANKR. LAW AND FRACT. 403 
(1997) (discussing the conflicts involved in representing insolvent corporations outside of bankruptcy 
and concluding that "no ethical or rational lawyer should ever willingly represent an insolvent 
corporation outside bankruptcy") 
186 "It is to insure [the] integrity of the bankruptcy processwhere, by definition, a debtor in 
possession is not disinterested, that counsel for the debtor in possession must be disinterested, free 
of any adverse entanglements which could cloud its judgment respecting what is best for the estate." 
In re JLM, Inc. 210 B.R. at 26. 
187 91 B.R. 742 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988); See also, Diamond Lumber, Inc. v. Unsecured 
Creditors' Comm. Of Diamond Lumber, Inc. (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988); In re Chapel Gate Apts. Ltd. 
64 B.R. 569 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986). Westbrook refers to all of these cases as the Kendavis trio 
of cases. Westbrook, supra note 185 at 290. 
188 In re Kendavis, 91 B.R. at 744. 
189 Id at 745-46. 
190 Id at 750-51. One of these items clearly demonstrates the nature of the conflict. One of 
the family members wrote "As Barb [apparently a member of Locke Purnell] continues to repeat and 
evezyone agrees there is no shareholder equity - so we've got nothing to loose [sic]- The banks 
have it all on the line now - not us." Id at 763. 
191 Id at 749-751. Specifically, the court examined the Debtor's new value plan finding that 
it was unconfirmable because it did not propose a substantial contribution, Id at 749, and Locke 
Purnell's vigorous opposition to the Committee's plan which called for 100% payment to all non-
bank and non-insider creditors. Id at 750. 
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comt stated that the activities of Locke Purnell ''were designed to fmther the interest interests 
of the Davis family"I92 and concluded that the totality of the evidence could lead only to the 
conclusion that Locke Purnell represented the interests of the Davis family.l93 The court 
awarded Locke Purnell only $2,000,000 of the $4,000,000 in fees previously awarded-
requiring disgorgement of the balance. 1M 
In the course of the Kendavis decision, the court engaged in a detailed analysis of 
conflicts of interest in the bankruptcy process. The court set the stage for this broader 
inquiry by stating that the case "demonstrates the problems inherent in a popular theory 
regarding representation of Debtors in bankruptcy, the concept of the 'potential' conflict of 
interest ... "195 In its discussion, the court noted that the history and statutory language of 
the disinterestedness requirement of Section 327196 creates no room for allowing 
representation of multiple entities in one or a series of related cases on the basis that the 
conflicts created are only''potential.''I97 The court's broad holding is that "whenever counsel 
for a debtor corporation has any agreement, express or implied, with management or a 
director of the debtor, or with a shareholder, or with any control party, to protect the interest 
of that party, counsel holds a conflict. "198 
Courts considering similar situations often note the difficulties that a rigid 
interpretation of the disinterestedness requirement would create, usually concluding that the 
Kendavis result should be limited to egregious conflicts such as those considered in that 
case. l99 For example, the court in In re Howelfoo approved counsel for the debtor's 
192 Id at 752. 
193 Id at 751. 
194 Id at 762-3. See 11 U.S.C. § 328(c)' (1994) (allowing the court to deny allowence of 
compensation if "at any time during such professional person's employment ... , such professional 
person is not a disinterested person, or represents or holds an interest adverse to the interest of the 
estate .... " In addition the court ordered disgorgement ofa $500,000 retainer that had been paid 
to Locke Purnell by a related Debtor but that had not been disclosed to the court. Id See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 329(a) (1994) (requiring attorneys to file a statement of compensation paid or agreed to be paid). 
195 Id at 744. 
196 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (1994) requires that professionals employed by the trustee not "hold 
or represent an interest adverse to the estate" and that such persons be "disinterested." 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(14)(E) (1994) further defines disinterested person as a person who, "does not have an interest 
materially adverse to the interest of the estate or of any class of creditors or· equity security holders 
" 
.197 In re Kendavis, 91 B.R. at 752-57. 
198 Id at 754. 
199 See, e.g., In re Spanjer Bros., Inc., 191 B.R 738, 754 (Bankr. N.D. TIl. 1996) (noting lack 
of evidence that the DIP's attorney represented management, directors, or sharholders); In re Office 
Products of America, 136 B.R 983, 988 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992) (limiting application of Ken davis 
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application for compensation even though the attorney represented the bankruptcy estates of· 
both a closely held corporation (a beauty school) and its individual shareholders. The court 
distinguished Kendavis on its facts citing the egregious nature of the Kendavis attorney's 
behavior. lOt The court also rejected the reasoning of the Kendavis court, applying instead 
a potential conflicts analysis.202 Ultimately, the court in Howell concluded that "The unity· 
of interest and interdependence that exists between the debtors and the school exemplify the 
'mom & pop' nature of the present situation so that Archer's dual representation was both 
economically reasonable and legally appropriate. "203 Thus the cost of separate counsel may 
be one factor that limits strict adherence to the disinterestedness analysis. 
The court in In re Office Products of America, Inc. 204 provided another rational for 
limiting the holding of Kendavis to its facts. In OPA the trustee, joined by creditors and an 
unofficial creditors' committee, objected to the fee application of counsel for the DIP 
("Gresham Davis"). Among their arguments was that Gresham Davis represented the 
interests of OPA's management in fighting a reconversion of the case to Chapter 7. lOS Upon 
a review of the detail of the fee application, the court agreed that "at some point in the 
representation, the interests of the officers and directors ofOPA may have become elevated 
over those of the estate."206 In particular, the court focused on the fact that managements' 
proposed plan of reorganization "could redound only to the benefit of the owners of the 
enterprise and not to its creditors ... "207 The court refused, however, to find a conflict 
based solely on the fact that management had proposed a cramdown plan benefitting only 
the shareholders: 
There are serious policy ramifications to such a holding . . . which auger 
against deciding the case on that basis. The cramdown provisions of the Code 
are an expression of congressional intent regarding the importance of 
reorganization values even in the face of considerable creditor opposition, 
provided those creditors interests are appropriately protected.208 
to cases with "compelling facts"); In re Howell, 148 B.R 269, 271 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992) (limiting 
Kendavis result to egregious behavior). 
200 Id 
201 Id at 271. 
202 Id at 271-72. 
203 Id at 272. See also, In re Roberts, 7S B.R. 402, (D. Utah 1987) (citing client's choice 
of counsel and the economic realities as reasons to permit joint representation). 
204 136 B.R 983. 





The court also noted that a strict application of Kendavis would create an inevitable in 
terrorem effect that would discourage competent counsel from accepting responsibility for 
such cases in the first place and from diligently discharging their duties. 209 . 
Thus the widespread use of the principles enunciated in Kendavis is subject to the 
cost and normative concerns that limit the effectiveness of the bankruptcy governance 
structure. In small cases, courts are reluctant to find that dual representation constitutes a 
per se disqualification on the basis of disinterestedness. In addition, courts are averse to 
holding that DIP counsel's actions which benefit managers and shareholders of the debtor 
necessarily should be taken as an indication that the attorney has abandoned her broader duty 
to the estate in favor of a particular group. 
This is not to say, however, that attorney's compensation plays no role in the 
bankruptcy governance structure. In contrast to the fairly broad approach taken in the 
disinterestedness cases, courts are increasingly examining attorney's fees and governance 
issues in a somewhat more targeted way by examining how the work provided a benefit to 
the estate as is required under Section 330(a)(3)(C).210 These cases require attorneys to 
exercise independent judgment regarding the continued viability of a debtor or to risk losing 
their fees for work done beyond the point at which the reorganization appears to be 
hopeless.211 
In re OPA212 provides an example of this approach. In this case, after concluding that 
the DIP counsel's actions did not warrant a finding of disinterestedness,213 the court went on 
to consider whether the firm's efforts to avoid a reconversion of the case provided a benefit 
to the estate.214 Again, the court noted that the plan of reorganization filed by the debtor in 
an effort to avoid conversion of the case was unconfirmable,215 and stated that the fee detail 
209 Id at 988. 
210 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)(C) (1994) directs the court in reviewing a fee application to 
consider, among other things, "whether the services were necessary to the administration ot: or 
beneficial at the time at which the service was rendered toward the completion of, a case under this 
title." In addition, 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(A)(ii) (1994) prohibits the court from allowing 
compensation for services that were "reasonably likely to benefit the debtor's estate" or that were not 
"necessary to the administration of the estate." 
Section 330 was substantially rewritten in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-394 (1994). In large part the change appears simply to codify the lodestar method of 
determining attorney's fees used by many bankruptcy courts. . 
211 "Chapter 11 cases which lack viable chances of reorganization may place the fees of 
counsel at risk." In re Offield, 128 B.R. 548, 550 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991). 
212 136 B.R. 983. 
213 See notes 187-209 supra, and accompanying text. 
214 136 B.R. at 988-91. 
215 Id at 990. 
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filed in the case suggested ''that there was a point in time when the debtor knew or should 
have known that pursuit of [the] plan flew in the face of [the plan confirmation standards] 
.... "216 The comt concluded that "[a]t that point, the services of the counsel were no longer 
necessary."217 The court denied allowance of the DIP counsel's request for$10,31S.00 in 
fees that related to the plan stating that that work "served primarily to maintain then-current 
management in control of the enterprise, at significant risk to the creditor body.,,211 
InRubner&Kutner, P.e. v. u.s. Trustee (In re Lederman Ent., Inc.),219 the Tenth Circuit 
made clear that in evaluating fee applications, benefit to the estate is a threshold concern 
which the comt must determine before conducting any review into the reasonableness of the 
attorney's fees.D1 Lederman involved an appeal of a bankruptcy court order disallowing the 
DIP counsel fees related to plan confirmation and disclosure. The bankruptcy court held that 
the debtor's petition was not filed in good faith and, therefore, that the work did not benefit 
the estate.221 The firm appealed the order arguing that the bankruptcy court erred in treating 
lack of benefit to the estate as a basis for denial of all fees related to particular work. 
Instead, the firm argued, benefit to the estate is merely a factor that the court should consider 
in detennining the amount of the fees. 222 The Lederman court also rejected the firm's 
argument that the bankruptcy court's denial of compensation amounted to punishment for 
the debtor's decision to file the petition, citing a number of cases in which courts have denied 
fees for work completed when it is obvious that there is no reasonable prospect for a 
successful reorganization.223 
216 Id at 990-91. 
217Id 
211 Id at 991. 
219 997 F.2d 1321 (10· Cir. 1993). 
220 Id at 1323. 
221 Id at 1322. 
222 Id at 1323. The finn also appealed the bankruptcy court's reduction of its fees based on 
inadequate infonnation in the fee application. The district court found that the bankruptcy court erred 
in imposing a 200/0 across the board reduction in the fees, and remanded the case for a recalculation 
offees. In re Ledennan, 143 B.R 772, 775 (D. Colo. 1992). The district court affirmed the portion 
of the bankruptcy court's opinion reducing the fees for lack of benefit to the estate, however. Id 
223 ld. at 1323-24 (collecting cases). See also, In re Ogden Modulars, Inc., 207 B.R.198 
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1997) (denying fees of attorney for opposing the revocation of an order of 
confinnation); In re Parke Imperial Canton, Ltd., 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 259 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) 
(reducing fees related to the preparation of unconfirmable plan and disclosure statement and appeal 
of confirmation of creditor plan);. In re Mflex Corp., 172 B.R 854 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994) 
(disallowing all compensation and requiring disgorgement of retainer where counsel filed plan with 
little chance of confirmation and failed to disclose compensation and conflicts of interest); In re 
Automobile Warranty Corp. 138 B.R. 72 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991) (fees disallowed for preparation 
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Not all courts have followed the lead of cases such as Lederman and OPA. These two 
cases place the DIP counsel into a unique role. Normally when representing a corporation, 
an attorney is entitled to look to the corporation's management for direction regarding 
business judgements. The comments to Ru1e 1.13 of the Model Ru1es of Professional 
Conduct evidence this traditional allocation of authority: 
When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions 
ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is 
doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and operations, including ones 
entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer's province. However, 
different considerations arise when the lawyer knows that the organization 
may be substantially injured by action of a constituent that is in violation of 
law.224 
The court in In re Spanjer Bros., Inc.:m cited this commentary in its consideration of a 
creditors' committee's challenge to DIP counsels fees incurred in its unsuccessful opposition 
to the committee's motion for the appointment of a trustee.226 The court noted that the 
debtor's management's opposition to the motion was not a violation of law and therefore it 
was DIP counsel's duty to follow the instructions of management and defend against the 
committee's motion.227 
Of course, one cannot take the Model Ru1es standard of illegality too literally in the 
bankruptcy context. It is not illegal to take actions such as filing plans that violate absolute 
priority, appealing confllmation orders or opposing conversion, yet taking such actions may 
place DIP counsel at risk of losing his fees if the court determines that the actions did not 
benefit the estate. Cases in which courts deny fees on this basis revolve around the fuzzy 
standards imposed by the fiducimy principle, not some hard-edged notion of illegality. Still 
cases such as Spanjer remind us that in examining those fiduciary standards, the Code 
requires the DIP and thus its counsel to represent all of the interests in the estate - not just 
those creditors seeking a quick liquidation. 
of plan that was filed as delay tactic); In re S & E Oil Co., Inc., 66 B.R. 6 (Bankr. W.O. La. 1986) 
(Reducing fees where it should have been obvious that reorganization would not succeed). 
224 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.13 comment. Professor Ayer has 
noted that such bar pronouncements of the ethical obligations of attorneys are based on a litigation 
model and on a model of negotiation that includes a basic supposition that a lawyer is a person who 
tries a case. Ayer, supra note 109, at 378-84. He further points out that bankruptcy does not fit 
within the models represented by the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Model Rules. Id at 
392. 
:m 191 B.R. 738 (Bankr. N.D. lll. 1996). 
2261d at 751-52. 
227 Id' at 752. 
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Casco Northern Bank, N.A. v. DN Associates (In re DN Associates)228 makes clear 
that this broad duty plays an important role in the detennination of fee disputes. The court 
rejected a creditor's argument that DIP's counsel represented interests that were materially 
adverse to the estate. The creditor argued that the counsel's opposition to the creditor's plan 
and the proposal of three plans under which the limited partners would retain an interest in 
the reorganized debtor warranted a disallowance of fees. The court quoted the bankruptcy 
court with approval stating that: 
[i]t would be unfortunate if courts, looking only at plan provisions removed 
from context, concluded as a matter of law that a conflict of interest existed 
whenever a debtor and its counsel, in the face of creditor opposition, pursued 
a reorganization strategy that, while providing for creditors in a fashion 
consistent with Chapter 11 priorities, sought to adjust the rights and relations 
of parties-in-interest so that the interests of equity interest holders could be 
preserved. ,,229 
The interests of the equity holders in preserving their interests also carried over to the courts 
analysis of how the work benefitted the estate. The court approved the bankruptcy court's 
analysis of the intangible benefits the plans provided. Among these benefits was the attempt 
to protect "all interested parties, including creditors and debtor's investors"230 and the 
constructive competition that arose among the plans.231 
The ability of debtors to retain counsel willing to undertake such an expansive role 
naturally is impaired by the risk that the court will deny fees to attorneys who err in favor 
of managers and shareholders. In In re Garrison Liquors,232 the court noted that a rule that 
penalized attorneys for a failed reorganization efforts ''would not merely chill the enthusiasm 
for debtors' representation but would prejudice the bankruptcy system itself by promoting 
the filing of liquidation cases rather than reorganizations. "233 In somewhat stronger language, 
the court in In re City Mattress234 rejected the notion that attorneys should act as watchdog 
over the viability of the reorganization, noting that "[l]egal services are the vel)' lifeblood of 
a debtor in reorganization."23s The court seemed to reject the benefit to the estate standard, 
substituting instead a good faith requirement stating, "To the extent that a Chapter 11 Debtor 
228 3 F.3d 512 (}it Cir. 1993). 
229 Id at 516, quoting In re DN Associates, 14 B.R. 195,200 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992). 
23°Id 
231 Id 
232 108 B.R. 561 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989). 
233 Id at 564. See a/so, In re James Contracting Group, 120 B.R. 868, 873 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 1990) ("counsel should not be penalized for merely for the lack of a successful reorganization"). 
234 174 B.R. 23 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1994). 
23S Id at 26. 
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is incapable of reorganization, the Trustee's Office may move for conversion or dismissal. 
So long as the debtor is permitted to continue in Chapter 11, however, this court will not 
penalize counsel for its good-faith representation.,,236 
These cautionmy notes notwithstanding, the trend seems to be to treat DIP counsel 
as a critical component of the Chapter 11 governance system. The unique nature of debtor 
practice requires the attorney to monitor continually not only the legal aspects of the case but 
also the business decisions made by the management. This unique status arises not only 
from the broad fiducimy duties owed by the DIP, and thusby DIP counsel, but also from 
purely pragmatic considerations. As the court in In re Pacijic Forest Industries, Inc. 237 so 
aptly pointed out, the governance structure that Congress envisioned for the Code does not 
work in a world of ever increasing filingS.238 The courts and the U.S. Trustee's office are 
hopelessly overburdened239 and thus the process must tum to DIP counsel as the one person 
who is familiar with both the debtor and the practical constraints on the reorganization 
process.24O 
D. Summary: Making the Best of a Bad Situation 
Bankruptcy courts have shown a remarkable resourcefulness in responding to the 
problem of governing managerial behavior within a legislative framework that is theoretically 
sound but practically unworkable. 241 Through active case management, courts have placed 
outside limits on the ability of managers and shareholders to delay the ultimate demise of 
hopeless debtors. Courts have successfully used examiners to overcome managers' 
informational advantages and to assist in plan negotiations. Finally, through their control 
over fee awards, courts have conscripted attorneys for DIP's into a governance role. Each 
236 Id The City Mattress case did not, however, involve a challenge to the DIP counsel's fees 
based on lack of benefit. Instead, the case considered the U.S. Trustees challenge to an application 
for interim compensation. 
237 95 B.R. 740 (Bankr. C.D. Calif. 1989). 
238 Id at 743-44. 
239 Cj. NBRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 26 (expanding the role of the United 
States Trustee in small business reorganizations). 
240 In Pacific Forest Industries, the court examined DIP counsel referred to as an application 
to sequester his attorneys fees. The plan called for the monthly payment of attorney's fees which the 
DIP counsel would place in his client trust account pending court approval of his fee application. Id 
at 741. The attorney argued that DIP attorneys should not be forced to finance the case and risk 
losing their fees if the reorganization failed. Id The court noted that the risk of non-payment 
provided the attorney an incentive to monitor the DIP and to assure that the assets were not wasted 
in a futile attempt at reorganization and denied the application. Id at 743. 
241 Clark, supra note 107, at 200. 
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of these methods are subject to difficulties that limit their effectiveness, however. The 
nature of the judicial role may be inconsistent with some forms of case management. This 
problem, combined with concerns over costs, limit the widespread creative use of examiners. 
The need to attract high quality attorneys to debtors practice, coupled with the inherent 
conflicts such a practice entails, causes courts to be reluctant to rely too heavily on DIP 
counsel. On balance, however, these approaches seem to be reasonably calculated to 
respond to the intractable problems native to the reorganization process. 
v. THE BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION REpORT: PRAGMATISM MEETS POLICY 
Appointed under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,242 the National Bankruptcy 
Review Commission, has recently completed an exhaustive study of all aspects of the 
bankruptcy process.243 The Commission's 1,000 page report includes more than 170 
recommendations covering the entire range of bankruptcy problems from individual 
bankruptcies to large corporate reorganizations. Although, the Commission chose not to 
draft an all-encompassing bankruptcy reform bill, perhaps reducing the likelihood of prompt 
legislative consideration, it is likely that the report will dominate discussions of bankruptcy 
policy for years to come. 
While, the Commission's report recommended a number of changes to Chapter 11, 
by far the most significant proposals for changes in the reorganization governance structure 
attempt to address the unique problems of small business reorganizations. As noted above, 244 
small business cases not only dominate Chapter 11,245 but also present unique problems that 
have led some commentators to question the wisdom of including large and small cases 
under the same statutory framework. 246 The Commission noted two fundamental problems 
relating to small business Chapter 11 'So . First, some of Chapter II's requirements are so 
242 Pub. L. No. 103-394 §601-1O. 
243 The Commission's Report was presented to Congress, the President and the Chief Justice 
on October 20, 1997. 
244 See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text. 
24S The commission estimated that approximately 85% of Chapter 11 filings would fall withiri 
the $5,000,000 debt limit that the recommendations use to define "small business." See supra note 
65. 
246 See Hon. Alexander L. Paskay & Frances Pilaro Wolstenholme, Chapter 11: A Growing 
Cash Cow: Some Thoughts on How to Rein in the System, 1 AM. BANKR. lNST. L. REv. 331 
(1993).Compare, Clark" supra note 107, at 200 (examining the question but concluding that well 
trained bankruptcy judges can tailor the single chapter to fit a variety of debtors) with David Arthur 
Sked,MarketCourtsandtheBraveNew World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 465, 510-
517 (1993 ) (suggesting that Congress should enact separate reorganization chapters for public and 
closely held corporations). 
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costly and cumbersome that relief under the chapter is out of reach for some businesses 
wishing to reorganize.247 Thus, the Commission recommendations included proposals to 
streamline some of Chapter II's procedures for these cases. Second, the Commission noted 
that the majority of small businesses seeking relief have no reasonable likelihood of 
rehabilitation. 2AI With respect to this latter category of cases, the Commission attempted to 
craft rules to identify more quickly hopeless debtors and to move them out of the 
reorganization process. 
Solutions to these two problems create a tension, however. Provisions that are 
designed to eliminate those cases languishing in Chapter 11 without hope of reorganization 
will necessarily increase the cost of the process.249 Conversely, cost cutting and 
simplification measures cany the risk of reducing the effectiveness of the governance 
s1ructure. The Commission report appears sensitive to this tension - generally erring on the 
side of improved governance.2SO 
A. The Small Business Proposals 
The small business proposals attack the problem of governing these cases from two 
directions. First, the proposals provide standards regarding the DIP's conduct of both the 
case and the underlying business. These proposals provide shortened deadlines for both plan 
filing and confirmation and provide that the failure of the debtor to comply with either the 
deadlines or a number of other requirements constitute cause for dismissal, conversion or the 
appointment of a trustee. Second, the proposals enhance oversight of the debtor in 
possession and the conduct of the case. The proposals expand the reporting requirements, 
require the court to conduct status conferences and increase the role of the U.S. Trustee's 
247 NBRCREPoRT, supra note 6, at 614. 
248 Id at 609. 
249 See NBRC REpORT, supra note 6, at 640 (noting the additional cost and burden of 
proposed reporting requirements) 
2S0 The principal cost cutting measures will likely have little effect on the governance 
structure. Piggybacking off of the existing provisions on small business bankruptcies, the proposals 
eliminate the mandatory appointment of creditors' committees for a larger number of cases. See 11 
U.S.C. § 1l02(a}(I} (1994). This provision is likely to have a negligible effect on bankruptcy 
governance since creditors' committees are currently appointed in only around 15 % ofall Chapter 
11 cases. The other cost cutting measure is the proposal to simplify the disclosure requirements by 
allowing the use of form disclosure statements and allowing courts the discretion to combine the 
hearing on approval of the disclosure statement with the confirmation hearing. The commission noted 
that small cases cannot support the fees required to draft the elaborate disclosure statements required 
under current law. NBRC REPoRT, supra note 6, at 637. It is therefore likely that simplifying the 
disclosure statement requirements will result in better disclosure than is currently available. 
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office in overseeing the case. The following discussion examines these approaches in more 
detail. 
1. Standards of Conduct 
. The heart of the standards of conduct governing small business reorganizations is the 
Commission's proposal to amend Section 1 112(b).2S1 The proposal provides particularized 
benchmarks for the conduct of the business and the Chapter 11 case and shifts the burden to 
the debtor to show its entitlement to continue in Chapter 11 if the benchmarks are not met. 
Among the benchmarks are failure to maintain insurance or to pay taxes or bankruptcy fees 
or charges, continued loss to or diminution of the estate, failure to file reports in the case or 
to attend Section 341 meetings or Rule 2004 examinations or to comply with the U.S. 
Trustee's reasonable requests for meetings or information. 252 The DIP's failure to meet these 
benchmarks constitutes cause for dismissal, conversion or the appointment of a trustee. The 
proposed revisions to Section 1112 represent the Commission's attempt both to add teeth to 
the Code's procedural requirements and to identify objective factors that have a high 
correlation with a likelihood of a failed reorganization.253 
Where cause is established, the burden shifts to the debtor to show an entitlement to 
continue in Chapter 11. Not only must the debtor show that it is more likely than not that 
a plan will be confirmed within the time set by the court, but if the cause was an act or 
omission of the debtor, the debtor must show a reasonable justification for the act or 
omission and must cure the problem within 30 days, or less if the court so orders.254 The 
Commission's Report explains that the intent of this proposal is to adopt a burden of proof 
"halfway between existing Chapter 11 practice and the burden of proof imposed on 
nondebtor litigants seeking injunctive relief against creditor action."2SS The proposals 
continue to place the burden on the party seeking dismissal or conversion until the debtor 
fails to meet one of the benchmarks. At that point, the burden shift to the debtor to show a 
likelihood of success. . 
In addition to the proposed changes to Section 1112, the Commission has 
recommended shortened deadlines for filing and confirming a plan of reorganization. Under 
251 It is unclear from the text of the recommendations for revision of Section 1112 whether 
the proposal is intended to apply only to small business reorganizations. The proposal itself 
recommends a replacement for 1112(b) which appears to apply to all Chapter 11 cases. NBRC 
REcOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 30-31. The report's discussion of the proposal makes several 
references to small business cases, however. NBRC REPoRT, supra note 6, at 652-56. 
252 NBRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 31. 
253 NBRCREPoRT, supra note 6, at 653. 
254 NBRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 30. 
25S NBRC REPoRT, supra note 6, at 652-63. 
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the proposal, all plans~6 and disclosure statements must be filed within 90 days and a plan 
must be confirmed within 150 days. The proposal would permit extensions only if the 
hearing is conducted and ruled upon within the deadline and only if the debtor proves "by 
a preponderance of the evidence that it is more likely than not to confirm a plan of 
reorganization within a reasonable time"~7 The proposal includes a requirement that the 
U.S. Trustee actively participate in the extension hearing and requires the court to set a new 
deadline at the time the extension is granted. ~8 While the Commission Report justifies this 
requirement as a cost saving measure that is beneficial to the debtor,2'9 it is perhaps more 
appropriately viewed as providing assurance to the creditors that there will be an outside 
limit on managers ability to maintain control over the business in Chapter 11. 
2. Oversight 
Of course, these standards would be ineffective to counteract the control of managers 
in cases in which no one raises the debtor's failure to meet the standards. Thus, as a 
complement to the standards, the Commission's recommendations combine enhanced powers 
of the U.S. Trustees and a requirement that the court hold at least one "on the record" 
scheduling conference260 with increased debtor reporting requirements to provide a structure 
of debtor oversight. These provisions represent the Commission's effort to counteract the 
governance problems associated with creditor apathy in small Chapter 11 cases. 
The centerpiece of the Commission's oversight proposal is their enhancement of the 
role of the U.S. Trustee. The proposals require the U.S. trustee to conduct an initial debtor 
interview ("lOr') soon after the initiation of the case. The purpose of the IOI is two-fold. 
First the IOI is intended to provide debtor education. The proposal requires the U.S. Trustee 
. to infonn the debtor of its reporting and other obligations under the Code. Second, the IOI 
allows the U.S. Trustee to begin learning about the debtor's business and likely prospects for 
reorganization. In addition to the IOI, the U.S. Trustee is given the authority to visit the 
debtor's business premises to examine the debtors books and records. Finally, and perhaps 
most significantly, the proposals require the U.S. Trustee to review and monitor cases with 
a view toward identifying those cases in which the debtor's prospects appear hopeless and 
~ The recommendation retains the exclusivity period for the entire 90 days but allows the 
court to lift exclusivity. NBRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 28. 
257 Id at 29. 
~8 Id 
~9 NBRC. Report at 644. 
260 NBRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 29. The court may dispense with the 
scheduling conference if the debtor and the U.S. Trustee present an agreed scheduling order to the 
court for approval on notice and a hearing. Id The proposals contemplate that, in most cases, such 
an order will be agreed to at the initial debtor interview. See note 261, infra and accompanying text. 





to move for relief under Section 1112 where material grounds exist. 261 
The Commission's proposed enhancements to the Chapter 11 reporting requirements 
are conceptual rather than specific. The proposal calls for Advisory Committee on 
Bankruptcy Ru1es to develop nationwide standards for small business reporting that achieve 
a balance between reasonably complete information and affordability and simplicity. 
Elaborating on what constitutes reasonably complete information, the proposal states that the 
reportiJlg "requirements shou1d, at a minimum include information regarding profitability, 
including projections of receipts and disbursements and a comparison of actual versus 
projected resu1ts, and information regarding the debtor's compliance with the Code's 
requirements and tax obligations.262 
B. Evaluation of the Commission's Proposals 
The Commission's proposals obviously draw heavily from the positive experiences 
of bankruptcy judges who have used active case management techniques in an effort to 
reduce the delay and consequent waste of assets in small business cases. The oversight 
function of the u.S. Trustee responds directly to the creditor indifference problem that many 
commentators have identified in these cases. In addition, the shortened deadlines for plan 
filing and confirmation coupled with the changes in the substantive standards for dismissal 
or conversion provide creditor with some assurance that some outside limits are placed on 
both the length and the breadth of managerial discretion Overall then, the recommendations 
represent a positive step toward improved governance in Chapter 11. 
This conclusion is subject to a few caveats, however. The Commission's general 
proposals regarding Chapter 11 may limit somewhat the effectiveness of the small business 
proposals. By a 5-4 vote, the Commission proposed the codification of the new value 
261 NBRC REcOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 32. 
262 NBRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 26-27. 
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exception (corollmy?)263 to the absolute priority rule2(i.4 in all cases, big and small.26' The 
effect of this proposal on the governance concerns discussed here is somewhat indirect but 
may be substantial.266 Both the substantive and oversight aspects of the small business 
proposals have as their goal, the identification of cases in which a confirmed plan is unlikely. 
The effort, of course, is to eliminate the ability of managers and shareholders to use the 
delays inherent in Chapter 11 to remain in control and perhaps to extract concessions from 
the creditors. ']Ij7 Small business debtors may remain in Chapter 11 beyond the deadlines only 
upon a showing that it is more likely than not that they will confIrm a plan within a 
reasonable time. To the extent that the new value rule makes it easier to propose a 
confirmable plan, the deadlines may lose some of their effectiveness.268 
']IjJ Whether the new value rule is an exception or corollary to the absolute priority rule turns 
on the appropriate interpretation of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 1129(b)(2)(B) which provides that, in a 
cramdown plan, junior classes may not "receive or retain under the pian on account of such junior 
claim or interest any property" (emphasis added) unless senior classes are paid in full. The correct 
characterization may also tum on which side of the new value debate one finds him or herself 
Compare, NBRC REPoRT, supra note 6, at 104 (discussing the Commissions recommendation to 
codify the new value "corollary") with Hon. Edith H. Jones, Dissent from Certain Commission 
Recommendations on General Issues in Chapter J J, at19, published in NBRC REPoRT: VIEWS OF 
TIlE INDIVIDUAL COMMISSIONERS, available at <http://www.nbrc.gov/reportJ24commvi.pdt> 
(hereinafter, Chapter J J Dissent) (discussing the Commissions proposal to codify a new value 
"exception") . 
2(i.4 NBRCREcOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 24. 
26' In fact, the Report makes specific reference to the needs of "mom and pop" businesses 
in its new value discussion. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 564. 
266 The proposal does, however, include a provision terminating the debtor's exclusive right 
to propose a plan on motion by a party in interest when the debtor moves to confirm a non-
consensual new value plan. NBRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at 24. This aspect of the 
proposal ameliorates somewhat the imbalance created by granting the debtor an exclusive option to 
propose such a plan. NBRC REPoRT, supra note 6, at 562. The lifting of exclusivity may not be 
sufficient, however, to counteract the negotiating leverage created by the ability to delay the case by 
proposing a new value plan and the informational advantage held by the debtor's management. See 
Jones, Chaptelf 1 J Dissent, supra note 263, at 24-27 (pointing out the inadequate protection provided 
bycompeti.1g plans). 
U,7 Th~ Commission Report recognizes the concern that the ability of equity to propose a new 
value plan may create additional opportunities for equity to exercise "hold-out leverage," but 
concludes that "in the context of the widely held publically traded debtor, this proposal is unlikely to 
change negotiating positions based on hold-out powers." NBRC REPoRT, supra note 6, at 565. The 
report does not respond to this concern in the context of smaller cases. 
']Ij8 See Jones, Chapter J J Dissent, supra note 263, at 28 (arguing that the proposal undercuts 
the small business proposals). Judge Jones also argues that the proposal does not include the 
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In addition it may be that the proposals do not go far enough in resolving the 
governance problems in small business cases. In its deliberations over how oversight should 
be conducted, the Commission considered and rejected proposals to require the appointment 
of an independent business expert to examine the viability of the business and to oversee the 
debtor's management. 269 Critics of this approach cited the duplication of functions already 
seIVed by the courts, U.S. Trustees and panel trustees, the likelihood that such agents would 
be perceived as "stereotypical government bureaucrats" and the cost of such professionals 
270 In the end the Commission decided to allocate this function to the U.S. Trustees. 
The Report's discussion of this decision provides an unsatisfactory explanation. 
Duplication is a function of the allocation of authority. Presumably, the presence of an 
independent monitoring agent would alleviate the governance burden placed on others in the 
process.271 Furthermore, it is unclear what problems are created by a perception that the 
monitor is a bureaucrat. Even if such a perception would create difficulties, it unlikely that 
the perception of a monitoring agent as a "stereotypical government bureaucrat" is reduced 
by the allocation of oversight authority to a governmental entity. 
The Commission's reference to the cost of an additional professional in the case raises 
what is perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the small business proposals. While the Report 
uses cost as a means of justifying its decision not to use an independent monitoring agency, 
the report is nearly devoid of any discussion of the likely cost of the expanded duties 
allocated to the U.S. Trustee. The only reference to the cost of expanding the duties of the 
U.S. Trustee is a brief passage expressing concern over whether Congress will appropriate 
the necessary funds for the U.S. Trustee to fulfill its new role.272 
Of course, inadequate funding would cripple the oversight provisions. The problem 
with the Commission's approach to the cost issue is more fundamental, however. Increasing 
oversight comes only at a cost - no matter whether the role is assigned to a governmental 
or private entity. Itmay be that the U.S. Trustee can perform this role more efficiently than 
can a private monitoring agent, but the Report provides no evidence that this is true. Aside 
from the relative efficiency of government versus private monitors is the question of who 
should bear the cost of oversight. By assigning the oversight role to the U.S. Trustee, the 
proposal places this burden on the government, creating an additional subsidy for the 
requirements for new value contributions set out in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. 106 
(1939) and may ovenule the Supreme Court's holding in Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 
U.S. 197 (1988). Id at 23. These deficiencies would make it even easier to confirm a new value plan. 
269 NBRC REpORT, supra note 6, at 658. The Report refers to the success of such an 
approach in the United Kingdom. Id 
270 Id at 658-59. 
271 In addition, the Report's reference to a duplication of the panel trustee's function is 
somewhat mystifying. 
272 Id at 657. 
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reorganization process. Such a subsidy may be defensible in light of the public benefits of 
the reorganization process. At a minimum, however, the question raises substantial policy 
issues that the Report's treatment of the cost issue obscures. 
C. The Bankruptcy Commission Proposals and the Continued Debate over the Goals of 
Chapter 11 
Like most of the Recommendations, the small business proposals are not entirely free 
of controversy. Two of the Commissioners dissented from the small business proposals 
noting that "the Commission's Recommendation sets up a requirement-laden, inflexible 
program aimed primarily at removing cases from the system that cannot confirm plans in the 
limited time pemritted."273 The dissent cites the benefits of Chapter 11 to employees, 
customers and suppliers and taxing authorities and argues that the proposals would make 
those benefits more difficult to achieve.274 In its conclusion, the dissent states quite clearly 
the deep-seated policy issues that the proposals raise: 
The Recommendation thus reveals an unmistakable sense that it is not the 
failing business lingering aimlessly in Chapter 11 that is the target so much as 
it is Chapter 11 itself. If that is the message of the Recommendation, then a 
more fundamental debate about Chapter 11 must be resolved-or at least the 
clear policy choices identified-before large scale case management proposals 
can be realistically considered. 275 . 
These Commissioners' comments illustrate a point made earlier. There exists no clear 
consensus regarding the appropriate goals of Chapter 11.276 
This lack of consensus surfaces elsewhere in the Report and the dissents. In her 
dissent from the Chapter 11 proposals, Judge Jones complained that the majority's proposals 
included a number of unstated assumptions that include debtor's need for added negotiating 
leverage and control and that there are too few cases with confirmed plans.277 She further 
expressed concern that there was a lack of attention paid to "concrete proposals to get the 
creditors paid more quickly and certainly."271 Shatply divided votes on proposals such as the 
new value recommendation may simply reflect differences of opinion regarding the 
273 Babette Ceccotti & Hon. Robert Ginsberg, Dissent From Recommendation Regarding 
Small Business Chapter 11 Cases, at 1, published in NBRC REPoRT: VIEWS OF TIlE INDIVIDUAL 
COMMISSIONERS, available at <http://www.nbrc.gov/reportl24commvi.pdt>(hereinafier, Small 
Business Dissent). 
274 See Id at 2-3. 
275 Id at 3. 
276 See notes 71-82, supra and accompanying text. 
277 Jones, Chapter 11 Dissent, supra note 263, at S. 
278 Id at 6. 
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appropriate means to an agreed end. It is more likely, however, that the differing views 
reflect a more fundamental disagreement on the appropriate ends. 
A cOmInon refrain in discussions of Chapter 11 is that it is intended to rehabilitate 
businesses ''for the benefit of both debtors and creditors [and] to preserve jobs and other ties 
within communities."2'79 Successful reorganizations can do both. But this well worn maxim 
obscures an important fact - the goals of benefitting creditor and saving jobs and ties within 
communities conflict anytime the business has a liquidation value that exceeds its value as 
a going concern. 280 These are the cases that present the most fundamental policy questions 
regarding the goals of Chapter 11. The Commission report shows that the resolution of such 
questions will continue to undergird the debate over bankruptcy reform. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In theOlY, the problem of controlling managerial behavior in Chapter 11 presents no 
real challenge. Chapter 11 provides a structure of investor representation and judicial 
oversight that facially addresses the governance problems inherent in running an insolvent 
cotporation. By looking to the principles of financial economics that support and illuminate 
the non-bankruptcy governance structure, analysts have developed a number of suggestions 
regarding ways to apply non-bankruptcy governance principles in Chapter 11 to assure that 
managerial decisions maximize the value of the business assets. 
The theoretical solutions to governance problems in Chapter 11 do not provide 
answers in the real world, however. Small bankruptcies present unique governance problems 
that arise from the fact that creditors do not individually have enough at stake to justify 
monitoring the debtor's management and challenging actions that do not maximize the value 
of the debtor's assets. The most fundamental of such actions relate to efforts to continue an 
attempt at reorganization that appears, to an objective observer, to be hopeless. The delay 
in liquidation places creditor recoveries at risk in an effort that may only benefit shareholders 
and managers. Bankruptcy courts have developed three somewhat related approaches to 
combat managerial autonomy in these cases. Through active case management, the flexible. 
use of examiners and control over the fees of the DIP counsel, some courts have attempted 
to counteract managerial autonomy. The National Bankruptcy Review Commission has 
incorporated some of these approaches in its proposals for reform of the provisions 
governing small business bankruptcies. 
But lurking under the surface of the both the cases and the Commission's Report is 
a more fundamental problem - a lack of consensus regarding the goals of Chapter 11. 
Evetyone can agree on what we want bankruptcy to do - it should rehabilitate companies 
in order to maximize creditor returns, preserve jobs and assure continuing support for 
T19 NBRCREPoRT, supra note 6, at 566-67. 
280 See supra note 75, and accompanying text. 
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communities surrounding the business. Sometimes Chapter 11 can do this but most of the 
time it cannot The question is not whether we should save the businesses that can be saved 
and quickly liquidate the rest, however. It is instead a question of in which direction the I 
process should err. Since our approach to governance will necessarily have an effect on the 
direction of error, it is unlikely that a fully fimctioning governance structure will emerge until 
this fundamental question is answered. 
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DISCHARGE AND DISCHARGEABILITY LITIGA nON 
COMMENCEMENT. TIMING AND PROCEDURE 
A. Commencement 
1. Adversary proceeding governed by Part VII of the Bankruptcy Rules. Bankr. 
R.7001. 
In re Catron, 186 B.R. 194, 196-97 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (adversary 
proceeding must be ftled before court can declare debt nondischargeable. 
Consent order in stay litigation agreeing to nondischargeability after deadline 
for filing complaint has no preclusive effect where debtor did not fraudulently 
induce creditor to forfeit right to ftle discharge ability complaint.). 
B. Timing and extensions of time 
1. Section 523(a)(2), (4) or (6) complaint must be fIled no later than 60 days after 
the first date set for the meeting of creditors. 11 U.S.c. § 523(c); Fed. R. 
Bankr. P. 4007(c). 
In re Dawson, 185 B.R. 406 (Bankr. D.R.1. 1993) (preconversion objection to 
confirmation of Chapter 13 plan alleging misappropriation of probate funds 
and requesting that judgment be declared nondischargeable under § 523(a)(4) 
constitutes amendable dischargeability complaint). 
2. Sixty days from-meeting of creditors at which debtor was present, 60 days from 
date first set, or 60 days from date of continued meeting? 
3. 
Datson v. Cote (In re Datson), 197 B.R. 1 (D. Me. 1996) (The bar date for 
filing dischargeabiIity complaints is not tolled because the meeting of creditors 
is continued. "[T]he sixty-day period starts running on the fITst date set for the 
creditors' meeting, regardless of when the meeting is actually held. If the 
meeting of the creditors is rescheduled or if a creditor anticipates that the 
meeting of creditors will not be held during the sixty-day period, then the 
proper remedy is for the creditor to request an extension before the expiration 
of the bar date pursuant to Rule 4004(a) and Rule 4007(c).") 
Peerless Ins. Co. v. Miller (In re Miller), 182 B.R. 507 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995) 
(given ambiguous wording of Rule 4007(c), 60 day period runs from date 
meeting of creditors actually held, not fITst date set; court cautions majority 
view is otherwise and Sixth Circuit has not ruled on issue). 
Cause for extension of time 
In re Amezaga, 192 B.R. 37 (Bankr. D. P.R. 1996) (absent bad faith, extensions 
of time under Rule 4004(b) should be granted liberally. An allegation of need 
for discovery constitutes sufficient cause. Court may grant the extension 
without a hearing. The phrase "after hearing on notice" in Rule 4004(b) is 
D -1 
4. 
similar to "after notice and a hearing" and "clearly different from the statutory 
provisions stating that the Court 'shall hold a hearing. "') 
Party in interest must seek extension of time before original deadline expires 
Brady v. McAllister (In re Brady), 101 F.3d 1165 (6th Cir. 1996) (chapter 7 
trustee has standing to extend deadline for all creditors to file § 523 complaints. 
Trustee timely filed motion to "extend the date for filing non-discharge 
complaints." The trustee's motion was granted by order that provided "that the 
Trustee . . . shall, on behalf of the estate and all unsecured or undersecured 
creditors of the estate, have through and including October 21, 1992 in which 
to file non-dischargeability complaints .... " After original complaint deadline 
but before October 21, a creditor filed a complaint under § 523(a)(2) & (a)(4). 
The debtor argued that the complaint was untimely, and that the chapter 7 
trustee did not have standing tomove to extend the time for all creditors. Sixth 
Circuit found that the motion and order extending time were "somewhat 
ambiguous," but the court would not contradict the bankruptcy court's 
interpretation of its own order. "Party in interest" under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 
4007(c) includes a trustee. To "depriv[e] the trustee standing to secure 
additional time for creditors to file' nondischargeability complaints could 
undennine the efficient administration of bankruptcy proceedings .... " That 
the chapter 7 trustee could not file a complaint on his own behalf "does not 
preclude the ability to request additional time to file such a complaint." 
Trustee, as representative of the estate, has an economic interest in obtaining 
the extensions because "'nondischargeable debts do share in the estate 
distributions pro rata with dischargeable debts of the same class.''') 
In re Farmer, 786 F.2d 618 (4th Cir.1986) ("party in interest" does not have 
the same meaning in Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(b) and 4007(c). Because 
Chapter 7 trustee could not bring a complaint under § 523, trustee is not a party 
in interest to seek an extension of time under 4007(c). Granting of trustee's 
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c) motion to extend time did not extend the period for 
creditors to file complaints under § 523. Chapter 7 trustee is a party in interest 
to seek an extension of time under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(b) because tnistee 
has standing to object to discharge under § 727.) 
Ruben v. Hamer (In re Hamer), 194 B.R. 388 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996) (debtor's 
failure to object to trustee's standing to seek extension of time for filing 
dischargeability complaints waived timeliness objection to creditor's otherwise 
late filed complaint). . 
Marshall v. Demos (In re Demos), 57 F.3d 1037 (11th Cir. 1995) (bankiuptcy 
court order, extending the time for filing discharge and dischargeability 
complaints, on joint motion of trustee and debtor, extended time for all parties 
in interest. The motion invoked the court's equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 105, not FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004. Motion stressed the numerous creditors 
and sought an extension for both discharge and discharge ability complaints. 
Order extending time was reasonably relied upon as an extension of deadlines 
for all creditors.) 
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Philmar Jewelers. Inc. v. Cirkinyan (In re Cirkinyan), 192 B.R. 643 (D.N.J. 
1996) (receipt by debtor's counsel offaxed motion to extend time satisfies Rule 
4007(c). "Made" in the last sentence of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c) means 
served, i.e., a motion to extend time to fIle a dischargeability complaint is made 
when served upon debtor's counsel under Rule 7005. Fax service was 
effective, notwithstanding that no state or federal rule recognized fax service. 
Counsel for debtor received a legible copy of the motion within the time 
required by the rules. Had creditor's counsel mailed the motion to debtor's 
counsel on the day that it was faxed, service would have been timely. "To 
deem service improper when complete, legible papers were actually received, 
but proper when they were mailed but received after the limitations date, is 
absurd.") 
In re Miller, 188 B.R. 1021 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995) ("motion to extend [time 
to file dischargeability complaint] pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c) is 
'made' on the date that is 'fIled,' regardless of when it is served on the debtor 
or debtor's counsel"). 
Dombroffv. Greene (In re Dombroffl, 192 RR. 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (while 
the time period fIXed by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(a) is not jurisdictional, "Rule's 
deadlines are to be interpreted strictly and in a manner consistent with the 
Code's policies in favor of providing a fresh start for the debtor and prompt 
administration of the case." Extensions may not be granted nunc pro tunc after 
the deadline for requesting an extension has passed. That the trustee believed 
debtor's counsel submitted a stipulation extending the time does not constitute 
equitable grounds for an untimely extension of time. The trustee's reliance was 
"unreasonable as a matter of law where the trustee had over a week to 
determine whether the court hlid granted the extension or, indeed, whether the 
stipulation in fact had been filed with the court. . .. Although the failure of 
[debtor's] counsel to advise the trustee that he would not sign the stipulation 
was both discourteous and inappropriate, in the last analysis, the trustee bears 
too great a share of the responsibility for the failure to obtain the extension to 
hold that [debtor] is estopped [to assert timeliness as a defense].") 
Datson v. Cote (In re Datson). 197 B.R. 1 (0. Me. 1996) (court declined to use 
equitable powers to extend time to fIle a dischargeability complaint where 
creditors did not rely on a clerical error and there was no evidence that debtor 
intentionally abused the bankruptcy process by filing in Pennsylvania rather 
than in Maine. Creditors' remedy was to file a motion to extend the time to file 
discharge complaint if they feared that meeting of creditors would not occur 
prior to the expiration of time.) 
Effects of clerk's office notice and administrative mistakes 
Wilzig v. Lopez (In re Lopez), 192 RR. 539 (RA.P. 9th Cir. 1996) (clerks' 
office mailed two notices setting different deadlines for the filing of 
dischlirgeability complaints. The first purported to reschedule a meeting of 
creditors previously set, however, no prior notice had issued. The second 
notice set the date for the meeting of creditors and the date by which 
dischargeability complaints hlid to be fIled. Plaintiff filed its complaint within 
date set in second notice .. "To be effective, a notice which announces the 
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running of a time period must do so clearly .... Parties are entitled to be 
notified in clear and unambiguous terms of deadlines, particularly when they 
are critical. ... A notice cannot be said to be 'reasonably calculated' to afford 
interested parties an opportunity to protect legal rights where its factual premise 
is not readily discernible and is misleading." "[W]here the court misleads a 
creditor regarding the deadline for filing complaints, a bankruptcy court may 
employ its equitable powers under § 105(a) to hold a complaint timely filed.") 
6. Can timeliness of complaint be waived? 
Compare European Am. Bank v. Benedict (In re Benedict), 90 F.3d 50 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (time period for filing dischargeability complaints under Fed. R. 
Bankr. P. 4007(c) is not jurisdictional and can be waived by debtor. "The 
Supreme Court has stated that' [s ]tatutory filing deadlines are generally subject 
to the defenses of waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.' ... There is nothing 
in the Bankruptcy Code that persuades us to hold that Rule 4007(c) is any 
different from a statutory provision that iillpOSeS a filiIlg deadline. Nor do we 
perceive that there is a controlling policy goal that would be served by holding 
that Rule 4007(c) is jurisdiction." Debtor waived her right to challenge a late 
filed § 523 complaint because she agreed in a reaffIrmation agreement 
executed after the deadline for dischargeability complaints that if she rescinded 
the agreement, the creditor could still file a complaint under § 523.), with State 
Bank of India v. Chalasani (In re Chalasani), 92 F.3d 1300 (2d Cir. 1996) (Fed. 
R. Bankr. P. 4004 creates "an inflexible and mandatory rule, one not subject to 
a court's discretion .... The interest of fmality, advanced by the deadline, 
furthers an important policy goal in bankruptcy law, that is, that a debtor 
should obtain a fresh start in life and an opportunity to move ahead free of 
fmancial distress as quickly as possible .... After the deadline passes, it is too 
late for any party to object to discharge in an ongoing adversary proceeding or 
to seek to intervene to raise an objection to discharge in another 
proceeding .... Hence, under § 727 an objection must be made within 60 days 
or not at all. "). 
C. Statutes of limitations 
Lee-Benner v. Gergely (In re Gergely), 110 F.3d 1448, _ (9th Cir. 1997) (that state 
statute of limitations for fraud expired is not fatal of § 523(a)(2)(A) action where 
plaintiff has a state court judgment. "[T]he expiration of a state statute of limitations 
on fraud actions does not affect an action for nondischargeability if there is a valid 
judgment. . . . The state limitations period for fraud actions is irrelevant to the 
dischargeability of an established debt." The plaintiff claimed that the debtor, an 
obstetrician, misrepresented the need for amniocentesis and then performed the 
procedure negligently resulting in the plaintiff being born blinded in one eye. Three 
years before bankruptcy, the child obtained a nonfraudjudgment for $780,282. The 
child's argument that fraudulent misrepresentation of the need for amniocentesis was 
actionable under § 523(a)(2)(A) was not barred by the state statute oflimitations for 
fraud, citing In re McKendry, 40 F.3d 331 (10th Cir. 1994).) 
Perdue v. Cantrell (In re Cantrell), 88 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 1996) (bankruptcy court 
properly dismissed complaint under §§ 523(a)(2) and 727(a)(2)(A) because no 
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prosecutable claim existed. Statute of limitations had run prior to plaintiffs' state court 
complaint, thus plaintiff had no prosecutable claim in the bankruptcy case.) 
Resolution Trust Corp. v. McKendry (In re McKendzy), 40 F.3d 331 (10th Cir. 1994) 
("[T]he question of the discharge ability of [a] debt under the Bankruptcy Code is a 
distinct issue governed solely by the limitations periods established by bankruptcy 
law." The "debt," on the other hand, is a creature of nonbankruptcy law, and is 
governed by applicable state or other federal statutes oflimitation. If an action on the 
"debt" is not brought within the applicable limitations period, the debt cannot be 
established, and the issue of discharge ability is academic. Mortgage deficiency 
judgment containing no fmding offraud is a debt that may be nondischargeable under 
§ 523(c) notwithstanding that state statute oflimitations for fraud expired long before 
filing of bankruptcy case.). Accord Kaleta v. Sokolow, 183 B.R. 639, 642 (M.D. Ala. 
1995). 
Lee-Bennerv. Gergely (In re Gergely), 186 B.R. 951 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995)(declining 
to follow McKendry, 40 F.3d 331 (10th Cir. 1994), statute of limitations bars 
dischargeability action where plaintiff obtained state court judgment for medical 
malpractice, but raised intentional tort theories of liability for the first time in 
dischargeability complaint filed years after the state statute of limitations expired for 
such actions). 
GW. White & Son. Inc. v. TriW (In re Trillll), 189 B.R. 29 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(where the only issue before the court is discharge ability under § 523(a), and no 
request is made for judgment on debt, the defense that the statutory limitation period 
for maintaining an action has lapsed is misplaced. "[State statute of limitations creates 
a material issue in an] action based on Code § 523(a)(6) only if it defmes the existence 
of the Debtor's role as a fiduciary.") 
D. Service of process 
1. Delayed service of summons 
Broitman v. Kirkland (In re Kirkland), 86 F.3d 172 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a discharge ability 
complaint that was served one day beyond time limit set forth in Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 4(j). Failure to serve the summons and complaint within 120 days is 
excused only for "good cause." "Good cause" is not equivalent to "excusable 
neglect" under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(I), thus the flexible test adopted by 
the Supreme Court in Pioneer is not applicable. "Good cause" is construed 
narrowly. Mere inadvertence or neglect do not constitute "good cause." Pro 
se plaintiffs stated no legitimate reason for belief that they had an additional 
day to complete service; neither mistake of counsel nor ignorance of the rules 
suffice.) 
Artificial Intelligence Corp. v. Casey (In re Casey), 193 B.R. 942 (Bankr. S.D. 
Cal. 1996) (Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7004 a complaint shall be dismissed ifnot 
served within 120 days "if the party to provide service cannot show good cause 
why such service was not made within that period. The good cause must be 
connected with the failure to serve timely. The meaning of good cause is 
unaffected by the intervention of a time bar that will preclude refiling, 
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notwithstanding that the dismissal is nominally without prejudice." Plaintiffs 
tactical delay of service beyond 120 days was fatal to the complaint where 
failure to serve was not due to debtor's misconduct or any inability on plaintiff's 
part to complete service.) 
Mrochek v. Qprean (In re Oprean), 189 B.R. 616 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) ("If 
a plaintiff is not diligent and fails to serve the complaint, the case shall be 
dismissed without prejudice unless plaintiff demonstrates good cause not to 
dismiss the action .... '[T]he ... burden of establishing good cause ..• is a 
difficult one to meet,' ... Once plaintiff fails to establish good cause, dismissal 
is mandatory, and plaintiff must refile .... Upon refiling, plaintiff is subject to 
all time defenses even if the effect of dismissal 'is to bar plaintiffs claim. "'). 
Mazzone v. Osebach (In re Osebach), 187 B.R. 92 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(complaint dismissed with prejudice due to plaintiff's failure to serve summons 
and complaint within 120 days. Statute of limitations expired after suit filed.) 
E. Amending complaint after filing deadline 
1. Allowing amendment 
Schwager v. Fallas (In re Schwager), 121 F.3d 177, 186 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(bankruptcy court appropriately exercised discretion under Bankruptcy Rule 
7015 to permit amendment of § 523(a)(4) complaint after 60 day deadline. 
"The amended complaint did not allege new grounds for rmding the 1989 
judgment debt nondischargeable, but merely added specific facts consistent 
with the nondischargeability grounds advanced in their original complaint.") 
Beasley v. Adams (In re Adams), 200 B.R. 630 (N.D. lli. 1996) (applying Rule 
7015 standards, amendmentto add § 523(a)(15) cause of action relates back to 
time of filing complaint asserting only § 523(a)(5) because both actions arise 
out of the same settlement agreement or divorce decree. Original § 523(a)(5) 
complaint was filed before 60-day bar date. Amendment to add § 523(a)(15) 
came after bar date. "Sections 523(a)(5) and (a)(15) are, ... , 'merelyaltemate 
theories for an objecting ex-spouse to establish a debt as nondischargeable.' ... 
Which of these alternate theories applies depends upon whether the debt is in 
the nature of alimony, maintenance or support; or in the nature of a property 
settlement. This is a factual determination that the bankruptcy judge must 
make no matter whether Section (a)(5), Section (a)(15) or both are at issue, and 
no matter what language was used in the agreement or divorce decree since 
'even an obligation designated as property settlement may be related to support 
because State courts often will adjust alimony awards depending on the nature 
and amount of marital assets available for distribution. ",) 
F. Intervention; substitution 
FDIC v. Meyer (In re Meyer), 120 F.3d 66 (7th Cir. 1997) (substitution ofRTC or 
FDIC as successor to a failed bank in § 523 litigation is appropriate when 
nondischargeability complaint was timely filed in the bank's name, the debtor was on 
notice and there is no prejudice to the debtor. That the original complaint was filed ---1 
by a subsidiary to the parent bank that actually held the debt is "of no consequence.") 3 
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State Bank of India v. Chalasani an re Chalasani), 92 F.3d 1300 (2d C~. 1996) 
("substitution" of parties does not avoid 60-day deadline for complaints. Original 
plaintiff asserted both § 523 and § 727 objections, but obtained default judgment only 
on § 523 ground. Five months after the default judgment was noticed to the trustee 
and to creditors, and more than one year after expiration of the original deadline for 
filing complaints, another creditor sought to be substituted as plaintiff to reopen the 
proceeding to amend the judgment to deny debtor's discharge under § 727. The 
attempted substitution was procedurally inappropriate. "[C]ommon sense argues 
against a discretionary substitution that facilitates an end-run around the 60-day time 
limit."). 
Papadakis v. Zelis an re Zelis), 66 F.3d 205 (9th Cir. 1995) (where original complaint 
ass~rted both §§ 523 and 727, substituted plaintiff permitted to reopen adversary 
proceeding and obtain default judgment under § 727 despite its failure to intervene 
when original plaintiff served notice of intention to default on § 523 cause of action). 
FDIC v. Meyer (In re Meyer), 197 B.R. 277 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (FDIC, as successor to 
R TC, was properly substituted as plaintiff for failed bank; extension of time to file 
complaint granted to bank inures to benefit of successor party. Debtor challenged the 
timeliness of the FDICs complaint on the ground that only the bank, not the FDIC or 
the RTC, obtained extensions oftime to file a complaint. Argument, while clever, was 
rejected. Debtor's argument failed to "demonstrate that Rule 17(a) is intended to 
distinguish between substitutions that involve an adverse complaint filed without an 
extension of time under Rule 4007, and substitutions that involve an adverse 
complaint filed with an extension of time.") 
G. Jury trial in discharge and dischargeability proceedings 
American Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Hashemi (In re Hashemi), 104 F.3d 
1122 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Bankruptcy litigants ... have no Seventh Amendment right to 
a jury trial in dischargeability proceedings.") 
Jaster v. Schmidt (In re Schmidt), 188 B.R. 86 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1995) (debtor is not 
entitled to jury trial on complaint to revoke discharge. "[F]or the puIposes of jury trial 
analysis, there is no logical distinction which can be made between an action under 
§ 523 and one under § 727. The remedy sought under both [sections] is a declaration 
that the debt (§ 523) or the debtor (§ 727) is not entitled to the equitable power of the 
Bankruptcy Code.") . 
Samson v. Ward (In re Ward), 184 B.R. 253, 256-57 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1995) (where 
liability and damages were fixed by state court judgment, no right to jury trial in 
dischargeability action. Alternatively, debtor waived jury trial right by stipulated 
judgment in state court.) 
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H. Estoppel and res judicata 
1. Res judicata or "claim preclusion" generally not available in discharge and 
dischargeability proceedings 
Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979). 
Swate v. Hartwell (Inre Hartwell), 99 F.3d 1282 (5th Cir. 1996) (res judicata 
bars relitigation of dischargeability of alimony and support in second 
bankruptcy case. Award of monthly payments to former spouse was 
determined by bankruptcy court to be nondischargeable in debtor's 1987 
bankruptcy case. In subsequent suit to enforce divorce decree state court found 
debtor in breach of agreement and jury awarded former spouse lump sum 
judgment for all past due and future alimony (anticipatory breach of contract), 
child support and attorneys' fees. Debtor filed second bankruptcy in 1993 
seeking to discharge the lump sum judgment. That the agreement incident to 
divorce merged into the post divorce fmal judgment did not change the 
substance of the liability. Because the liability was determined to be 
nondischargeable in the first case, second complaint was barred by res 
judicata.) 
Read v. Read (In re Read), 183 B.R. 107, 110-12 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1995) 
(where debtor failed to raise § 523(a)(5) dischargeability defense, post-
bankruptcy state court judgment for alimony arrearage precludes claim that 
debt was discharged. Brown v. Felsen applies only to pre-petition state court 
judgments). 
2. Collateral estoppel or "issue preclusion" may be available in discharge and 
dischargeability proceedings 
a. In general 
Grogan v. Gamer, 498 U.S. 279 (1991) (collateral estoppel principles 
do apply in § 523(a) proceedings). 
(1) First Circuit 
Piccicuto v. Dwyer, 39 F.3d 37 (lst Cir. 1994) (jury verdict for 
intentional interference with an advantageous business 
relationship coupled with fmding that debtors engaged in unfair 
trade practices under Massachusetts law collaterally estopped 
debtors from (re)litigating issues of willfulness and 
maliciousness under § 523(a)(6». 
Century 21 Balfour Real Estate v. Menna (In re Menna), 16 F.3d 
7 (1st Cir. 1994) (collateral estoppel may preclude real estate 
agent from proving reasonable reliance on debtor's 
misrepresentations to agent where. state court found agent and 
debtor jointly liable for negligent misrepresentations to buyer 
and element of state court action was that agent failed to exercise 
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reasonable care in obtaining or communicating information from 
the debtor). 
Phalon v. Varrasso (In re Varrasso), 194 B.R. 537 (Bankr. D. 
M!lss. 1996) ("Under full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738, the preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a 
subsequent nondischargeability proceeding under federal 
bankruptcy law is governed by the collateral estoppel law of the 
. state from which the judgment is taken.") 
Brzys v. Lubanski (In re Lubanski), 186 B.R. 160, 165 (Bankr. 
D. Mass. 1995) (although state law action for installing 
eavesdropping device had no "malice" element, there is an 
"identity of issues" and state court fmdings satisfied "malice" 
element of § 523(a)(6)~ State court found no compensable injury 
and awarded only statutory liquidated damages, but such 
damages constitute a "deemed" injury). 
(2) Second Circuit 
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Roberti (In re Roberti), 183 B.R. 991, 
1000 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995) (split of authority whether federal 
law creates exception to state collateral estoppel rules for 
§ 523(a)(2), (4), (6), matters within bankruptcy court's exclusive 
jurisdiction). 
Benderv. Tobman CInre Tobman), 107 BR 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(jury's fmding of fraudulent inducement not sufficient to 
collaterally estop the debtor from relitigating the issue; of fraud 
where verdict could have been based on some or all of several 
misrepresentations not all of which would suffice for 
§ 523(a)(2)(A) purposes); Stone v. Stone (In re Stone), 94 B.R. 
298 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), affdwithoutop., 880 F.2d 1318 (2d Cir. 
1989) (collateral estoppel appropriate on issue of embezzlement 
under § 523(a)(4) where: (1) debtor found by state court to have 
engaged in the defalcation of partnership assets; (2) fmding was 
necessary to state court ruling; (3) appellant had sufficient 
incentive to litigate matters at that time; (4) issues raised in 
bankruptcy and state proceedings essentially the same; (5) state 
and federal standards for embezzlement were identical). 
(3) Third Circuit 
Baldino v. Wilson (In re Wilson), 116 F.3d 87,90 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(bankruptcy court abused its discretion by denying relief from 
the stay to allow the plaintiff to appeal state trial court's 
dismissal of the malicious prosecution complaint. If the plaintiff 
is successful in the state courts, a judgment for malicious 
prosecution will have preclusive effect in nondischargeability 
litigation under § 523(a)(6). If the plaintiff is not allowed relief 
from the stay to appeal the state court judgment, issue preclusion 
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may prevent the plaintiff from litigating the elements of the 
malicious prosecution action in the bankruptcy court. Citing the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the state court plaintiff "cannot 
relitigate the adverse trial court judgment in bankruptcy 
court ... [I]t is necessary to lift the stay to permit prosecution of 
her appeal to the state appellate courts.") 
In re Conte, 33 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 1994) (jury verdict in attorney 
malpractice action not entitled to collateral estoppel effect in 
§ 523(a)(6) action because jury fmding of "knowledge" of high 
probability of harm and "reckless indifference" to the 
consequences was not a fmding of "willful and malicious 
injury.") 
(4) Fourth Circuit 
Pahlavi v. Ansari (In re Ansari), 113 F.3d 17 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(applying Virginia law, default judgment entered as sanction for 
discovery tactics by debtor was entitled to collateral estoppel 
effect in dischargeability litigation.) 
Hagen v. McNallen (In re McNall en), 62F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 
1995) ("federal courts must, as a matter of full faith and credit, 
apply the forums state's law of collateral estoppel." Sister sued 
brother in Texas state court for tortiously removing their mother 
from a retirement home. Texas jury verdict that debtor acted in 
an "outrageous" manner--in a manner that a civilized community 
would fmd to be atrocious and utterly intolerable--and in wanton 
disregard for the welfare of his mother, collaterally estopped 
debtor from contesting malice for purposes of § 523(a)(6).) 
Eborn v. Sawyer (In re Sawyer), 192 B.R 671 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 
1996) (district court fmding in admiralty proceeding that debtor 
refused to pay "maintenance" and "cure" to an injured seaman 
bars relitigation of willfulness and malice in § 523(a)(6) action. 
Debtor was sued by seaman in federal district court for injuries 
suffered on debtor's shrimping vessel. District court found the 
vessel was seaworthy and that plaintiffs injuries were not caused 
by any unseaworthy condition. However, pursuant to the laws 
of admiralty, the court ordered debtor to pay "cure," 
"maintenance," and lost wages-the shipowner's duty of care 
toward seamen who become injured while in the owner's service. 
That debtor did not voluntarily pay and attempted to shield 
himself of liability,the court found to "constitute willful and 
arbitrary conduct that justifies the award of both attorney's fees 
and punitive damages .... Under maritime law, a shipowner's 
failure to pay maintenance and cure is an independent tort that 
renders the shipowner liable for any aggravation of the seaman's 
injury." The district court fmding that debtor's failure to pay was 
"willful and arbitrary," estops the debtor from (re)litigating 
willfulness and maliciousness under § 523(a)(6).) . ~ 
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Catron v. Morrison (In re Catron), 186 B.R. 197, 202 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. 1995) (state juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to 
determine whether hold hannless provision was in the nature of 
support. Fonner spouse not collaterally estopped in subsequent 
dischargeability proceeding.) 
CatercOI:p. Inc. v. Henicheck (In re Henicheck), 186 B.R. 211, 
215,217 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (complaint, answer, amended 
counterclaim, jury instructions, and special jury verdict defme 
issues litigated in state court; if sufficiently detailed, court may 
determine whether issue preclusion applies. Jury fmding that 
debtor made intentional misrepresentations to induce plaintiff to 
enter into settlement agreement had collateral estoppel effect.) 
(5) Fifth Circuit 
Schwager v. Fallas (In re Schwager), 121 F.3d 177, 182-4 (5th 
Cir. 1997) (collateral estoppel does not preclude debtor's 
relitigation of § 523(a)(4) elements where state court jury found 
in the alternative that the debtor had breached a fiduciary duty 
and breached a partnership agreement. "The bankruptcy court 
found, and the district court agreed, that collateral estoppel 
applied, based on the jury's fmdings in the 1989 judgment. The 
jury found several facts that pertain to this case. In response to 
Question No. 16, the jury found that 'Schwager breach[ed] his 
fiduciary duty to [the limited partners] in the perfonnance of his 
responsibilities, ... which proximately caused damages [to the 
limited partners].' In response to Question No. 17, the jury 
determined that 'Schwager materially breach[ed] the limited 
partnership agreement, ... proximately causing damages to the 
[limited partners].; The jurors were instructed to answer 
Question No. 18 only if they answered 'yes' to either Question 
No. 16 or Question No. 17. The jury then awarded damages 
pursuant to Question No. 18, which is as follows: "What sum of 
money ... would fairly and reasonably compensate [the limited 
partners] for damages sustained, if any, as a result of breach of 
fiduciary duty or the material breach of the partnership 
agreement (which you previously found)?" ... The jury also 
answered 'yes' to Question No. 19, which is as follows: Was 
Bruce Schwager's breach of fiduciary duty, if any, committed 
intentionally, maliciously or with heedless and reckless disregard 
of the rights of any of the limited partners? ... Texas courts have 
adopted the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, which is 
the general rule on issue preclusion. The Texas Supreme Court 
applied comment i to the Restatement, which states: 'i. 
Alternative determinations by court of first instance. If a 
judgment of a court of first instance is based on determinations 
of two issues, either of which standing independently would be 
sufficient to support the result, the judgment is not conclusive 
with respect to either issue standing alone.' ... [T]his case falls 




to use one issue in the judgment, the breach of fiduciary duty, 
standing alone. However, the jury was asked in a single question 
to award damages for either breach of fiduciary duty or breach 
of the partnership agreement. Therefore, neither ground was 
essential to. the judgment awarding these damages to the limited 
partners because the award can be upheld on either basis .... We 
reverse and remand for a redetermination of the dischargeability 
issues, with specific, independent factual fmdings."). 
Fielder v. King (In re King), 103 F.3d 17, 19-20 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(state court judgment on debtor's motion for a new trial that 
eliminated jury fmding that debtor had committed fraud does not 
collaterally estop the state court plaintiff from asserting fraud in 
subsequent § 523(a)(2)(A) complaint. A Texas state court jury 
found that the debtor had breached a contract and committed 
fraud. On the debtor's motion for a new trial, the trial court 
substituted a judgment liIrited to contract damages. "In this 
circuit, issue preclusion will prevent a bankruptcy court from 
determining discharge ability issues for itself only if 'the first 
court has made specific, subordinate, factual fmdings on the 
identical dischargeability issue in question . . . and the facts 
supporting the court's fmdings are discernible from that court's 
record.' ... The record reflects no 'specific, subordinate, factual 
findings' that King's debt to the Fielders was not obtained by 
false pretenses, false representations, or actual fraud .... King 
essentially argues that the substituted state court judgment, which 
awarded contract damages and denied 'all relief not expressly 
granted,' constitutes a specific fmding that King did not obtain 
the debt by false pretenses, false representation, or actual fraud. 
We disagree. The bare fact that the state court awarded only 
contract rather than fraud damages does not preclude the 
bankruptcy court from inquiring into the true nature of that debt. 
The bankruptcy court is not bound by the 'breach of contract' 
label that the state-court assigned to the judgment awarded to the 
Fielders. . . . Under these circumstances, the state court's 
elimination of fraud damages can hardly be construed as a 
specific factual fmding regarding the federal law dischargeability 
issue.") 
Boyce v. Greenway (In re Greenway), 71 F.3d 1177, 1181 (5th 
Cir. 1996) (plaintiff is collaterally estopped to prove willful and 
malicious injury under § 523(a)(6) where state court jury refused 
to find gross negligence by the debtor in the operation of a 
motorboat while drinking. "A state court judgment's preclusive 
effect on a subsequent federal action is determined by the full 
faith and credit statute .... Under this statute, we must look to 
the rules of preclusion of the state in which the judgment was 
rendered .... Because Greenway's state judgment was entered 
by a Texas court, we apply Texas preclusion rules .... In the 
state court proceeding, gross negligence was defmed to the jury 
as 'such an entire wont of care as to establish that the act or 
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omISSIon in question was the result of actual conscious 
indifference to the rights, welfare and safety of the persons 
affected thereby.' Conscious indifference is the salient element 
of gross negligence under Texas law .... We have consistently 
defmed 'willful and malicious' under § 523(a)(6) ... to mean 
'intentional' and lacking 'just cause or excuse.' ... Comparing 
Texas' standard for gross negligence with the language of 
§ 523(a)(6), we agree with the district court that the jury's refusal 
to fmd that Greenway acted with 'actual conscious indifference' 
necessarily precludes a subsequent fmding that Greenway's 
actions were both 'intentional' and without 'just cause or 
excuse.' Accordingly, we affrrm the district court's holding that 
the plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from litigating whether 
Greenway's actions were willful and malicious under § 523(a)(6) 
of the Bankruptcy Code. "). 
Gamer v. Lehrer (In re Gamer), 56 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(state court judgment that debtor "acted with spite, ill-will and 
malice" entered after trial at which debtor did not appear, was a 
"post-answer 'default' judgment" entitled to collateral estoppel 
effect in § 523(a)(6) action against debtor. Preclusive effect of 
a state court judgment is guided by the full faith and credit 
statute, 28 U.S.c. § 1738. Federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over 
discharge and dischargeability proceedings does not effect an 
exemption from the full faith and credit statute.); Pancake v. 
Reliance Ins. Co. (In re Pancake), 199 B.R. 350 (N.D. Tex. 
1996) (Texas default judgment entered after court struck debtor's 
pleadings as a sanction for failing to comply with discovery did 
not collaterally estop the debtor from litigating dischargeability 
under § 523(a)(11). State court did not hear evidence, hold a 
prove-up hearing or otherwise consider witness testimony}, ajf'd, 
106 F.3d 1242 (5th Cir. 1997). 
RecoverEdge L.P. v. Pentecost (In re Carpenter), 44 F.3d 1284, 
1289-1294 (5th Cir. 1995) (RTC and its successor in interest are 
collaterally estopped to assert the debtor's conspiracy to commit 
fraud where jury returned verdict for debtor in a civil conspiracy 
trial. Debtor and others were named by the RTC in a civil 
complaint for conspiracy to defraud a bank by participating in a 
sham real estate transaction. "The jury ultimately rendered a 
special verdict fmding that all of the . . . defendants except 
Carpenter had engaged in a conspiracy to defraud the RTC .... " 
Notwithstanding the jury's verdict, the separate issue of 
nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A) was submitted to the 
district court which found the debt nondischargeable reasoning: 
"The Court must disregard the jury's fmding on this point 
because the evidence establishes and logic dictates that Houston 
Storage, Inc. [a codefendant] could not be a conspirator except 
through the conduct of Carpenter. ... The inquiry is whether 
Carpenter incurred a debt by false pretenses, representation or 
fraud. This Court fmds that he did and the record is sufficiently 
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ample on this point." The Fifth Circuit reversed: "There is no 
question that the issue of whether Carpenter conspired with 
others to defraud Universal Savings was actually litigated in the 
first proceeding and necessary to the court's fmal judgment 
entered on the jury's verdict. Therefore, the crucial issue in this 
case is whether the issues are identical. ... Collateral estoppel 
will apply in a second proceeding that involves separate claims 
if the claims involve the same issue .... To defme the issue that 
was actually litigated in the first proceeding, we look to the 
jury's special verdict. ... The verdict form submitted to the jury 
demonstrates that the issue in the first case was whether 
Carpenter 'engaged in a civil conspiracy with [named and 
unnamed defendants] to defraud [the R TC as receiver for 
Universal Savings] in connection with [the Houston Storage 
transaction]. , . . . When asked whether it found by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Carpenter engaged in the 
conspiracy, the jury answered 'No.' The issue in the second 
proceeding was whether the RTC's breach of contract judgment 
was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A) .... Viewed in the 
abstract, the elements of nondischargeability under 
§ 523(a)(2)(A) are sufficiently distinct from the elements of civil 
conspiracy to defraud to suggest that a jury verdict in a 
conspiracy to defraud case would not ordinarily preclude a 
determination of nondischargeability under 
§ 523(a)(2)(A) .... However, we do not compare the issues in 
the abstract, and in this case, the specific nature of the RTC's 
nondischargeability claim against Carpenter has made what 
might otherwise be distinct issues identical. ... In other words, 
the RTC argued that Carpenter's debt is nondischargeable under 
§ 523(a)(2)(A) because he participated in a conspiracy to defraud 
the RTC. That issue, however, is precisely the issue decided by 
the jury in the RTC's conspiracy case against 
Carpenter .... Because the issues of ultimate fact in the two 
proceedings are identical, we hold that the R TC was precluded 
from asserting its 'participation in a fraudulent scheme' theory 
of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A) and the district court 
was bound by the jury's verdict in Carpenter's favor on the 
factual issue underlying the RTC's theory. We do not hold that 
a fmding of nonliability . for civil conspiracy to defraud 
necessarily precludes litigation of nondischargeability under 
§ 523(a)(2)(A). Rather we hold that where, as here, the factual 
issue that forms the basis for the creditor's theory of 
nondischargeability has been actually litigated in a prior 
proceeding, neither the creditor nor the debtor may relitigate 
those grounds."); Geisler v. Pansegrau (In re Pansegrau), 180 
B.R. 468, 471 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1995). 
(6) Sixth Circuit 
Rally Hill Prods .. Inc. v. Bursack (In re Bursack), 65 F.3d 51 
(6th Cir. 1995) (Bankruptcy court's exclusive jurisdiction over 
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dischargeability issues does not alter the fundamental principle 
that '''judicial proceedings [of any court of aIiy state] shall have 
the same full faith and credit in every court within the United 
States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of such 
State ... from which they are taken. '" Jury verdict of fraud 
entitled to collateral estoppel effect in § 523(a)(2) litigation 
notwithstanding that debtor did not appear at trial. Because the 
judgment was not a ''true default judgment," court did not have 
to address continuing vitality of statement in Spilman v. Harley, 
656 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1981), "that default judgments can never 
have preclusive effect in bankruptcy proceedings regardless of 
their treatment under relevant state law."); White v. Rogers (In 
re Rogers), No. 94-5056, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15394 (6th Cir. 
June 16, 1995) (unpublished) (Quoting Harris v. Byard (In re 
Byard), 47 B.R 700, 707 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985), "There is 
no compelling statement of federal bankruptcy law which 
expressly or impliedly excepts to the normal operation of § 1738 
where the state court judgment for which issue preclusive effect 
is sought is a default judgment." Civil "default" judgment for 
malicious and intentional shooting was "actually litigated" where 
victim testified. "Even if the default judgment had been 
rendered without the hearing of evidence ... Tennessee law 
would give it preclusive effect. ... Because a Tennessee court 
would give preclusive effect to the default judgment in this case, 
and no federal policy creates an exception to the normal rules of 
full faith and credit in this case, the bankruptcy court was 
obligated to give preclusive effect to the defaultjudgment.") 
Wood v. Dealers Financial Servs .. Inc., 199 B.R 25 (E.D. Mich. 
1996) (default judgment in Michigan state court action for fraud, 
conversion, misappropriation and conspiracy did not collaterally 
estop debtor from litigating. dischargeability under 
§ 523(a)(2)(A). Bankruptcy court erred in its reliance on 
Michigan law to determine the preclusive effect of the default 
judgment. The Sixth Circuit decision in Spilman "excepted 
dischargeability determinations from [28 U.S.C.] § 1738." The 
sixth Circuit established a federal collateral estoppel standard 
which requires "'that the precise issue in the later proceedings 
have been raised in the prior proceeding, that the issues were 
actually litigated, and that the determination was necessary to the 
outcome.' . .. [TJaken literally, Spilman seemingly precludes 
satisfaction of the 'actually litigated' requirement by any state 
court default judgment as a matter of law." Court did not discuss 
Sixth Circuit's later decisions in Bursack and Rogers.) 
Rowe Oil. Inc. v. McCoy (In re McCoy), 189 B.R 129 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio 1995) (Ohio state court judgment for 
misappropriation of trade secrets collaterally estopped debtor 
from defending nondischargeability action under § 523(a)(4). 
Finding of malice was prerequisite to award of attorneys' fees in 
state court.) 
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(7) Eighth Circuit 
Tudor Oaks Ltd. Partnership v. Cochrane (In re Cochrane), 1997 
WL 542249 *4 (8th Cir. Sept. 5, 1997) (state court jury verdict 
that debtor breached fiduciary duty to partnership collaterally 
estopped debtor in § 523(a)(4) litigation. "[I]ssues concerning 
Cochrane's breach of his fiduciary duties were fully, fairly and 
actually litigated and were essential to the final judgment entered 
in the underlying state court action .... [T]he bankruptcy court 
did not err in concluding that Cochrane is bound by the jury's 
fmdings."). 
Abbott Bank v. Armstrong. 44 F.3d 665, 666-7, n.3 (8th Cir. 
1995) (prior judgment denying the debtor's discharge under 
§ 727(a)(2) collaterally estops debtor's objection to the same 
creditor's claim. Abbott Bank successfully prosecuted the denial 
of the debtor's discharge. Later, the debtor objected to the 
bank's claim on the grounds that the claim was extinguished 
because the bank failed to give proper notice of a sale of its 
collateral and that the claim was barred because the bank had 
received a preference. Bankruptcy and district courts sustained 
the debtor's objection to the bank's claims. Reversing, the court 
of appeals explained: "The denial of discharge is predicated on 
the holding that the Annstrongs defrauded a creditor and that the 
Bank was that creditor. ... Holding that the bank was a creditor 
was necessary to our judgment .... [t]he issue was inherent in 
the first litigation, and essential to the valid fmal judgment that 
was entered .... [T]hat the Bank was a creditor was admitted in 
the Armstrong's initial pleading." The court does not explain 
how the bank's status as a "creditor" collaterally estops the 
debtor to litigate the allowance of the bank's claim. With respect 
to the preference argument, the court notes in a footnote "The 
Annstrongs' argument that the Bank's claim should be barred on 
account of preferences is subject to the same collateral estoppel 
analysis. ") 
(8) Ninth Circuit 
Cowen v. Kennedy (In re Kennedy), 108 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (voluntary dismissal before trial of state court lawsuit 
does not collaterally estop plaintiff from litigating 
dischargeability. Dismissal was voluntary, without prejudice and 
left the debtor "as if he were never a party to the suit, with the 
result that collateral estoppel does not apply"). 
Kelly v. Okoye (In re Kelly), 182 B.R. 255 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
1995), affd mem., 100 F.3d 110 (9th Cir. 1996) (legal 
malpractice judgment fmding "gross negligence" does not satisfy 
nondischargeability standards. State court legal malpractice 
judgment does not satisfy all requirements for 
nondischargeability under §§ 523(a)(2), (a)(4), or (a)(6). 
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Insufficient identity of issues. The state court judgment was 
based on a fmding of "gross negligence as a fiduciary." Gross 
negligence is not sufficient to satisfy § 523(a)(6)'s willful and 
malicious standard because there was no evidence of an 
intentional deception.) 
Papadakis v. Zelis (In re Zelis), 66 F.3d 205 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(debtor is collaterally estopped to contest willfulness and 
maliciousness where California Court of Appeals sanctioned the 
debtor for "intentionally and wrongfully" filing frivolous notices 
of appeal "in bad faith and for abusive litigation tactics." "In 
Grogan ... the Supreme Court recognized that a creditor who 
successfully obtained a fraud judgment in state court could 
invoke collateral estoppel in an action under section 523(a). The 
same reasoning applies to the present case where the 
requirements for collateral estoppel have been met, i.e., actual 
litigation of the issue and a determination in a prior action of 
those elements of the claim that are the same as the elements 
required for nondischargeability .... [F]iling a frivolous appeal 
necessarily causes harm to the opposing parties by requiring 
them to incur unnecessary litigation costs and attorneys' fees, 
and by delaying fmal resolution of the dispute. Likewise, a court 
generally orders sanctions only when the party's conduct has 
been particularly abusive and there is no justification or excuse 
for the behavior. ") 
Silva v. Smith's Pacific Shrimp. Inc. (In re Silva), 190 B.R. 889 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (unopposed motion for summary 
judgment in federal litigation was not actually litigated for 
purposes of collateral estoppel). 
Stokes v. Vierra, 185 B.R. 341, 345 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (question 
whether fraud was actually litigated as part of default judgment 
proceeding in state court remanded because transcript not part of 
record). 
(9) Eleventh Circuit 
HSSM #7 Limited Partnership v. Bilzerian (In re Bilzerian), 100 
F.3d 886 (11th Cir. 1996) (debtor collaterally estopped to 
relitigate issues of fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A) because district 
court jury was presented with nearly identical issues. That the 
jury was instructed that plaintiffs reliance must be "reasonable" 
did not preclude collateral estoppel because it was a higher 
standard than the "justifiable" reliance required under 
§ 523(a)(2)(A).) 
League v. Graham (In re Graham), 191 B.R. 489 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 1996) (full faith and credit statute requires bankruptcy court 
to apply state collateral estoppel standard to state court judgment; 
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Georgia default judgment for fraud collaterally estops debtor in 
§ 523(a)(2) litigation). 
Mills v. Ellerbee (In re Ellerbee), 177 B.R. 731, 737 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga 1995), ajJ'd, No. 1:95-CV-459-JEC (N.D. Ga. May 31, 
1995) [unpublished decision]; ajJ'd mem., 78 F.3d 600 (11th 
Cir.), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 117 S. Ct. 357, 136 L. Ed.2d 
249 (1996) (jury :fmding in state court defamation case that 
debtor acted with "actual malice" is not preclusive of "willful. 
and malicious" injury for § 523(a)(6) purposes because :fmding 
did not rule out possibility that debtor recklessly disregarded the 
truth-verdict does not establish that debtor intended to injure or 
knew that injury would necessarily follow from his conduct.) 
Sikes v. Norton (In re Norton), 185 B.R. 945, 948-50 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga. 1995) (debtor collaterally estopped in § 727 action by 
:fmdings of intent in prior fraudulent conveyance action in 
bankruptcy court.) 
Sims v. Morris (In re Morris), 185 B.R. 939, 943-45 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga. 1994) (no preclusive effect on intent issue where record 
does not show the controlling facts or exact issues decided. 
Preclusive effect given to liability determination and amount of 
debt); Smith v. Assevero (In re Assevero), 185 B.R. 951, 958 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995) (preclusive effect given state court 
default judgment as to liability, but not dischargeability) . 
. Phillips v. Phillips (In re Phillips), 187 B.R. 363, 370-71 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 1995) (in § 727(a)(4)(A) action, debtor collaterally 
estopped from claiming "book value" for stock on his 
bankruptcy schedules because state court rejected debtor's lower 
valuation in prior divorce proceeding). 
b. Default judgment 
Pahlavi v. Ansari (In re Ansari). 113 F.3d 17 (4th Cir. 1997) (applying 
Virginia law, default judgment :fmding defalcation in a fiduciary 
capacity is entitled to collateral estoppel effect in dischargeability 
litigation. State court judgment entered as sanction for debtor's tactics 
in avoiding discovery was a default judgment but would satisfy the 
"actual litigation" requirement for collateral estoppel under Virginia 
law.) 
Gayden v. Nourbakhsh (In Te Nourbakhsh), 67 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(Florida default judgment :fmding fraud collaterally estops debtor to 
relitigate fraud in a § 523(a)(2)(A) action because the supreme court of 
Florida would give collateral estoppel effect to the default judgment. 
''Nourbakhsh argues that under federal collateral estoppel law, default 
judgments should not be given preclusive effect because the issues 
resolved by default were not 'actually litigated.' ... This argument is 
misguided, however, because Florida collateral estoppel law, not federal 
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collateral estoppel law, controls. The preclusive effect of a state court 
judgment in a subsequent federal lawsuit generally is determined by the 
full faith and credit statute .... 28 U.S.C. § 1738 .... The Supreme 
Court of Florida ... held that collateral estoppel ... bars relitigation of 
an issue decided by default judgment. ... If collateral estoppel applies 
under state law, we next determine whether an exception to § 1738 
should apply .... [Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979)] was a res 
judicata case, and the Court expressly left open the question of whether 
a bankruptcy court adjudicating as § 17 claim (now a § 523 claim) 
should given collateral estoppel effect to a prior state court 
judgment. ... The Court answered that question conclusively in Grogan 
v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 [(1991)] ... : 'We now clarify that collateral 
estoppel principles do indeed apply in discharge exception proceedings 
pursuantto § 523(a).'''); FDIC v. Daily (In re Daily), 47 F.3d 365,368-
9 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curium) (default judgment entered against debtor 
in RICO case for failure to comply with discovery requests collaterally 
estops debtor to contest nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A) & 
(B). "The judgment entered in the RICO action was not an ordinary 
default judgment. Daily did not simply decide the burden of litigation 
outweighed the advantage of opposing the FDIC's claim and fail to 
appear. He actively participated in the litigation, albeit obstructively, 
for two years before judgment was entered against him. A party who 
deliberately precludes resolution of factual issues through normal 
adjudicative procedures may be bound, in subsequent, related 
proceedings involving the same parties and issues, by a prior judicial 
determination reached without completion of the usual process of 
adjudication. In such a case the 'actual litigation' requirement may be 
satisfied by substantial participation in an adversary contest in which the 
party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself on the 
merits but chooses not to do so .... Due process is not violated by a 
court's entry ofa default judgment or other sanction against a party for 
refusal to cooperate with discovery .... Nor is due process violated if 
the defendant is later held to the consequences of such a judgment in a 
bankruptcy discharge proceeding."); Green v. Kennedy (In re Green), 
198 B.R. 564 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996) (liThe bankruptcy court is required 
to give the same collateral estoppel effect to a state court judgment as 
would a court of that state. II Under California law default judgment is 
entitled to collateral estoppel effect. Debtor was estopped from 
relitgating issue of fraud.); Newsom v. Moore (In re Moore), 186 B.R. 
962,973 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing In re Bugna, 33 F.3d 1054 (9th 
Cir. 1994), default judgment has collateral estoppel effect under 
California law where defendant participated in case and "prove-up" 
hearing was conducted. Malice in § 523(a)(6) may be inferred from 
award of punitive damages in default judgment entered after prove-up 
hearing). Compare Hernandez v. Pizante (In re Pizante), 186 B.R. 484, 
489 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1995) (default judgment for failing to respond to 
requests for adnrissions in state court has no collateral estoppel effect); 
Stokes v. Vierra, 185 B.R. 341, 344 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (under South 
Carolina law, issue must be "actually litigated;" since state court 
transcript not in record, case remanded for determination whether fraud 
actually litigated at default hearing). 
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Bay Area Factors. v. Calvert (In re Calvert), 105 F.3d 315,321 (6th Cir. 
1997) (because California would give collateral estoppel effect to a 
"pure" default judgment, a California default judgment is entitled to 
collateral. estoppel effect in a discharge ability proceeding under 
§ 523(a). "In the absence of any indication in the Bankruptcy Code or 
legislative history suggesting that Congress intended an exception to [28 
U.S.C.] § 1738 apply to true default judgments and with no principled 
distinction between cases where a defendant participates in part in 
defense of the state court suit and cases where the defendant does not 
respond at all, we conclude that collateral estoppel applies to true 
default judgments in bankruptcy dischargeability proceedings in those 
states which would give such judgments that effect."); Rally Hill Prods .. 
Inc. v. Bursack (In re Bursack), 65 F.3d 51 (6th Cir. 1995) (jury verdict 
of fraud entered after a trial at which the debtor did not appear was not 
a "true default judgment" and thus was entitled to collateral estoppel 
effect in subsequent § 523(a)(2) litigation without offending Spilman v. 
Harley, 665 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1981).); White v. Rogers (In re Rogers), 
No. 94-5056, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15394 (6th Cir. June 16, 1995) 
(unpublished) (civil "default" judgment for malicious and intentional 
shooting was "actually litigated" and thus entitled to collateral estoppel 
effect where the victim testified, notwithstanding that the debtor did not 
appear. In dicta, because Tennessee law would give preclusive effect 
to a default judgment--even one rendered without the hearing of 
evidence--the civil default judgment was entitled to collateral estoppel 
effect in the bankruptcy court in dischargeability litigation.); Dean v. 
Rogers (In re Rogers), 189 B.R. 136 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) ("The 
result of the Bursack opinion is that [bankruptcy court] must look to the 
laws of Ohio regarding application of the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel. . .. The Ohio courts have not expanded on what constitutes 
'actual and direct litigation.' [However, where] there was no evidence 
that [debtor] participated at any level in the underlying state court 
action[, the court would not apply collateral estoppel]." 
Pancake v. Reliance Ins. Co. (In re Pancake), 106 F.3d 1242, 1244 (5th 
Cir. 1997) (Texas "post-answer" default judgment is not entitled to 
collateral estoppel effect in dischargeability litigation. "We have held 
under Texas law that where the court enters a default judgment after 
conducting a hearing or trial at which the plaintiff meets his evidentiary 
burden, the issues raised therein are considered fully and fairly litigated 
for collateral estoppel purposes. In the case at bar, however, we agree 
with the district court that the record before us fails to demonstrate that 
the state court conducted a hearing in which Reliance met its burden of 
proving that Pancake defrauded Sunbelt. ... In the case at bar the court 
entered judgment after striking Pancake's answer, thus creating a 
situation similar to that where no answer is filed, i.e., a no-answer 
default judgment. In that context, the defendant is deemed to admit the 
plaintiffs pleadings and, thus, judgment may be entered based upon 
those pleadings. For purposes of collateral estoppel, however, the 
critical inquiry is not directed at the nature of the default judgment but, 
rather, one must focus on whether an issue was fully and fairly litigated. 
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Thus, even though Pancake's answer was struck, if Reliance can 
produce record evidence demonstrating that the state court conducted 
a hearing in which Reliance was put to its evidentiary burden, collateral 
estoppel may be found to be appropriate. All of that remains to be 
determined and we express no opinion thereon."); Gober v. Terra + 
Com. (In re Gober), 100 F.3d 1195 (5th Cir. 1996) (Texas default 
judgment for discovery abuse has collateral estoppel effect in 
discharge ability litigation. Debtor participated in state court action for 
two years then failed to post security for costs, failed to respond to 
discovery requests and failed to appear at hearing to resolve discovery 
issue. Default judgment for actual and punitive damages was entered 
after the state court heard plaintiffs evidence. Texas courts recognize 
different types of default judgments-those entered for failure to answer 
("no-answer" default) and those entered after an answer is filed ("post 
answer"). "A post-answer default 'constitutes neither an abandonment 
of the defendant's answer nor an implied confession of any issues joined 
by defendant's answer.' Because the merits of the plaintiffs claim 
remain at issue, judgment cannot be rendered on the pleadings, and the 
plaintiff must offer sufficient evidence to meet his burden of proof as if 
at trial. ... [I]n a no-answer default judgment, the defendant is deemed 
to have admitted all of the plaintiffs allegations with respect to 
liability .... [However,] conduct sufficient to warrant punitive damages 
is not regarded as admitted by default. ... [T]o support an award of 
punitive damages [at the time judgment was rendered in this case], the 
defendant's act must not only be unlawful, 'but must partake of a wanton 
and malicious nature.'" The state court found "'after hearing the 
evidence and arguments of counsel,' that [ debtor] acted 'maliciously and 
willfully when he converted [$307,284.96], for which exemplary and 
punitive damages should be awarded.'" Collateral estoppel was 
appropriate. Court cautioned that it did not "purport to establish a per 
se rule that collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues whenever 
punitive damages are assessed against a defendant after default.".); In 
re Gamer, 56 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Post-answer 'default' 
judgment" --a judgment entered after the debtor answered a complaint, 
but the trial occurred without the debtor in attendance--was entitled to 
collateral estoppel effect under Texas law and thus was entitled to 
collateral estoppel effect in § 523{a){6) litigation in the bankruptcy 
court). 
Bush v. Balfour Beatty Bahamas. Limited On re Bush), 62 F.3d 1319 
(11th Cir. 1995) (The general federal rule is that default judgments are 
not given collateral estoppel effect. However, "[W]here a party has 
substantially participated in [a federal action] in which he had a full and 
fair opportunity to defend on the merits, but subsequently chooses not 
to do so, and even attempts to frustrate the effort to bring the action to 
judgment, it is not an abuse of discretion for the district court to apply 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel to prevent further litigation of the 
issues resolved by the default judgment in the prior action." Default 
judgment for fraud given preclusive effect where judgment was entered 
as a sanction for debtor's failure to cooperate in discovery.); Wilcox v. 
Hritz (In re Hritz), 197 B.R. 702 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996) {default 
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judgment by Georgia state court after debtor's failure to appear at trial 
did not collateral estop debtor from litigating issues of fraud and willful 
and malicious injury. Under Georgia law application of collateral 
estoppel requires that the issues were necessarily litigated and actually 
decided in the prior proceeding. From the state court judgment it could 
not be discerned upon what grounds judgment was entered.); League v. 
Graham (In re Graham), 191 B.R. 489 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996) (Georgia 
default judgment for fraud collaterally estops debtor in § 523(a)(2) 
litigation). 
Meyer v. Rigdon, 36 F.3d 1375 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The plain language of 
section 523(a)(II) ... (preempts] the common law collateral estoppel 
rules with respect to default judgments, settlement agreements, and 
certain administrative agency decisions .... [A] debt arising from a 
debtor's breach of fiduciary duty to a fmancial institution is not 
dischargeable if that debt is provided in 'any fmal judgment, 
unreviewable order, or consent decree or order' entered in any federal 
or state court.") 
Ramsey v. Bernstein (In re Bernstein), 197 B.R. 475 (Bankr. D. Md. 
1996) (default judgment after debtor answered complaint but failed to 
appear at trial, and after plaintiff presented its case to the jury, was not 
a typical default judgment under Raynor, and collaterally estopped 
debtor from relitigating issues of willfulness and malice. "There should 
be a difference in effect as to issue preclusion between a default 
judgment where there is no participation by the party and an 
uncontested judgment against a party that has appeared but has elected 
not to defend. If an answer is filed, then the case may be deemed to 
have been actually litigated. To hold otherwise would allow defendants 
to play the litigation game, while providing them with a mechanism by 
which to escape the collateral estoppel effects of an adverse judgment 
if things start to go badly. . .. A prior judgment satisfies the actually 
litigated standard, however, only if the party against whom the 
judgment was entered had proper incentive to litigate the matter in the 
prior hearing and could reasonably foresee later litigation on the same 
issue."); Colwell v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 186 B.R. 67 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
1995) (in the Fourth Circuit, M & M Transmissions, Inc. v. Raynor (In 
re Raynor), 922 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1991), prevents application of 
collateral estoppel to issues decided by default. Although not discussed 
in Raynor, this rule applies to damages). 
Phalon v. Varrasso (In re Varrasso), 194 B.R. 537 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
1996) (while the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has not 
addressed whether default judgment is "actually litigated," 
Massachusetts' courts would adopt position that default judgments do 
not satisfy the actually litigated requirement). 
FDIC v. Roberti (In re Roberti), 201 B.R. 614 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996) 
(under Connecticut law some default judgments will be entitled to 
collateral estoppel effect. "'[T]he appropriate inquiry ... is whether the 
party had an adequate opportunity to litigate issues and such issues 
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were necessary to a default judgment, that judgment should put to rest 
subsequent litigation of all issues necessary for the rendering of the 
defaultJudgment. "j; Federal Trade Comm'n v. Wright (In re Wright), 
187 B.R. 826, 834-36 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995) (default judgment in prior 
federal court action has no preclusive effect in dischargeability 
litigation). 
Arbitration and other "quasi-judicial" proceedings 
Com v. Marks (In re Marks), 192 B.R. 379 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (confIrmed 
arbitration award collaterally estopped debtor from relitigating 
willfulness and maliciousness. "A court reviewing the confIrmation of 
an arbitration award must 'apply [the Full Faith and Credit statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1738,] and follow its directive of assessing the preclusive 
effect the state court's decision would be given by another court in the 
state." The arbitration award was based on a fmding that debtor 
intentionally interfered with plaintiff's economic opportunities in 
connection with a shareholders' agreement. Under Pennsylvania law 
"the elements of tortious interference with an economic opportunity are: 
'(1) the existence of a contractual relationship; (2) an intent on the part 
of the defendant to harm the plaintiff by interfering with that contractual 
relationship; (3) the absence of a privilege or justifIcation for such 
interference ... and (4) damages resulting from the defendant's 
conduct.' . . . The tort of intentional interference requires an intent to 
injure; this makes it a 'willful and malicious injury. '" That the 
arbitrator awarded punitive damages supports conclusion that debtor's 
conduct was willful and malicious.) 
d. Summary judgment 
Polechronis v. Cape Cod Needleworks (In re Polechronis), 186 B.R. 1, 
4-5 (D. Mass. 1995) ("actually litigated" requirement not necessarily 
met where state court entered summary judgment against debtor. 
Bankruptcy court must 1) review state court proceeding to determine 
whether "actually litigated" and 2) if summary judgment not opposed 
by debtor, consider whether failure to oppose was consistent with 
actions of '''honest but unfortunate debtor'''-did debtor have good 
faith excuse for not responding and meritorious defense to state court 
action). 
Bell v. Douglass, 184 B.R. 301, 304-06 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (under Iowa 
law, issues not "actually litigated" where summary judgment entered 
after debtor's attorneys withdrew due to nonpayment offees and debtor 
did not respond to requests for admissions. Judgment not qualitatively 
different from default judgment). 
Forrester v. Staggs (In re Staggs), 178 B.R. 767, 778 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 
1994), aff'd, 177 B.R. 92, 98 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (uncontested summary 
judgment satisfIes "actually litigated" requirement where debtor 
appeared in state court, contested an issue, and state court judgment was 
based on facts or evidence presented to it). 
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e. Prior judgment pending on appeal 
Sacks v. Reader (In re Reader), 183 B.R. 630, 633 (Bankr. D. Idaho 
1995) (under Idaho law, state court judgment on appeal is a "fmal 
judgment" for collateral estoppel purposes). 
Moore v. Gill (In re Gill), 181 B.R. 666, 672-73 & n. 7 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 1995) (that prior action is pending on appeal does not prevent 
collateral estoppel under Georgia law. If state court later reverses, 
equity would require bankruptcy court to allow debtor to reopen 
proceeding to determine whether to vacate nondischargeability 
judgment). 
3. Equitable estoppel 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Com. v. Potter (In re Potter), 185 B.R. 68, 71-72 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) (equitable estoppel precludes debtor's "defense" that 
complaint is untimely. Bankruptcy Rules 4007(c) and 4004(d) are not 
jurisdictional. Equitable estoppel requires: "(1) a representation or 
concealment of material facts; (2) made with knowledge, actual.or virtual, of 
the facts; (3) to a party actually ignorant of the truth; (4) with the intention that 
the latter act upon it; and (5) the party must have been induced to act upon it." 
Debtor lied and failed to disclose filing of bankruptcy to attorney for judgment 
creditor in post-judgment discovery proceedings.) 
4. "Quasi-Estoppel" and "Iudicial Admissions" 
Morgan v. Musgrove (In re Musgrove), 187 B.R. 808, 812 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
1995) (listing plaintiff on Chapter 7 schedules as undisputed creditor 
constitutes judicial admission that debt owed for purposes of discharge ability 
complaint). 
1. Exceptions to dischargeability apply to individual debtors only 
New Venture Partnership v. JRB Consolidated. Inc. On re JRB Consolidated. Inc.), 
188 B.R. 373 (Bankr. W. D. Tex. 1995) (creditor can maintain dischargeability action 
under § 523(a) against a corporate chapter 12 debtor. Unlike chapter 11, 
"Chapter 12 ... contains a specific provision in § 1228(a) which says 'the debtor' gets 
a discharge 'except' for debts 'of the kind' specified in § 523(a). There is no 
liquidation versus continuing business distinction for corporate or partnership debtors 
[ in § 1228] and there is no specific separate section referring to individual debtors. 
The language of § 1228(a) is not inconsistent with § 523(a) as individual debtors are 
still subject to the § 523(a) exceptions. But, § 1228(a) is broader in that its language 
is inclusive of all debtors -- individuals, partnerships, and corporations ... , The 
meaning of the word debtor in Chapter 12 is not unclear. The wording in § 1228(a)(2) 
describing 'debts of the kind' specified in § 523(a) does not naturally lend itself to also 
incorporate the meaning 'for debts of the kind' referenced in § 523(a) .... [T]his 
court believes that the term 'of a kind' does not incorporate the limiting defmition 




Exceptions to discharge and community property 
Kastner v. Brown (In re Kastner), 197 B.R. 620 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1996) (insurance 
Commissioner sought detennination that Commissioner's claim was nondischargeable 
against any property of the fonner community of debtor and her non-debtor ex-
husband. "[U]nder Section S24(a)(3), the dischargeability of claims against the 
debtor, ... , would operate as a discharge against all community property, unless the 
court makes a detennination that the Commissioner's claims are non-dischargeable as 
to ... the non-debtor spouse." Section 524(a) allows the creditor to proceed in a 
hypothetical case involving the nonfiling spouse. "If the debt is hypothetically 
nondischargeable as to the nondebtor spouse, then the community does not receive a 
discharge." However, the court's judgment does not reach the non-debtor's separate 
property.) 
Jurisdiction, concurrent jurisdiction and abstention 
Thaggard v. Pate (In re Tha~gard), 180 B.R. 659, 662-65 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (even if 
stay violation occurred, bankruptcy court did not err in abstaining to allow state court 
to resolve § 523(a)(5) issue; abstention did not violate due process or equal 
protection). 
Roberson v. Roberson (In re Roberson), 187 B.R. 159, 162 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) 
(court declines to permissively abstain in §§ 523(a)(5) and 727 proceeding). 
Brothers v. Tremaine (In re Tremaine), 188 B.R. 380 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995) 
(abstention appropriate in § 523(a)(5) proceeding where divorce decree was on appeal 
in state court, debtor had engaged in forum shopping, and proceeding in one court 
would be more efficient). 
Fidelity Nat'! Title Ins. Co. v. Franklin (In re Franklin), 179 B.R. 913 (Bankr. E.D. 
Cal. 1995) (state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 523(a)(3) action 
notwithstanding underlying claim of fraud under § 523(a)(2) over which bankruptcy 
court would have had exclusive jurisdiction. Applying twelve factor test, bankruptcy 
court abstains.) 
L. Standing 
Lee-Benner v. Gergely (In re Gergely), 110 F.3d 1448, _ (9th Cir. 1997) (because 
California law would permit an unborn child to recover for misrepresentations to the 
mother, child can maintain § 523(a)(2)(A) action against obstetrician for alleged 
intentional misrepresentations with respect to the need for amniocentesis and for 
negligent performance of the procedure that blinded the unborn child. "California 
courts allow recovery for negligence occurring before a plaintiff's birth where damage 
to the unborn child was foreseeable .... This reasoning applies at least as well to fraud 
as to negligence .... If [the plaintiff] has standing to bring an otherwise-traditional 
fraud claim under California law, then that claim would be for fraud within 
§ 523(a)(2)(A).") 
O'Connor. Cavanagh. Anderson. Westover. Killingsworth & Beshears v. Perlin (In re 
Perlin), 30 F.3d 39 (6th Cir. 1994) (fonner spouse's attorneys and expert witnesses did 
not have standing to contest discharge of state court award of fees and expenses in 
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divorce proceeding. "As a general rule, one party may not assert the rights of 
another .... In certain instances [however,] a plaintiff with a particularly close 
relationship to a third party may assert the rights of a third party where the plaintiff 
faces an actual economic harm." Although superficially plaintiffs had an economic 
stake in the outcome of the litigation, that the state court could have made (but did not) 
award directly to plaintiffs clouded the issue.). Compare Martin v. Morello (In re 
Morello), 185 B.R. 753, 754-56 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1995) (attorney has standing in 
523(a)(5) proceeding where fee, designated as alimony, was awarded directly to 
attorney by state court). 
Compare Young v. Beugen (In re Beugen), 99 B.R. 961 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1989), ajJ'd 
mem., 930 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1991) (creditor that purchased claims against the debtor 
pre- and postpetition was without standing to object to debtor's discharge where 
creditor was a "vexatious litigant" who sought to "'use the Court as a Whipping post 
to inflict punishment on the [debtor.] ... The right to object to a debtor's discharge 
is not a marketable commodity which may be purchased by one party from another 
in order to inflict further punishment and discomfort upon the debtor. "'), with Ota v. 
Sarnsung Elecs. Co .. Ltd. (In re Ota), 192 B.R. 545 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996) (prepetition 
assignee of claims is a creditor with standing to object to discharge under § 727. 
Distinguishing Beugen, "there are no facts in the record ... to support even an 
inference that [ creditor] obtained the claims at issue for a purpose other than to satisfy 
[debts to creditor].") 
State Bank of Graymont v. Rich (In re Rich), 202 B.R. 107 (Bankr. C.D. III 1996) 
(fully secured creditor has standing to object to debtor's discharge). 
Sikes v. Norton (In re Norton), 185 B.R. 945, 949 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995) (state court 
judgment for creditor collaterally estops challenge to standing as "creditor" under 
§ 727(c». . 
Putnam County Savings Bank v. Bagen (In re Bagent 185 B.R. 691, 694-95 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1995) (mortgagee may lack standing to bring dischargeability action where 
mortgagee did not seek deficiency in postpetition state court foreclosure action. 
Although a "creditor" at petition, mortgagee may have lost creditor status by failing 
to seek deficiency in foreclosure action). Contra Norwich Savs. Soc'y v. Flonnes (In 
re Flonnes), 183 B.R. 37, 40 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995) (standing not lost by creditor that 
conducted mortgage foreclosure postpetition without obtaining a deficiency 
notwithstanding loss of right to enforce claim under Connecticut law). 
Ferraro v. Phillips (In re Phillips), 185 B.R. 121, 127-28, 131 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.1995) 
(shareholder of closely held corporation has standing to sue both individually and as 
a shareholder to determine dischargeability of debtor's personal expenses paid by 
corporation. Stockholder's derivative suit may be basis for determination of 
nondischargeability. ) 
M. Settlement of discharge and discharge ability litigation 
AT&T Universal Card Servo v. Bermingham (In re Bermingham), 201 B.R. 808 
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996) (consent judgments in dischargeability litigation may be 
rendered only after court is satisfied that the debtor's consent is fully informed. The 
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N. 
court's responsibility is heightened where counsel is retained on a flat fee and has no 
financial incentive to litigate discharge ability complaints.) 
In re Vickers, 176 B.R. 287 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994) (denies trustee's motion to 
approve $24,000 payment by debtor in settlement of an objection to discharge. 
"Either the discharges ought to be granted or they ought to be denied. Nothing in the 
Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee to seek funds from a debtor or to release a 
nondebtor entity as a price for giving up on a discharge complaint. Discharges are not 
property of the estate and are not for sale. It is against public policy to sell 
discharges. ") 
Effect of Pre bankruptcy Settlement or Novation 
Key Bar Inv .. Inc. v. Fischer (In re Fischer), 116 F.3d 388, 390-1 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(prebankruptcy "Compromise Agreement and Mutual Release" precluded § 523(a)(2) 
action based on alleged misrepresentations in sale of a business. "[O]ur decision in 
Gonderv. Kelley, 372 F.2d 94 (9th Cir. 1967), squarely controls this case .... '[I]fit 
is shown that the note, by express agreement, is given and received, as a discharge of 
the original obligation or tort action, then the execution of the note extinguishes the 
tort action and it would be error for the court to look behind the note.' ... [T]he 
Agreement, by its own terms, created a novation, extinguishing all claims arising out 
of the sale of Precision Tune .... Gonder dictates that the claims at issue here do not 
qualify as 'nondischargeable debt' under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)."). 
United States v. Spicer, 57 F.3d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 
116 S. Ct. 701, 133 L.Ed.2d 658 (1996) (that debtor entered into a settlement 
agreement prepetition did not affect a "novation" or otherwise preclude summary 
judgment that debtor's misrepresentations of borrowers' fmancial conditions on HUD 
loan applications were actionable under § 523(a)(2)(A). Declining to follow In re 
West. 22 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 1995), the court must "'inquire into the factual 
circumstances behind the settlement agreement to ascertain whether ... the debt ... 
was derived from the alleged fraudulent conduct. ... '" Failure to look behind the 
settlement agreement would elevate form over substance, allowing a fraudulent debtor 
"through the alchemy of a settlement agreement" to transform into a nonfraudulent 
one.) 
In re West., 22 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 1994) (note for $75,000 to former employer in 
return for general release and covenant not to sue on any obligation other than the 
note, was dischargeable notwithstanding that note was given because of debtor's 
embezzlement of $100,000 from employer. Relying on Maryland Casualty Co. v. 
Cushing, 171 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1948), while the obligation arising from debtor's 
"embezzlement would have been nondischargeable due to its fraudulent nature, no 
allegations of fraud surround the note, and the note substituted a contractual obligation 
for a tortious one.") 
Greenberg v. Schools, 711 F.2d 152 (11th Cir. 1983) (underlying debt was result of 
debtor's fraud or defalcation; settlement agreement does not defeat § 523(a)(4) 
action); Haynes v. Bobofchak (In re Bobofchak), 101 B.R. 465 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
1989). 
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o. Enhanced damages and costs 
1. Punitive damages are nondischargeable 
Hagen v. McNallen (In re McNallen), 62 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 1995) (punitive 
damages of $100,000 that "sprang from the same conduct" that gave rise to 
nondischargeable compensatory damages are nondischargeable under .--' 
§ 523(a)(6». 
Bugna v. McArthur (In re Bugna), 33 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 1994) (§ 523(a) 
excepts enumerated "debts" from discharge. Traditional punitive damages 
imposed by state court for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty constitute a 
nondischargeable debt under § 523(a)(4). However, had the punitive damages 
not been predicated on the debtor's culpability or had the jury been given 
"unlimited discretion to impose punitive damages," their dischargeability 
would have to be re-evaluated.) 
FDIC v. Roberti (In re Roberti), 201 B.R. 614 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996) 
(punitive damages are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A). "Debt" is 
coextensive with "claim," which is defmed as a "'right to payment, whether or 
not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, 
contingent, ... "', which is sufficiently broad to include punitive damages.) 
2. Treble damages 
De La Cruz v. Cohen (In re Cohen), 185 B.R 180 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995), affd, 
191 B.R. 599 (D.N.J. 1996) (New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act's treble damages 
provision applies iD. § 523(a)(2)(A) rent overcharge case where debtorllandlord 
recklessly disregarded the truth regarding rent control ordinance), aff d, 106 
F.3d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1997) ("We conclude that the language 'to the extent 
obtained by' was not intended by Congress to limit the amount of debt 
considered nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A)."), cert. denied, 65 USLW 
3826 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1997). 
FDIC v. Roberti (In re Roberti), 201 B.R 614 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996) (treble 
damages are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(4). '''Whether for compensatory 
or punitive damages, a state court judgment is a 'right to payment,' and thus a 
'debt' within the meaning of section 523(a)(4)."') 
Masters v. Hamama an re Hamama), 182 B.R 757, 758-59 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
1995) (double damages on unpaid wages and treble damages on converted 
funds allowable under state law are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6». 
3. Attorneys fees, interest, other damages and costs 
See also attorney fees in § 523(a)(5) litigation supra. 
Mayer v. Spanel Int'l Ltd. (In re Mayer), 51 F.3d 670,677 (7th Cir. 1995), 
cert. denied,· _ U.S. _, 116 S. Ct. 563, 133 L.Ed.2d 488 (1995) 
("Adtt(p0rneybs' fees provided by contrathctdarebPart ofthed~ebht, and Ib·flthe PrinciPthal ~ 
an re- ankruptcy) interest on e e tare non- ISC argea e, so are e ::j 
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other elements of the debt. Attorneys' fees, no less than the principal and 
interest, are the result of the fraud, and the perpetrator cannot escape the 
consequences .... Under the American Rule, attorneys' fees would not be 
added to a debt as of course .... But if a debtor agrees by contract to pay legal 
expenses, this is no different in principle from agreeing to a higher rate of 
interest, or a balloon payment, or any other contractual element of 
compensation to the lender."); Roberts v. Glenn Roberts & Wip. Inc., 199 B.R. 
393 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (attorneys' fees arid collection costs awarded by state 
court are part of nondischargeable debt under § 523(a)(2)(B)). 
Leeper v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Leeper), 49 
F.3d 98 (3d Cir. 1995) (Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358 (1964), stands 
for "the general proposition that creditors may accrue as to the debtor 
personally post-petition interest on nondischargeable debts while a bankruptcy 
is pending."). Accord McLeod v. Diversified Collection Servs. (In re 
McLeod), 176 B.R. 455 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994). 
Martin v. Morello (In re Morello), 185 B.R 753, 758 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1995) 
(bankruptcy court not authorized to award attorney fees incurred in successful 
§ 523(a)(5) action despite state statute permitting fee awards for enforcing any 
decree for alimony); Colbert v. Colbert (In re Colbert), 185 B.R 247 (Bankr. 
M.D. Tenn. 1995) (bankruptcy court has no authority to award attorney fees 
incurred in dischargeability litigation under §§ 523(a)(5) and (a)(15) where 
plaintiff had no contractual right to fees. Under Tennessee law, plaintiff may 
seek modification of divorce decree in state court if she needs additional 
support due to cost of discharge ability action). 
Silverstein v. Glazer (In re Silverstein), 186 B.R. 85, 87 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 
1995) (interest on judgment for child support arrearage pursuant to general 
state statute for interest on all judgements is dischargeable under § 523(a)(5) 
because not actually in the nature of support). 
Mills v. Ellerbee (In re Ellerbee), 177 B.R. 731, 745-47 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
1995), aft'd, No. 1:95-CV-459-JEC (N.D. Ga. May 31, 1995) (unpublished), 
ajJ'dmem., 78 F.3d 600 (1IthCir.), cert. denied, _U.S. _,117 S.Ct. 357, 
136 L. Ed.2d249 (1996) Gury award of attorneys fees in defamation case based 
on Georgia statute allowing expenses oflitigation under certain circumstances 
are separate, special damages flowing from the underlying tort and are 
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).). 
American Title Ins. v. Marderosian (In re Marderosian), 186 B.R. 341, 344-45 
(Bankr. D.RI. 1995) (rejecting cases that limit nondischargeable attorney fees 
to state court judgments based on contractual or statutory provisions, awards 
attorney fees for equitable indemnitee in § 523(a)(4) action). 
Peterson v. Bozzano (In re Bozzano), 183 B.R. 735, 739 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 
1995) (payment from third party credited pro rata against dischargeable and 
nondischargeable portions of damages award against debtor). 












P. Motions to alter or amend and motions for relief from judgment 
Ellis v. Ellis (In re Ellis), 72 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 1995) (February 24th "Motion for 
Leave to Alter or Amend" bankruptcy court judgment entered on January 28 was 
untimely under Rule 59· and the bankruptcy court was without jurisdiction to enlarge 
the 10 days allowed for such a motion. The bankruptcy court's use of Rule 60 to 
"overcome the untimeliness" of the Rule 59 motion is improper. Under Bankruptcy 
Rule 9006(b )(2), the bankruptcy court cannot enlarge the 10 days within which to flle 
a Rule 59 motion. That the bankruptcy court entered an amended judgment which 
was then timely appealed cures the problem.) 
Q. Default judgments 
Weingarten v. Campagna (In re Weingarten), 178 B.R. 283 (M.D. Fla. 1995), aff'd 
without op., 86 F.3d 1169 (lIth Cir. 1996) (default against debtor in § 727 action not 
an abuse of discretion. Eleventh Circuit does not require culpable or willful 
misconduct by defendant to justify denying motion to set aside default.) 
Wells Fargo Bank v. Beltran (In re Beltran), 182 B.R. 820 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) 
(after default against defendants and at conclusion of default "prove up" hearing at 
which the debtor testified, trial court may enter judgment against plaintiff where the 
proof shows that default judgment is not appropriate and plaintiff did not request 
additional time to conduct discovery or amend complaint, and did not request a trial 
on the merits); Kubick v. FDIC (In re Kubick), 171 B.R. 658 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) 
(default judgment barring discharge set aside on appeal because FDIC's § 727 
complaint parroting the statute would have been dismissed had the debtor moved to 
dismiss instead off ailing to answer. Before entering a default, bankruptcy court has 
"independent duty" to determine sufficiency of § 727 complaint. On remand, 
bankruptcy court is not compelled under Rule 7055 to set aside default but court "must 
exercise its informed discretion."); In re Villegas, 132 B.R. 742 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991) 
(pro se debtors' failure to respond to § 727 complaint does not necessarily entitle 
creditor to a default judgment. Bankruptcy court appropriately denied creditor's 
motion for judgment on the pleadings because pleadings were not closed for purposes 
of Rule 12(c) where no answer had been flled by debtors. Creditor's Rule 12 motion 
for judgment on the pleadings was more properly treated as a motion for default under 
Rule 55. At first hearing, court "entered default" against the debtors and set a 
continued evidentiary hearing on the "entry of a default judgment." At continued 
hearing, creditor failed to present any evidence on mistaken assumption that debtor's 
failure to answer entitled creditor to automatic entry of default judgment. Bankruptcy 
court apparently examined debtors at second hearing on its own and concluded to 
enter judgment in favor of debtors. Appellate panel reversed, holding that failure of 
creditor to present evidence at default judgment hearing did not authorize trial court 
to enter judgment in favor of the defaulting debtor. Trial court cannot enter judgment 
in favor of defaulting debtor until creditor has opportunity for trial on the merits.); 
General Elec. CQPital Com. v. Bui (In re Bui), 188 B.R. 274 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1995) 
(GECC loses default judgment hearing under Rule 7055 because it failed to prove 
prima facie § 523(a)(2)(B) case. "A plaintiff must demonstrate a prima facie case by 
competent evidence in order to obtain a Default Judgment." Each element of the 
plaintiffs § 523(a)(2)(B) case must be demonstrated by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Declarations flled by GECC failed to prove that debtor's charge application 
was false-$3,500 monthly income on application was "not necessarily" inconsistent 
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with $23,000 annual income in bankruptcy schedules. Court apparently disbelieves 
GECC's declaration that it relied on the charge application when it bought the debtor's 
accounts from retail merchants.) 
Avco Financial Servs. ofS. Cal.. Inc. v. Cruz (In re Cruz), 198 B.R. 330 (Bankr. S.D. 
Cal. 1996) (default judgment in favor of creditor will not be entered absent proof of 
entitlement to judgment on the merits. Allegation that debtor has failed to return 
merchandise to creditor will not establish conversion for purposes of § 523(a)(6).) 
Meganck v. Couts (In reCouts), 188 B.R. 949 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995) (declines to 
set aside default judgment in § 523(a)(2)(A) fraud action notwithstanding that debtor 
was not personally served and summons is now more than 120 days old. In exercising 
discretion whether to set aside default judgment, court should consider the prejudice, 
if any, to the plaintiff, whether the defendant has a meritorious defense, and whether 
culpable conduct of the defendant led to the default. Where debtor did not present 
meritorious defense, judgment would not be set aside. That debtor was not properly 
served with complaint was not determinative because debtor had actual knowledge of 
complaint and allowed judgment to be entered. Debtor gambled on a technical 
reading of the rules.) 
Tullock v. Hardy (In re Hardy), 187 B.R. 604 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1995) 
(considerations under Rule 7055 will be applied more liberally when reviewing entry 
of default as opposed to default judgment. Because default judgment had been 
entered, under stricter standard, defendant failed to show excusable neglect to set aside 
default judgment). 
R. Entry of fmal judgment 
Cowen v. Kennedy (In re Kennedy), 108 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing In re 
McLaren, 990 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1993), bankruptcy court has jurisdiction in the 
context of a § 523(a)(2)(A) complaint to enter a fmal judgment determining the 
amount of the debt that is nondischargeable). 
Citibank v. Fisher (In re Fisher), 186 B.R. 70, 71 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1995) (bankruptcy 
court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(n to enter money judgment in 
dischargeability proceeding). 
II. LITIGATION OF DISCHARGEABILITY COMPLAINTS: 11 U.S.C. § 523 
A. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a){l): 
"for a tax or a customs duty .... " 
1. Counting and tolling of time periods 
Waugh v. Internal Revenue Servo (In re Waugh), 109 F.3d 489,493 (8th Cir. 
1997) (three-year priority period in § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) is suspended or tolled 
during debtor's prior bankruptcy case. "Although the plain language of section 
1 08( c) states that it tolls priority periods only in nonbankruptcy cases, we 
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conclude that Congress intended 11 U.S.C. § 1 08( c) and 26 U.S.C. § 6503(b) 
and (h) to toll the three-year priority period of 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i).") 
Smith v. United States (In re Smith), 96 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 1996) (Rule 9006 
is not applied to count the two year element of a nondischargeable tax claim 
under § 523(a)(I)(B)(ii). Debtor hired a courier servic.e on Friday, November 
22, 1991, to deliver his return to the IRS. The service delivered debtor's return 
on Monday, November 25, 1991. Debtor filed his Chapter 7 petition on 
November 23, 1993, and argued that his tax indebtedness was discharged under 
§ 523(a)(I)(B). The debtor's first argument that his return was 'filed' when 
delivered to the courier service was rejected. "Generally, a tax return is 'filed' 
on the date that it is received by the United States .... A familiar exception to 
that rule applies to tax returns mailed with the United States Postal Service, 
which are considered 'received' by the United States (and therefore 'filed') on 
the date of the postmark. . .. However, the 'mailbox rule' does not apply to 
[the debtor's] returns because he sent them by private courier service." 
Alternatively, the debtor argued that under FED R. BANKR. P. 9006, "counting 
backwards from the filing date, the 'last' day is a Saturday, and that the two 
year period should not begin until the following Monday, November 25." The 
Sixth Circuit rejected this use of Rule 9006. "The Rule contemplates a 
deadline given to a party to take some action. The period 'runs' forward from 
the occurrence of some event until the expiration of the time limit, or the next 
business day thereafter. The reason for the rule is to encourage courts to read 
the Code's sometimes draconian catalogue of time limits in a manner that is 
fair to the party against whom the time limit is running, i.e., to guarantee that 
no party is shortchanged by a unfortunately - positioned weekend or holiday." 
Here, the choice of filing date was completely within the debtor's control, and 
debtor "cannot make a claim that a literal calculation of dates would unfairly 
cut short the time he had to take action .... [Moreover,] [a]s a general matter, 
we believe that Rule 9006 should apply only to periods calculated by counting 
forward from the OCCUITence of some event. . . . The Rule speaks of 'running,' 
and time does not run backwards .... [T]he time periods contemplated by Rule 
9006 are times within which a party or court should do something. In this case, 
the two-year period is a time within which the potential bankrupt must not do 
something, i.e., not file for bankruptcy lest certain of his debts be non-
dischargeable. . .. One must not forget that Rule 9006 is intended to benefit 
the party against whom a period is running." Debtor's taxes would have been 
dischargeable if petition had been filed two days later.) 
Abed v. United States (In re Abed), 159 B.R. 792 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993), 
ajf'd, 175 B.R. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1994), ajf'd, 78 F.3d 241 (6th Cir. 1996) (offer 
of compromise by taxpayer prior to assessment of taxes does not toll the 240-
day rule under § 507(a)(7)(A)(ii). Taxes assessed more than 240 days prior to 
filing are not entitled to priority and are not excepted from discharge under 
§ 523(a)(1)(A) notwithstanding that IRS considered and rejected debtor's offer 
of compromise during the 240 day period.) 
Shedd v. United States (In re Shedd), 190 B.R. 693 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) 
("the priority period for taxes under § 507 of the Bankruptcy Code is tolled 
during the pendency of a Bankruptcy case, thereby preventing uncollected 
taxes from becoming stale and dischargeable merely because the Government 
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is prevented from collecting such taxes by operation of the automatic stay. 
Further, courts have consistently held that the additional six months afforded 
the Internal Revenue Service to resume collection activities after the conclusion 
of a Bankruptcy Case also served to toll the running of the priority period, 
thereby preserving the nondischargeability of the taxes for the full term 
provided in the Code.") 
Tibaldo v. United States (In re Tibaldo), 187 B.R. 673 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) 
(although literal interpretation 'of § 108(c) would be otherwise, 26 U.S.C. 
§ 6503 suspends two year period in § 523(a)(1)(B)(ii) while automatic stay in 
effect and for six months thereafter). 
Turnerv. United States (In re Turner). 182 B.R. 317 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995), 
adhered to on reconsideration, 195 B.R. 476 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996) (§ 108(c) 
and IRC § 6503(h) do not suspend three year priority period of 
§ 507(a)(7)(A)(i), the 240 day priority period of § 507(a)(7)(A)(ii), or the three 
year discharge ability period of § 523(a)(7)(B); however, equitable toiling 
might apply to non-penalty portion of tax if debtor engaged in dilatory or bad 
faith conduct in prior bankruptcy cases resulting in injustice to IRS). 
Campbell v. United States (In re Campbell), 186 B.R. 731 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 
1995) (despite evidence that debtor's attorney mailed return and IRS record of 
"[r]eturn filed and tax assessed," debtor has not met burden of proving late 
return was "filed"); Conner v. IRS (In re Conner), 187 B.R. 217, 219-20 
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1995) (where IRS failed to prove it made diligent search 
and did not receive debtor's return, court may consider extrinsic evidence other 
than certified or registered mail receipt from debtor, distinguishing Surowka v. 
United States, 909 F.2d 148 (6th Cir. 1990». 
2. Trust fund, excise or gross receipts tax 
Industrial Comm'n of Arizona v. Camilli (In re Camilli), 94 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 
1996) (statutory obligation for workers' compensation benefits paid by state 
commission because debtor failed to obtain insurance was an "excise tax" for 
purposes of§ 523(a)(1). To qualify as a tax, "a debt must be (1) an involuntary 
pecuniary burden; (2) imposed by the state legislature; (3) for a public purpose; 
(4) under the police or taxing power.") Accord Waldo v. Dep't of Labor & 
IndustIy Uninsured Employers Fund (In re Waldo), 186 B.R. 118 (Bankr. D. 
Mont. 1995) (uninsured employer's obligation to pay Montana Uninsured 
Employer's Fund after injured employee makes claim against fund is "excise 
tax," not insurance premium substitute or penalty for failure to pay premiums). 
Pert v. United States (In re Pert), 201 B.R. 316 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) 
("transferee liability" -liability assessed pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6901 against 
transferee of assets when transferor is rendered insolvent or unable to pay his 
taxes as a result of the transfer-is a debt, not a tax within scope of § 523(a)(1). 
At best, the government has an unsecured claim if it has filed a timely proof 
ofcIaim.) 
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3. Fraudulent return or willful attempt to evade 
Toti v. United States (In re Toti), 24 F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,_ 
U.S. _, 115 S. Ct. 482, 130 L.Ed.2d 395 (1994) (§ 523(a)(I)(C) does not 
adopt criminal standard to establish debtor ''willfully attempted in any manner 
to evade or defeat tax" --it does not require the government prove an afftrmative 
act. Debtor's omissions, i.e., failure to file tax returns and failure to pay taxes, 
made liability nondischargeable.); Goffy. IRS (In re Goff), 180 B.R. 193, 198 
(Bankr. W.O. Tenn. 1995); Ketchum v. United States an re Ketchum), 177 
B.R. 628, 630-32 (B.D. Mo. 1995). 
United States v. Fegeley (In re Fegeley), 118 F.3d 979, 983-4 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(citing Toti, "[T]he majority of courts have found that afftrmative conduct by 
a debtor designed to evade or defeat a tax is not required. Rather, 
§ 523(a)(1)(C) encompasses acts of culpable omission as well as acts of 
commission .... The majority of courts ... have adopted the test for 'civil 
willfulness' ... for purposes of § 523(a)(I)(C), to require that the debtor's 
attempts to avoid his tax liability were 'voluntary, conscious, and 
intentional. "'). 
In re Birkenstock, 87 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 1996) (adopting Sixth Circuit's 
interpretation of § 523( a)( 1 )( C) in Toti, "willfulness requirement prevents the 
application of the exception to debtors who make inadvertent mistakes, 
reserving nondischargeability for those whose efforts to evade tax liability are 
knowing and deliberate." History of efforts by husband to avoid federal 
income taxes including a trust fund into which all of the debtors' property and 
income was transferred for no consideration, and the failure to file tax returns, 
constituted a willful attempt to evade tax liability. Wife's state of mind could 
not be determined on the sole basis that she signed the couple's joint returns. 
"[H]er only conduct directed toward evading or defeating tax liability was the 
filing of returns assigning personal income to family trust. The government 
needed to put forth evidence that this evasion was willful, and it did not."); In 
re Zuhone, 88 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 1996) (failure of IRS to call a single witness 
to refute debtors' testimony as to intent did not preclude bankruptcy court's 
conclusion that tax liability was nondischargeable where bankruptcy court 
found debtors' testimony incredible. "Actions speak louder than words." 
Debtors engaged in a series of transfers to their children and other questionable 
transactions over a number of years.) 
Dalton v. IRS, 77 F.3d 1297, 1300-01 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Toti with 
approval, "willful attempt ... to evade or defeat" in § 523(a)(I)(C) requires 
something more than just failure to pay taxes, but can be proven by conduct 
less than the willfulness necessary to convict for felony tax evasion. "Congress 
did not defme or limit the methods by which a willful attempt to defeat and 
evade might be accomplished .... By way of illustration, and not by way of 
limitation, we would think afftrmative willful attempt may be inferred from 
conduct such as keeping a double set of books, making false entries or 
alterations, or false invoices or documents, destruction of books or records, 
concealment of assets or covering up sources of income, handling of one's 
affairs to avoid making the records usual in transactions of the kind, and any 
conduct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead or to conceal." 
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Bankruptcy court did not error in fmding that debtor willfully concealed his 
ownership interest in two assets.). 
Haas v. IRS (In re Haas), 48 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 1995) (debtor who regularly 
and accurately filed tax returns for 1977 through 1985 did not willfully attempt 
to evade or defeat his tax liability merely because he did not remit payment 
with those returns. That debtor chose to prefer other creditors over the IRS did 
not make a "dishonest debtor." While debtor may have defeated payment of 
taxes, that is not the conduct Congress sought to punish in § 523(a)(1)(C). 
Congress is capable of distinguishing evasion of a tax from evasion of payment 
of a tax. Any other interpretation would "render the general rule of 
dischargeability of tax liability an empty letter and defeat the central purpose 
of the Bankruptcy Code.") 
Compare United States v. Cox, 189 B.R. 214 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (agrees with 
Toti, civil tax fraud standard applies under § 523(a)(1)); Binkley v. United 
States (In re Binkley), 176 B.R. 260 (BarJa. M.D. Fla. 1994) (failure to file 
returns until summoned to IRS office is sufficient to establish willful attempt 
to evade or defeat tax liability), with Miller v. United States (In re Miller), 176 
B.R. 266 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) (failure to file tax returns for six years not 
necessarily a willful attempt to evade or defeat tax liability. Debtor established 
good faith with $28,000 prepetition payment to IRS.) 
Bruner v. United States (In re Bruner), 55 F.3d 195 (5th Cir. 1995) (adopts 
Sixth Circuit's interpretation of § 523(a)(1)(C) in Toti. Debtors who failed to 
file tax returns or to pay taxes for eight years willfully attempted to evade or 
defeat tax liabilities within the meaning of § 523(a)(1)(C)). 
United States v. Sumpter (In re Sumpter), 170 B.R. 908 (E.D. Mich. 1994), 
aff'd, 64 F.3d 663 (6th Cir. 1995) (unpublished), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 
116 S. Ct. 1673, 134 L.Ed.2d 777 (1996) (§ 523(a)(1)(C) requires only that the 
debtor "willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat" a tax, not that the 
debtor be successful. Lack of equity in fraudulently transferred property does 
not mitigate intent to evade or defeat tax liability. "Mr. Sumpter took the 
affirmative step of transferring property to avoid its attachment as a tax lien, 
an act to which he admits. By taking this affirmative step, Mr. Sumpter 
attempted to 'willfully evade or defeat' payment of his tax debt and he is 
excepted from discharge of that debt under Section 523(a)(1)(C) .... Mrs. 
Sumpter was raised in Italy and has only a high school education. The 
Bankruptcy Court found that she defers to her husband on most issues and has 
very little, if anything, to do with his business .... There is no evidence that 
she had any real control over the Trust assets when she signed the document 
to receive the loan from the Trust or that she understood that transfer to be any 
different from the earlier transfers. Mrs. Sumpter simply signed the document 
at the direction of her husband .... The transfer was, in effect, another business 
transaction by Mr. Sumpter of which Mrs. Sumpter had little knowledge or 
control. ... Neither we nor the IRS want to encourage a spouse to turn a 'blind 
eye' to the couple's tax situation and even minimal involvement in the family's 
fmancial affairs can be sufficient in some circumstances. In this case, however, 
where the conduct primarily concerned Mr. Sumpter's business affairs, which 
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were fairly complex, Mrs. Sumpter's actions cannot be said to be 'willful' 
under Section 523(a)(I)(C).") 
Semo v. United States (In re Semo), 188 B.R. 359 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1995) 
(under either the. Toti, 24 F.3d 806 (6th Cir; 1994) approach-no affIrmative 
act of evasion required-or the Haas, 48 F.3d 1153 (lIth Cir. 1995), 
approach-mere act of omission not sufflcient-this debtor willfully attempted 
to evade or defeat taxes. Debtor failed to fIle returns for six years and 
submitted form W -4's to his employer in which he advanced from claiming one 
exemption to claiming twelve, fourth-five, fifty and eventually asserting that 
he was exempt from payroll taxes); Fuller v. United States On re Fuller), 189 
B.R. 352 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1995) (the appropriate standard for willfulness 
under § 523(a)(I)(C) is "whether the debtor-taxpayer voluntarily, consciously, 
or intentionally attempted to evade taxes .. " [Under this standard, debtor's 
mere] failure to pay his taxes, alone, does not fall within the scope of Section 
523(a)(I)(C)'s exception to discharge .... " Where debtor honestly believed 
he had no tax liability over amount he had withheld from disability and IRA 
withdrawal, did not falsify records, made no misstatements as to income arid 
fIled accurate, if not overstated, returns when fmally filed, tax liability is 
dischargeable.) 
B. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2): 
"for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refmancing of credit, to 
the extent obtained, by -- (A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual 
fraud, ... (B) use of a statement in writing - (i) that is materially false; (ii) respecting 
the debtor's or an insider's fmancial condition; (iii) on which the 
creditor ... reasonably relied; and (iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published 
with intent to deceive." 
1. Elements of proof under § 523(a)(2)(A) 
a. To the extent obtained by fraud 
Lee-Benner v. Gergely (In re Gergely), 110 F.3d 1448, _ (9th Cir. 
1997) (claim that a physician intentionally misrepresented the need for 
amniocentesis and then negligently performed the procedure states a 
cause of action for fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A). Obstetrician performed 
amniocentesis on plaintiffs mother. Plaintiff was born blinded in one 
eye. Child obtained $780,282 judgment for damages. Three years later, 
obstetrician flled Chapter 7. The child "alleged damage from negligent 
performance of a procedure undergone because of intentional 
misrepresentation. That was suffIcient. His [§ 523(a)(2)(A)] claim 
should not have been dismissed. Gergely's alternative argument that 
any alleged misrepresentation was made only to, and relied on only by, 
Lee-Benner's [the plaintiff's] mother is advanced because Lee-Benner, 
not his mother, is the creditor contesting dischargeability .... We have 
stated that § 523(a)(2)(A) requires misrepresentations made 'with the 
intention and purpose of deceiving the creditor," on which 'the creditor 
relied' ... Weare satisfied that under state law Lee-Benner could have 
stated such a fraud claim. California courts allow recovery for 
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negligence occurring before a plaintiffs birth where damage to the 
unborn child was foreseeable .... This reasoning applies at least as well 
to fraud as to negligence .... If Lee-Benner has standing to bring an 
otherwise-traditional fraud claim under California law, then that claim 
would be for fraud within § 523(a)(2)(A).") 
Anastas v. American Savs. Bank (In re Anastas), 94 F.3d 1280 (9th Cir. 
1996) ("[There are] two separate points in the relationship between the 
credit card issuer and the card holder. First, there is the point at which 
the credit card is issued .... [A]t this point there is a representation by 
the card holder, in accepting the credit card, that he has the intention of 
paying for the charges incurred. Second, ... there is the point at which 
the card holder forms an intent not to repay the debt which he is 
incurring .... [At that point] the card holder has a duty to disclose his 
new state of mind ifhe no longer has the intent to repay the credit card 
debt which he is incurring .... In many credit card cases the inquiry is 
not whether the card holder lacked an intent to repay all of the charges 
made on the card because of a fraudulent fmancial scheme, but rather 
whether the card holder lacked an intent to repay when making certain 
individual charges because he planned to shortly discharge them in 
bankruptcy. This behavior is commonly referred to as 'loading up'. In 
cases where the question is simply whether a card holder defrauds a card 
issuer by making charges when he plans to discharge them in 
bankruptcy, we should look to whether the individual charges were 
made with a fraudulent intent. This inquiry is easily applied if we view 
each individual credit card transaction as the formation of a unilateral 
contract between the card holder and card issuer.") 
Cho Hung Bank v. Kim (In re Kim), 163 B.R. 157 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
1994), aff'd, 62 F.3d 1511 (9th Cir. 1995) (an extension, renewal or 
refmancing obtained in a manner proscribed by § 523(a)(2) need not be 
joined with new value or additional funds for the original indebtedness 
to be declared nondischargeable. The creditor must demonstrate, 
however, that it had valuable collection remedies at the time of the 
extension, renewal or refmancing, that in reliance on debtor's 
misrepresentation it did not exercise those remedies, and that the 
remedies lost value after extension, renewal or refmancing.) 
HSSM #7 Limited Partnership v. Bilzerian (In re Bilzerian, 100 F.3d 
886 (11th Cir. 1990) (adopts "receipt of benefits" theory to defme 
"obtain" in § 523(a)(2)(A). Debtor may not have directly obtained 
money invested in limited partnership based on his misrepresentations, 
but he had connections with companies that "placed him in a position 
to benefit from any infusion of capital to that enterprise." To limit 
§ 523(a)(2)(A) to direct benefits "would provide a dangerous incentive 
for the sophisticated debtor, who could circumvent the provision by 
creating a shell corporation to receive the fruits of his or her fraud.") 
United States v. Spicer, 57 F.3d 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
_ U.S. _, 116 S. Ct. 701, 133 L.Ed.2d 658 (1996) ("only that 
portion of a debt attributable to the debtor's fraud is nondischargeable." 
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All of the $339,000 settlement by the debtor offalse claims actions by 
HUD was attributable to fraudulent misstatements by the debtor in 
mortgage loan applications. That debtor plead guilty to only 1 of 80 
transactions and denied liability for fraud in settlement of civil action 
did not preclude fmding that underlying misconduct extended to all 
transactions and all injury suffered by HUD.) 
Medley v. Owen (In re Owen), 181 B.R. 288 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1995) 
("to the extent obtained by" limits nondischargeable debt to amount 
obtained by actual fraud and does not include pre-judgment interest, 
attorneys' fees or other charges). 
Vaughn v. Aboukhater (In re Aboukhater), 165 B.R. 904 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 1994) (fraudulent acts must be part of transaction through which 
money or property was obtained. Debtor's allegedly wrongful conduct 
after the fact is of no consequence under § 523(a)(2).) 
b. Actual fraud, not constructive or statutory fraud 
Anastas v. American Savs. Bank (In re Anastas), 94 F.3d 1280 (9th Cir. 
1996) (bankruptcy court mistakenly overemphasized inferences from 
debtor's hopeless fmancial condition in fmding fraud. "A fmding that 
a debt is non-dischargeable under 523(a)(2)(A) requires a showing of 
actual or positive fraud, not merely fraud implied by law .... Actual 
fraud 'is the type involving moral turpitude, or intentional wrong, and 
thus there can be no mere imputation of bad faith. ,,, Although overall 
financial condition may be relevant to establish an inference that the 
debtor incurred the debt "maliciously and in bad faith, ... the hopeless 
state of a debtor's fmancial condition should never become a substitute 
for an actual fmding of bad faith.") 
Bombardier Capital. Inc. v. Baietti (In re Baietti), 189 B.R. 549 (Bankr. 
D. Me. 1995) (debtor's silence that boats at dealership were sold, not 
available for sale, was fraud because debtor knew that creditor's 'walk 
through" of dealership was intended to confirm available inventory. 
Section 523(a)(2)(A) requires plaintiff to prove that "'debtor engaged 
in conduct that is truly blameworthy in an everyday sense, as well as in 
a technical legal sense.'" "False pretense" encompasses "'implied 
representations, or conduct intended to create or foster a false 
impression. "') 
De La Cruz v. Cohen (In re Cohen), 185 B.R. 171, 177-79 (Bankr. 
D.N.I. 1994) ("actual fraud requires knowledge of the falsity and an 
intent to deceive" but reckless indifference will suffice to show both 
knowledge and intent elements. Pattern of rent overcharges by 
debtorllandlord who should have been aware of rent control ordinance 
are nondischargeable). 
D - 38 
c. Fraud must be pleaded with particularity 
d. 
Fuller v. Johannessen (In re Johannessen), 76 F.3d 347 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(bankruptcy and district courts imposed too high a burden on the 
creditor to plead facts in support of fraud in response to debtor's motion 
to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). It is sufficient that the 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant/debtor misrepresented how he would 
use money he received from the plaintiff, that the plaintiff relied on the 
misrepresentations and was justified in doing so.). 
Express, affIrmative misrepresentations of existing facts 
Citibank (South Dakota). N.A. v. Eashai (In re Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082 
(9th Cir. 1996) ("In the case of credit card kiting, the debtor makes a 
false representation: (1) by creating the facade that all of his accounts 
are in good standing; and (2) by failing to disclose to the creditor his 
intent not to pay his credit card debt. ... [A] credit card kiter has a duty 
to disclose his intention not to pay because he previously represented to 
the card issuer his intention to pay for charges incurred on the credit 
card .... When a debtor, with intent to defraud the creditor, makes 
minimum payments with cash advances from other credit cards, the 
debtor has a duty to disclose to the creditor that he no longer intends to 
pay his credit card debt. If the debtor fails to make this disclosure, then 
he commits actual fraud." Yet, the making of a minimum payment on 
one credit card with a cash advance from another is not alone grounds 
for nondischargeability. Courts should recognize the "fragility of 
human nature,"- "'[h]uman experience tells us debtors can be 
umeasonably optimistic despite their fmancial circumstances. "'); 
American Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Hashemi (In re 
Hashemi), 104 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 1996) (each time debtor used 
American Express card, he made a fraudulent representation because he 
did not actually intend to repay the debt). 
Anastas v. American Savs. Bank an re Anastas), 94 F.34 1280 (9th Cir. 
1996) ("When the card holder uses his credit card, he makes a 
representation that he intends to repay the debt. The intention to 
perform an agreement may be expressed but it is normally merely to be 
implied from the making of the agreement. ... When the card holders 
uses the card without an intent to repay, he has made a fraudulent 
representation to the card issuer. . . . Thus, the central inquiry in 
determining whether there was a fraudulent representation is whether 
the card holder lacked an intent to repay at the time he made the 
charge .... [T]he representation made by the card holder in a credit card 
transaction is not that he has an ability to repay the debt; it is that he has 
an intention to repay .... [R]eckless disregard for the truth of a 
representation satisfies the element that the debtor has made an 
intentionally false representation in obtaining credit.") 
Apte v. Japra (In re Apte), 96 F.3d 1319 (9th Cir. 1996) (debtor as 
sublessor incurred nondischargeable obligation by failing to tell 
sublessee that landlord would not approve terms required by sublessee. 
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"[T]he nondisclosure of a material fact in the face of a duty to disclose 
has been held to establish the requisite reliance and causation for actual 
fraud under the Bankruptcy Code. . .. In determining the duty to 
disclose in the context of fraud under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), we look 
to the conunon law concept of fraud at the time such language was 
added to the statute. . .. [The Restatement (Second) Torts (1976), 
provides:] (1) One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows 
may justifiably induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a 
business transaction is subject to the same liability to the other as though 
he had represented the nonexistence of the matter that he has failed to 
disclose, if, but only if, he is under a duty to the other to exercise 
reasonable care to disclose the matter in question. (2) One party to a 
business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to 
disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated, * * * (e) 
facts basic to the transaction, ifhe knows that the other is about to enter 
into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of the 
relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other objective 
circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts." 
Here, debtor had a duty to disclose to the sublessee that the landlord 
would never agree to certain of the provisions of the sublease on which 
the sublessee was insistent. "[A] party to a business transaction has a 
duty to disclose when the other party is ignorant of material facts which 
he does not have an opportunity to discover.") Accord Drake Capital 
Secs .. Inc. v. Larkin (In re Larkin), 189 B.R. 234 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
1995) (debtor's failure to reveal an injunction that prohibited the 
transfer of stock supports § 523(a)(2)(A) action. "A debtor's silence 
and failure to disclose a material fact constitute a misrepresentation 
actionable under Section 523(a)(2)(A).'; This is consistent with the 
common law tort of deceit.) 
Brothers v. Young an re Young), 91 F.3d 1367 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(attorney/debtor's failure to disclose in writing the terms of a business 
relationship with a client, pursuant to the New Mexico Rules of 
Professional Conduct, together with his failure to disclose potential 
conflicts of interest relating to an exchange of service agreement, 
constituted misrepresentations for purposes of § 523(a)(2)(A». 
Caccamo v. Pouliot On re Pouliot), 196 B.R. 641 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
1996) (debtor-:obstetrician's transfer of his assets to a revocable trust 
and election not to carry medical malpractice insurance under Fla. Stat. 
§ 458.320(5)(g)(4), did not give rise to a nondischargeable malpractice 
judgment when debtor was not fmancially responsible for $10 million 
judgment. Sign required under Florida law to be posted in patient area 
was not a materially false statement as "[t]he statutory language set forth 
in the Sign is limited in that a noninsured physician must simply, in lieu 
of carrying medical malpractice insurance, 'demonstrate fmancial 
responsibility.' The Sign does not state that [debtor] will satisfy all 
adverse judgments. The Sign only provides that [debtor] will either 
satisfy an adverse judgment against him or be subject to penalties 
pux:suant to Florida law.") 
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Chase Manhattan Bank v. Murphy (In re Murphy), 190 B.R. 327 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (cash advances for gambling and options trading 
were dischargeable because debtor intended to repay at time of 
advances and had some history of doing so. Mindful of the Supreme 
Court's admonition inFieldv. Mans. _U.S. _,116 S. Ct. 437,133 
L. Ed.2d 351 (1995), that "[w]here Congress uses terms that have 
accumulated settled meaning under ... the cornmon law, a court must 
infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to 
incorporate the established meaning of these terms," the court looked to 
cornmon law fraud to determine whether credit card advances taken by 
a gambler were dischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A). "Under the 
cornmon law a promise to perform a statement of future intention is 
actionable as fraud only if, at the time the statement was made, the 
debtor never intended to honor his statement." Further, the "out-come 
determinative question," whether the court should apply a subjective test 
or an objective, reasonable person test is also answered by reference to 
Field ''which requires us to answer that question in accordance with the 
cornmon law of fraud. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 526 
suggests that it is inappropriate to apply a 'reasonable person' test to 
determine fraudulent intent. ... Finding whether the Debtor had that 
intent requires a consideration of all the circumstances .... [A] factor-
counting exercise turns the job of fact rmding on its head .... What the 
courts need to do is determine whether all the evidence leads to the 
conclusion that it is more probable than not that the debtor had the 
requisite fraudulent intent. This determination will require a review of 
the circumstances of the case at hand, but not a comparison with 
circumstances (a/kJa 'factors') of other cases .... [TJhe fact-rmding 
process is only clouded by copying a list of factors from other cases and 
weighing evidence according to how well it matches that list." Debtor 
that incurred substantial debt gambling and options trading intended at 
the time he took the cash advances to repay those debts and "believed 
(however unreasonably) that he would have the means to do so from his 
gambling and investments. The Debtor had for years successfully relied 
on such 'income' to pay off his credit card debt." There had been no 
significant increase in spending before he filed and no evidence that he 
considered bankruptcy at the time of the advances.) 
Cheyy Chase Bank. FSB v. Briese (In re Briese), 196 B.R. 440 (Bankr. 
W.D. Wis. 1996) ("Field ... neatly solves the struggle over 
conceptualizing credit card fraud. At cornmon law, a promise of future 
performance or intention is actionable as fraud if at the time the 
statement was made, the debtor never actually intended to honor the 
statement." That there is no face to face contact between the debtor and 
the credit card issuer should not present a conceptual problem because 
the scope of "representation" is broad enough to encompass acts or 
conduct which transmit a promise. "There is no longer a need to craft 
'legal fictions' under which the debtor purportedly makes various 
representations regarding ability or intent to pay. . .. This approach to 
fraudulent representations can be examined by reference to Pop eye 's 
good friend Wimpy, who always promised, 'I'll gladly pay you 
Tuesday' for a hamburger today. Wimpy is not guilty of fraud just 
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because on Tuesday he doesn't have the money, or even if he was 
hopelessly insolvent when he made the promise. The common law 
notion of actual fraud requires that he have acted with an intent to 
deceive when he made the promise to pay. . .. The situation is the same 
even if Popeye gives Wimpy a credit card to use in making the 
purchase. The act of using the card constitutes a 'representation' or 
promise regarding Wimpy's future performance." Because it is 
difficult if not impossible for a plaintiff to prove debtor's intent to 
deceive, "courts may legitimately utilize circumstantial evidence to 
ascertain the debtor's intent." The issue then becomes whether the court 
should judge the debtor's intent on objective or subjective grounds. 
Common law principles direct the court to a subjective standard --
whether the person making the statement was aware of its falsity. 
Applying this standard to credit card debts from gambling addiction, 
court concluded that debtor had "an honest, if questionable and 
undoubtedly foolish, belief that she could win enough to pay her debts. 
She paid her debts and maintained her minimum payments [on 
approximately $30,000 in credit card debt] until the day she filed 
bankruptcy.") 
Bank One Columbus. N.A. v. McDaniel (In re McDaniel), 202 B.R 74 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996) (the use of a credit card carries with it no 
representation, express or implied). 
Hecht's v. Valdes (In re Valdes), 188 B.R. 533 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995) 
($732.16 in unpaid department store credit card purchases are 
dischargeable. Rejects theories of implied representation and 
assumption of risk in credit card cases; adopts totality of circumstances 
theory. Court employs twelve factor test: the length of time between 
the charges made and the filing of the bankruptcy; whether an attorney 
had been consulted concerning the filing of the bankruptcy before the 
charges were made; the number of charges made; the amount of the 
charges; the fmancial condition of the debtor at the time the charges 
were made; whether the charges were above the credit limit of the 
account; whether the debtor made multiple charges on the same day; 
whether debtor was employed and debtor's prospects for employment; 
the fmancial sophistication of the debtor; whether there was a sudden 
change in the debtor's buying habits; and whether the purchases were 
made for luxuries or necessities. List is neither exhaustive nor 
detenninative. Creditor need not establish all twelve factors to prevail. 
Debtor's insolvency is just one additional element that may be 
considered.) 
AT & TUniversal Card Seiys. v. Samani (In re Samani), 192 B.R 877 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1996) ("Creditors cannot establish fraud [for purposes 
of § 523(a)(2)(A)] based on the implied representation of an intent to 
repay and ability to pay based on the mere use by the debtor of a credit 
card." Rather, the court must apply im objective totality of 
circumstances test.) 
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Barnett Bank of Pinellas County v. Tinney (In re Tinney), 188 B.R. 
1015 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (after consulting an attorney and deciding 
not to file bankruptcy, debtor drew nearly $12,000 in cash advances on 
two credit cards and a line of credit to pay the IRS to release levy 
against his medical practice. The cash advances were dischargeable 
under § 523(a)(2)(A). "The availability of credit for difficult fmancial 
times is one very good reason to establish credit. The test for 
nondischargeability is not whether the credit is used in difficult times; 
the test ... is whether credit was used with the intent not to repay." 
Debtor reasonably believed at the time of the advances that his medical 
practice would tum around and show a profit, and the funds were drawn 
for the purpose of continuing the practice. Unforseen and unforeseeable 
circumstances caused debtor ultimately to reconsider his decision not to 
file bankruptcy.); American Express Travel Related Servs. Co .. Inc. v. 
Diaz (In re Diaz), 185 B.R. 867, 869-70 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) (credit 
card charges incurred after debtors conferred about bankruptcy with 
friend are nondischargeable, indudLng charges made before card 
revocation). 
Union Nat'! Bank & Trust Co. of Souderton v. Guest (In re Guest), 193 
B.R. 745 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (utterance of NSF check "is not, 
standing alone, a fraudulent misrepresentation sufficient to sustain a 
nondischargeable claim under § 523(a)(2)(A)"); Tusco Grocers. Inc. v. 
Coatney (In re Coatney), 185 B.R. 546 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) (check 
is not a representation whether it will be honored. No fraud exists 
without some positive statement regarding sufficiency of bank balance 
at the time check is offered.) 
e. Agency, master-servant, corporate officers, spouses, and partners 
Insurance Co. ofN. Am. v. Cohn (In re Cohn), 54 F.3d 1108 (3d Cir. 
1995) ("[C]ommon law principles of agency law would probably dictate 
the imputation of an agent's fraud to a principal under 
§ 523(a)(2)(B)(iv) analysis. Ifprinciples of imputability applied, [the 
debtor] could be held responsible for Scutto's statements and intent to 
deceive. However under the facts of this case, agency law is not 
directly applicable. . . . The third party-INA-never relied upon 
anything [the debtor's] agent said on behalf of [the debtor]. Because 
INA relied only upon the principal's representations, agency law is 
irrelevant to this case.") 
RecoverEdge L.P. v. Pentecost (In re Carpenter), 44 F.3d 1284, 1296-7 
(5th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing Luce, fraud of other individuals who 
acted through a corporation in which the debtor was president, a director 
and a shareholder is not properly imputed to the debtor for 
§ 523(a)(2)(A) purposes where there has been no fmding or allegation 
that the debtor was the alter ego of the corporation. RTC sued the 
debtor and several other individuais claiming they conspired through a 
corporation to defraud a bank by sham loan transactions. A jury found 
all of the other defendants guilty of civil conspiracy to defraud but 
found for the debtor on the conspiracy claim. "In [Luce] we held that 
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a partner's fraud could be imputed to an innocent partner to make the 
innocent partner's debt nondischargeable under 
§ 523(a)(2)(A) .... Luce is consistent with the general rule that '[a] 
debtor who has made no false representation may, nevertheless, be 
bound by the fraud of an agent acting within the scope of the debtor's 
authority.' ... That rule, like our decision in Luce, has no bearing on 
this case because RecoverEdge does not contend that Pentecost and 
Westmoreland acted as Carpenter's agents. RecoverEdge's imputation 
argument is supported neither by the cases it cites nor by existing case 
law on nondischargeability. It is also inconsistent with the general 
principle that § 523(a)(2)(A) 'contemplates frauds involving "moral 
turpitude or intentional wrong; fraud implied in law which may exist 
without imputation of bad faith or immorality, is insufficient." , [citing 
Allison]. ") 
Luce v. First Equip. Leasing Com. (In re Luce), 960 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 
1992) (fraud of one partner is properly imputed to another partner where 
the partner proclaiming innocence benefitted in some manner from the 
fraud of the other partner). 
Allison v. Roberts (In re Allison), 960 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1992) (fraud 
of one spouse not imputed to other spouse where there was no evidence 
linking the "innocent" spouse to the fraudulent conduct); O'Connell v. 
Floyd (In re Floyd), 177 B.R. 985, 988 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995). 
First USA. Inc. v. Savage (In re Savage), 176 B.R. 614 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 1994) (imputation of fraud from one spouse to another requires an 
agency or business relationship-marriage contract not sufficient ). 
Corestates Bank v. Richardson (In re Richardson), 179 B.R. 791, 795-97 
(Bankr. D.S.C. 1994) (no representation may be implied from use of 
credit card where debtor's wife applied for and used credit card issued 
in debtor's name without debtor's knowledge). 
Sears. Roebuck & Co. v. Schoelier (In re Schoelier), 178 B.R. 395, 397 
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1994) (one spouse's intent to defraud does not raise 
presumption that other spouse intended to defraud). 
BancBoston Mortgage Com. v. Ledford (In re Ledford), 970 F.2d 1556 
(6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 916, 113 S. Ct. 1272, 122 L. 
Ed.2d 667 (1993) (fraud of one general partner is imputed to other 
general partner under Tennessee law and for purposes of 
§ 523(a)(2)(A). Culpable partner committed fraud while acting on 
behalf of partnership and in the ordinary course of partnership. 
Innocent partner shared in the monetary benefit of the fraud. Court of 
Appeals affmned judgment entered by district court against "innocent" 
partner notwithstanding dismissal by bankruptcy court of complaint 
against innocent partner at close of plaintiff s proof.); Moore v. Gill (In 
re Gill), 181 B.R. 666, 673-74 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995). 
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Walker v. Citizens State Bank (In re Walker), 726 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 
1984) (fraud of agent will not be imputed to debtor absent showing 
debtor knew or should have known of agent's fraudulent actions). 
In re Fravel, 143 B.R. 1001 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992) (state's claims 
against debtors, and their closely held corporation, for violations of 
Virginia Prizes and Gifts Act and Virginia Consumer Protection Act in 
connection with debtors' tele-marketing scheme were nondischargeable 
under § 523(a)(2)(A). Corporation's sales representatives were acting 
as agents for debtors; therefore, representations by sales representatives 
were attributable to debtors as if they had made the representations 
themselves. Representations regarding cleaning products sold by 
corporation and promotional promises of free durable goods were 
actionable in fraud where the parties were on unequal terms, 
representations were made by persons holding themselves out as 
knowledgeable in the field, and promises of free gifts were made with 
no intention of giving such gifts.) 
In re Sostarich, 73 B.R. 731 (W.D. Ky. 1987) (actual fraud must be the 
debtor's, not imputed to debtor through contractual relationship with 
agent who commits actual fraud. Collateral estoppel effect not given to 
prior state court judgment fmding debtor liable for the imputed fraud of 
its agent.) 
In re Paolino, 75 B.R. 641 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (fraud of agent may 
be imputed to principal for § 523(a)(2) purposes). Accord Love v. 
Smith (In re Smith), 98 B.R. 423 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1989). 
f. Intent to deceive 
Palmacci v. Umnierrez (In re Umpierrez), 121 F.3d 781 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(debtor lacked intent to deceive when represented thathe and his brother 
would invest $75,000 "of their own money" in a project but instead 
encumbered the project. Citing Anastas, 94 F.3d 1280 (9th Cir. 1996), 
"The factual question to be determined by the trier of fact is not whether 
Umpierrez knew or should have known that he did not have the money 
available to invest, but whether in good faith he intended to keep his 
promise. This is because '[a] fmding that a debt is non-dischargeable 
under 523(a)(2)(A) requires a showing of actual or positive fraud, not 
merely fraud implied by law.' ... This is not a negligence case where 
the standard is whether a reasonable person would have acted as 
Umpierrez did. . . . Fraudulent intent requires an actual intent to 
mislead, which is more than mere negligence .... A 'dumb but honest' 
defendant does not satisfy the test of scienter .... There must. .. be an 
actual finding of intent to deceive: mere inability to pay does not 
constitute such a fmding .... Umpierrez testified that he thought he 
would be able to come up with his $75,000 investment from his 
personal funds, and the judge believed him, apparently taking into 
account all circumstances including the weight of the alleged 
unreasonableness of his belief .... We cannot say the trial court clearly 
erred in its choice of which inferences to draw from the evidence 
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presented to it." Bankruptcy court did not err in refusing evidence about 
the debtor's actions after the alleged misrepresentations. Although 
"subsequent conduct may be relevant to an earlier state of mind," the 
offered testimony "related to events almost two years after [the 
plaintiff's] investment was induced ... [and] would not have been 
directly prohibitive ofUmpierrez's intent to deceive.") 
Anastas v. American Savs. Bank (In re Anastas), 94 F.3d 1280 (9th Cir. 
1996) (bankruptcy court mistakenly focused on debtor's fmancial 
condition which revealed no realistic hope of repaying gambling debts 
on credit card. "However, apart from the fact of his fmancial condition, 
the record contains no other persuasive evidence of an intent to 
defraud." Debts were incurred over six month period during which 
debtor made monthly payments. Debtor contacted bank in attempt to 
work out repayment. Debtor testified he "always" intended to repay. 
Finding of intent to defraud was clearly erroneous.) 
National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh. PA. v. Bonnanzio (In re 
Bonnanzio), 91 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 1996) (unsophisticated debtor who 
signed blank fmancial statement for investment in tax shelter had no 
actual intent to defraud where fmancial advisor actually filled out the 
credit application using false information that vastly exaggerated the 
debtor's income and assets, unbeknownst to the debtor. Debtor did not 
have "constructive intent" based on reckless disregard for consequences 
because the debtor was unsophisticated and the bankruptcy court's 
finding of lack of recklessness was not clearly erroneous. However, 
fraudulent intent might be "imputed" to the debtor "under general 
principles of agency." "[T]here is conflicting authority regarding 
whether, under § 523(a)(2)(B), the fraudulent intent of a debtor's agent 
may be imputed to the debtor without a further fmding that the debtor 
knew or should have known of the fraud. No court of appeals has 
directly ruled on this issue, but the Third Circuit has observed in dicta 
'common law principles of agency law would probably dictate the 
imputation of an agent's fraud to a principal under § 523(a)(2)(B)(iv) 
analysis'. .. . The Eighth Circuit, construing a closely related provision 
of the Bankruptcy Code, has held that 'more than the mere existence of 
an agent-principal relationship is required to charge the agent's fraud to 
. the principal. ... If the principal either knew or should have known of 
the agent's fraud, the agent's fraud will be imputed to the debtor-
principal.' ... We need not decide this issue .... The bankruptcy court 
made no factual fmdings as to whether Bonnanzio knew or should have 
known of Berlin's fraud. Ifwe hold that such a showing is necessary to 
demonstrate an intent to deceive under § 523(a)(2)(B), we would still 
have to remand so that the bankruptcy court could make that factual 
determination in the first instance. On the other hand, if we hold that no 
such showing is necessary, Bonnanzio may still prevail, on the theory 
that a principal is not charged with an agent's misdeeds if the agent acts 
in a manner completely adverse to the principal's interest. .. . The 
district court emphasized that Bonnanzio cannot rely on the adverse 
interest exception, because she retained a benefit as a consequence of 
the fraud. . . . . Whether Bonnanzio received a benefit from Berlin's 
D -46 
fraud is unclear on this record .... We further observe that, even if a 
principal receives a benefit from an agent's fraudulent actions, under 
agency principles that benefit is only significant if the principal 
knowingly retains it before a change of position .... We are unaware of 
any case that has addressed this particular issue of agency law in the 
bankruptcy context. Generally, a change in position is a change in the 
principal's circumstances induced by the receipt of the benefit. ... [W]e 
remand for decisions on the following: (1) whether under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(2)(B), the fraudulent intent of a debtor's agent may be imputed 
to the debtor without a further fmding that the debtor knew or should 
have known of the fraud; (2) if so, whether Bonnanzio knew or should 
have known of Berlin's fraudulent actions; (3) in any event, whether 
Berlin acted in a manner that was completely adverse to Bonnanzio's 
interest; (4) if so, whether a debtor who knowingly retains the benefit 
of an agent's fraud before a change in position has the requisite intent 
to deceive under § 523(a)(2)(B); and (5) if so, whether Bonnanzio did 
knowingly retain such a benefit and therefore had the requisite intent to 
deceive.") 
Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Eashai (In re Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082 
(9th Cir. 1996) (adopts Dougherty's twelve factors. "A creditor in a 
credit card kiting case must also prove the other elements of common 
law fraud, including a false representation, justifiable reliance, and 
damages."); In re Dougherty, 84 B.R. 653 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988) (in 
credit card case, factors to be considered bearing on intent are: (1) 
length of time between charges made and filing of bankruptcy; (2) 
whether attorney has been consulted concerning the flling of bankruptcy 
before charge is made; (3) number of charges; (4) amount of charges; 
(5) financial condition of debtor at time charge is made; (6) whether 
charges were above credit limit of account; (7) whether debtor made 
multiple charges on same day; (8) whether debtor employed; (9) 
debtor's prospects for employment; (10) fmancial sophistication of 
debtor; (11) whether there was sudden change in debtor's buying habits; 
and (12) whether purchases were made for luxuries or necessities). See 
also American Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Hashemi (In re 
Hashemi), 104 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 1996). 
Williamson v. Busconi, 87 F.3d 602 (1st Cir. 1996) ("['S]ubsequent 
conduct may reflect back to the promisor's state of mind and thus may 
be considered in ascertaining whether there was fraudulent intent' at the 
time the promise was made, proper application of the 'totality' test in 
the instant context often warrants consideration of post-transaction 
conduct and consequences, as well as pre-transaction conduct and 
contemporaneous event. ... [T]he bankruptcy court ruling excluding 
[debtor's] relevant post-closing conduct constituted an abuse of 
discretion. ") 
New Jersey Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection v. Trombadore (In re 
Trombadore), 201 B.R. 710 (D.N.J. 1996) ("mere insolvency is 
insufficient to establish fraud. . .. Although incurring debt while 
insolvent may be indicative of an intent not to repay, this Court adopts 
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the Ninth Circuit's holding that 'the hopeless state of a debtor's 
fmancial condition should never become a substitute for an actual 
fmding of bad faith. ''') 
Chase Manhattan Bank v. Sparks (In re Sparks), 154 B.R. 766 (N.D. 
Ala. 1993) (use of credit card with knowledge that debtor will be unable 
to repay is actual fraud for purpose of § 523(a)(2)(A). Debtor drew on 
line of credit after creditor took substantial judgment. Debtor knew or 
should have known that he would be unable to repay debts.). Compare 
Chase Manhattan Bank v. Ford (In re Ford), 186 B.R. 312 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 1995) (criticizing "actual fraud" defmition in Chase Manhattan v. 
Sparks, inability to pay credit card does not automatically make debt 
nondischargeable ). 
Carroll & Sain v. Vernon (In re Vernon), 192 B.R. 165 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1996) (plaintiff failed to prove intent not to pay attorneys fees to divorce 
counsel notwithstanding evidence that debtor asked divorce counsel 
about bankruptcy on several occasions during the divorce. "Where 
there is room for an inference of honest intent, the question of 
fraudulent intent must be resolved in favor of the debtor.") 
AT&T Universal Card Servs. Corp. v. Totina (In re Totina), 198 B.R. 
673 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1996) (applying subjective test, debtor's testimony 
that he believed he could repay advances taken to supply his gambling 
problem was credible. Debtor had an annual income of $42,000 and did 
not take advances after he consulted bankruptcy attorney.) 
National Bank of Commerce v. Lazar (In re Lazar), 192 B.R. 161 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1995) (intent not to pay credit cards was formed when debtor's 
attorney wrote issuer a prebankruptcy letter threatening bankruptcy and 
offering workout. Intent not to repay debt must be present at the time 
the charge is made or the advance taken. While the debtor may not have 
the ability to repay the debt when it is incurred, if the debtor had an 
intent to repay coupled with a legitimate expectation that he would 
eventually be able to do so, then the obligation is discharged.) 
g. Reliance 
Field v. Mans, _U.S. _, 116 S. Ct. 437, 133 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995) 
(standard for reliance in § 523(a)(2)(A) litigation is "justifiable" 
reliance. Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts and Prosser, "The 
Restatement expounds upon justifiable reliance by explaining that a 
person is justified in relying on a representation of fact 'although he 
might have ascertained the falsity of the representation had he made an 
investigation.' . . . 'Although the plaintiffs reliance on the 
misrepresentation must be justifiable ... this does not mean that his 
conduct must conform to the standard of the reasonable man. 
Justification is a matter of the qualities and characteristics of the 
particular plaintiff, and the circumstances of the particular case, rather 
than of the application of a community standard of conduct to all 
cases.' ... a person is 'required to use his senses, and cannot recover if 
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he blindly relies upon a misrepresentation the falsity of which would be 
patent to him if he had utilized his opportunity to make a cursory 
examination or investigation .... [T]he rule stated in this Section applies 
only when the recipient of the misrepresentation is capable of 
appreciating its falsity at the time by the use of his senses.' ... 'It is 
only where, under the circumstances, the facts should be apparent to one 
of his knowledge and intelligence from a cursory glance, or he has 
discovered something which should serve as a warning that he is being 
deceived, that he is required to make an investigation of his own. "'), on 
remand, 200 B.R. 293 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1996) (debtor's representations 
that he wanted to avoid due on sale clause, "coupled with the fact that 
payments under the note were kept current for three years after the 
[unauthorized] transfer," support conclusion that plaintiffs justifiably 
relied on debtor's representations. Plaintiffs not required to make no 
independent inquiry into ownership of property notwithstanding 
suggestions of a transfer of the property without consent.) 
Anastas v. American Savs. Bank (In re Anastas), 94 F.3d 1280 (9th Cir. 
1996) (a "credit card issuer justifiably relies on a representation of intent 
to repay as long as the account is not in default and any initial 
investigations into a credit report do not raise red flags that would make 
reliance unjustified.") 
Citibank (South Dakota). N.A. v. Eashai (In re Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082 
(9th Cir. 1996) ("The issue in this case is how a creditor establishes 
justifiable reliance when the debtor employs a kiting scheme. In a 
kiting case, the creditor continues to extend credit to the debtor in 
reliance on the fact that the debtor's credit card account is not in default. 
In some instances, the creditor may initially rely on the debtor's credit 
report (before issuing the credit card) which shows that the debtor has 
a history of servicing his credit card debt in a timely manner. The 
debtor, who is kiting his credit cards, creates the illusion that he intends 
to pay his credit card debts and honor his credit agreements. 
Presumably, if the creditor knew the true state of the debtor's fmancial 
affairs and intentions, the creditor would revoke the debtor's credit card 
or deny the debtor's request for a credit card. Thus, by kiting, the 
debtor induces the creditor to refrain from action in reliance on the 
appearance of the debtor's intent to repay. If the creditor has warning 
that the debtor's account was in danger of default, the creditor will not 
be able to establish justifiable reliance. We will not allow a creditor 
who has been put on notice of the debtor's intent not to repay, to extend 
credit and then later claim nondischargeability on the basis of fraud. 
Unfortunately, the true deceit of kiting is that by making minimum 
payments the debtor almost guarantees that his account will never raise 
a red flag.") 
Apte v. Japra (In re Apte), 96 F.3d 1319 (9th Cir. 1996) (sublessee's 
reliance on representations and repeated assurances of debtor/sublessor 
that the landlord approved the sublease and construction was justified. 
"[Sublessee] was highly educated in medicine, but he was not highly 
experienced in real estate. He had never negotiated a sublease and did 
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i· 
not have legal counsel. ... [Sublessee's] only source of infonnation was 
[debtor, as landlord would not communicate with sublessee directly]. 
[Debtor] not only encouraged [sublessee] to continue construction, he 
assured him his plans had been approved and gave plausible 
explanations why [landlord's] written consent had been delayed. 
Unaware of [debtor's] dire fmancial condition, [ sublessee] has no reason 
to believe [ debtor] would lie. [Sublessee] may have been negligent in 
continuing construction without [the landlord's] written approval, but 
negligence in failing to discover a misrepresentation is not a defense to 
fraud." "[T]he nondisclosure of a material fact in the face of a duty to 
disclose has been held to establish the requisite reliance and causation 
for actual fraud under the Bankruptcy Code .... [A] party to a business 
transaction has a duty to disclose when the other party is ignorant of 
material facts which he does not have an opportunity to discover.") 
City Bank & Trust Co. v. Vann (In re Vannl, 67 F.3d 277, 283 (11 th 
Cir. 1995) (decided before Field, "justifiable" is the reliance standard 
in § 523(a)(2)(A) litigation. "To constitute justifiable reliance, '[t]he 
plaintiffs conduct must not be so utterly unreasonable, in the light of 
the infonnation apparent to him, that the law may properly say that his 
loss is his own responsibility.' ~ .. This conclusion, however, does not 
mean that the reliance must be objectively reasonable. 'Although the 
plaintiff's reliance on the misrepresentation must be justifiable, ... this 
does not mean that his conduct must conform to the standard of the 
reasonable man.' ... Justifiable reliance is gauged by 'an individual 
standard of the plaintiffs own capacity and the knowledge which he 
has, or which may fairly be charged against him from the facts within 
his observation in the light of his individual case.' ... It is only where, 
under the circumstances, the facts should be apparent to one of 
[plaintiff's] knowledge and intelligence from a cursory glance, or he has 
discovered something which should serve as a warning that he is being 
deceived, that he is required to make an investigation of his own."') 
Arndt v. Hanna (In re Hanna), 197 B.R. 413 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(reliance on representation that stockbroker would not execute trades 
without authorization was neither justified nor reasonable. Over a seven 
month period debtor executed unauthorized trades. Plaintiff received 
monthly statements and confirmations after every trade. Plaintiff 
admitted that she was aware of debtor's activity almost immediately. 
Plaintiff may have telephoned debtor's firm to complain, she never 
made a written complaint and did not transfer or close her account.) 
Bank One Columbus. N.A. v. McDaniel (In re McDaniel), 202 B.R. 74 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996) (credit card issuer did not justifiably rely on 
any representation by the debtor when it unilaterally raised credit limit 
and enticed debtor to increase use of card. "Passively extending credit 
hardly constitutes reliance on individual instances of card usage, nor can 
this Court conceive why such reliance, if it did exist, should always be 
justifiable. A creditor cannot sit back and do nothing and still meet the 
standard for actual and justifiable reliance when it had a opportunity to 
make adequate examination or investigation.") 
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h. Proximate cause 
United States v. Spicer, 57 F.3d 1152, 1159, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1995), 
cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 116 S. Ct. 701, 133 L.Ed.2d 658 (1996) 
(courts below appropriately inferred that debtor's misrepresentations of 
fmancial qualifications of home buyers on HUD mortgage applications 
proximately causedHUD's losses when some of those buyers defaulted 
on their mortgages. This inference was appropriate on summary 
judgment notwithstanding that the debtor's guilty plea to one count of 
fraud in a separate criminal action was insufficient to establish the 
fraudulent nature of 80 other transactions in which the debtor 
participated. Debtor's settlement of civil False Claims actions by the 
government contained a denial of liability clause: "Here, Spicer adduced 
no evidence supporting an inference contrary to that reached by the 
court below. Instead he argues only that as a matter of law his 
misrepresentations could not have been the proximate cause ofHUD's 
losses .... [H]owever, Spicer's legal argument is without merit. .... [I]t 
follows ineluctably that Spicer's misrepresentations must have been the 
proximate cause of HUD's losses. It is undisputed that Spicer 
intentionally misrepresented buyers' downpayments in order to induce 
HUD to approve FHA-insured mortgages for parties who otherwise 
would not quality; without evidence of adequate downpayments, HUD 
would have rejected the applications, calculating the risk of default too 
high. HUD went for Spicer's bait, and suffered massive losses when 
those buyers subsequently defaulted. Viewing all the evidence in the 
light most favorable to Spicer, we think a rational factfmder could only 
conclude from the undisputed facts that Spicer's misrepresentations did 
indeed proximately cause HUD' s losses .... We agree with Spicer that 
proof that his misrepresentation proximately caused harm to the 
government is required in order to establish the fraudulent nature of his 
debt for purposes of § 523(a)(2)(A) .... Spicer's misrepresentations 
were material to HUD's determination that the mortgage applicants met 
the fmancial requirements to qualify for FHA-insured 
mortgages .... The misrepresentations were thus more than a 'but-for' 
cause; they proximately caused HUD's losses when the buyers to whom 
HUD improvidently granted FHA-insured mortgages on the basis of 
Spicer's misrepresentations of their fmancial qualifications defaulted. 
The defaults were thus a foreseeable consequence of Spicer's conduct. 
It is undoubtedly true that in each case other factors also 'caused' the 
buyer's default, but that is of no moment, for as long as Spicer's 
misrepresentations were a material and proximate cause, they need not 
have been the sole factor causing HUD's losses.") 
2. Elements of proof under § 523(a)(2)(B) 
a. Materially false 
Candland v. Insurance Co. ofN. Am. (In re Candland), 90 F.3d 1466 
(9th Cir. 1996) (material misrepresentations for purposes of 
§ 523(a)(2)(B) are "substantial inaccuracies of the type which would 
generally affect a lender's or guarantor's decision." Sophisticated 
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debtor's failure to discount to present value annuities and pensions listed 
on fmancial statement constituted material misrepresentations.) 
Bethpage Fed. Credit Union v. Furio (In re Furio), 77 F.3d 622 (2d Cir. 
1996) (omission of guarantee of a promissory note with a potential 
monthly payment of $240 and failure to disclose a $140 per month child 
support payment were not material for § 523(a)(2)(B)(i) purposes 
because credit union incorrectly calculated whether the debtor was 
eligible for the loan and would have made the loan even if the debtor 
had properly accounted for his debts). 
Norris v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Norris), 70 F.3d 27 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(statement at renewal that debtors "enjoyed a cash flow surplus of over 
$45,000" is material--exaggerated the actual fmancial situation by 
approximately $37,000. This amount '''would be a material discrepancy 
in everybody's book.''') 
Insurance Co. ofN. Am. v. Cohn (In re Cohn), 54 F.3d 1108, 1114-5 
(3d Cir. 1995) ("The materiality prong of the 'material falsehood' test 
includes a certain reliance component. Under a materiality analysis, we 
refer to a creditor's reliance upon a false statement in the sense that a 
untruth can be considered important (or 'material') if it influences a 
creditor's decision to extend credit. However, a statement can still be 
material if it is so substantial that a reasonable person would have relief 
upon it, even if the creditor did not in fact rely upon it at hand .... We 
note that there is also a reliance component in the 'reasonable reliance' 
requirement of § 523(a)(2)(B)(iii) .... These are certainly overlapping 
concepts. Section 523(a)(2)(B)(iii), however, requires that the creditor 
actually rely on the debtor's statement. Accordingly, if it were 
reasonable to rely on a debtor's statement, but the creditor did not in 
fact rely upon the false statement, (B)(iii) would not be satisfied. We 
recognize that the distinction between the two reliance concepts is 
somewhat subtle, and to a degree, the reliance concept in (B)(i) is 
subsumed within (B)(iii). However, it is important to keep the 
distinction intact . . . . The element of materiality under 
§ 523(a)(2)(B)(i) is a question oflaw." A debtor's false statement on a 
bond application that he owned $110,000 in real estate was "material" 
where the application indicated a total net worth of $259,000, the false 
asset constituted a substantial proportion of the debtor's net worth and 
the bonding company offered the testimony of an employee that the 
bond would not have been issued if the application had been accurate 
with respect to the nonexistent $110,000 of real estate.) 
Mazeika v. Townsley (In re Townsley), 195 B.R. 54 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 
1996) (that future sales were overestimated in pro forma provided to 
creditor would not alone support nondischargeability under 
§ 523(a)(2)(B)). 
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b. Intent to deceive 
Anastasv. American Savs. Bank (In re Anastas), 94 F.3d 1280 (9th Cir. 
1996) (conclusion that debtor mane credit card charges without an intent 
to repay was clearly erroneous where the bankruptcy court relied almost 
exclusively on evidence of hopeless fmancial condition. Gambling 
addiction caused debtor to overload credit card during a six-month 
period. Debtor attempted to workout a payment schedule with the 
card's issuer. Although it was unlikely that debtor would win back the 
money to pay back cash advances, "the record fully support[ ed] 
[debtor's] good faith intention to do so.") 
National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh. PA. v. Bonnanzio (In re 
Bonnanzio), 91 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 1996) (unsophisticated debtor who 
signed blank fmancial statement for investment in tax shelter had no 
actual intent to defraud where fmancial advisor filled out the credit 
application using false information that vastly exaggerated the debtor's 
income and assets, unbeknownst to the debtor. Debtor did not have 
"constructive intent" based on reckless disregard for consequences 
because the debtor was unsophisticated. However, fraudulent intent 
might be "imputed" to the debtor "under general principles of agency." 
"[T]here is conflicting authority regarding whether, under 
§ 523(a)(2)(B), the fraudulent intent of a debtor's agent may be imputed 
to the debtor without a further fmding that the debtor knew or should 
have known of the fraud. No court of appeals has directly ruled on this 
issue, but the Third Circuit has observed in dicta 'common law 
principles of agency law would probably dictate the imputation of an 
agent's fraud to a principal under § 523(a)(2)(B)(iv) analysis' .... The 
Eighth Circuit, construing a closely related provision of the Bankruptcy 
Code, has held that 'more than the mere existence of an agent-principal 
relationship is required to charge the agent's fraud to the principaL ... 
If the principal either knew or should have known of the agent's fraud, 
the agent's fraud will be imputed to the debtor-principal.' ... We need 
not decide this issue . . . . The bankruptcy court made no factual 
fmdings as to whether Bonnanzio knew or should have known of 
Berlin's fraud. If we hold that such a showing is necessary to 
demonstrate an intent to deceive under § 523(a)(2)(B), we would still 
have to remand so that the bankruptcy court could make that factual 
determination in the frrst instance. On the other hand, if we hold that no 
such showing is necessary, Bonnanzio may still prevail, on the theory 
that a principal is not charged with an agent's misdeeds if the agent acts 
in a manner completely adverse to the principal's interest. .. . The 
district court emphasized that Bonnanzio cannot rely on the adverse 
interest exception, because she retained a benefit as a consequence of 
the fraud ..... Whether Bonnanzio received a benefit from Berlin's 
fraud is unclear on this record .... We further observe that, even if a 
principal receives a benefit from an agent's fraudulent actions, under 
agency principles that benefit is only significant if the principal 
knowingly retains it before a change of position .... We are unaware of 
any case that has addressed this particular issue of agency law in the 
bankruptcy context. Generally, a change in position is a change in the 
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principal's circumstances induced by the receipt of the benefit. ... [W]e 
remand for decisions on the following: (1) whether under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(2)(B), the fraudulent intent of a debtor's agent may be imputed 
to the debtor without a further fmding that the debtor knew or should 
have known of the fraud; (2) if so, whether Bonnanzio knew or should 
have known of Berlin's fraudulent actions; (3) in any event, whether 
Berlin acted in a manner that was completely adverse to Bonnanzio's 
interest; (4) if so, whether a debtor who knowingly retains the benefit 
of an agent's fraud before a change in position has the requisite intent 
to deceive under § 523(a)(2)(B); and (5) if so, whether Bonnanzio did 
knowingly retain such a benefit and therefore had the requisite intent to 
deceive."). 
In re Sheridan, 57 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 1995) (that debtor used an overly 
aggressive valuation process to arrive at financial statement values was 
not enough to fmd reckless or wrongful intent for purposes of 
§ 523(a)(2)(B). Intent to defraud can be inferred from circumstantial 
evidence but bankruptcy court's refusal to so infer is not reversible as 
a matter of law in the absence of clear error in its fact fmding.) 
Insurance Co. ofN. Am. v. Cohn (In re Cohn), 54 F.3d 1108, 1119-20 
(3d Cir. 1995) (intent to deceive can be derived from the totality of the 
circumstances. "[A] creditor can establish intent to deceive by proving 
reckless indifference to, reckless disregard of, the accuracy of the 
information in the fmancial statement of the debtor when the totality of 
the circumstances supports such an inference .... [W]e fmd of interest 
discussion in certain bankruptcy courts within this circuit regarding a 
rebuttable presumption of intent to deceive that arises upon the making 
of a false fmancial statement. ... and a shifting burden of production of 
evidence upon a creditor's establishing a prima facie case .... [W]e 
conclude that it is not necessary to utilize a presumption of intent or a 
shifting burden of production in processing objections to the discharge 
of a debt. ... It is sufficient that fraud must be pled and proven with 
particularity .... Thus, the creditor at all times retains both the burden 
of proof and the burden of production regarding all four elements of 
§ 523(a)(2)(B). We believe that the standards adopted today (i.e., that 
'intent to deceive' includes both recklessness and subjective intent and 
that it is not appropriate to use a shifting burdens analysis) achieve the 
preferable balance between a creditor's difficult burden of proof and the 
underlying purpose of bankruptcy law to provide the debtor with a 
'fresh start. "') 
Equitable Bank v. Miller (In re Miller), 39 F.3d 301 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(district court erred in reversing bankruptcy court's factual 
determination that debtors lacked intent to deceive under 
§ 523(a)(2)(B). "It is plausible that the [debtors'] fmancial estimates, 
though perhaps careless or presumptuous were made without dishonest 
intent." That the debtors "netted" notes against the value of assets 
rather than listing notes, and used· exempt assets to try and prop up 
failing businesses was accepted by bankruptcy court to negate inference 
of bad intent. District court should not have substituted its judgment.) 





c. Reasonable reliance 
First Nat'l Bank v. Pontow, 111 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 1997) ("borrowing 
base certificates" that overstated'the eligible accounts receivable may 
have been false statements respecting the debtor's business, but the bank 
failed to prove that it relied on the certificates by advancing funds in 
excess of its line of credit agreement with the debtor. "The Bank made 
AIR loans despite [the debtor's] failure to supply all the financial 
information called for in the certificates. On four occasions, the Bank 
made loans even though the resulting indebtedness exceeded eighty 
percent of the accounts 'receivable. The Bank's discarding of the 
certificates shortly after they were submitted, instead of retaining 
them . . . strongly suggests that the Bank did not rely upon those 
documents in making the loans. . ; . 'the borrowing base certificates 
were merely a means to request funds be advanced under a line of 
credit.' . . .' Indeed, it appears that the Bank made the additional 
$200,000 loan not because of reliance upon . . . reported accounts 
receivable, but because the Bank realized that without that loan the 
debtor would fail and jeopardize whatever chance the Bank had of 
recovering its loans.") 
National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh. PA. v. Bonnanzio (In re 
Bonnanzio), 91 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 1996) (once a creditor has proven that 
the debtor furnished a materially false fmancial statement, "'the 
reasonableness requirement of § 523(a)(2)(B) 'cannot be said to be a 
rigorous requirement, .but rather is directed at creditors acting in bad 
faith' .... Reasonableness is therefore 'a low hurdle for the creditor to 
meet, and is intended as an obstacle only for creditors acting in bad 
faith.' . . . The reasonableness of reliance requires the fact fmder to 
, consider the 'totality of the circumstances' ... the bankruptcy court is 
'most familiar' with this factual setting" and thus must have the 
opportunity to determine the reasonableness of reliance as a matter of 
fact in the first instance.) 
Norris v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Norris), 70 F.3d 27 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(bank demonstrated reasonable reliance on debtors' overstatement of 
income in financial statement at renewal of loan notwithstanding 
practice of "automatically" renewing the note. Bank officers testified 
that there had been a substantial decline in the value of collateral 
securing the loan at the last renewal and thus they relied "to a greater 
extent than they previously had upon the [debtors'] fmancial 
statement. ") 
In re McFarland, 84 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 1996) (credit union proved 
reliance on a false fmancial statement by testimony from collection 
administrator that 45% debt to income ratio would have been violated 
had the debtor told the truth about the liabilities on the financial 
statement). 
McOuaid v. First Interstate Bank (In re McQuaid), 65 F.3d 175 (9th Cir. 
1995) (unpublished) (reliance on debtor's misrepresentation of the 
D - 55 
ownership of a fann was "reasonable and justifiable" where bank used 
"the industry standard and practice in the rural farming community" 
which "did not include title searches into fanns.") 
Citizens Bank v.Broyles (In re Broyles), 55 F.3d 980 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(bankruptcy court's determination that bank did not rely on 
misrepresentations made by debtor/guarantors in fmancial statements 
submitted to the bank was not clearly erroneous. There was no evidence 
that either the original loan or the extension made a year later had been 
conditioned on the personal fmancial statements of the debtors. Rather, 
the bank relied on the parties' long term fmancial relationship and the 
corporation's assets.); Riggs Nat'l Bank of Washington. D.C. v. Ross 
(In re Ross), 180 B.R. 121, 128 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994), aff'd, 199 B.R. 
576 (E.D. Va. 1995) (reliance satisfied where fmancial statement was 
requested and furnished and was substantial consideration or 
contributory cause for transaction). 
Insurance Co. ofN. Am. v. Cohn (In re Cohn), 54 F.3d 1108 (3d Cir. 
1995) (reasonable reliance is a question offact "insulated by the clearly 
erroneous standard of review." Considered must be: "(1) the creditor's 
standard practices in evaluating credit-worthiness ... ; (2) the standards 
or customs of the creditor's industry in evaluating credit-
worthiness ... ; and (3) the surrounding circumstances existing at the 
time of the debtor's application for credit." District court correctly used 
a different legal standard for evaluating the reasonableness of reliance 
than did the bankruptcy court. However, the district court erred by 
engaging in its own fact fmding with respect to the reasonableness of 
reliance. Where the record from the bankruptcy court is susceptible of 
more than one reading, "factual fmdings are only properly made by the 
bankruptcy court after a hearing where both parties have an opportunity 
to offer such evidence as they deem appropriate." Case is properly 
remanded to the bankruptcy court to make the determination in the first 
instance of the reasonableness of a creditor's reliance.) 
General Elec. Capital Com. v. Bui (In re Bui), 188 B.R. 274 (Bankr. 
N.D. Cal. 1995) (on motion for default judgment, creditor failed to 
prove that it relied, actually or justifiably, on false statements of the 
debtor. Plaintiff purchased debtor's account from store which had sold 
debtor furniture. In its declarations in support of a default judgment 
under Rule 7055, plaintiff offered no evidence that debtor made any 
statement concerning debtor's fmancial condition, or anything else, to 
plaintiff. Plaintiff did not represent that when it agreed to purchase the 
debtor's account from the store, it reviewed debtor's application. That 
statement of income by debtor in application to store was inconsistent 
with statement of income in bankruptcy schedules did not show that 
GECC relied on application. "In a situation such as this, involving a 
'middleman', reliance should be shown by each link in the chain of 
parties involved.") 
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e. Causation 
In re McFarland, 84 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Read as a contextual 
whole and as applicable to the facts of this case, § 523(a)(2)(B) provides 
that dischargeability is not available for' ... an extension, renewal, or 
refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by ... use of a written 
statement ... that is materially false.' The May 1993 note was, in part, 
a refmancing of the May 1991 note: the proceeds of the McFarland's 
May 1993 note were used to pay off her existing debt on the May 1991 
note .... The ordinary and common meaning of , ref mance' in the 
context of § 523(a)(2)(B) requires that the portion of the May 1993 note 
constituting the balance previously due on the May 1991 note be 
nondischargeable .... The language of the district court's order suggests 
that its analysis was premised upon a conclusion that the Credit Union 
was no worse off than it would have been had it not refmanced 
McFarland's debt on the May 1991 note prior to her filing under 
Cnapter 7. This iiuplies t.'1e existence of a detriment requirement in the 
statute, but the text of § 523(a)(2)(B) contains no damage or detriment 
requirement, and the courts are not empowered to add one."). 
Norris v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Norris), 70 F.3d 27 (5th Cir. 1995) (the 
"renewal ... of credit" provision of § 523(a)(2) covers renewal loan 
where no new funds were disbursed. It is not necessary that the bank 
show an advance of new funds proximately caused by the misleading 
fmancial statement at renewal; it is sufficient that there was a "renewal 
of credit.") 
3. 11 U.S.C. § 523{a)(2)(C): Luxury goods 
Carroll & Sain v. Vernon an re Vernon), 192 B.R. 165 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) 
("legal fees and expenses incurred during divorce proceedings do not qualify 
as 'luxury goods or services' within the meaning of § 523(a)(2)(C).") 
4. 11 U.S.C. § 523( d): Fees and costs 
In re Sheridan, 105 F.3d 1164, 1166 (7th Cir. 1997) (an admittedly commercial 
debt cannot be the basis for an award of attorneys fees to a successful debtor 
under § 523(d). Florida state law that imposes reciprocity with respect to 
contract provisions for recovery of attorneys fees cannot be basis for debtor to 
recover fees because § 523( a)(2) "does not qualify as [ an action] 'with respect 
to the contract'" for purposes of the Florida fee shifting statute.) 
Mercantile Bank v. Williamson (In re Williamson), 181 B.R. 403 (Bankr. W.O. 
Mo. 1995) (under § 523(d) pro se debtor entitled to costs including value of 
time spent preparing for trial). 
C. 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(3): 
"neither listed nor scheduled under section 521(1) ... unless such creditor had notice 
or actual knowledge of the case in time .... " 
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Judd v. Wolfe (In re Judd), 78 F.3d 110, 114-16 (3d Cir. 1996) (in a no asset, no bar 
date Chapter 7 case, debtor's failure to list a claim does not affect discharge; if the 
claim does not fall within the fraud exceptions in §§ 523(a)(2), (4) or (6) as described 
in § 523(a)(3) the debt is discharged without scheduling and there is no purpose served 
to reopen the bankruptcy case under § 350 to add the omitted creditor. "Because 
section 727(b), on its face, does not create an exception for unlisted or unscheduled 
debts, every prepetition debt is discharged under section 727(b) subject to the 
provisions of section 523(a)(3) .... Because this is a 'no-asset' Chapter 7 case, the 
time for filing a claim has not, and never will, expire unless some [non-] exempt assets 
are discovered; thus, section 523(a)(3)(A) cannot be applied in Judd's 
circumstances .... Thus, in a no-asset Chapter 7 case where no bar date has been set, 
we conclude that there would be no purpose served by reopening a case to add an 
omitted creditor to the bankrupt's schedules. If the debt at issue is not a debt 
described under section 523(a)(2), (4) or (6), the debt has been discharged by virtue 
of section 727(b), whether or not it was listed. If, however, the debt is a debt that falls 
under sections 523(a)(2), (4) or (6), the debt is not discharged by virtue of section 
523( a )(3)(B) .... Our interpretation of section 727 (b) and 523( a )(3) is consistent with 
that of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. ... In re Beezley, 994 F.2d 1433 
(9th Cir. 1993) .... We decline to hold that the issue here, whether Judd's debt to 
Wolfe is discharged pursuant to section 523(a)(3)(A) and 727(b), turns on whether the 
omission of Wolfe from Judd's schedules was made in good faith, for the Bankruptcy 
Code does not impose a requirement of good faith for the discharge of an omitted debt 
in a no asset, no bar date case. 'No where in section 523(a)(3) is the reason why a 
debt was omitted from the banlauptcy schedules made relevant to the discharge of that 
debt.' In re Beezley, 994 F.2d at 1439. As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
observed there, such a holding would interpose 'an equitable barrier between the 
debtor and his discharge that Congress simply did not enact in the Bankruptcy Code.' 
/d. The plain language of section 523(a)(3), represents a congressional policy choice. 
Clearly, Congress could have exempted from the debtor's discharge, pursuant to 
section 727(b) and 523, debts that were omitted intentionally, rather than merely 
inadvertently, from the debtor's schedules. Congress chose not to do so. Unless 
Wolfe can show that his claim falls under the statutory exceptions of section 523(a)(2), 
(4) or (6), his debt has been discharged by operation oflaw."); In re Anderson, 196 
B.R. 839 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996) ("the Bankruptcy Code does not impose a 
requirement of good faith for the discharge of an omitted debt." That debtor 
intentionally omitted creditor from schedules is irrelevant to dischargeability of the 
unscheduled debt.) 
Gagan v. American Cablevision. Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 968 (7th Cir. 1996) (pro se 
defendant in RICO trial in U.S. district court was appropriately refused permission to 
amend his answer in July of 1994 to allege discharge in bankruptcy in April 1992 
where plaintiff in RICO case was not listed in defendant's banlauptcy case. Discharge 
in bankruptcy is an affIrmative defense that must be pleaded under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(c). Pro se defendant's failure to raise the defense of bankruptcy during two years. 
of preparation for RICO trial justifies denial ofleave to amend. Furthermore, defense 
of discharge in bankruptcy was "insuffIcient as a matter of law" because defendant 
failed to give notice to plaintiff of the bankruptcy case and "since [the plaintiff] had 
no notice of [the debtor/defendant's] bankruptcy until after the April 13, 1992, 
discharge order, that order did not discharge [the debtor/defendant's] debt in this case. 
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(B).") 
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GAC Enters. v. Medaglia (In re Medaglia), 52 F.3d 451 (2d Cir. 1995) (the 
§ 523(a)(3)(B) "notice or actual knowledge of the case" proviso does not offend due 
process by requiring persons with actual, timely knowledge of a case to take necessary 
steps to preserve their rights. Creditor's counsel was aware of bankruptcy 57 days 
before bar date and wrote debtor's counsel warning that his clients' debts would not 
be discharged if they were not scheduled by the debtor.) 
Faden v. Insurance Co. ofN. Am. (In re Faden), 96 F.3d 792 (5th Cir. 1996) (In no 
asset, no bar date Chapter 7 case, debtors' failure to provide counsel accurate address 
for creditor barred discharge ability of claim under § 523(a)(3) notwithstanding 
absence of prejudice to creditor because debtor "intentionally or recklessly avoided 
supplying ... proper address." Debtors failed to provide their counsel the correct 
address for plaintiff. Counsel used an address from phone book but transcribed it 
incorrectly. The bankruptcy court found the debtor's testimony to be vague and not 
credible. Fifth Circuit noted that the debtor had reliable information in his original 
investment documents with the creditor, in documents relating to a state court action 
filed by creditor upon debtor's default on a bond, and in correspondence from the 
creditor. "Despite this reliable information, the [debtors] made no attempt to provide 
any address to their counsel." Debtors "did not reasonably calculate their notice under 
the circumstances." Because debtors were "more than negligent" in their failure to list 
the creditor, the bankruptcy court properly denied their request to add a creditor. 
"Even absent prejudice, equitable action should not be taken in cases where the 
debtor's failure to properly schedule a creditor is a result of more than 'mere 
negligence or inadvertence. '" While Ms. Faden was not a signatory on the creditor's 
investment documents and was not named in the creditor's suit against Mr. Faden, 
"[b]y filing for protection under the Code as a joint debtor, she assumed the obligation 
to comply with the Code requirements for 11 U.S.C. § 523."); Carpet Servs., Inc. v. 
Hutchinson (In re Hutchinson), 187 B.R. 533 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1995) ("the proper 
scheduling of a creditor requires listing the creditor at its own address or at least that 
of an agent designated for service of process .... [T]he initial scheduling which occurs 
before a creditor or its attorney has made an appearance in the case should be the 
creditor's own address if it has one." While actual timely notice to a creditor's 
attorney might meet due process requirements, "imputed notice to a creditor's attorney 
does not." Creditor improperly scheduled by its name in care of attorney in state court 
litigation was entitled to proceed with a complaint under § 523(a)(3)(B).). 
Stone v. Caplan (In re Stone), 10 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 1994) (§ 523(a)(3) is anything but 
clear and unambiguous. Legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
makes clear that Congress sought to validate liberal interpretations of § 523(a)(3)'s 
predecessor, § 17(3) of the Bankruptcy Act and to overrule the Supreme Court's strict 
interpretation of the former statute in Birkett v. Columbia Bank, 195 U.S. 345 (1904). 
In the words of Congress, a "debt is excepted from discharge if it was not scheduled 
in time to permit timely action by the creditor to protect his rights .... " In Robinson 
v. Mann, 339 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1964), the Fifth Circuit (ignored Birkett?) adopted 
a liberal construction of § 17(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Act. That construction is 
appropriate for § 523(a)(3). Under Robinson the court must consider three factors: "1) 
the reasons the debtor failed to list the creditor; 2) the amount of disruption [to the 
court] which would likely occur; and 3) any prejudice suffered by the listed creditors 
and the unlisted creditor in question." Under the first prong, "a court should not 
discharge a debt under section 523(a)(3) if the debtor's failure to schedule that debt 
was due to intentional design, fraud or improper motive." Negligence or inadvertence 
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will excuse the failure to schedule. Only undue disruption to courts' dockets is 
addressed by second factor. Under the third prong, "[ c ]reditors are prejudice only if 
their rights to receive their share of dividends and obtain dischargeability 
detenninations are compromised." In a no asset case, because no creditor will receive 
a dividend, there is ·no prejudice unless a creditor has a ground to argue 
nondischargeability under a section other than § 523(a)(3). Inadvertent omission 
coupled with absence of any other ground for challenging discharge ability preclude 
§ 523(a)(3) action in no asset case.) 
Omni Mfg .. Inc. v. Smith (In re Smith), 21 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 1994) (bankruptcy court 
erred in extending time for omitted creditor to file a proof of claim in Chapter 11 case 
and extending time for creditor to make objection to discharge or dischargeability. 
Under § 523(a)(3) and Stone v. Caplan (In re Stone), 10 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 1994), 
whether the claim of a creditor without notice or actual knowledge of a bankruptcy 
filing is discharged is detennined by examination of "the reason debtor failed to list 
the creditor, the amount of disruption which would likely occur by an untimely listing 
of the claim, and any prejudice suffered by the listed creditors and the unlisted creditor 
in question." Lower courts' result did not conform to this methodology. First, the 
"facts ... reek of [debtor's] irresponsibility, if not worse ..... " Although bankruptcy 
court's resolution minimized disruption associated with late claim, the court 
misconstrued the prejudice to the unlisted creditor because it "overlooked ... a critical 
difference between liquidation and reorganization cases. Dramatic consequences 
integral to . . . Chapter 11 [accompany debtors' obligation to schedule 
creditors.] ... Chapter 11 is a participatory endeavor in which ... creditors negotiate 
with the debtor a plan of reorganization .... If a creditor is not scheduled or notified 
of the bankruptcy, it loses its opportunity to participate and influence the negotiating 
process .... It may also lose the opportunity to try to call a halt to a Chapter 11 case 
that is hopelessly mismanaged or over-extended .... [it] loses the rights to object to 
its initial claim-classification, to vote on the plan, and if necessary, to object to 
confirmation." Remanded with instructions to declare creditor's debt 
nondischargeable. ) 
Beezley v. California Land Title Co. (In re Beezley), 994 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(bankruptcy court's denial of debtor's motion to reopen Chapter 7 case to schedule 
omitted creditor was not an abuse of discretion. In a no asset, no bar date Chapter 7 
case, dischargeability is unaffected by whether a claim is scheduled; amendment of 
debtor's schedules was a pointless act. The unscheduled debt was either discharged 
under § 523(a)(3)(A), or not under § 523(a)(3)(B), pursuant to § 727.); In re Hicks, 
184 B.R. 954, 959 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) (Beezley is "misguided in its dictum about 
the pointlessness of reopening and amending the schedules." Appropriate to reopen 
to permit debtor to seek injunction against post discharge collection action.) 
Pulley v. Langfitt (In re Pulley), 196 B.R. 498 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1996) (creditor 
required to demonstrate the merits ofits§ 523(a)(2), (4) or (6) claim). 
D. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4): 
"for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or 
larceny." 
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1. Fraud or defalcation 
Schwager v. Fallas (In re Schwager), 121 F.3d 177, 185 (5th Cir. 1997) 
("While defalcation may not require actual intent, it does require some level of 
mental culpability. It is clear in the Fifth Circuit that a 'willful neglect' of 
fiduciary duty constitutes a defalcation-essentially a recklessness standard.") 
R.E. America. Inc. v. Garver (In re Garver), 116 F.3d 176, 179-80 (6th Cir. 
1997) (because attorney-client relationship is not an express or technical trust, 
debtor/attorney could not have committed a "misappropriation or failure to 
properly account for" trust funds, thus the debtor did not commit a defalcation. 
"We find that the bankruptcy court erred in relying upon this dictionary 
definition of defalcation because the dictionary defmition improperly expands 
upon our previous defmition of the term .... Interstate Agency, [760 F.2d 121 
(6th Cir. 1995)] defmed defalcation as the embezzlement, misappropriation of 
trust funds held in a fiduciary capacity, and failure to properly account for trust 
funds .... This defmition did not include the broader language of 'failure to 
meet an obligation' while acting in a fiduciary capacity. The mere failure to 
meet an obligation while acting in a fiduciary capacity simply does not rise to 
the level of defalcation; an express or technical trust must also be present." In 
a note, "an attorney's breach of fiduciary duty, without more, does not 
constitute defalcation. Absent an express or technical trust, an attorney's legal 
malpractice, like all other types of professional malpractice, remains 
dischargeable under the Code .... [Section] 523(a)(4 is limited to only those 
situations involving an express or technical trust relationship arising from 
placement of a specific res in the hands of the debtor .... Defalcation then 
occurs though the misappropriation or failure to properly account for those 
trust funds .... Although Garver stipulated to the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship sufficient to satisfy the fiduciary relationship aspect of the 
defalcation provision of § 523(a)(4), we hold under the facts of this case that 
Garver did not commit defalcation. REA does not contend that Garver 
misappropriated or improperly accounted for its $600,000. To the contrary, the 
funds were merely lost because the venture turned out to be a poor investment. 
Because all funds in this case were properly accounted for, no defalcation 
occurred, and the debt is dischargeable."). 
Otto v. Niles (In re Niles), 106 F.3d 1456, 1461-62 (9th Cir. 1997) (burden of 
proof with respect to defalcation is on the debtor once the creditor proves that 
funds were entrusted to a fiduciary and not properly accounted for. "In the 
absence of evidence that . . . Congress intended to impose sub silentio a 
particular burden of proof on a creditor asserting the§ 523(a)(4) 
exception ... we conclude that the appropriate point of reference is the burden 
imposed by the common law .... [C]ommon law generally ... places the 
burden on one acting as a fiduciary to explain all transactions taken on the 
principal's behalf .... Basic principles of the law of fiduciaries therefore place 
the burden to render an accounting on the fiduciary once the principal has 
shown that funds have been entrusted to the fiduciary and not paid over or 
otherwise accounted for." "The burden that the common law places on the 
fiduciary to account is more than a shifting of the burden of coming forward 
with evidence." Debtor/real estate broker was a fiduciary under California law 
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and thus the burden of proof shifted to the debtor to account for rents and other 
monies.) 
Lewis v. Scott (In re Lewis), 97 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Defalcation is 
defmed as the 'misappropriation of trust funds or money held in any fiduciary 
capacity; [the] failure to properly account for such fund'. . .. Under section 
523(a)(4), defalcation 'includes the innocent default ofa fiduciary who fails to 
account fully for money received.' Rejects Martin, 161 B.R. 672 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 1993). Debtors commingled plaintiffs investment with other monies and 
were unable to account for monies invested by plaintiff in a partnership.); 
Johns v. Johns (In re Johns), 181 B.R. 965, 974 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1995) (Martin 
adopted new, more stringent test for determining defalcation; dissent in Martin 
more persuasive-mere inadvertence or negligence can constitute defalcation). 
Schaffer v. Dempster (In re Dempster), 182 B.R. 790, 801 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1995) (close friend and co-habitant who handled plaintiffs fmances was not 
a fiduciary., In re Marchhiando, 13 F.3d 1111, 1116 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. 
denied sub nom., lllinois Dept. of Lottery v. Marchhiando, _' U.S. -' 114 
S.Ct. 2675, 129 L. Ed.2d 810 (1994) requires an express trust or fiduciary 
relations of '''inequality that justify the imposition on the fiduciary of a special 
duty .... ",). 
2. Fiduciary capacity 
a. In general 
Newsom v. Moore an re Moore), 186 B.R. 962, 974-750 (Bankr. N.D. 
Cal. 1995) ("fiduciary capacity" is question of federal law which defmes 
tenn narrowly. State law is consulted to determine when a trust exists. 
Constructive, resulting and implied trusts not sufficient. 
Employer/employee relationship insufficient.) 
Houston v. Capps (Inre Capps), 193 B.R. 955 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996) 
(divorce decree that granted debtor sole possession of marital home 
until the children graduated high school at which time the debtor would 
sell the house and remit to plaintiff $5,000, created express trust for 
purposes of § 523(a)(4). Decree had all characteristics of an express 
trust under Alabama law: "( 1) it is a relationship; (2) it is a relationship 
of a fiduciary character; (3) it is a relationship with respect to property; 
(4) it involves the existence of equitable duties imposed upon the holder 
of the title to the property to deal with it for the benefit of another; and 
(5) it arises as a result of a manifestation of an intent to create the 
relationship." Encumbrance by debtor which caused the property to 
yield an insufficient amount for plaintiff upon sale was a defalcation in 
a fiduciary capacity by the debtor.) 
Rowe Oil. Inc. v. McCoy (In re McCoy), 189 B.R. 129 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 1995) (the words '''while acting in a fiduciary capacity' do not 
qualify the words 'embezzlement' or 'larceny,' .... [L]arceny can be 
defmed as the actual or constructive taking away of property of another 
without the consent and against the will of the owner or possessor with 
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b. 
the intent to convert to [sic] the use of the property to the use of 
someone other than the owner.") 
Partners and joint venturers 
Schwager v. Fallas (In re Schwager), 121 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(applying Texas law, general partners duties to limited partners "fall 
squarely" within the defInition ofa fIduciary relationship for § 523(a)(4) 
purposes). 
Johnson v. Woldman, 158 B.R. 992 (N.D. Ill. 1993), ajJ'd, 92 F.3d 546 
(7th Cir. 1996) (under Illinois law the relationship of joint venturers is 
governed by the same principles applicable to partners. Duty of "utmost 
good faith and honesty" is general statement of "fiduciary" and is not 
sufficient for § 523(a)(4) purposes. Illinois partnership law creates only 
a trustmaleficio--a trust when there is wrongdoing--insufficient under 
§ 523(a)(4).) 
Lewis v. Scott (In re Lewis), 97 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1996) (in Arizona, 
as in California, see Ragsdale, 780 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1986), partners 
are fiduciaries within the meaning of § 523(a)(4». 
Richard v. Dougherty (In re Dougherty), 179 B.R. 316, 320 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 1995) (partners not fiduciaries for purposes of § 523(a)(4». 
c. Officers, directors and shareholders 
Umholtz v. Brady, 169 B.R. 569 (E.D.N.C. 1993), ajJ'd mem., 27 F.3d 
564 (4th Cir. 1994) (under North Carolina law, dominant shareholder 
who is also an officer and director, is a fiduciary of other corporate 
shareholders. That dominant shareholder did not disclose his inability 
to make cash contributions when soliciting contributions from other 
shareholders did not breach a duty. That the dominant shareholder was 
making large withdrawals (loans) did not breach duty because all 
withdrawals were internally disclosed on the books, and readily 
available to anyone who cared to inspect them.) 
Energy Prods. Eng'g. Inc. v. Reuscher (In re Reuscher), 169 B.R. 398 
(S.D. Ill. 1994) (under Illinois law "'[t]he moment a corporation 
becomes insolvent its directors occupy a different relation. The 
assets . . . must then be regarded as a trust fund for payment of all its 
creditors, and the directors occupy a position of trustees .... '" This 
relationship falls within § 523(a)(4). The duty arises upon insolvency, 
alone, absent any bad acts. Subsequent breach of that duty is a 
nondischargeable liability.) 
Mozeika v. Townsley (In re Townsley), 195 B.R. 54 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 
1996) ("a corporate officer's breach of fiduciary duty by diverting a 
corporate opportunity for his personal benefit falls well within the 
meaning of the term 'defalcation' under § 523(a)(4).") 
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First Options of Chicago. Inc. v. Kaplan (In re Kaplan), 162 B.R. 684 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa, 1993), aft'd, 189 B.R. 882 (E. D. Pa, 1995) ("[T]he 
trust relationship which arises from a corporate liquidation appears 
likened to a trust ex maleficio, which arise out of the very action which 
creates the alleged fiduciary relationship. Such a relationship does not 
give rise to § 523(a)(4) liability."); Sullivan v. Clayton (In re Clayton). 
198 B.R. 878 (Bankr. E.D. Pa, 1996) (fiduciary duties that arise upon 
the insolvency of a corporation are not within the scope of § 523 (a)( 4)). 
d. Attorneys 
Tudor Oaks Ltd. Partnership v. Cochrane {In re Cochrane), 1997 WL 
542249 *5 (8th Cir. Sept. 5, 1997) ("In general, an attorney-client 
relationship is the type of relationship for which the attorney's breach 
of fiduciary duties to the client may give rise to a fmding of a 
'defalcation' within the meaning of § 523(a)(4) .... Cochrane had been 
engaged by Tudor ... to represent them in the bank foreclosure on 
Tudor Oak's failing multimillion dollar condominium project. His 
clients understood that he would assemble a group of investors (i.e. 
KSCS) to buyout the project while allowing Tudor Oaks to retain a 
20% interest. Cochrane instead kept the 20% interest for himself as a 
'fee' and also failed to disclose to his clients that he was a 25% 
shareholder in KSCS .... [T]he bankruptcy court did not err in fmding, 
for purposes of applying § 523(a)(4), that he had committed an act by 
defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity."). 
R.E. America. Inc. v. Garver {In re Garver), 116 F.3d 176, 179 (6th Cir. 
1997) (adopting "narrow interpretation" of fiduciary relationship for 
§ 523(a)(4) purposes, "The attorney-client relationship, without more, 
is insufficient to establish the necessary fiduciary relationship for 
defalcation under § 523(a)(4). Instead, the debtor must hold funds in 
trust for a third party to satisfy the fiduciary relationship element of the 
defalcation provision of § 523(a)(4)." Although the parties stipulated 
a fiduciary relationship for § 523(a)(4) purposes, the debtor/attorney 
could not have committed a "defalcation" because there was no express 
or technical trust and the debtor did not misappropriate or improperly 
account for money invested by client in a joint venture with the debtor.) 
Brothers v. Young (In re Young), 91 F.3d 1367 (10th Sir. 1996) 
(business relationship between attorney and client is not alone sufficient 
to establish fiduciary relationship required in § 523(a)(4)). 
e. Debtors and debtors-in-possession 
Bombardier Capital. Inc. v. Black {In re Black), 179 B.R. 509 (Bankr. 
E.D. Tex. 1995) (must have evidence of alter ego or veil piercing 
theories to prove nondischargeability against officer of corporate 
Chapter 11 debtor notwithstanding that DIP violated fiduciary duties by 
converting proceeds and failing to account for property). 
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f. Miscellaneous 
Lee-Benner v. Gergely (In re Gergely), 110 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(doctor/patient relationship is not an express trust for purposes of 
§ 523(a)(4». 
Otto v. Niles (In re Niles), 106 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir. 1997) (real estate 
broker/manager is a fiduciary subject to an expressed trust under 
California law and for purposes of § 523(a)(4); once plaintiff proved 
that rents came into the debtor's trust account, burden of proof rested on 
the debtor to account and to prove that no defalcation occurred). 
Tritter v. Cony (In re Tritter). 69 F.3d 531 (1st Cir. 1995) (unpublished) 
(custodian of an account pursuant to the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act 
is a fiduciary within the meaning of § 523(a)(4). Custodian's failure to 
properly account for funds in his daughter's account and use of monies 
for his own legal fees constitute defalcation.) 
Martin v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. (In re Martin), 161 B.R. 672 (B.A.P. 
9th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds, Lewis v. Scott (In re Lewis), 
97 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1996» (California conservator relationship 
creates an express trust for purposes of § 523(a)(4». 
Harsch v. Eisenberg (In re Eisenberg), 189 B.R. 725 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 
1995) (district court award of attorneys' fees and statutory penalties for 
violation of ERISA supports summary judgment on nondischargeability 
. complaint for defalcation in a fiduciary capacity under § 523(a)(4). 
Fees and penalties "arose out of and were ancillary" to the principal debt 
owed to the plaintiffs, and accordingly were nondischargeable.); 
Morgan v. Musgrove (In re Musgrove), 187 B.R. 808, 813-14 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga. 1995) (ERISA fiduciary is fiduciary to corporate employee for 
purposes of § 523(a)(4». 
Texas LotteD' Commission v. Tran (In re Tran), 190 B.R. 85 (Bankr. 
S.D. Tex. 1995) (following Marchiando,_ U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 2675, 
129 L. Ed.2d 810 (1994), "a lottery ticket agent is not in a sufficient 
position of control vis a vis the state or the trust res to impose the 'high 
level of responsibility' required in a fiduciary relationship [under 
§ 523(a)(4)]"). 
N.P. Deoudes. Inc. v. Snyder (In re Snyder), 184 B.R. 473 (D. Md. 
1995) (statutory trust under Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 
7 U.S.C. § 49ge(c), is trust for purposes of § 523(a}(4); segregation of 
funds not mandatory element of express trust}. 
Caccamo v. Pouliot (In re Pouliot), 196 B.R. 641 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
1996) ("the relationship between a physician and his patient does not 
create a 'technical trust' which establishes a 'fiduciary capacity' under 
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).") 
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Barnsters Abstract Corp. v. Caulfield (In re Caulfield), 192 B.R. 808 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996) ("A landlord-tenant relationship is not 
ordinarily a fiduciary one.") """,. 
3. Embezzlement or larceny 
Brady v. McAllister (In re Brady), 101 F.3d 1165 (6th Cir. 1996) (debtor 
embezzled money transferred from joint account with creditor to account of a 
corporation controlled by debtor. "A creditor proves embezzlement by 
showing that he entrusted his property to the debtor, the debtor appropriated the 
property for a use other than that for which it was entrusted, and the 
circumstances indicate fraud." The "appropriation requirement" for 
embezzlement under § 523(a)(4) does not demand "a showing that the debtor 
individually profited in an amount equal to that lost by the creditor.") 
Lin v. Ehrle (In re Ehrle), 189 B.R. 771 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (lender with 
unrecorded second deed of trust has no basis for nondischargeability under 
§ 523(a)(4)'s embezzlement prong as creditor had no recognized interest in the 
property). 
Chrysler First Commercial Corp. v. Nobel (In re Nobel), 179 B.R. 313, 315 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (no embezzlement under § 523(a)(4) where inventory 
subject to floor plan was sold out of trust but agreement did not require 
segregation of funds. Facts may establish § 523(a)(6) cause of action if debtor 
had requisite intent). 
E. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5): 
"to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, 
or support. .. in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree, or other 
order of a court of record, determination made in accordance with state or territorial 
law by a governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, .... " 
1. To spouse, former spouse or child 
See "Attorneys' fees" infra; "Standing" supra. 
Hudson v. Raggio & Raggio. Inc. (In re Hudson), 107 F.3d 355,357 (5th Cir. 
1997) (attorneys fees awarded directly to law firm for representation of the 
debtor's child's mother in state court paternity proceeding are excepted from 
discharge under § 523(a)(5). "A court ordered obligation to pay attorney fees 
charged by an attorney that represents a child's parent in child support 
litigation against the debtor is non-dischargeable .... Because the ultimate 
purpose of such a proceeding is to provide support for the child, the attorney 
fees incurred inure to her benefit and support, and therefore fall under the 
exception to dischargeability set out in § 523(a)(5).") 
Miller v. Gentry (In re Miller), 55 F.3d 1487 (lOth Cir. 1995), cert. denied,_ 
U.S. _,116 S. Ct. 305,133 L. Ed.2d 210 (1995) (the emphasis of § 523(a)(5) 
is on the nature of support, rather than on the identity of the payee. "[D]ebts 
to a guardian ad litem, who is specifically charged with representing the child's 
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best interests, and, a psychologist hired to evaluate the family in child custody 
proceedings, can be said to relate just as directly to the support of the child as 
attorney's fees incurred by the parents in a custody proceeding.") 
O'Connor. Cavanagh. Anderson. Westover. Killingsworth & Beshears y. Perlin 
(In re Perlin)' 30 F.3d 39 (6th Cir. 1994) (former spouse's attorneys and expert 
witnesses did not have standing to contest discharge of state court award of fees 
and expenses in divorce proceeding. "As a general rule, one party may not 
assert the rights of another .... In certain instances [however,] a plaintiff with 
a particularly close relationship to a third party may assert the rights of a third 
party where the plaintiff faces an actual economic harm." Although plaintiffs 
had an economic stake in the outcome of the litigation, that the state court 
could have made (but did not) award directly to plaintiffs clouded the issue.). 
Compare Martin v. Morello (In re Morello), 185 B.R. 753, 754-56 (Bankr. 
E.D. Tenn. 1995) (attorney has standing under § 523(a)(5) where fee, 
designated as alimony, awarded directly to attorney by state court); Hubbard 
v. Woodall (In re Woodall), 185 B.R. 743, 744 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1995) 
(medical bills are in the nature of child support and nondischargeable although 
originally payable to third-party providers). 
County v. Crouch (In re Crouch), 199 B.R. 690 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996) (costs 
incurred by county when debtor's child was housed by county were 
dischargeable because debt was neither owed to a child of the debtor nor would 
become a liability of a child of the debtor in the event debtor did not pay.) 
Saafrr v. Kansas De.p't of Social Servs. (In re Saafrrl,192 B.R. 964 (Bankr. D .. 
Neb. 1996) (department of social services judgment for support of debtor's 
child while the child was a ward of the state is dischargeable because it was not 
a dc:bt to a child or to a former spouse. Debt arose from the debtor's statutory 
obligation to reimburse the state for expenditures incurred on behalf of a child. 
State's rights were not derivative of child's right of support under Kansas law.) 
2. Alimony, maintenance or support 
a. In general 
Friedkin v. Sternberg (In re Sternberg), 85 F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1996) 
("A trial court should consider several factors in determining how the 
parties intended to characterize the obligation .... Foremost, the trial 
court should consider whether the recipient spouse actually needed 
spousal support at the time of the divorce. . . . The trial court should 
examine if there was an 'imbalance in the relative income of the parties' 
at the time of the divorce decree .... The trial court should also consider 
whether the obligation terminates upon the death or remarriage of the 
recipient spouse and whether the payments are 'made directly to the 
recipient spouse and are paid in installments over a substantial period of 
time.' ... Finally, the labels given to the payments by the parties may 
be looked at as evidence of the parties' intent." That the debtor's 
payments were taxable to the ex-spouse and were to survive the ex-
spouse's remarriage was not controlling. The courts have '''rarely found 
the tax treatment of a debt dispositive on dischargeability. ", The parties' 
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election to extend support payment beyond remarriage was "not in 
conflict with an intent to provide spousal support under California 
law .... Whether the monthly payments are modifiable under state law 
is not a dispositive factor in determining whether the parties intended to 
create a spousal support obligation for purposes of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(5)."). 
Fraser v. Fraser, 196 B.R. 371 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (determination whether 
obligation is in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support under 
§ 523(a)(5) is a factual fmding reviewed under the clearly erroneous 
standard. Rejects "actual effect test" of Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103 (6th 
Cir. 1983), in favor of "functional analysis" of Gianakas, 917 F.2d 759 
(3d Cir. 1990). "Reasonableness" inquiry is best left to the state divorce 
court.) 
Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald (In re Fitzgerald), 9 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(Calhoun has been applied more broadly than was intended. "When 
[this court] stated in Calhoun that [a] loan assumption should be treated, 
to the extent possible, the same as ordinary direct child support or 
alimony payments, we were not suggesting that alimony or support 
payments be reduced to necessary support. Rather, we were applying 
to loan assumptions a minimum standard ordinarily applied by state 
courts, holding that, to the extent loan assumptions exceed what a court 
would have awarded for alimony, maintenance or support, they are 
dischargeable."); Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103 (6th 
Cir. 1983) (four-step test for determining whether state court award is 
nondischargeable: (1) Did state court or parties intend to create a 
support obligation; (2) Does state court order have the actual effect of 
providing support necessary to ensure the daily needs of the former 
spouse or children; (3) Is obligation manifestly unreasonable under 
traditional concepts of support; and, (4) if the original obligation was 
excessive, then what is now a reasonable limit on the portion of the 
obligation which is nondischargeable); Silverstein v. Glazer (In re 
Silverstein), 186 B.R. 85, 87 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1995) (judgment for 
child support arrearage nondischargeable; no need to apply Calhoun 
four step analysis because obligation designated by parties as child 
support). 
Ehlers v. Howell (In re Ehlers), 189 B.R. 835 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) 
(support for child who reached majority prior to bankruptcy filing 
retains its character as child support and is nondischargeable under 
§ 523(a)(5)). 
Nix v. Nix (In re Nix), 185 B.R. 929 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994) ($500,000 
lump sum "alimony" to homemaker wife of orthodontist payable in five 
yearly installments is nondischargeable where amount served as only 
viable means for former wife to meet living expenses. That award did 
not cease upon death or remarriage not a reliable method for deciding 
award's purpose). 
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b. State court labels 
Dennis v. Dennis (In re Dennis), 25 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. 
denied, _ U.S. _, 115 S. Ct. 732, 130 L. Ed.2d 636 (1995) (that 
Texas state court found debtor's agreement to pay taxes on his former 
spouse's half of debtor's military pension "part of the division of 
community property between the parties and did not constitute nor 
should it be interpreted to be any form of spousal support, alimony or 
child support" did not collaterally estop the bankruptcy court from 
finding the obligation was nondischargeable support, alimony or 
maintenance under § 523(a)(5). Texas court could label the obligation 
in no other manner because Texas has "no such animal as alimony." 
Federal bankruptcy law, not Texas law, governs dischargeability issues.) 
Gionis v. Wayne (In re Gionis), 170 B.R. 675 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994), 
ajJ'd mem., 92 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 1996) (state court denial of spousal 
support based on short length of marriage a.'1d other factors does not 
preclude bankruptcy court from fmding that award of $185,000 to ex-
spouse's attorneys for fees and expenses in custody battle were 
nondischargeable support under § 523(a)(5). State court label is merely 
some evidence.) 
Tevella v. Edwards (In re Edwards), 162 B.R. 83 (D. Conn. 1993) (state 
court's description of award in divorce proceeding as "in the nature of 
alimony and support" is not determinative of § 523(a)(5) issue. 
Standard applied under state law considered factors not relevant to 
discharge, such as cause of divorce.). Compare Carter v. Carter (In re 
Carter), 138 B.R. 356 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1992) (that divorce decree states 
that the obligation "shall be nondischargeable in bankruptcy" 
established that parties intended to foreclose issue in any future 
bank..mptcy). 
Lightv. Adkins (Inre Adkins), 151 B.R. 458 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1992) 
(clause in marital dissolution agreement that declares obligations 
nondischargeable in the event of bankruptcy has no effect in § 523(a)(5) 
litigation. ) 
Freeman v. Freeman (In re Freeman), 165 B.R. 307 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
1994) (Schrnetterer, J., by designation) (provision in property settlement 
agreement that its obligations are nondischargeable is neither 
specifically enforceable nor binding. "[A ]greement to waive the benefit 
of a discharge ... is void .... " The agreement, however, can assist the 
inquiry into the parties' intent.) 
Catron v. Morrison (In re Catron), 186 B.R. 197 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) 
(hold harmless agreement nondischargeable that included: "The parties 
mutually ... agree that it is their mutual intent and bargain, which goes 
to the very essence of this entire agreement, that the 
monetary ... liabilities assumed ... including spousal support . ... shall 
be considered, for the purposes of federal bankruptcy law, exempt from 
discharge and non-dischargeable in bankruptcy as debts to a spouse or 
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former spouse of the obligor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or 
support of a spouse or former spouse as being in the nature of alimony, 
maintenance or support as the debts, liabilities and obligations created 
by this agreement are intendedfor economic security, after considering 
many facts, circumstances, and factors,"). 
Ianke v. Ianke (In re Ianke), 185 B.R. 297, 298-300 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 
1995) (although separation agreement provided that attorney fees and 
joint credit card accounts were not dischargeable in bankruptcy and 
former spouse testified that she accepted smaller monthly maintenance 
in reliance on debtor's agreement to pay those bills, nondischargeability 
agreement not binding on bankruptcy court). 
c. Attorneys' fees 
Macy v. Macy (In re Macy), 114 F.3d 1,3 (1st Cir. 1997) (enactment of 
§ 523( a)(15) in 1994 did not upset nondischargeability of attorneys' fees 
awarded in connection with divorce or separation under § 523(a)(5). 
"[A]ttorneys' fees continue to be governed by section 523(a)(5). There 
is a strong policy interest in protecting ex-spouses and children from the 
loss of alimony, support and maintenance owed by a debtor who has 
filed bankruptcy .... Congress sought to apply section 523(a)(15) to 
debts that had previously been construed as property 
obligations .... There is no indication that Congress intended to affect 
the liberal interpretation of section 523(a)(5). It follows, then, that 
Congress did not intend to apply section 523(a)(15) to debts that were, 
prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act, considered to be nondischargeable 
under section 523(a)(5)." The plaintiffs action under §§ 523(a)(5) and 
523(a)(15) was filed beyond the 60-day period for complaints under 
§ 523(a)(15), Debt was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5), thus 
untimeliness of (a )(15) action was not fatal.) 
Hudson v. Raggio & Raggio. Inc. (In re Hudson), 107 F.3d 355,357 
(5th Cir. 1997) (attorneys fees awarded directly to a law fmn for 
representation of the debtor's child's mother in a state court paternity 
proceeding are in the nature of support for the child and are excepted 
from discharge under § 523(a)(5)). 
Strickland v. Shannon (In re Strickland), 90 F.3d 444 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(award of attorneys' fees for post dissolution custody dispute constitutes 
support under § 523(a)(5). Under Florida law, former spouse may be 
entitled to attorneys' fees in a modification action depending on need 
and ability to pay. State court necessarily determined that former 
spouse had a greater need than debtor.); Lanting v. Lanting (In re 
Lanting), 198 B.R. 817 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996) ("an award of 
attorneys' fees is nondischargeable as alimony, maintenance, or support 
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) where the decree contains an award of 
child support, alimony, or a combination thereof'); Robinson v. 
Robinson (In re Robinson), 193 B.R. 367, 373 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996) 
(attorneys' fees awarded by state divorce court may be 
nondischargeable support under § 523(a)(5). "[I]t appears to make no 
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difference that the divorce court may have ordered payment directly to 
the attorney .. , provided that it truly came 'in the nature of alimony, 
support or maintenance. '" To determine whether award is 
nondischargeable, court will "employ a mixed approach, balancing both 
the apparent function of the award and the nature of the litigation in an 
attempt to discover the intent behind the award of fees." That the state 
court denied alimony to the plaintiff is not alone determinative of 
whether an award of -attorneys' fees is in the nature of support. 
"Independent of any need for general maintenance payments, the fee 
award frequently bases itself on the recognition that support 'may be 
essential to a spouse's ability to defend a matrimonial action and thus 
necessary under the law."') 
Holliday v. Kline (In re Kline), 65 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 1995) (attorneys' 
fees awarded in divorce proceeding are not . dischargeable, though 
payable to the fonner spouse's attorney, if the award is in the nature of 
maintenance or support to the fonner spouse or a child of the debtor. 
"[E]xceptions from discharge for spousal and child support deserve a 
more liberal construction.") 
Gionis v. Wayne (In re Gionis), 170 B.R 675 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994), 
aff'd mem., 92 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1996) (state court order awarding 
$185,000 in fees directly to attorneys for fonner spouse is 
nondischargeable because of unbalanced fmancial resources, 
notwithstanding that state court refused to award "spousal support" to 
fonner spouse); In re Slater, 188 B.R. 852 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1995) 
(''the payment of the fees to a third party is not in and of itself sufficient 
to exclude the payment from the § 523(a)(5) exception to 
dischargeability." Intent of the parties, substance of the obligation and 
relative fmancial positions of the parties are considered.) 
Miller v. Gentry (In re Miller), 55 F.3d 1487 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
_U.S. -,116 S. Ct. 305,133 L. Ed.2d 210 (1995) (the emphasis of 
§ 523(a)(5) is on the nature of support, rather than on the identity of the 
payee. "[D]ebts to a guardian ad litem, who is specifically charged with 
representing the child's best interests, and, a psychologist hired to 
evaluate the family in child custody proceedings, can be said to relate 
just as directly to the support of the child as attorney's fees incurred by 
the parents in a custody proceeding."); Champion v. Champion (In re 
Champion), 189 BR 516 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1995) (attorneys' fees to ex-
spouse were nondischargeable because intent of award was to provide 
support to children and ex-spouse. Debtor shot ex-spouse disabling her 
to work. That debtor was destitute without any likelihood of significant 
income while incarcerated was his own doing. Substantial portion of 
attorneys' fees were direct result of debtor's unreasonable conduct 
concerning child custody.) 
Silverstein v. Glazer (In re Silverstein), 186 B.R 85, 87 (Bankr. W.D. 
Tenn. 1995) (attorney fee in post-divorce child support enforcement 
judgment is ancillary to the child support and actually in nature of 
support). 
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Colbert v. Colbert (In re Colbert), 185 B.R. 247 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 
1995) (bankruptcy court has no authority to award attorney fees in 
dischargeability litigation under §§ 523(a)(5) and (a)(15) absent .~ 
contractual right to fees. Under Tennessee law, plaintiff may seek ':":' 
modification of divorce decree in state court if she needs additional 
support due to cost of dischargeability litigation; state court has 
concurrent jurisdiction to determine dischargeability of any such fees 
awarded.) 
d. Rights in future pension benefits 
Gendreau v. Gendreau (In re Gendreau), 1997 WL 464710 *2 (9th Cir. 
Aug. 15,1997) (decree that awarded ex-spouse a 50% interest in ERISA 
qualified pension plan was not dischargeable under § 523(a)(5) 
notwithstanding that state court order was not a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order. The ex-spouse's claim "is against the United Pilot's 
pension plans and not against [the debtor]. ... Therefore, the claim is 
not a personal liability of [the debtor] that could be discharged by his 
bankruptcy. ") 
McCafferty v. McCafferty (In re McCafferty), 96 F.3d 192 (6th Cir. 
1996) (prepetition state court award of one-half interest in pension was 
a constructive trust that never came into bankruptacy estate. Seven 
months prior to chapter 7 filing, state court awarded ex-spouse one-half 
of debtor's pension. State court referred to this as "'a distribution of 
[debtor's] retirement plan"'and called the award a '''property 
distribution.'" Sixth Circuit accepted former spouse's argument that 
"her share of the pension benefits was her sole and separate property 
held in constructive trust by her former husband and could not be 
considered property of [debtor's] estate." Unlike In re Omegas Group, 
Inc., 16 F.3d 1443 (6th Cir. 1994), imposition of a constructive trust 
would not offend the bankruptcy policy of equitable distribution 
because debtor's pension benefits "would not have been subject to the 
reach of creditors, even after he filed bankruptcy." "The [state] court 
having entered judgment for the stated amount as 'a distribution of her 
interest' in the retirement plan, we believe [debtor] retained only a bare 
legal title in the designated portion of the plan's benefit and that [the 
non-debtor] became the equitable owner of the retirement plan to that 
extent. Thus, this property interest never became part of the property 
of the bankruptcy estate. . . . Since it would result in an unjust 
enrichment for [debtor] to receive the entire value of the retirement 
benefits, a constructive trusts arose to the extent of the interest awarded 
to [the non-debtor]. ... It makes not difference that the payments to Ms. 
McCafferty do not begin until 1998 or that [debtor's] interest in the 
benefits mayor may not have matured at that time (depending on when 
he takes retirement). The Ohio court enjoyed complete discretion in 
determining how best to divide the retirement benefits .... The court's 
decree irrevocably established Ms. McCafferty's separate interest in her 
husband's pension benefits .... How the pension distribution was to 
be effected does not change the fact that Ms. McCafferty was the 
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equitable owner of$100,250.21 of the pension benefits when [debtor] 
began the bankruptcy proceeding.") 
Ellis v. Ellis (In re Ellis), 72 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 1995) (decree that 
awarded former spouse $300,000 interest in debtor's pension and profit 
sharing plan, to be paid in $50,000 installments, was a prepetition 
division of marital property, not an award of maintenance or support 
and thus was dischargeable); Walston v. Walston, 190 B.R. 66 
(E.D.N.C. 1995) ("marital property interests in a debtor's military 
pension are not dischargeable in bankruptcy." Under North Carolina 
law military pensions are marital property. Distinguishes Perlow v. 
Perlow, 128 B.R. 412 (E.D.N.C. 1991), which held that wife's equitable 
distribution action was discharged in bankruptcy because at filing she 
had no specific interest in marital property, only an unsecured claim.) 
Albert v. Albert (In re Albert), 187 B.R. 697, 701-03 (Bankr. D. Kan. 
1995), affd, 194 BK 907 (D. Kan. 1996) (former spouse's entitlement 
to percentage of future retirement pay not property of bankruptcy estate 
and not a pre-petition debt subject to discharge. However, pre-
bankruptcy arrearage is dischargeable since not § 523(a)(5) support, not 
§ 523(a)(6) "malicious" injury, and constructive trust remedy not 
available where no evidence of fraud or unconscionable conduct). 
g. Miscellaneous 
Silverstein v. Glazer (In re Silverstein), 186 B.R. 85, 87 (Bankr. W.D. 
Tenn. 1995) (interest on state court judgment for child support arrearage 
pursuant to general state statute for interest on all judgements is not 
actually in the nature of support and therefore dischargeable in 
§ 523(a)(5) proceeding). 
3. Changed circumstances 
Swate v. Hartwell (In re Hartwell), 99 F.3d 1282 (5th Cir. 1996) (not 
appropriate for bankruptcy court to review the reasonableness of state court 
lump sum alimony award. Even where review by the state court is no longer 
available, federal court should not interfere with state policy decisions in the 
area of domestic relations.) 
Friedkin v. Sternberg (In re Sternberg), 85 F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1996) (relevant 
inquiry "is the intent of the parties at the time the divorce decree or settlement 
agreement was executed." Bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing debtor's offer of evidence with respect to fmancial circumstances at 
time of dischargeability trial.) 
Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald (In re Fitzgerald), 9 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 1993) (Calhoun 
has been applied more broadly than was intended. "When [this court] stated 
in Calhoun that [a] loan assumption should be treated, to the extent possible, 
the same as ordinary direct child support or alimony payments, we were not 
suggesting that alimony or support payments be reduced to necessary support. 
Rather, we were applying to loan assumptions a minimum standard ordinarily 
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applied by state courts, holding that, to the extent loan assumptions exceed 
what a court would have awarded for alimony, maintenance or support, they 
are dischargeable."); Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 
1983) (four-step analysis for determining whether a state court divorce or 
separation judgment constitutes alimony, maintenance or support. The fourth 
step requires consideration of changed andlor current circumstances of the 
debtor and the debtor's former spouse.). 
4. Assignment of support rights 
See "§ 523(a)(18)" infra. 
Visness v. Contra Costa County (In re Visness), 57 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 1995), 
cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 116 S. Ct. 828, 133 L. Ed.2d 770 (1996) 
(reaffirming Ramirez, 795 F.2d 1494 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 
1003, 107 S. Ct. 1624,95 L. Ed.2d 198 (1987), county's claim for assigned 
support rights is dischargeable in bankJuptcy because under California law 
neither the custodial parent nor a minor child has a right to support payments 
absent a court decree or agreement and at the time of assignment to the county, 
neither the debtor's spouse nor the debtor's child had established a right to 
support from the debtor. Neither the 1984 or 1986 amendments to § 523(a)(5) 
changed this outcome.) 
Smith v. Child Support Enforcement (In re Smith), 180 B.R. 648, 652-53 (D. 
Utah 1995) (agreement with nongovernmental child support collection agency 
not a true assignment for purposes of § 523(a)(5)(A) therefore underlying child 
support arrearages may still be nondischargeable). 
5. Postpetition and postdischarge alimony or support modification 
Siragusa v. Siragusa (In re Siragusa), 27 F.3d 406 (9th Cir. 1994) (state 
domestic relations court can increase debtor's alimony obligation after 
discharge based on changed circumstances including the discharge of property 
settlement portion of state court decree. Debtor owed former spouse alimony 
arrears and $1.2 million property settlement. After bankruptcy court ordered 
payment of alimony portion and discharged property settlement portion, former 
spouse petitioned domestic relations court for alimony modification due to 
change circumstances--discharge in bankruptcy of $1.2 million property 
settlement. State court granted modification by more than doubling debtor's 
monthly alimony to $7,500 per month. That decision was appealed to state 
supreme court. Debtor sought relief from bankruptcy court on ground that 
alimony modification accomplished indirectly what could not be accomplished 
directly--collection of a discharged property settlement. Bankruptcy court 
abstained. Ninth Circuit affIrmed: "In deciding whether to modify the alimony, 
the divorce court properly considered [debtor's] discharge in bankruptcy of the 
property settlement debt as 'changed circumstance.'" Abstention appropriate 
because state court could address all of debtor's claims and complaint in 
bankruptcy court was "an end run over the state court jurisdiction."); Siragusa 
v. Siragusa, 843 P.2d 807 (Nev. 1992) ("discharge of a property settlement 
obligation in bankruptcy may be taken into account in determining whether the 
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parties' circmnstances have changed sufficiently to justify a modification of alimony.') 
Richardson v. Richardson, 868 P.2d 259 (Wyo. 1994) ("[T]here is a significant 
body of authority which consistently supports the district court's decision to 
treat the results of the bankruptcy proceeding as a change of circumstances 
justifying modification of original decree .... ") 
Carter v. Carter, 447 S.E.2d 522 (Va. 1994) (obligation to former wife was a 
dischargeable property settlement. However, discharge in bankruptcy of 
property settlement agreement breached the debtor's obligations under the 
settlement agreement. In effect, debtor repudiated the agreement, which gave 
his former wife the right to rescind. Upon rescission, marital home was 
ordered sold with a division of funds between the parties. Debtor also required 
to pay attorneys' fees of $500.) 
Dickson v. Dickson. 474 S.E.2d 165 (Va. App. 1996) (discharge in bankruptcy 
is a change in circumstances justifying modification of spousal support award. 
Foimer spouse petitioned state court for increase in spousal support on ground 
that bankruptcy discharge of husband's equitable distribution obligations 
constituted a material change in circumstances. Court found that bankruptcy 
discharge of over $620,000 in debt that greatly reduced the debtor's monthly 
expenditures and improved his fmancial condition was a material change in 
circumstances. ) 
Eckert v. Ecke!1, 424 N.W.2d 759 (Ct. App. Wis.), review denied, 430 N.W.2d 
351 (Wis. 1988) (rejected debtor's argument that maintenance modification 
order "re-created" discharged debt, frustrating fresh start objective of 
Bankruptcy Code). 
Brabham v. Brabham (In re Brabham), 184 B.R. 476 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1995) 
(hold harmless and other provisions of divorce decree were property settlement· 
and were discharged in wife's Chapter 7. Husband's reopening of state divorce 
proceeding seeking new division of property based on changed circumstance 
of wife's discharge violated discharge injunction in § 524). 
F. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6): 
"for willful and malicious injury by the debtor .... " 
1 . In general 
Boyce v. Greenway (In re Greenway), 71 F.3d 1177, 1181 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, _ U.S. -' 116 S. Ct. 2499, 135 L. Ed.2d 191 (1996) (state court 
jury's refusal to fmd "gross negligence" collaterally estops plaintiff from 
proving willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6). Debtor had a 
motorboat accident while drinking. Jury in state court trial rejected liability for 
"gross negligence," but found the debtor 60% responsible for the accident and 
awarded damages. Gross negligence was defmed by Texas law as "such an 
entire wont of care as to establish that the act or omission in question was the 
result of actual conscious indifference to the rights, welfare and safety of the 
persons affected thereby." Willful and malicious for purposes of § 523(a)(6) 
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means "intentional" and lacking "just cause or excuse." "[T]he jury's refusal 
to fmd that Greenway acted with 'actual conscious indifference' necessarily 
precludes a subsequent fmding that Greenway's actions were both 'intentional' 
and without 'just cause or excuse. ''') 
Corley v. Delaney, 97 F.3d 800 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (tapping barrel of 
loaded sawed-off shotgun on window of car to get driver's attention was not 
willful and malicious injury when gun went off. "For willfulness and malice 
to prevent a discharge under § 523(a)(6), the debtor must have intended the 
actual injury that resulted. . .. [I]ntent to injure may be established by a 
showing that the debtor intentionally took action that necessarily caused, or 
was substantially certain to cause, the injury. '[T]he plain language of Section 
523(a)(6) excepts from discharge debts arising from 'willful and malicious 
injury' rather than willful and malicious acts which cause an injury.'" To the 
extent that Seven Elves has been construed to support a looser standard, it can 
no longer be so construed. Debtor intentionally loaded shotgun, carried it to 
where plaintiff was, aimed it at plaintiff and twice tapped it against the 
windshield of the car in which plaintiff sat. The fIring of the gun was neither 
intentional nor deliberate within the meaning of § 523(a)(6); "on the contrary, 
it was wholly unintentional, even though possibly not wholly unforeseeable. 
It follows that under our ... reading of § 523(a)(6), [debtor] did not intend 
[plaintiffs] injury -- or any injury for that matter. . .. [Debtor] neither 
intended the injury nor intentionally took action that was 'substantially certain' 
to cause the injuries that [plaintiff] suffered.") 
Conte v. Gautman (In re Conte), 33 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 1994) ("An injury is 
willful and malicious under the Code only if the actor purposefully inflicted the 
injury or acted with substantial certainty that injury would result." Under that 
standard, the court vacated a judgment holding a malpractice verdict preclusive 
on the issue whether debtor's actions were willful and malicious. The jury had 
merely found that debtor acted with knowledge of a high probability of harm 
and with reckless indifference to consequences, neither of which equate with 
willful and malicious.) 
Romesh Japra. M.D .. FAe.e.. Inc. v. Apte (In re Apte), 180 B.R. 223, 231-32 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995), aff'd on other grounds, 96 F.3d 1319 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6) are not mutually exclusive but have different 
elements: (a)(2)(A) requires showing of specifIc intent to deceive plaintiff 
while (a)(6) does not require specifIc intent to deceive or specifIc intent to 
harm plaintiff; (a)(2)(A) actual fraud requires only losses proximately caused 
by misrepresentation while (a)(6) malice element requires stronger showing 
that act necessarily produced the harm); McCrary v. Barrack (In re Barrack), 
201 B.R. 985 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) (creditor cannot escape the writing 
requirement of § 523(a)(2)(B) by asserting an action under § 523(a)(6). "[A] 
claim for fmancialloss which fails under Section 523( a)(2) for lack of a writing 
may [not] be brought [without more] under Section 523(a)(6).") 
Bairstow v. Sullivan (In re Sullivan), 198 B.R. 417 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) 
(trespass onto land and destruction of trees was intentional and deliberate, 
continued for several months after brought to the attention of debtor, and 
constituted willful and malicious conduct under § 523 (a)( 6). 
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2. Libel and slander 
Mills v. Ellerbee (In re Ellerbee), 177 B.R. 731, 737 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995), 
affd, 1:95-CV-459-JEC (N.D. Ga. May 31, 1995) (unpublished), aff'd mem., 
78 F.3d 600 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, _ U.S. _,117 S. Ct. 357,136 L. 
Ed.2d 249 (1996) (collateral estoppel does not apply to jury fmding in state 
court defamation case that debtor acted with "actual malice," because jury 
could base fmding on reckless disregard standard. Verdict does not establish 
that debtor intended to injure or knew that injury would necessarily follow. 
Collateral estoppel does apply to issues whether debtor defamed plaintiff and 
whether debtor had a high degree of awareness of probable falsity of his 
statements). 
3. Drunk driving 
Boyce v. Greenway (In re Greenway), 71 F.3d 1177 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
_U.S. _,116 S. Ct. 2499,135 L. Ed.2d 191 (1996) (motorboat accident 
that occurred while the debtor was drinking was not "willful and malicious 
injury" for purposes of § 523(a)(6) because jury refusal to fmd "gross 
negligence" collaterally estops the plaintiff to prove willful and malicious 
misconduct. Motorboat is not a "motor vehicle" for purposes of § 523(a)(9»; 
Schachter v. Fall (In re Fall), 192 B.R. 16 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1995) (drunken 
driving of a motor boat did not prove that drunkenness was the cause of the 
accident or that debtor's conduct was willful and malicious under § 523(a)(6). 
Drunkenness was not certain or even substantially certain to result in injury to 
the plaintiff. Debtor's actions after the accident were reprehensible~he left 
the scene and lied to the marine patrol-but they were not relevant to . the 
court's inquiry.) 
Taneffv. Hoehn (In re Tanef!), 190 B.R. 501 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (bankruptcy 
court improperly denied debtor sununary judgment in § 523(a)(6) action 
against tavern owner for drunk driving by patron. Willfulness '''requires not 
only intentional conduct on the part of the debtor, but also intentional or 
deliberate injury.'" A "should have known" standard "misstates the standard 
for a willful injury .... [N]egligence, or even recklessness for that matter, does 
not establish a willful injury for nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6). . .. No 
matter how hard the tragic and devastating injury that underlies this proceeding 
tugs at the heartstrings, there must be some modem of evidence that [ debtor] 
intended the injury for § 523(a)(6) to except the debt from discharge." Not 
only was there no evidence that the debtor sold alcohol to someone who he 
"knew or even suspected was intoxicated ... even if he did, § 523(a)(6) 
requires at least a deliberate action substantially certain to produce harm.") 
Choi v. Brown (In re Brown), 201 B.R. 411 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996) (owner of 
car (wife) not responsible under § 523(a)(6) for injury caused by husband who 
was driving while intoxicated, without a license, and without insurance. 
Creditor failed to establish that wife gave husband permission or otherwise 
allowed husband to drive the car, thus wife's conduct could not be said to have 
been willful under § 523(a)(6). Plaintiffs injury was not substantially certain 
to result from wife's failure to insure the car.) 
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4. Conversion 
Printy v. Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc., 110 F.3d 853 (1st Cir. 1997) (debtor 
willfully and maliciously injured brokerage fIrm by knowingly taking 
advantage of brokerage fIrm's mistake in crediting stock to a trust account 
controlled by the debtor. After reviewing the conflicting defInitions of "willful 
and malicious" from other circuits, First Circuit adopts "[t]he majority rule 
followed by the bankruptcy courts for the District of Massachusetts . . . 
'malicious' means an act done in conscious disregard of one's duties. No 
special malice toward the creditor need be shown .... [T]he term 'willful and 
malicious' in § 523(a)(6) means an act intentionally committed, without just 
cause or excuse, in conscious disregard of one's duty and that necessarily 
produces an injury .... While something more than a mere voluntary act is 
necessary to satisfY the scienter requirement ... specifIc intent to injure is not 
necessary .... An injury inflicted willfully and with malice ... is one inflicted 
intentionally and deliberately, and either with the intent to cause the harm 
complained of, or in circumstances in which the harm was certain or almost 
certain to result from the debtor's act. ", The debtor "Willfully and maliciously 
injured Dean Witter by not informing it that a mistake had been made by 
crediting to the Trust account the ... stock that [the debtor] knew he did not 
own. [The debtor] took advantage of Dean Witter's computer error by 
borrowing against and withdrawing funds from the false margin account that 
derived its value from shares of stock that [the debtor] knew he did not own. 
Such conduct by [the debtor] translates easily into an intent to willfully and 
maliciously cause harm.") 
Navistar Fin. Com. v. Stelluti (In re Stelluti), 94 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(transfer of funds, in which floor plan fmancier had an interest, from operating 
account of dealership to new accounts in dealership and personal names at 
banks in neighboring state was willful and malicious under § 523(a)(6). 
Willful means "deliberate or intentional." Debtor/wife's actions were deliberate 
as she personally made a withdrawal from dealership account and opened new 
bank accounts. '''[M]alicious' means wrongful and without just cause or 
excuse, even in the absence of personal hatred, spite, or ill-will .... Malice may 
be constructive or implied .... Implied malice may be demonstrated 'by the 
acts and conduct of the debtor in the context of [the] surrounding 
circumstances. '" Debtor/wife performed bookkeeping and clerical work for 
dealership. Funds were transferred to out-of-state banks during an ongoing 
dispute with the floor plan fmancier amid rumors that the fmancier was about 
to pull-the-plug on the dealership. Wife's participation was malicious although 
she may not have understood exactly why she was moving money and opening 
new accounts. Debtors "[did] not indicate that there were any legitimate 
personal or business justifIcations for their actions.") 
First Nat'l Bank v. Stanley (In re Stanley), 66 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 1995) (willful 
and malicious conversion when an $8,000 line of credit was mistakenly listed 
as $80,000 on bank statement and debtor drew down the $72,000 difference for 
an investment in speculative real estate. Debtor applied for a $10,000 line of 
credit. Application was approved but for only $8,000. Three months later, 
statement from bank indicated "without explanation" that credit line increased 
from $8,000 to $80,000. Debtor called branch manager and inquired "whether 
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the statement was accurate." Branch manager checked computer and "verified" 
that the limit was $80,000. Debtor then bought several acres of unimproved 
property which he held for 13 months and eventually sold at a substantial loss. 
"The act or conduct at issue here ... is a conversion-an unauthorized exercise 
of dominion or control over property belonging to another that seriously 
interferes within the owner's rights. . . . The conversion was 
wrongful. ... Stanley knew that something was amiss when his credit limit was 
suddenly increased by a factor often. Stanley's explanation that the thought 
that the bank had granted him a $72,000 'unsecured' line of credit is wholly 
irreconcilable with his knowledge that, just three months earlier, he had been 
approved for $2,000 less than the relatively modest secured line that he had 
requested .... [The debtor] is an accountant with one year of graduate school 
education; he is by no means unsophisticated. In fmding that he lacked the 
requisite malice to be denied discharge, the bankruptcy court concentrated on 
Stanley's intent to repay FNB out of the 'profits' from the sale of the Howard 
County property. The bankruptcy court's fmding that Stanley acted with 
hopeful intentions is probably correct; i!ldeed, Stanley remained current on his 
FNB payments for over a year. However, that Stanley did not intend for FNB 
to ultimately suffer a loss is legally irrelevant. For conversion to occur, it is not 
necessary that the property be damaged, but merely that the owner suffer a 
serious deprivation of the incidents of ownership. Consequently, the proper 
focus in this case is not on Stanley'S 'good intentions,' but simply on his 
exercise of dominion and control over funds that he knew belonged to another. 
Stanley's deliberate conversion of the funds is the intentional, wrongful act that 
prevents the discharge of his debt to FNB.") 
Wolfson v. Equine Capital Com. (In re Wolfson), 56 F.3d 52 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(citing Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328 (1934), not every 
conversion results in willful and malicious injury for purposes of § 523(a)(6). 
Debtor's use of income from sale of lender's collateral deposited to general 
business account did not constitute willful and malicious conversion of lender's 
proceeds. As stated by the Supreme Court in Davis "'[t]here may be an honest, 
but mistaken belief, engendered by a course of dealing, that powers have been 
enlarged or incapacities removed. In these and like cases, what is done is a 
tort, but not a wilful and maliCious one.' ... Here, the course of dealing clearly 
indicates that Wolfson had a reasonable belief that his business practices were 
known to his secured creditor. More importantly, it indicates that the secured 
creditor knowingly acquiesced in Wolfson's business practices, and took no 
steps to protect its collateral. ... [The lender] knew that the Farm placed its 
proceeds into a general account out of which it paid ordinary business 
expenses, and knew also which of the loan collateral the Farm had sold during 
the month. Wolfson's belief, engendered by a course of dealing, was thus 
reasonable, and under Davis could support the conclusion that if Wolfson 
committed the tort of conversion, it was not a willful or malicious one. 
However, it is not necessary to reach the question of whether Wolfson's actions 
were willful and malicious, nor the question of whether Wolfson's sale of 
collateral and failure to remit the proceeds amounted to conversion. As the 
bankruptcy court recognized, [the lender] not only knew of and failed to object 
to the Farm's sales of collateral and its business practice of depositing all 
proceeds into a general business account, but [the lender] also continued to 
renew and extend additional credit to the Farm .... [S]ince [the lender] failed 
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to enforce whatever rights it may have had regarding the disposition of its 
collateral, it waived its right to assert under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) that its claim 
is non-dischargeable and that it suffered 'willful and malicious' injury by 
Wolfson. ... [The lender'S] 'failure to take reasonable steps to protect its 
collateral ... prevented application of the exception."'); American Gen. Fin. 
v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 187 B.R. 736, 739-40 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) 
(creditor fails willfulness standard where several items of personal property 
were taken by ex-wife without debtor's permission and debtor sold dinette 
chairs to pay rent nine months before bankruptcy, intending at time to continue 
paying for dinette set). 
Straub v. Straub (In re Straub), 192 B.R. 522 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1996) (transfer 
of property subject to a judicial lien was nondischargeable because debtor 
knew that transfer would foil plaintiffs efforts to collect judgment); United 
States v. Vandrovec (In re Vandrovec), 61 B.R. 191 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986) 
(guilty plea to conversion of grain does not collaterally estop debtor to contest 
nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6). The conversion to which the debtor 
pled guilty included the element of willfulness but had no prerequisite of 
maliciousness. ) 
5. Professional "negligence" 
Lee-Benner v. Gergely (In re Gergely), 110 F.3d 1448, _ (9th Cir. 1997) 
(botched amniocentesis that blinded child was not a willful and malicious 
injury because harm was not certain or almost certain to result from the 
physicians malpractice. Misrepresentation of need for procedure was 
actionable under § 523(a)(2)(A). "Lee-Benner [the child] did not allege that 
Gergely [the debtor] acted maliciously. We recognize that malice can be 
proved without showing an intent to injure .... However, without such an 
intent it is 'necessary to show that [Gergely] committed a wrongful act which 
necessarily produced harm.' ... This standard requires that the act be 'certain 
or almost certain to cause' the harm. ... Nothing in In re Britton, 950 F.2d 602 
(9th Cir. 1991), changed this standard .... Our conclusion in Britton that the 
debtor acted maliciously was derived from the particular facts of that case, 
including that the debtor had intentionally misrepresented himself to be a 
doctor .... Malpractice was not certain or almost certain to occur. Lee~Benner 
therefore failed to allege that Gergely acted maliciously.") 
Geiger v. Kawaauhau (In re Geiger), 93 F.3d 443 (8th Cir. 1996) (medical 
malpractice is not willful and malicious injury for purpose of § 523(a)(6). 
"Conduct that is merely reckless is not malicious within the meaning of the 
statute .... Congress intended 'to allow discharge ofIiability for injuries unless 
the debtor intentionally inflicted an injury.'" Where debtor/doctor's treatment 
of plaintiff was "at very least negligent, the bankruptcy court erred when it 
concluded that his conduct was willful and malicious .... [T]he worst thing 
that can be said about [debtor] is that he acted recklessly in treating 
[plaintiff] . . . . The evidence showed only that [ debtor] failed to save 
[plaintiff s] leg from the ravages of infection, not that he intended to harm her. 
In other words, his efforts . . . were not calculated to result in the loss of 
[plaintiff's] leg, and were therefore not malicious."), on reh 'g en bane, 113 
F.3d 848, 853-4 (8th Cir. 1997) (rejecting Perkins, 817 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 
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1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853 (1987), ''we hold only that for a judgment 
debt to be nondischargeable under [§ 523(a)(6)] it is necessary that it be based 
on the conumssion of an intentional tort .... [S]ince it is not even alleged that 
Dr. Geiger intended to inflict an injury on his patient, and it cannot be said that 
he believed that an injury was substantially certain to result, the judgment 
underlying this case could not have given rise to a 'debt ... for willful and 
malicious injury by the debtor."'), cert. granted, 66 USLW 3108 (U.S. 
Sept. 29, 1997) . 
. Conte v. Gautam (In re Conte), 33 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 1994) (debtor, a lawyer, 
failed to answer discovery requests resulting in dismissal of medical 
malpractice action. Debtor did not tell clients in time to reinstate case. Jury 
awarded $520,000 compensatory and $1 million punitive damages based on 
findings that debtor knew of dismissal, deliberately did not inform his clients 
and had reckless indifference to the high degree of probability of harm to his 
clients. Jury verdict not preclusive of § 523(a)(6) action because "willful and 
malicious" requires a rmding that debtor acted with a purpose of producing 
injury or deliberately and with the knowledge that there was a "substantial 
certainty" of producing injury. Substantial certainty is something more than 
a "high probability." That the debtor "deliberately committed a wrongful act 
with a high probability of producing injury" is not enough because such a test 
would capture all merely reckless acts.) 
Caccamo v.Pouliot (In re Pouliot), 196 B.R. 641 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996) 
(debtor-obstetrician's transfer of substantially all of his assets to a revocable 
trust and election not to carry medial malpractice insurance under Fla. Stat. . 
§ 458.320(5)(g)(4), did not constitute willful and malicious injury to woman 
or child whose skull was crushed due to alleged improper use of forceps during 
delivery. However, whether debtor acted willfully and maliciously during 
woman's pregnancy and delivery was not beyond § 523(a)(6). Issues off act 
remained ''whether debtor's alleged malpractice constituted a 'wilful' injury to 
[the child] when he committed certain intentional acts the purpose of which 
may have been substantially certain to cause [child's] injuries.") 
Smith v. Assevero (In re Assevero), 185 B.R. 951,955-56 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
1995) (negligence or recklessness not sufficient to make medical malpractice 
nondischargeable. No willfulness unless debtor intended to cause injury or 
knew that injury was substantially certain.) 
Fernandez v. McMahon an re McMahon), 183 B.R. 948,950,952 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 1995) (plaintiff showed more than negligence or gross negligence by 
oral surgeon where during 9 hour inappropriate surgery resulting in migration 
of dental implants into sinus cavity, surgeon rebuffed debtor's cries for relief 
from pain by telling her he "would cut her tongue off if she did not keep 
quiet"). 
Breach of contract 
Catercom. Inc. v. Henicheck (In re Henicheck), 186 B.R. 211, 215, 217 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. 1995) (breach of covenant not to compete is not per se violation of 
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§ 523(a)(6). Plaintiff collaterally estopped because state court jury found 
defendant did not act with malice.) 
Other wrongful acts 
Baldino v. Wilson an re Wilson), 116 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 1997) (success in a state 
court malicious prosecution action would be preclusive in nondischargeability 
litigation under § 523(a)(6). Bankruptcy court abused its discretion in not 
granting relief from the stay to permit the plaintiff to appeal the state trial 
court's dismissal of the complaint. Unless reversed on appeal, the state trial 
court's dismissal of the malicious prosecution complaint would preclude 
malicious prosecution as the basis for a § 523(a)(6) complaint in the 
bankruptcy court. Citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, because bankruptcy 
court could not review the trial court judgment, it was necessary to lift the stay 
to permit the state court plaintiff to appeal.) 
Murray v. Bammer (In re Bammer), 112 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1997) (debtor did 
not willfully and maliciously injure judgment creditor by accepting frauduient 
conveyance from his mother before creditor could record judgment nor by 
encumbering the property and giving the loan proceeds to his mother just 
before reconveying the property to his mother because son subjectively had 
compassion for his mother and the loan proceeds helped the mother not the 
son. "We have considered both objective facts and subjectively held beliefs of 
the debtor in determining whether an individual's conduct was malicious .... A 
debtor is not free to injure others maliciously, however, and escape liability for 
his actions by pleading that he subjectively held a belief that his actions would 
lead to good. Instead, the debtor's subjectively held beliefs are examined for 
their objective reasonableness .... The court found Bammer credible when he 
testified that he did not obtain the loan as a way of unjustly enriching himself 
at the expense of creditors, but rather, as a way to help his mother with 
expenses he viewed as critical. ... Bammer acted out of compassion for his 
mother .... Bammer's motives and the lack of personal benefit he derived 
from obtaining the loan are compelling reasons favoring discharge." The 
debtor's mother embezzled money in fictitious real estate transactions. By 
agreement she conveyed her residence to her son without consideration. The 
son then obtained a loan using the property as collateral and gave the proceeds 
to his mother. Before creditors could record judgments, the son reconveyed the 
property to his mother. Dissenting judge failed to fmd "just cause or excuse" 
in the son's participation in the fraudulent conveyances and the son's surrender 
of the proceeds to his mother.), petition/or reh 'g en bane granted, 121 F.3d 
531 (9th Cir. 1997). 
Corley v. Delaney (In re Delaney), 97 F.3d 800 (5th Cir. 1996) (debtor 
intentionally loaded a shotgun, carried it to where plaintiff was, aimed it at 
plaintiff and twice tapped it against the windshield of the car in which plaintiff 
sat. The gun discharged. The firing of the gun was neither intentional nor 
deliberate within the meaning of § 523(a)(6); "on the contrary, it was wholly 
unintentional, even though possibly not wholly unforeseeable. It follows that 
under our. .. reading of § 523( a)( 6), [ debtor] did not intend [plaintiff s] injury 
-- or any injury for that matter. ... [Debtor] neither intended the injury nor 
intentionally took action that was 'substantially certain' to cause the injuries 
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that [plaintifl] suffered." "'[T]he plain language of Section 523(a)(6) excepts 
from discharge debts arising from 'willful and malicious injury' rather than 
willful and malicious acts which cause an injury. "') 
Waugh v. Eldridge (In re Waugh), 95 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 1996) (50% 
shareholder's participation in transactions that stripped assets from corporation 
after accident involving corporation's truck was willful and malicious injury 
to victims of accident. Debtor "repeatedly engaged in transactions to the 
benefit of himself and the other shareholders and to the detriment of [the 
corporation's] creditors.") 
Papadakis v. Zelis (In re Zelis), 66 F.3d 205 (9th Cir. 1995) (sanctions imposed 
by state court for frivolous appeal of a consent judgment are nondischargeable 
under § 523(a)(6). Debtor is collaterally estopped to contest willfulness and 
maliciousness because California Court of Appeals. found that the debtor 
"intentionally and wrongfully filed two frivolous notices of appeal in bad faith 
and for abusive litigation tactics." "[F]iling a frivolous appeal necessarily 
causes harm to the opposing parties by requiring them to incur unnecessary 
litigation costs and attorneys' fees, and by delaying [mal resolution of the 
dispute. Likewise, a court generally orders sanctions only when the party's 
conduct has been particularly abusive and there is no justification or excuse for 
the behavior." Plaintiff's settlement of sanctions award with co-defendant 
precludes recovery of part of the sanctions from the debtor.) 
Hope v. Walker (In re Walker), 48 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 1995) (failure of 
employer to obtain workers' compensation insurance does not result in willful 
and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6). The statute excepts from discharge 
debts arising from willful and malicious injury, not willful and malicious acts 
which cause an injury. Debtors are responsible for willful injury when they 
commit an intentional act the purpose of which is to cause injury or which is 
substantially certain to cause injury. The plaintiff's work injury was not 
"substantially certain" to result from the debtor's failure to have insurance. 
The debtor did not intend his employee to suffer a fall.) 
Barnett Bank v. Ussery (In re Ussery), 179 B.R. 737 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1995) 
(damage to car caused by tree falling during violent storm is nondischargeable 
where contract required insurance, debtor cancelled insurance because he could 
no longer afford it, debtor intended to sell car, and did not drive car after 
cancellation. Rejects "majority view" that lack of insurance was not cause of 
injury.) 
Kaufman v. Vamvakaris (In re Vamvakaris), 197 B.R. 228 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
1996) (bailee's failure to maintain loss insurance on bailed goods that were 
stolen, and misrepresentations to plaintiff that he did carry such insurance, did 
not constitute willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6). "The debtor did 
not intend to cause injury. And even though debtor's misrepresentation may 
be considered a deliberate and intentional act, it did not directly or necessarily 
lead to the loss of plaintiff's jewelry.") 
Princess House. Inc. v. Kraft (In re Kraft), 192 B.R. 735 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 
1996) (jury verdict that debtor interfered with contractual relationship and 
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misappropriated trade secrets not sufficient to preclude trial of § 523(a)(6) 
complaint. Collateral estoppel was not applicable because '''for conduct to be 
malicious ... [it] must not only be 'certain or almost certain to cause ... 
harm,' it must also be targeted at the creditor.' ... In other words, the jury must 
have found that debtor's conduct was motivated by an 'intent to cause injury' 
to plaintiff, 'rather than [being] merely an 'intentional act which causes injury.' 
Here, the fact that the jury found that debtor, acting in her own self-interest, 
took steps which resulted in harm to plaintiff, does not necessarily mean that 
the jury also found that she acted with malice towards the plaintiff.") Compare 
Rowe Oil. Inc. v.McCoy (In re McCoy), 189 B.R. 129 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
1995) (misappropriation of trade secrets constitutes willful and malicious injury 
within § 523(a)(6)). 
Eborn v. Sawyer Cln re Sawyer), 192 B.R. 671 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1996) 
(shipowner's failure to pay "maintenance" and "cure" to injured seaman was 
willful and malicious injury. Debtor was sued by seaman for injuries suffered 
on debtor's shri_mpLng vessel. District court found that plaintiffs injuries were 
not caused by any unseaworthy condition on board the ship, but ordered debtor 
to pay "cure," "maintenance," and lost wages-the shipowner's duty of care 
toward seamen injured while in the owner's service. That debtor did not 
voluntarily pay and attempted to shield himself of liability "constitute willful 
and arbitrary conduct that justifies the award of both attorney's fees and 
punitive damages .... Under maritime law, a shipowner's failure to pay 
maintenance and cure is an independent tort that renders the shipowner liable 
for any aggravation of the seaman's injury." District court fmding that failure 
to pay was "willful and arbitrary," estopped the debtor from (re)litigating 
willfulness and maliciousness under § 523(a)(6).) 
Brzys v. Lubanski (In re Lubanski), 186 B.R. 160, 167 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) 
(violation of statute prohibiting electronic eavesdropping will support 
§ 523(a)(6) action. Injury under § 523(a)(6) not limited to bodily injury or 
physical abuse). 
Haeske v. Arlington (In re Arlington), 192 B.R. 494 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) 
(attorneys' fees awarded to defendant as sanctions for an unfounded lawsuit are 
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6)). 
Sielschott v. Reimer (In re Reimer), 182 B.R. 816, 818-19 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 
1995) (award of attorney's fees in connection with divorce decree enforcement 
is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) because debtor intentionally failed to 
pay child support and fmancial injury was certain to occur). 
Bethesda Hospital v. Kessnick Clnre Kessnick), 174 B.R. 481 (S.D. Ohio 1994) 
(debtor's use of errant insurance benefit check to pay nonmedical debts, despite 
assignment of benefits to health care provider, was willful but not malicious 
under § 523(a)(6). Debtor was not experienced in such matters, he made no 
attempt to conceal receipt of the benefit check, he was expecting 
reimbursement for personal medical expenses and the explanation of benefits 
did not make clear whose claims the benefit check was to cover.) 
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Cromer v. Cromer an re Cromer), 164 B.R. 680 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) 
(debtor's use of joint credit cards in violation of separation agreement does not 
fit § 523(a)(6) because extension of credit and credit rating are not "property"). 
Hammond v. Gee (In re Gee), 156 B.R. 291 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1993), aff'd 
in part, rev'd on other grounds, 173 B.R. 189 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) (state 
court judgment against employer for sexual harassment of employee is a 
nondischargeable claim for willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6»; 
Avery v. Sotelo (In re Sotelo), 179 B.R. 214 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1995); Hainline 
v. Neal (In re Neal), 179 B.R. 234, 238-39 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1995) (cause of 
action in Idaho for sexual battery does not require acts that "necessarily caused 
injury" and therefore will not automatically result in nondischargeable debt 
under § 523(a)(6». 
Moore v. C.F. (In re Moore), 165 B.R. 495 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (state court 
default judgment for sexual abuse of a minor precluded debtor from relitigating 
willfulness and maliciousness under § 523(a)(6». 
Wells v. Jennings (In re Jennings), 188 B.R. 110 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(failure to maintain property did not constitute willful and malicious injury 
when adjoining building was damaged by a fire that originated in debtor's 
building. "Mere negligence, even if gross or reckless, will not support an 
exception under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).") 
8. Agency, master-servant and imputed liability 
Asher v. Yarom (In re Yarom), 86 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 1996) (table decision; 
text at 1996 WL 285713) (state court award of punitive damages "necessarily" 
means state court found that the debtor had "ratified" the fraudulent acts of his 
agents. "Yarom's ratification of the fraud, therefore, was willful and malicious 
because he had the requisite intent to commit the acts that caused harm to [the 
plaintiff]. ") 
Taneff v. Hoehn (In re Taneft'), 190 B.R. 501 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (owner of 
tavern not liable under § 523(a)(6) for injuries caused by patron. Willfulness 
'''requires not only intentional conduct on the part of the debtor, but also 
intentional or deliberate injury.'" A "should have known" standard "misstates 
the standard for a willful injury .... [N]egligence, or even recklessness for that 
matter, does not establish a willful injury for nondischargeability under 
§ 523(a)(6). . .. No matter how hard the tragic and devastating injury that 
underlies this proceeding tugs at the heartstrings, there must be some modem 
of evidence that [debtor] intended the injury for § 523(a)(6) to except the debt 
from discharge." Not only was there no evidence that the debtor sold alcohol 
to someone who he "knew or even suspected was intoxicated ... even if he 
did, § 523(a)(6) requires at least a deliberate action substantially certain to 
produce harm.") 
Choi v. Brown (In re Brown), 201 B.R. 411 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996) (owner of 
car (wife) not responsible under § 523(a)(6) for injuries caused by husband 
who was driving while intoxicated, without a license, and without insurance. 
Creditor failed to establish that wife had given husband permission or 
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otherwise allowed husband to drive the car, thus wife's conduct could not be 
said to have been willful under § 523(a)(6). Plaintiffs injury was not 
substantially certain to result from wife's failure to insure the car.) 
Deroche v. Miller (In re Miller), 196 B.R. 334 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1996) (state 
court judgment against debtor for intentional, wanton, willful and malicious 
shooting by debtor's son is dischargeable under § 523(a)(6). "[T]he phrase' 
by the debtor' follows the phrase 'for willful and malicious injury' [in § 
523(a)(6)]. Thus, the plain meaning test requires that the debtor must have 
been the one who caused the willful and malicious injury. Imputed liability is 
insufficient. ") 
Bairstow v. Sullivan (In re Sullivan), 198 B.R. 417 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) 
(damages for trespass and timber cutting by agents and employees of debtor is 
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) because debtor knew what was happening 
but deliberately did nothing to stop it. Debts based on vicarious liability are 
ordinarily dischargeable because they are not based on the deliberate or 
intentional conduct of the debtor. Where debtor knew or should have known 
of misconduct of agents and did nothing to stop it, the debt will be 
nondischargeable if it otherwise satisfies § 523(a)(6)). 
G. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7): 
" ... for a fme, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental 
unit, ... not compensation for actual pecuniary loss, other than tax penalty .... " 
See also "18 U.S.C. § 3613(e) & (f);" "11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(13);" "11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(17)" infra. 
United States Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev. v. Cost Control Mktg. & Sales 
Management of Va .. Inc., 64 F.3d 920,927-8 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, _ U.S. 
_, 116 S. Ct. 1673, 134 L. Ed.2d 777 (1996) (order requiring the officers of a 
corporate real estate marketing firm to disgorge $8.65 million in profits pursuant to 
anti-fraud provisions of Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act is nondischargeable 
under § 523(a)(7). "The Supreme Court has given § 523(a)(7) a broad reading, and 
has held that it applies to all criminal and civil penalties, even those designed to 
provide restitution to injured private citizens. [Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 
(1986)] ... We interpret these cases to say that so long as the government's interest 
in enforcing a debt is penal, it makes no difference that injured persons may thereby 
receive compensation for pecuniary loss. In other words, the 'not compensation for 
actual pecuniary loss' phrase in § 523(a)(7) refers to the government's pecuniary 
loss.") 
Betts v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinaty Comm'n, 165 B.R. 870 (N.D. Ill. 1994), 
aff'd mem., 51 F.3d 275 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 116 S. Ct. 571, 133 L. 
Ed.2d 495 (1995) (Illinois Supreme Court rule that any attorney subject to discipline 
must reimburse the disciplinary commission for costs incurred imposes a 
nondischargeable liability under § 523(a)(7). The disciplinary commission is a 
"governmental unit." Inherent authority to regulate attorney admissions lies with the 
Illinois Supreme Court, and the commission "acts as an agent in administering its 
disciplinary function." Costs imposed by the commission acting in that capacity are 
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penal in nature because they are triggered by misconduct like the criminal fmes in 
Hollis and Zarzynski. "Costs" imposed under the Supreme Court rule are a component 
of the discipline, and nondischargeable.) 
County v. Damore (In re Damore), 195 B.R. 40 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (suretyship 
agreement that related to a forfeited bail bond was dischargeable where the debtor was 
not the defendant who failed to appear. Surety's obligation is contractual, not penal, 
and thus dischargeable under § 523(a)(7).) 
Compare Ricketson v. Florida Dep't of Environmental Protection (In re Ricketson), 
190 B.R. 684 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (civil penalty awarded state department of 
environmental protection was not within the scope of § 523(a)(7)(B). Section 
523(a)(7)(B) applies only to "tax [mes, forfeitures, and penalties.") with In re Corbly, 
149 B.R. 1367 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1992) (Section 523(a)(7)(B) is not limited to tax related 
penalties, fmes or forfeitures.} 
Clayton v. Tennessee Dep't of Safety (In re Clayton), 199 B.R. 29 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 
1996) (statutory fees under state fmancial responsibility statute, which must be paid 
to regain driving privileges, constitute a "penalty" under § 523(a)(7). "First, the 
underlying offenses lend great weight to the determination that such statutory fees are 
penal sanctions for wrongdoing. The statutory fees are imposed upon a conviction for 
offenses ranging from driving without a license to vehicular homicide. Second, there 
is not a single reinstatement fee, but rather each offense carries a separate and distinct 
$65.00 fee ... This cummulative characteristic of the reinstatement fees supports the 
proposition that the fees indeed are in the nature of 'penalties' as contemplated under 
11 U.S.C. §523(a)(7).") 
H. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8): . 
" ... for an educational benefit .... " 
1. Cosigners, guarantors and non-students 
Keilig v. Massachusetts Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. (In re LaFlamme), 188 
B.R 867 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1995) (that loan proceeds were used by debtor's child 
not by debtor, does not change calculus under § 523(a)(8). Nature of the loan, 
not identity of the borrower controls.); Uterhark v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. 
Corp. (In re Uterhark), 185 B.R 39, 40-42 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) (debt 
nondischargeable where only the non-student parent is liable; Congress was 
concerned with solvency of educational loan programs as well as prevention 
of student fraud). 
2. Government made, government guaranteed or funded by non-profit institution 
T I Fed. Credit Union v. DelBonis, 72 F.3d 921,932-38 (1st Cir. 1995) (federal 
credit union is a "governmental unit" for purposes of § 523(a)(8); erroneous 
stipulation that credit union was "not a governmental unit" does not preclude 
appellate court from holding otherwise. "[H]istory demonstrates that federal 
credit unions were intended to perform a variety of governmental 
functions ... to issue loans and dividends to their members ... to invest their 
funds in obligations of the United States ... [to] serve as fiscal agents of the 
D - 87 
United States and depositories of public monies. . . . In United States v. 
Michigan, 851 F.2d 803 (6th Cir. 1988), the Sixth Circuit found that federal 
credit unions are government instrumentalities precisely because they perform 
such functions .... [The] performance of governmental functions, exemption 
from federal tax, and extensive government regulation are compelling indicia 
of federal instrumentality status. . . . [T]reating federal credit unions as 
'government instrumentalities' and, thus, 'government units,' is consistent with 
Section 523(a)(8)'s discharge-limiting purpose .... [N]arrowly construing the 
term 'government unit' to exclude federal credit unions would create a perverse 
incentive for educational debtors .... Allowing educational loans issued by 
federal credit unions to be freely discharged in bankruptcy could devastate 
many federal credit unions.") 
Keilig v. Massachusetts Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. (In re LaFlamme), 188 
B.R. 867 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1995) ("Parent Plus Loans" originated with private 
bank are funded under the Higher Education Act of 1965 and are thus "made, 
insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit" within the scope of § 523(a)(8). 
That loan originated with private bank is not relevant.) 
3. Scholarship v. loan; educational benefit overpayment 
Santa Fe Medical Servs .. Inc. v. Segal (Inre Segal), 57 F.3d 342 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(loan made pursuant to an employment contract, although used to repay 
educational debt is not within the scope of § 523(a)(8). The loan did not 
facilitate the debtor's education, rather it was an inducement to accept 
employment. Discharge of the obligation to the employer/refmancier did not 
frustrate the purposes of § 523(a)(8). The nonprofit institution, federal treasury 
or service obligation would not be affected; they were fully satisfied.); A.L. 
Lee Memorial Hospital v. McFayden (In re McFayden), 192 B.R. 329 (Bankr. 
N.D.N.Y. 1995) (hospital's buyout of debtor's tuition costs for completing 
nursing school in exchange for a three year commitment to hospital is beyond 
§ 523(a)(8). While the hospital was a nonprofit institution, and the loan was 
made as part of a program, the loan did not constitute an educational loan. 
"Educational loans" are "made without business considerations." The loan at 
issue was "inextricably tied to the Debtor's employment with the Plaintiff as 
a registered nurse for a period of three years. It was an 'all or none' 
proposition .... [T]he Plaintiffs program was intended not as an educational 
benefit to the Debtor, but rather it was intended to benefit the Plaintiff by 
assuring that it had a qualified nursing staff on a relatively long-term basis.") 
Dakota Wesleyan Univ. v. Nelson (In re Nelson), 188 B.R. 32 (D.S.D. 1995) 
(rejecting Najafi v. Cabrini College (In re Najafi), 154 B.R. 185 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 1993), and Stone, 180 B.R. 499 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1995), as flawed and 
unsupportable, debts incurred on open account with university for tuition, room 
and board, course fees, books and supplies are not loaned funds and were not 
advanced as an educational benefit by an institution that qualifies under 
§ 523(a)(8)). 
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4. Measurement of seven-year period 
Gibson v. Virginia. State Educ. Assistance Authority (In re Gibson), 86 F.3d 
1150 (4th Cir. 1996) (table decision; text at 1996 WL 267322) (105 days 
during which the debtor's Chapter 7 case was pending is an "applicable 
suspension" excluded from the 7-year counting period in § 523(a)(8»; 
Williams v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Williams), 195 B.R. 644 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996) (automatic stay of prior bankruptcy filing tolled 
running of seven year period under § 523(a)(8)(A». 
Nunn v. Washington (In re Nunn), 788 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1986) (all of a 
student loan is dischargeable under § 523(a)(8) if the first repayment 
installment became due more than five years prior to petition. Subsequent 
installments becoming due within the five-year period and partial payments by 
debtor within five years of petition do not render any portion of the student 
loan nondischargeable. Congressional intent behind five-year provision was 
to prohibit recipients from completing studies and precipitously filing 
bankruptcy.) 
Feuer v. Pennsylvania College of Podiatric Medicine (In re Feuer), 195 B.R. 
866 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (change from five to seven years applied to debtor 
whose loan was initiated when five year rule was in effect. Application of the 
longer period did not threaten any protected property interest.) 
5. Undue hardship 
Cuenca v. Dep't of Educ., 64 F.3d 669 (10th Cir. 1995) (Table decision; text 
at 1995 WL 49511), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 116 S. Ct. 1044, 134 L. Ed.2d 
191 (1996) (not undue hardship for debtor with income of $36,000 to repay 
student loan of $37,724.02. "'Undue hardship' means something more than an 
inconvenience or doing without what most would regard as luxuries. Student 
loans are different from most loans. They are made without the usual 
protections given to a lender .... Consequently, the discharge of a student loan 
should be based upon an inability to earn and not simply a reduced standard of 
living.") 
Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 
298 (3d Cir. 1995) (adopts undue hardship standard in Brunner, 831 F.2d 395 
(2d Cir. 1987). "The Brunner standard meets the practical needs of the debtor 
by not requiring that he or she live in abject poverty for up to seven years 
before a student loan may be discharged. [Yet, the] Brunner standard 
safeguards the fmancial integrity of the student loan program by not permitting 
debtors who have obtained the substantial benefits of an education funded by 
taxpayer dollars to dismiss their obligation merely because repayment ... 
would require some major personal and fmancial sacrifices .... Equitable 
concerns or other extraneous factors not contemplated by the Brunner 
framework may not be imported into the court's analysis to support a fmding 
of dischargeability."); Mayer v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency 
(In re Mayer), 198 B.R. 116 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (under Faish the court 
need not consider the debtor's motivation for flling bankruptcy. Faish did not 
retain the requirement that debtor maintain only a minimal standard of living. 
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"Faish . .. appears to direct that a bankruptcy court take a broader view of the 
debtor's fmancial circumstances .... [T]he Faish court makes no mention of 
the fact that the Faish debtor's income [was] over twice that of the applicable 
poverty guidelines." That debtor maintained a standard of living above the 
poverty level was not determinative.) 
Rice v. United States an re Rice),78 F.3d 1144, 1149-50 (6th Cir. 1996) (more 
stringent ''unconscionable'' standard in 42 U.S.C. § 292f(g) is applied to 
determine the disc4argeability of HEAL loan; citing Brunner, bankruptcy 
courts should examine totality of the circumstances to determine 
unconscionability of HEAL loans. "[I]n employing the term 'unconscionable,' 
Congress intended to adopt the ordinary usage of the term as 'excessive, 
exorbitant,' 'lying outside the limits of what is reasonable or acceptable,' 
'shockingly unfair, harsh, or unjust,' or 'outrageous.' ... We fmd the standard 
imposed by this defmition of 'unconscionability' to be significantly more 
stringent than the 'undue hardship' standard established for the discharge of 
educational loans under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) .... [W]e believe that 
bankruptcy courts should examine the totality of the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the debtor and the obligation to determine whether nondischarge 
of the obligation would be unconscionable .... [T]he bankruptcy court should 
be guided principally by such objective factors as the debtor's income, earning 
ability, health, educational background, dependents, age, accumulated wealth, 
and professional degree. . . . [T]he court should consider the amount of the 
debt .. '. the rate at which interest is accruing .... [T]he court should examine 
the debtor's claimed expenses and current standard of living ... ascertaining 
whether the debtor has attempted to minimize the expenses of himself and his 
dependents .... [T]he court should examine whether, and to what extent, the 
debtor's current sItuation is likely to continue or improve ... whether the debtor 
has attempted to maximize his income . . . whether the debtor is capable of 
supplementing his iBcome . . . whether [dependents] are, or could be, 
contrIbuting fmancially to their own support ... the debtor's previous efforts 
to repay the HEAL obligation ... the debtor's fmancial situation over the 
course of time when payments were due; ... the debtor's voluntary 
undertaking of additional fmancial burdens despite his knowledge of his 
outstanding HEAL debt; ... the percentage of the debtor's total indebtedness 
represented by student loans .... We believe the debtor's good faith to be an 
appropriate and necessary consideration."); Hornsby v. Tennessee Student 
Assistance Com. (In re Hornsby), 201 B.R. 195 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1996) 
(Cheesman set forth three factors to guide inquiry into undue hardship: "(1) 
whether the debtor is capable of paying the loan while maintaining a minimal 
standard of living; (2) whether the debtor's financial situation will improve in 
the foreseeable future; and (3) whether the debtor is acting in good faith or is 
attempting to abuse the student loan system by having a loan forgiven before 
embarking upon a lucrative career in the private sector." Debtors earn a 
combined monthly net income of $2,556.66, which results in "surplus" income 
of between $191 and $280 depending on overtime. Notwithstanding income 
that is far above the national poverty level of $17,710 for a family of five, 
, debtors fell behind on their obligations several times during the year while 
maintaining a modest lifestyle. To require debtors to repay student loan would 
"cause the Debtors to default on several of their existing obligations." "[T]his 
Court is of the opinion that Debtors should not be forced to live at or near the 
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poverty level in order to prove an undue hardship exception to the 
nondischargeability of student loans." Further, because there was little 
likelihood that debtors' financial (rnis)fortunes would change in the foreseeable 
future and there was no evidence of bad faith, loans were dischargeable.); Fox 
v. Student Loan Mktg. Ass'n (In re Fox), 189 B.R. 115 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
1995) (three-pronged test of undue hardship from Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 
532 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979) will be met only "under circumstances of 
extraordinary hardship, rather than mere hardship, fmancial adversity, or 
present inability to pay .... However, sometimes where undue hardship is not 
found it may be equitable to reduce the nondischargeable portion of the 
obligation." Debtor's "failure to maximize income from her [soon-to-be ex-
husband's] untapped earning potential or child care services" resulted in only 
a portion of debtor's student loan being discharged.); Elebrashy v. Student 
Loan Com. (In re Elebrashy), 189 B.R. 922 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) (court 
adopts "slightly modified version of the Johnson test. ... in Brunner [831 F.2d 
395 (2d Cir. 1987)]." Monthly net income of$I,213 with modest expenses 
totaling $1,325 demonstrated a minimal standard of living. Nothing budgeted 
for entertainment, newspapers or education other than $35 per month for cable 
television. No reserve for unforeseen expenditures. Debtor had no expectation 
for advancement in the foreseeable future. That debtor's wife did not 
contnbute to family income did not change the calculus-her English was poor 
and employment in the future was speculative. Debtor acted in good faith. 
Although no payments were made on the $42,000 of student loans prior to 
filing, debtor made payments toward the debt for three years under a chapter 
13 plan.) 
Keilig v. Massachusetts Higher Educ. Assistance Com. (In re LaFlamme), 188 
B.R. 867 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1995) (to quality for an undue hardship discharge 
debtor's condition must be "something extraordinary and exceptional and 
generally indicate a hopelessness for the indefmite future as to any possibility 
of repayment. ") 
Robinson v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Robinson), 193 B.R. 967 
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996) (adopts Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 532 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979) test for determining undue hardship. The only 
difference between Johnson and Brunner is that Brunner requires the court to 
consider whether the debtor is benefitting from the education.); Halverson v. 
Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Halverson), 189 B.R. 840 
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) (applying Brunner three part test, expenses in excess 
of take home pay does not prove inability to maintain a minimum standard of 
. living for a three person family with a combined net income of approximately 
$21,000, where debtor had stable job and expected raises in the near future.) 
Melton v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Com. (In re Melton), 187 B.R. 
98 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995) (not undue hardship that debtor with minimum 
wage job chose to live with girlfriend and her two children as a unit for state 
welfare benefits. That any increase in debtor's income would result in decrease 
. in welfare benefits does not show undue hardship). 
Commonwealth v. Dillon, 189 B.R. 382 (W.D. Va. 1995) (no undue hardship 
under three part test of Brunner where debtor testified that she and her husband 
D - 91 
could pay $50 to $75 a month to retire the student loan and payments would 
not cause their standard ofliving to fall below that minimally necessary.) 
O'Donnell v. New Hampshire Higher Educ. Assistance Foundation (In re 
O'Donnell), 198 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1996) (student loan could not be 
discharged because debtor able to increase her income in the future. However, 
repayment deferred for six months to allow debtor to become settled in new job 
or to obtain more stable employment.); Dennehy v. Sallie Mae (In re 
Dennehy), 201 B.R. 1008 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1996) (student loan is 
nondischargeablebut repayment and accrual of interest "deferred" for two 
years). 
Walcott v. USA Funds. Inc. (In re Walcott), 185 B.R. 721, 725 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.C. 1995) (despite substantial, unsuccessful effort to fmd employment, 
debt nondischargeable where debtor is "very articulate, has no disabilities or 
dependents, has family support, has an education, has some experience 
teaching literacy, and has the prospect of advancing in that field. .. [and] does 
not suffer from any extraordinary circumstances." Chapter 7 filed shortly after 
debtor ran out ofloan deferments). 
I. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9): 
" ... for death or personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of motor vehicle 
if such operation was unlawful because the debtor was intoxicated .... " 
In re Reese, 91 F.3d 37 (7th Cir. 1996) (§ 523(a)(9) does not violate the uniformity 
clause notwithstanding that states may affect the scope of the discharge under 
§ 523(a)(9) through varying defmitions of unlawful driving under the influence). 
Hoehn v. Taneff(In re TaneID, 172 B.R. 744 (BanIer. W.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd on other 
grounds, 190 B.R. 501 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (§ 523(a)(9) applies only to driver-debtors. 
It is not sufficiently broad to cover obligations imposed on nondriver debtors by state 
dram shop statutes. Dischargeability of a debt arising under dram shop statute may 
be challenged, if at all, under § 523(a)(6).) 
Willison v. Race, 192 B.R. 949 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (the phrase "motor vehicle" in 
§ 523(a)(9) is not limited to its common understanding. While neither the Code nor 
the legislative history are particularly useful in defming the phrase, "[ c ]learly, the 
provision was enacted to protect the victims of irresponsible persons who get drunk 
and injure others. Congress could not have intended for the drunk boater's victim to 
suffer while the drunk boater floats away with a 'fresh start. "'), on remand, 198 B.R. 
740 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996) (plaintifffailed to establish that debtor was intoxicated 
at the time the collision occurred); Radivoj v. Williams (In re Williams), 101 B.R. 356 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla.), ajJ'd, 111 B.R. 361 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (motorboat is a motor vehicle 
for purposes of § 523(a)(9)). Contra Boyce v. Greenway (In re Greenway), 71 F.3d 
1177, 1179-80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 116 S. Ct. 2499, 135 L. Ed.2d 
191 (1996) (motorboat is not a "motor vehicle" for purposes of § 523(a)(9). "The 
terms 'motorboat' or 'water craft' do not appear in § 523(a)(9) of the Bankruptcy 
Code .... Congress has used 'motor vehicle' to refer exclusively to automobiles in 
other statutes .... The above defmitions comport with our understanding that the plain 
and common meaning of the term 'motor vehicle' does not include motorboats. Had 
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Congress intended to include motorboats within § 523(a)(9) they would have either 
defmed the term 'motor vehicle' to include motorboats or added motorboats to the 
exception."); Schachter v. Fall (In re Fall), 192 B.R. 16 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1995) (motor 
boat is not motor vehicle within § 523(a)(9)). 
J. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(13) (as amended by Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320934, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994)): 
for any payment of restitution under title 18, United States Code. 
BT Commercial COil'. v. Kochekian (In re Kochekian), 175 B.R. 883 (Bankr. 
M.D.N.C. 1995) (§ 523(a)(13) is not retroactive). 
K. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(14) (as amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-394, § 221, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994)): 
incurred to pay a tax to the United States that would be 
nondischargeable pursuant to paragraph (1). 
MBNA America v. Chrusz (In re Chrusz), 196 B.R. 221 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1996) 
($16,000 credit card access check deposited two days before debtor issued a check to 
the IRS for $28,007.04 is nondischargeable to the extent of $13,641.60. Notation on 
check read "BuslIRSffaxes," which rebutted debtor's testimony that the advance was 
not taken to pay taxes. Amount declared nondischargeable represented the ratio 
between the payment to IRS and the total balance in commingled account at the time 
the check was deposited, or 85.26 percent.) 
L. 11 U.S.C. § 523[(a)](15) (as amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-394, § 304(e), 108 Stat. 4106 (1994)): 
not of the kind descnbed in paragraph (5) that is incurred by the 
debtor in the course of a divorce or separation or in connection 
with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a 
court of record, a detennination made in accordance with State 
or territorial law by a governmental unit unless--
(A) the debtor does not have the ability 
to pay such debt from income or property of the 
debtor not reasonably necessary to be expended 
for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a 
dependent of the debtor and, if the debtor is 
engaged in a business, for the payment of 
expenditures necessary for the continuation, 
preservation, and operation of such business; or 
(B) discharging such debt would result in 
a benefit to the debtor that outweighs the 
detrimental consequences to a spouse, former 
spouse, or child of the debtor; 
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1. Timing of decision 
Christison v. Christison (In re Christison), 201 B.R. 298 (Bankr. M.D. Fla .. 
1996) ("The relevant date for Section 523(a)(15) analyses is at or about the 
time of tria1. . .. It obviously is impossible ... for the court to anticipate future 
events. To the extent that support obligations are subject to changing 
circumstances, those future events are left to disposition by the divorce 
court."); Willey v. Willey (In re Willey), 198 B.R. 1007 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
1996) (applies time of trial standard but notes that a different standard may 
apply in another case). 
Greenwalt v. Greenwalt an re Greenwalt), 200 B.R. 909 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 
1996) (ability to pay is measured from the trial date). 
Henderson v. Henderson (In re Henderson), 200 B.R. 322 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
1996) (debtor's fmancial condition at time of trial should be considered for 
purposes of § 523(a)(15)). 
Anthony v. Anthony (In re Anthony), 190 B.R. 433 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) 
(examined facts on the date of the bankruptcy petition). 
Dressler v. Dressler (In re Dressler), 194 B.R. 290 (Bankr. D.R.1. 1996) 
(determine ability to pay and relative detriment as of time of trial). 
Campbell v. Campbell (In re Campbell), 198 B.R. 467 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996) 
(ability to pay measured at time of the trial). 
Morris v. Morris (In re Morris), 197 B.R. 236 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1996) 
(inquiry under § 523(a)(15)(A) is at the time of trial). 
Collins v. Hesson (In re Hesson), 190 B.R. 229 (Bankr. D. Md. 1996) 
(measuring point is time of trial). 
Becker v. Becker (In re Becker), 185 B.R. 567 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) 
(§ 523[(a)](15) is "concerned with the relative positions of the parties at the 
time of the bankruptcy, not at the time of the divorce"). 
Samayoa v. Jodoin (In re Jodoin), 196 B.R. 845 (Bankr. E.D. Ca1. 1996) (date 
for assessing debtor's ability to pay and for balancing the benefit and the 
burden of discharge is the trial date); Bodily v. Morris (In re Morris), 193 B.R. 
949 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) (measure the debtor's ability to pay and the 
relative harm to the parties at the time of trial). 
Sterna v. Paneras (In re Paneras), 195 B.R. 395 (Bankr. N.D. I1l. 1996) (court 
will consider relative fmancial positions at the time of trial; evidence of future 
prospects is relevant); Gantz v. Gantz (In re Gantz), 192 B.R. 932 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 1996) ("Facts and circumstances existing at the time of trial provide the 
most pragmatic measuring stick to assess whether the Debtor has the ability to 
pay the debt or whether the benefit of a discharge outweighs the detrimental 
consequences to the non-debtor spouse."); Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 184 B.R. 750 
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(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (measuring point is the date of the filing of the 
complaint). 
In re Smither, 194 B.R. 102 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996) (the date of trial is the 
appropriate starting point for making determinations under § 523(a)(15). 
However, the court's "inquiry in this matter is not controlled by mere 
'snapshot' of the debtor's fmancial strength as of a single moment in time. 
Rather, this inquiry must allow a court to consider the debtor's prospective 
earning ability. Unlike Chapter 13 cases where, if a debtor's fmances improve 
or deteriorate, plan payments can be adjusted over the term of the plan, the 
court has no ability to revisit a debtor's fmancial circumstances after the 
conclusion of the trial on the 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(l5) issues."); Belcher v. 
Owens (In re Owens), 191 B.R. 669 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1996) (measure ability 
to pay at the time of trial). 
Schmitt v. Eubanks (In re Eubanks), 197 B.R. 312 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1996) 
(relevant point of inquiry is the time of trial; however, appropriate analysis 
under § 523(a)(15) "includes a view of the debtor's future fmancial situation, 
including an ability to make minimal monthly payments on the debt, rather 
than a static view of the debtor's current ability to pay the debt."). Accord 
Johnston v. Henson (In re Henson), 197 B.R. 299 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1996). 
Humiston v. Huddelston (In re Huddelston), 194 B.R. 681 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
1996) ("the point of inquiry mandated by section 523(a)(15) appears nebulous 
at best. . .. Whether measured at the petition date or at the time of trial, the 
adopted 'snap shot' version of the disposable income test fails to take into 
account the nature of the analysis at hand -- the debtor's 'ability to pay' a debt, 
if that debt is declared nondischargeable. Unlike any analysis under section 
1325(b )(2), which actually tums on the ability to make payments in the 
bankruptcy, section 523(a)(15) looks beyond to the debtor's ability to pay after 
the bankruptcy event. ... Indeed, any standard which focuses on the debtor's 
current fmancial burden without taking into account the effect of his impending 
discharge may not be said to properly measure the debtor's ability to pay a 
divorce-related debt upon its relegation to nondischargeability. . .. Perhaps 
more importantly, a single-factored 'snap shot' approach that looks only to 
existing disposable income will do nothing to account for debtors, ... , who for 
whatever reason have underemployed themselves in the near term .... [A] 
'snap shot' standard would lead to the incongruous result of a discharge being 
granted despite the debtor's actual 'ability' to pay the debt in question.") 
Craig v. Craig (In re Craig), 196 B.R. 305 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996) (the court 
should examine whether the debtor has the ability to pay the debt over time, 
rather than at any particular point in time). 
2. Burden of proof. 
Cleveland v. Cleveland (In re Cleveland), 198 B.R. 394 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
1996) (creditor bears initial burden of establishing that the debt owed arose 
from out of a divorce or separation agreement and that it is not a debt for 
alimony, maintenance or support under § 523(a)(5). Thereafter the debtor has 
the burden of proving ability to pay and that the relative benefits of discharge 
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favor the debtor.); Humiston v. Huddelston (In re Huddelston), 194 B.R. 681 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996) (creditor bears initial burden of establishing that debt 
falls within § 523(a){l5), thereafter burden shifts to debtor to demonstrate 
either that he lacks the ability to pay, or that discharge of the debt would 
produce a benefit to the debtor that far exceeds any detriment to the former 
spouse.) 
Morris v. Morris (In re Morris), 197 B.R. 236 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1996) (The 
burden of going forward and the burden of proof are bifurcated on the issues 
of ability to pay and relative harm. The debtor has the burden on the issue of 
ability to pay, as the creditor has nO motivation to meet that burden-if the 
debtor has no ability to pay the inquiry stops. If the debtor has the ability to 
pay, then the creditor has the burden to prove that the detrimental consequences 
to the creditor outweigh those to the debtor.) cd 
Samayoa v. Jodoin (In re Jodoin), 196 B.R. 845 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1996) (both 
§ 523(a)(15)(A) and (B) "are drafted in terms of defenses rather than as 
substantive elements of non discharge ability." Thus, debtor has the burden of 
proof on both issues.); Bodily v. Morris (In re Morris), 193 B.R. 949 (Bankr. 
S.D. Cal. 1996) (under § 523(a){l5) burden is shifted to the debtor to establish 
inability to pay and that the balance of equities is in debtor's favor. The burden 
shift "amplifies the policy that even though the debtor is entitled to a fresh start, 
the debtor sometimes must show he or she deserves a fresh start with respect 
to a particular debt.") 
Gamble v. Gamble (In re Gamble), 196 B.R. 54 (Bankr. N.D. Tex~ 1996) (the 
burden of proof is on the debtor under § 523(a)(15). Section 523(a)(15) "sets 
up a rebuttable presumption that any property settlement obligation arising 
from a divorce is nondischargeable unless the debtor can prove that one of the 
two exceptions in subdivisions (A) or (B) apply.") 
Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 199 B.R. 37 (N.D. TIL 1996) (plaintiff has 
burden of proof as to both ability to pay and relative detriments under 
§ 523(a)(15)); Sterna v. Paneras (In re Paneras), 195 B.R. 395 (Bankr. N.D. 
I1l. 1996) (once plaintiff establishes the existence of a debt within the scope of 
§ 523(a)(15), burden of going forward shifts to the debtor to show either that 
debtor does not have the ability to payor that the discharge would be more 
beneficial to debtor than detrimental to the former spouse); Collins v. Florez 
(In re Florez), 191 B.R. 112 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (burden shifts to debtor to 
prove either inability to payor that the benefit of discharge outweighs the 
detriment to the creditor as a result of the discharge); Hill v. Hill (In re Him, 
184 B.R. 750 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (debtor has burden of proof under 
§ 523[(a)](15)(A) & (B). Subsections (A) and (B) are in the nature of 
affrrmative defenses which debtor must plead and prove.) 
King v. Speaks (In re Speaks), 193 B.R. 436 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996) (inability 
to pay and balance of harm are affrrmative defenses to be raised and proved by 
the debtor. That the plaintiff did not allege these issues in her complaint was 
not fataL); Craig v. Craig (In re Craig), 196 B.R. 305 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996) 
(burden is on debtor to prove inability to pay and to demonstrate that the ~ 
~ 
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benefit of a discharge of this debt outweighs the detriment of discharge to the 
former spouse). 
Christison v. Christison (In re Christison), 201 B.R. 298 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
1996) (debtor bears burden of proving either inability to payor that benefit of 
discharge outweighs detriment of discharge to creditor); Willey v. Willey (In 
re Willey), 198 B.R. 1007 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996) (burden on objecting 
creditor); Phillips v. Phillips (In re Phillips), 187 B.R. 363, 368 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 1995) (debtor has burden of proof). 
Schmitt v. Eubanks (In re Eubanks), 197 B.R. 312 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1996) 
(burden shifts to debtor). 
Carroll v. Carroll (In re Carroll), 187 B.R. 197,200 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995) 
(debtor has burden of proof); Woodworth v. Woodworth (In re Woodworth), 
187 B.R. 174, 177 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) (creditor has burden of proof). 
Straub v. Straub (In re Straub), 192 B.R. 522 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1996) (section 
523(a)(15) creates a rebuttable presumption of non discharge ability. Nondebtor 
must prove only a claim arising out of a divorce which is not covered by 
§ 523(a)(5). To overcome presumption, debtor must establish either an 
inability to payor that the benefit to the debtor from discharge of the debt 
outweighs the benefit to the nondebtor in having the debt declared 
nondischargeable. Ability to pay looks beyond the debtor's current fmancial 
resources, much like the inquiry under § 523(a)(8).) 
Becker v. Becker (In re Becker), 185 B.R.567 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) 
(§ 523(a)(15) sets up rebuttable presumption that any property settlement 
obligation is nondischargeable unless debtor can prove either inability to pay 
debt from income or property while supporting herself and dependents or 
continuing, preserving, or operating a business, or on balance the debt should 
be discharged because benefit to debtor outweighs detriment to fomler 
spouse.); Silvers v. Silvers (In re Silvers), 18? B.R. 648, 649 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 
1995) (after creditor/former spouse proves a claim for propertY settlement, 
burden of going forward, but not burden of proof, shifts to debtor). 
In re Stone, 199 B.R. 753 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996) (exhaustively collecting and 
analyzing § 523(a)(15) cases discussing burden of proof, debtor has burden to 
prove exceptions within the exception, citing Hill v. Smith, 260 U.S. 592 
(1923»; McGinnis v. McGinnis (In re McGinnis), 194 B.R. 917 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ala. 1996) (section 523(a)(15) "sets up rebuttable presumption of 
nondischargeability upon the flling of an adversary proceeding. . .. [T]he non-
debtor spouse bears the initial burden of establishing that the debt arose in the 
course of a separation agreement. ... Thereafter, the burden of coming forth 
shifts to the debtor to demonstrate that the debtor lacks the ability to pay the 
obligation or that the benefit of the discharge would outweigh the detrimental 
consequences to the non-debtor spouse.); Anthony v. Anthony (In re 
Anthony), 190 B.R. 433 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) (debtor has burden of proof 
under § 523(a){l5)(A) & (B». 
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3. 
In re Smither, 194 B.R. 102 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996) (creditor must 
demonstrate that the debt is of a kind dealt with under § 523(a)(15), then the 
burden shifts to the debtor who "must either prove an inability to pay the debt 
under § 523(a)(15)(A) or that a discharge of the debt would result in a benefit 
to the debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences of a discharge to the 
spouse, former spouse or children of the debtor under § 523(a)(15)(B) .... 
[B]oth the debtor and creditor will [however] have to present evidence under 
Section 523(a)(15)(B) concerning the consequences of the discharge on the 
respective parties.") 
Greenwalt v. Greenwalt (In re Greenwalt), 200 B.R. 909 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 
1996) (inasmuch as the statute and rules do not allocate the burden of proof 
under § 523(a)(15), the court follows Grogan and holds that a plaintiff in an 
action under § 523(a) bears the burden on all issues). 
Dressler v. Dressler (In re Dressler), 194 B.R. 290 (Bankr. D.R.!. 1996) 
("Congressional silence should not be read to overturn long-standing burden 
of proof rules .... Although § 523(a)(15)'s structure bears resemblance to that 
of § 523(a)(8) ... , that resemblance is insufficient to demand burden shifting 
under § 523(a)(15) because the context and requirements of the section differ 
in telling ways. . .. The statute and the rules do not require[] procedural 
gymnastics. . . . Congress did not intend the section to be a complex 
provision .... A § 523(a)(l5) plaintiff has every motivation (and ability) to 
demonstrate that the debtor has the ability to pay the obligation in question. 
And the plaintiff has the motivation (and ability) to prove that the detrimental 
consequences of discharge outweigh the benefits that the debtor would 
otherwise gain .... [T]he § 523(a)(l5) plaintiff [therefore] bears the burden 
of production and proof on all elements of dischargeability.") 
Adie v. Adie (In re Adie), 197 B.R. 8, n.1 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1996) ("the proper 
interpretation is that the burden of proof in the sense of burden of persuasion 
is on the creditor seeking a nondischargeability determination under § 
523(a)(15) of what would otherwise be a dischargeable debt.") 
Kessler v. Butler (In re Butler), 186 B.R. 371 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1995) (plaintiff 
has burden of proof). 
Tests and standards 
Beasley v. Adams (In re Adams), 200 B.R. 630 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (bankruptcy 
court may properly consider anticipated changes in the fmancial situations of 
the parties ''because, in applying balancing tests of the type required by Section 
523(a)(15)(B), bankruptcy judges must consider the 'totality of the 
circumstances."'); Taylorv. Taylor (In re Taylor), 199 B.R. 37 (N.D. Ill. 1996) 
(that debtor has ability to pay is not dispositive or even suggestive of the 
balancing of relative detriments. Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the detriment suffered by plaintiff would substantially 
outweigh the benefit to debtor of the fresh start. In weighing the relative 
benefits the court should consider "a variety of factors, including the amount 
and nature of the debt sought to be discharge, the conduct of the parties, and 
the income and expenses of the parties."); Jenkins v. Jenkins (In re Jenkins), 
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202 B.R 102 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1996) ("[A] judgment against Debtor ... would 
not improve [ex-spouse's] monthly fmancial deficit -- its effect would be a 
virtual wash. Even if Plaintiff were awarded all she asks for ... [her] budget 
indicates that she would continue to fall [behind each month]. This is one of 
the all-to-common instances in which '[a] discharge of debts by both parties 
strikes the Court as the most sensible solution .... "'); Sterna v. Paneras (In re 
Paneras), 195 B.R. 395 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (disposable income standard is 
proper test of debtor's ability to pay under § 523(a)(15)(A»; Collins v. Florez 
(In re Florez), 191 B.R. 112 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) ("subsections (A) and (B) 
of Section 523(a)(15) are disjunctive, [therefore] no equitable factors figure 
into the Debtor's ability to pay under Section 523(a)(15)(A). The irony is that 
the Plaintiff could be a millionaire, but that is irrelevant to the analysis under 
Section 523(a)(15)(A). A debtor may be forced to struggle to payoff an 
obligation from a paltry salary while the ex-spouse maintains a more 
advantageous fmancial position. The concept of a fresh start is amply 
challenged by application of Section 523(a)(15)(A). [In many cases,] the Court 
is forced to apply Section 523(a)(15)(A) in a way which nickels and dimes the 
Debtor."); Hill v. Hill (In re Him, 184 B.R. 750 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) 
(Section 523[(a)](15)(A)'s "ability to pay" test is similar to § 1325(b)(2)'s 
"disposable income" test. Factors relevant to § 523[(a)](15)(B) include: "the 
income and expenses of both parties; whether the nondebtor spouse is jointly 
liable on the debts; the number of dependents; the nature of the debts; the 
reaffmnation of any debts; and the nondebtor spouse's ability to pay." Where 
discharge will cause both parties significant detriment, the debtor must prevail. 
Where the debtor's fresh start is weighed against the possibility that the 
nondebtor may be forced to file bankruptcy, the debtor's fresh start should 
prevail. "A discharge of debts by both parties strikes the courts as the most 
sensible solution to the combined problems of the Plaintiff and the Debtor." 
Court rejects "undue hardship" comparison.) 
Christison v. Christison (In re Christison), 201 B.R. 298 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
1996) (disposable income test is appropriate under § 523(a)(15)(A). Congress 
did not intend "to force debtors with obligations under domestic property 
settlements into a poverty state but instead intended to require these debtors to 
pay obligations to former spouses under property settlement agreements if they 
could also pay the normal and reasonable everyday living expenses for 
themselves and their new families."); Willey v. Willey (In re Willey), 198 B.R 
1007 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996) ("If debtor prevails under § 523(a)(15)(A), where 
the debtor has no ability to pay the debt, the inquiry must end and the debt must 
be discharged." Disposable income analysis of § 1325(b) appropriate for 
purposes of calculating debtor's ability to pay under § 523(a)(15)(A). Under 
§ 523(a)(15)(B) court should look at the totality of the circumstances). 
Humiston v. Huddelston (In re Huddelston), 194 B.R 681 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
1996) (disposable income test of § 1325(b )(2) is the appropriate standard by 
which to evaluate ability to pay, provided that a broader net is cast to properly 
view ability in light of all relevant circumstances. "Whether measured at the 
petition date or at the time of trial, the adopted 'snap shot' version of the 
disposable income test fails to take into account the nature of the analysis at 
hand -- the debtor's 'ability to pay' a debt, if that debt is declared 
nondischargeable. Unlike any analysis under section 1325(b)(2), which 
D - 99 
actually turns on the ability to make payments in the bankruptcy, section 
523(a)(15) looks beyond to the debtor's ability to pay after the bankruptcy 
event ... Indeed, any standard which focuses on the debtor's current fmancial 
burden without taking into account the effect of his impending discharge may 
not be said to properly measure the debtor's ability to pay a divorce-related 
debt upon its relegation to nondischargeability. . .. Perhaps more importantly, 
a single-factored 'snap shot' approach that looks only to existing disposable 
income will do nothing to account for debtors, ... , who for whatever· reason 
have underemployed themselves in the near term. ... [A] 'snap shot' standard 
would lead to' the incongruous result of a discharge being granted despite the 
debtor's actual 'ability' to pay the debt in question." Within this scope the 
court must consider the totality of circumstances, which has proven the most 
accurate gauge to make similar fmdings of ability to pay under § 523(a)(8). 
Factors such as income and expenses of each party, a former spouse's ability 
to pay the debt, and the nature of the debt "present a starting point of inquiry 
[under § 523(a)(15)(B)], ... courts also must give weight to the intangible 
effect that [their] fmdings[s] have will upon each party involved."); Cleveland 
v. Cleveland (In re Cleveland), 198 B.R. 394 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996) (debtor 
"may not rely upon a 'snapshot' of his fmancial abilities at the time of 
filing. . .. Rather, [debtors must prove entitlement to discharge] by reference 
to the totality of their financial circumstances .... Notwithstanding the results 
of any closely tailored fmancial snapshot, if surveying these broader 
considerations reveals an actual ability to perform, the debtor cannot avail 
himself of section 523(a)(15)'s safe harbor.") 
Greenwalt v. Greenwalt (In re Greenwalt), 200 B.R. 909 (Bankr. W.O. Wash. 
1996) (ability to pay standard is more akin to the disposable income test of 
§ 1325(b)(2) "given the use of the phrase 'reasonably necessary' in both 
sections of the Code, and further given the fact that § 523(a)(15) debts are 
dischargeable in Chapter 13. Under this standard, the court must critically 
assess the debtor's budgeted expenses to determine the minimum the debtor 
could afford to pay over a three year period. . .. The court need not accept 
debtor's assessment of what expenses are 'reasonably necessary.': .. The 
debtor should not be permitted to direct the outcome of this proceeding by 
voluntary manipulations of either his income or his expenditures." "[S]imply 
providing the debtor with additional disposable income is not the kind of 
benefit Sec. 523'(a)(15)(B) ought to protect." The court must assess the totality 
of circumstances of both parties including the effect of the bankruptcy 
discharge on the debtor and the assets of the former spouse, for while the 
nondebtor may not be able to pay the debt at issue she may not be judgment 
proof.) 
In re Smither, 194 B.R. 102 (Bankr. W.O. Ky. 1996) (ability to pay requires a 
four step analysis: "First, the Court will have to determine the amount of the 
debts which a creditor is seeking to have held nondischargeable and the 
repayment terms and conditions of those debts. Second, the Court will have to 
calculate the Debtor's current income and the value and nature of any property 
which the Debtor retained after his bankruptcy. Third, the Court will have to 
ascertain the amount of reasonable and necessary expenses which the debtor 
must incur for the support of the Debtor, the Debtor's dependants and the 
continuation, preservation and operation of the Debtor's business, if any. 
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Finally, the Court must compare the Debtor's property and current income with 
his reasonable and necessary expenses to see whether Debtor has the ability to 
pay these obligations." Analysis of debtor's income must be viewed under the 
rubric of chapter 13's disposable income test of § 1325(b)(2). Excess income 
is not determinative of the court's consideration under § 523(a)(15)(B). Focus 
on excess income "ignores the value of the Debtor's discharge and simply 
blends 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(B) into an inseparable mass with 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(15)(A) . . .. [T]he best way to apply II U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(B) 
balancing test is to review the fmancial status of the debtor and the creditor and 
compare their relative standards of living to determine the true benefit of the 
debtor's possible discharge against any hardship the spouse, former spouse 
andlor children would suffer as a result of the debtor's discharge. If, after 
making this analysis, the debtor's standard of living will be greater than or 
approximately equal to the creditor's if the debt is not discharged, then the debt 
should be nondischargeable under the [§] 523(a)(l5)(B) test. . .. [W]here 
either a Debtor or Creditor has voluntarily reduced their income, that 
voluntarily [sic] reduction should still be considered by the Court in making the 
[§] 523(a)(15)(B) balancing test."); Patterson v. Patterson (In re Patterson), 199 
B.R. 21 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996) (a typical trial under § 523(a)(15) will 
proceed as follows: 1) decree will be used a starting point to determine if 
indebtedness falls within this section; 2) then debtor will be required to 
demonstrate inability to pay; 3) then, if debtor fails, plaintiff will be required 
to demonstrate the detrimental consequences of the discharge; and fmally, 4) 
debtor may present rebuttable proof with respect to detriment to the debtor); 
Belcher v. Owens (In re Owens), 191 B.R. 669 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1996) 
(disposable income analysis of § 1325(b) appropriate for purposes of 
calculating debtor's ability to pay under § 523(a)(15)(A». 
Campbell v. Campbell (In re Campbell), 198 B.R. 467 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996) 
(proper test to determine ability to pay is the disposable income test of 
§ 1325(b»; Scott v. Scott (In re Scott), 194 B.R. 375 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1995) 
(analysis under § 523(a){l5), like § 523(a)(8), requires consideration of future 
income prospects. Where debtor physician had realistic prospect to increase 
income from $60,000 to $140,000 and where most of debtor's $168,000 in 
prepetition debts would be discharged, debtor had the ability to pay $35,000 in 
marital debts under property settlement agreement.) 
Florio v. Florio (In re Florio), 187 B.R. 654, 657 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) 
(determine ability to pay on case by case basis; § 523(a)(8) analysis is helpful). 
Woodworth v. Woodworth (Inre Woodworth), 187 B.R. 174, 177 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 1995) ("income or property of the debtor" in § 523[(a)](15)(A) means 
debtor's exempt property and postpetition income; "reasonably necessary 
for . . . maintenance and support" permits consideration of assistance or 
property from friends or relatives. Statute does not permit consideration of fact 
that discharging debts will result in non-debtor spouse having to pay debts from 
funds reasonably necessary for her support. As stated in legislative history, one 
factor favoring debtor is that spouse probably judgment-proof.); Carroll v. 
Carroll (In re Carroll), 187 B.R. 197, 201 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995) (under 
relative benefit and detriment test, examine totality of circumstances including 
D -101 
income and expenses of_both parties, nature of debts, and non-debtor's ability 
to pay debts). 
Schmitt v. Eubanks (In re Eubanks), 197 B.R. 312 (Bankr. W.O. Ark. 1996) ~ 
(section 523(a)(15)(B) requires court to "weigh the benefit against the 
detriment -- an odd balancing and an impossibly amorphous standard. Despite 
this odd language, the courts appear to engage in a balancing of numerous 
factors regarding the finances, needs, and general merits of each party's 
position, trying to determine who will suffer more, ... , an issue Congress 
foolishly placed exclusively before the federal courts rather than state domestic 
and family courts which are clearly the courts with the expertise to assess need 
of the former spouses and their families.") 
Morris v. Morris (In re Morris), 197 B.R. 236 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1996) 
(ability to pay test mirrors the disposable income test of § 1325(b)(2). The 
court will consider combined annual income of the debtor and the debtor~s 
current spouse, and examine the debtor's expenses to determine if they are 
reasonably necessary. Court will consider pension or retirement funds from 
which the debtor is currently receiving monthly distributions. No equitable 
factors figure into the court's § 523(a)(15)(A) analysis. Balancing of equities 
under § 523(a)(15)(B) requires the court to "conduct a comparison of the 
relative fmancial conditions of the parties, while also keeping in mind the 
totality of each party's circumstances." Plaintiff with $500 surplus each month 
is in much better position to repay $6,800 indebtedness.) 
Adie v. Adie (In re Adiel, 197 B.R. 8 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1996) ("court cannot 
determine fmally the ability to pay and/or ultimate detriment and benefit 
without knowing what the state court will do in [] scheduled hearings to 
consider adjusting the marital obligations of these parties[]" due to the changed 
circumstances of bankruptcy.) 
Bodily v. Morris (In re Morris), 193 B.R. 949 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) 
(standard for determining debtor's ability to pay is § 1325(b)(2) not 
§ 523(a)(8), as the former standard "permits the Court to consider reasonably 
projectable future events known at the time of trial. Under this standard, the 
court must also evaluate whether the debtor's expenses are reasonably 
necessary for support." A fmding that debtor has the ability to paY,however, 
is not determinative of the balance of harms. "[F]orcing the Debtor to pay the 
equalizing debt [may] nickel[] and dime[] the Debtor and jeopardize[] 
[debtor's] relationship with his children. While preservation of the Debtor's 
relationship with his children may not be considered under §§ 523(a)(15)(A), 
the Court gives significant weight to this factor under § 523(a)(15)(B). This 
factor tips the scale in favor of discharging the debt where the Court also fmds 
the Plaintiff is hopelessly in debt."); Samayoa v. Jodoin (In re Jodoin), 196 
B.R. 845 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1996) (a modified version of the disposable income 
test is the appropriate standard to evaluate ability to pay. The test must be 
modified "so that 'disposable income' may be considered with an indefmite 
horizon in mind, instead of the three years that apply in chapter 13." Further, 
the ability to pay standard should not be limited to fmancial factors; the courts 
should be afforded wide latitude to consider subjective and nonfmancial_ 1 
factors. This latitude is required to allow the court to respond, when necessary, ~ 
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where a spouse refuses to work or intentionally impairs his or her ability to 
eam an income. In this regard, the standard resembles the test applied in undue 
hardship cases under § 523(a)(8). "[D]ebtor's ability to pay is no more than 
one factor to consider in what amounts to a 'totality of circumstances' standard 
for the balancing under § 523(a)(15)(B)"). 
Craig v. Craig (In re Craig), 196 B.R. 305 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996) (court 
looked to the disposable income test for guidance). 
Anthony v. Anthony (In re Anthony), 190 B.R. 433 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) 
("Ability to pay," under subsection (A), may be assessed by reference to 
§ 1325(b)(2) (disposable income), § 707(b) (substantial abuse of bankruptcy 
process), and § 523(a)(8) (undue hardship discharge ofa student loan). Section 
523(a)(15)(B) requires debtor to establish that the hardship to the debtor from 
a fmding of nondischargeability would exceed the hardship on the nondebtor 
if the debt were discharged. Debtor had ability to pay the hold harmless debt 
on the former couple's modular home. A modest inheritance received by the 
nondebtor after debtor's discharge did not shift the balance ofharm in debtor's 
favor. To fmd that the nondebtor would be harmed less by a determination of 
nondischargeability because she could use her inheritance to pay the 
indebtedness, might be legally correct but not equitably correct -- "an ironic 
circumstance for a court of equity."); 190 B.R. 429 (on debtor's motion to alter 
or amend, it was not the nondebtor's burden to prove that the "Debtor should 
pay the debt." "Absent a clear and unambiguous mandate from Congress, the 
Court is unwilling to interpret Section 523(a)(15)(B) in a manner that would 
diminish [nondebtor's] nest egg, afforded to her through the foresight of her 
grandmother. Such an interpretation would cause her detrimental 
consequences that would outweigh the benefit to [debtor] if he is allowed to 
discharge the debt."); McGinnis v. McGinnis (In re McGinnis), 194 B.R. 917 
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996) ("the Court's 'inquiry in this matter is not controlled 
by [a] mere 'snapshot' of the debtor's financial strength as ofa single moment 
in time.' . .. [The] Court will not restrict its review of the Debtor's fmancial 
condition as of some historical point in time, but instead will examine the 
Debtor's current and future circumstances.") 
Dressler y. Dressler (In re Dressler), 194 B.R. 290 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1996) 
(section 1325(b)(2),s disposable income standard is the appropriate test to 
determine ability to pay under § 523(a)(15)). 
SloverY. Slover (In re Slover), 191 B.R. 886 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1996) (court 
may consider income the debtor is capable of earning under § 523(a)(15)(A)). 
Income or property of debtor 
Christison v. Christison (In re Christison), 201 B.R. 298 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
1996) ("Under Section 523(a)(15)(A), income of the debtor's current spouse 
is irrelevant to debtor's ability to pay .... However, the current spouse's 
income may be considered in relation to any reasonably necessary expenses 
incurred for debtor's own support -- particularly those incurred jointly or since 
the date of the marriage."); Carter v. Carter (In re Carter), 189 B.R. 521 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 1995) (section 523(a)(15) restricts ability to pay inquiry to the 
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debtor's income; income of a new spouse not considered); Willey v. Willey (In 
re Willey), 198 B.R. 1007 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996) (debtor's girlfriend's income 
not included in balancing under § 523(a)(15) (B)); Phillips v. Phillips (In re 
Phillips), 187 B.R. 363, 369 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (value of property of 
estate not relevant). . 
Beasley v. Adams (In re Adams), 200 B.R. 630 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (court may 
consider new spouse's income under § 523(a)(15)(A) because "courts cannot 
detennine how much of a debtor's own income is truly 'necessary' for his and 
his dependent's support without inquiring into whether or not, and how much, 
his new spouse is contributing to the family's maintenance." Language of 
§ 523(a)(15) in nearly identical to § 1325(b)(2), and debtor's spouse's income 
is taken into account to detennine "disposable. income."); Gantz v. Gantz (In 
re Gantz), 192 B.R. 937 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1996) (section 523(a)(15)(A) 
"'restricts the detennination of the ability to pay solely to the income of the 
debtor.' ... Section 523(a)(15)(B), however, requires the Court to measure and 
weigh a 'benefit' to one party, as opposed to the 'detrimental consequences' to 
the other party .... Thus, the extent to which a spouse's contributions or 
expenses impact on the debtor should be relevant in balancing the equities.") 
Cleveland v. Cleveland (In re Cleveland), 198 B.R. 394 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
1996) ("when supplemental income from a new spouse or live-in companion 
serves to alter the debtor's fmancial prospects, the Court must factor that 
consideration into its evaluation of his 'ability to pay.''') 
Samayoa v. Jodoin (In re Jodoin), 196 B.R. 845 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1996) ("the 
total income and assets of the plaintiff and her new spouse are relevant, as are 
the total income and assets of the debtor and his new spouse"). 
Celani v. Celani (In re Celani), 194 B.R. 719 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996) ("Where 
the debtor and/or the debtor's former spouse have remarried, the financial 
circumstances of the new spouses logically and sensibly should be included in 
the balancing test set forth in § 523(a)(15)(B).") 
In re Smither, 194 B.R. 102 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996) (where the debtor has 
remarried prior to trial, the income of the new spouse should be included in any 
calculation of the debtor's disposable income). 
Woodworth v. Woodworth (In re Woodworth), 187 B.R. 174, 177 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 1995) ("income or property of the debtor" in § 523[(a)](15)(A) means 
debtor's exempt property and postpetition income; "reasonably necessary 
for . . . maintenance and support" permits consideration of assistance or 
property from friends or relatives. Statute does not permit consideration of fact 
that discharging debts will result in non-debtor spouse having to pay debts from 
funds reasonably necessary for her support. As stated in legislative history, one 
factor favoring debtor is that spouse probably judgment-proof.) But see Craig 
v. Craig (In re Craig), 196 B.R. 305 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996) (detriment to 
former spouse off set by her own chapter 7 filing). 
Sloverv. SloverCIn re Slover), 191 B.R. 886 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1996) (court 





Greenwalt v. Greenwalt (In re GreenwalQ, 200 B.R. 909 (Bankr. W.O. Wash. 
1996) ("[A] partial discharge is justified by § 523(a)(15), but not by analogy 
to § 523(a)(8). Section 523(a)(15) itself speaks to the dischargeability of 'such 
debt,' suggesting that the court may review each liability separately .... [T]he 
liability to the former spouse is comprised of the various underlying 
obligations, and there is nothing to prevent the court from analyzing them 
separately.") 
McGinnis v. McGinnis an re McGinnis), 194 B.R. 917 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 
1996) ("all or nothing" approach is not mandated by the language of 
§ 523(a)(15». 
Inre Smither, 194 B.R. 102 (Bankr. W.O. Ky. 1996)("courts may grant partial 
discharges." Debtor has ability to pay if he can pay "all or a material 
part ... within a reasonable amount of time.") 
Comisky v. Comisky (In re Comisky), 183 B.R. 883 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1995) 
(§ 523[(a)](15)(A) permits court to fashion equitable relief when to hold entire 
debt either dischargeable or nondischargeable would be inequitably harsh on 
one party. Court found support for this approach in § 523(a)(8) cases where 
courts have excepted from discharge a portion of a debtor's student loans on 
grounds of undue hardship. Here, debtor owed former spouse $25,000 on 
property settlement. Court discharged $15,000 and ordered debtor to pay $200 
per month toward balance.) 
Silvers v. Silvers (In re Silvers), 187 B.R. 648, 649 (Bankr. W.O. Mo. 1995) 
(probably cannot apportion). 
Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 184 B.R. 750 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (appears to reject 
apportionment). 
In general 
Macy v. Macy (In re Ma~), 114 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1997) (enactment of 
§ 523( a)( 15) in 1994 did not affect nondischargeability of attorneys' fees under 
§ 523(a)(5). "[A]ttorneys' fees continue to be governed by section 523(a)(5). 
There is a strong policy interest in protecting ex-spouses and children from the 
loss of alimony, support and maintenance owed by a debtor who has flled 
bankruptcy .... Congress sought to apply section 523(a)(I5) to debts that had 
previously been construed as property obligations .... There is no indication 
that Congress intended to affect the liberal interpretation of section 523(a)(5). 
It follows, then, that Congress did not intend to apply section 523(a)(15) to 
debts that were, prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act, considered to be 
nondischargeable under section 523(a)(5)." The plaintiff's action under 
§§ 523(a)(5) and 523(a)(I5) was filed beyond the 60-day period for complaints 
under § 523(a)(I5). Debt was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5), thus 






Zimmerman v. Soderlund (In re Soderlund), 197 B.R. 742 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
1996) (stranger to divorce proceeding can maintain action under § 523(a)(15). 
Debtor's divorce lawyers could seek determination of non discharge ability of bt 
legal fees related to divorce and child custody proceedings.) But see Barstow ~ 
v. Finaly (In re Finaly), 190 B.R. 313 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995) (section 
S23(a)(15) applies only to debts owed to a former spouse). 
Dressler v. Dressler (In re Dressler), 194 B.R. 290 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1996) ("If a 
debtor has agreed to assume a credit card obligation and hold his or her ex-
spouse harmless, it is only the hold harmless obligation that may escape 
discharge. The debtor's obligation to the credit card company 0 0 • will be 
wiped out.") 
Christison v. Christison (In re Christison), 201 B.R. 298 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
1996) (debtor's argument under § 523(a)(15)(B) that former spouse could 
avoid consequences of a discharge of debts assigned to debtor under property 
settlement agreement by merely filing bankruptcy herself "cavalierly ignores 
questions of whether the creditor spouse is eligible to file a bankruptcy case or 
is entitled to receive a discharge under Section 727 or discharge debts under 
Section 523 .. " In addition, many individuals today continue to consider 
bankruptcy as antithetical solution to oppressive debt, and courts should not be 
in the business of forcing inilocent parties into bankruptcy because they regard 
that as the lesser evil under Section 523(a)(15). Neither should one spouse be 
able to force a non-filing creditor spouse into bankruptcy by using the 
exception contained in Section 523(a)(15) .... Rather, the balancing test set 
forth in Section 523(a)(15)(B) requires a court to examine the harm and 
benefits caused to the parties in their existing situations." A potential 
bankruptcy filing by the non-debtor is not relevant.); Schmitt v. Eubanks (In 
re Eubanks), 197 B.R. 312 (Bankr. WoD. Ark. 1996) (under the balancing 
prong of § 523(a)(15) court "rejects any notion that the non-debtor should 
resolve his situation by filing bankruptcy himself. . .. Rather, the implication 
that a non-debtor would need to file bankruptcy because of another debt 
militates in his favor because it is a detriment to his fmancial status and credit 
rating."); Craig v. Craig (In re Craig), 196 B.Ro 305 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996) 
(detriment to former spouse off set by her own chapter 7 filing). 
Beasley v. Adams (In re Adams), 200 B.R. 630 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (amendment 
allowed to add § 523(a)(15) cause of action to complaint asserting only 
§ 523(a)(5) because both actions arise out of the same transaction, i.e., the 
settlement agreement or the divorce decree. "Sections 523(a)(5) and (a)(15) 
are, 0 • 0 , 'merely alternate theories for an objecting ex-spouse to establish a 
debt as nondischargeable.' 0 •• Which of these alternate theories applies 
depends upon whether the debt is in the nature of alimony, maintenance or 
support; or in the nature of a property settlement. This is a factual 
determination that the bankruptcy judge must make no matter whether Section 
(a)(5), Section (a)(15) or both are at issue, and no matter what language was 
used in the agreement or divorce decree since 'even an obligation designated 
as property settlement may be related to support because State courts often will 
adjust alimony awards depending on the nature and amount of marital assets 
available for distribution. "'); Samayoa v. Jodoin (In re Jodoin), 196 B.R. 845 
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1996) (that complaint raised only § 523(a)(15) did not 
D -106 
preclude the court from reaching a detennination of nondischargeability under 
§ 523(a)(5). Section 523(a)(5) is at issue in every § 523(a)(15) case. Further, 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) allows for the amendment of the pleadings to conform to 
the evidence -- the § 523(a)(5) issue was tried by implied consent of the parties. 
Finally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c) obliged the court to award plaintiff the relief to 
which she was entitled under the evidence adduced at trial provided the relief 
is within the court's jurisdiction and authority.) 
Macy v. Macy (In re Macy), 200 B.R. 467 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) 
(§ 523(a)(15) is not necessarily the appropriate section under which to consider 
awards of attorneys' fees. Section 523(a)(15) did not supplant traditional 
analysis under § 523(a)(5). "[A]ttorneys' fees 'should follow the classification 
of the primary obligation. ') 
Compare Schmitt v. Eubanks (In re Eubanks), 197 B.R. 312 (Bankr. W.D. 
Ark. 1996) (absence of hold harmless provision in divorce decree or settlement 
agreement is not fatal to action under § 523(a)(15). The "ordered" language 
in the decree created an obligation to comply with the decree, sufficient to 
bring debts within dischargeability provision. Further, at the time the decree 
was entered, the debtor was obligated to indemnify her former husband.); 
Johnston v. Henson (In re Henson), 197 B.R. 299 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1996) 
(accord); with, Stegall v. Stegall (In re StegaIl), 188 B.R. 597 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mo. 1995) (property settlement agreement providing that debtor would pay a 
liability that the former couple was jointly liable for did not bring the debt 
within § 523(a)(15). There was no debt "incurred" under the property 
settlement agreement-the property settlement agreement did not create a debt 
that otherwise did not exist.) 
M. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(I6) (as amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. 
L. No. 103-394, § 309, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994»: 
for a fee or assessment that becomes due and payable after the 
order for relief to a membership association with respect to the 
debtor's interest in a dwelling unit that has condominium 
ownership or in a share of cooperative housing corporation, but 
only if such fee or assessment is payable for a period during 
which-
(A) the debtor physically occupied a 
dwelling unit in the condominium or cooperative 
project; or 
(B) the debtorrented the dwelling unitto 
a tenant and received payments from the tenant for 
such period, but nothing in this paragraph shall 
except from discharge the debt of a debtor for a 
membership association fee or assessment for a 
period arising before entry of the order for relief in 
a pending or subsequent bankruptcy case. 
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Affeldt v. Westbrooke Condominium Ass'n (In re Affeldt), 60 F.3d 1292 (8th Cir. 
1995) (under pre-1994 law, condominium association failed to prove whether 
assessments were pre- or postpetition claims. If condominium assessments accrued 
prepetition, they were discharged; if they accrued postpetition, they were not 
discharged. This question turned on whether the assessments contained in the 
Condominium Declaration were "more akin to a contract or to a covenant running 
with the land." Court of appeals could not make this determination because 
condominium association -failed to introduce into -evidence the Condominium 
Declaration or any other condominium agreement. Debtor won on burden of proof.) 
In re Whitten, 192 B.R. 10 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) (post discharge condominium fees 
not discharged. Debtor's obligation to pay fees is a covenant that runs with the land 
and is not dischargeable.) 
N. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(17) (as amended by Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and 
Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996»: 
for a fee imposed by a court for the filing of a case, motion, complaint, 
or appeal, or for other costs and expenses assessed with respect to such 
filing, regardless of an assertion of poverty by the debtor under section 
1915(b) or (f) of title 28, or the debtor's status as a prisoner, as defmed 
in section 1915(h) of title 28. 
0.· 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(18) (as amended by the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 374, 110 Stat. 2105, 
2255 (1996»: 
(18) owed under State law to a State or municipality that is-
(A) in the nature of support, and 
(B) enforceable under part D of title IV of the Social Security 
Act (42 U.S.C. 601 et seq.). 
A companion amendment changed 42 U.S.C. § 656(b) to read: 
. NONDISCHARGEABILITY.-A debt (as defined in section 101 of title 
11 of the United States Code) owed under State law to a State (as 
defined in such section) or municipality (as defined in such section) that 
is in the nature of support and that is enforceable under this part is not 
released by a DISCHARGE in BANKRUPTCY under title 11 of the 
United States Code. 
P. 18 U.S.C. § 3613(e) and (f) (as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 207(c), 110 Stat. 1214, 1238 (1996». 
DISCHARGE OF DEBT INAPPLICABLE.--No discharge of debts in 
a proceeding pursuant to any chapter of title 11, United States Code, 
shall discharge liability to pay a fme pursuant to this section, and a lien 




APPLICABILITY TO ORDER OF RESTITUTION.--In accordance 
with section 3664(m)(1)(A) of this title, all provisions of this section are 
available to the United States for the enforcement of an order of 
restitution. 
LITIGATION OF COMPLAINTS TO BAR DISCHARGE: 11 U.S.c. § 727 
A. In general 
United States v. Cluck, 87 F.3d 138 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (successful action to 
revoke discharge for fraud did not preclude bankruptcy fraud prosecution under 18 
U.S.C. § 152. Later action did not violate Double Jeopardy Clause because debtor was 
not entitled to discharge and revocation of discharge did not constitute punishment.) 
B. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2): 
" ... with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud ... has transferred, removed, destroyed, 
mutilated, or concealed ... (A) property of the debtor, ... (B) property of the 
estate, .... " 
Hughes v. Lawson (In re Lawson), 1997 WL 469694 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1997) 
(adopting the doctrine of "continuing concealment," recording $350,000 deed of trust 
on debtor's residence in favor of debtor's mother on the same day state court jury 
awarded $750,000 malpractice judgment against the debtor, though more than a year 
before the Chapter 7 petition, satisfies § 727(a)(2) because the bankruptcy court could 
permissibly infer that the debtor "retained a secret property interest." Proof of this 
"secret benefit" was found in the debtor's continued use of the residence and that the 
mother's deed of trust was later subordinated to a $175,000 loan to the debtor.) 
Gullickson v. Brown (In re Brown), 108 F.3d 1290, 1293-94 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(debtor's transfer of security interest in antique car collection four days prior to 
bankruptcy did not violate § 727(a)(2)(A) because money received was used as capital 
for his business and was not "squandered." "In this case, the corporations of which 
Brown was a fifty percent owner required a cash infusion to pay attorneys and 
suppliers. The granting of a security interest in his only unencumbered asset in order 
to obtain much needed capital for his businesses, which were his sole source of 
income, does not evince fraud .... There was no evidence that the money was not 
reasonably used or that it was squandered. Indicia of fraud are totally 
lacking .... Brown's mere possession of the vehicles does not constitute evidence of 
fraudulent intent. Although some inference of fraudulent intent might be drawn from 
the fact that Brown's car collection became exempt due to this transaction, such an 
inference is de minimis at best." Differences in the value of assets by the debtor on 
fmancial statements prior to bankruptcy was explained as "puffery." "Though we do 
no condone such behavior, it does explain the disparity and no creditor is now 
claiming harm from this behavior .... [T]he inference of fraud does not flow from the 
facial discrepancy in the fmancial statement and bankruptcy schedule values absent 
other evidence. . . . As to the failure to list the automobile on the bankruptcy 
schedules, it is undisputed that the debtor raised the omission of the automobile at the 
§ 341 creditors' meeting. Although Brown should have amended his bankruptcy 
schedules to correct the error, we believe as a matter of law that no inference of 
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fraudulent intent can be drawn from an omission when the debtor promptly brings it 
to the court's or trustee's attention absent other evidence of fraud.") 
Martin v. Bajgar (In re Bajgar), 104 F.3d 495,497-501 (1st Cir. 1997) (reconveyance 
of property from wife to debtor four months after voluntary petition does not cure an 
admittedly fraudulent prepetition conveyance for purposes of § 727(a)(2)(A). 
Distinguishing Adeeb, 787 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1986), "Limiting the defInition of 
'transferred' to 'transferred and remained transferred,' in fact, would contradict the 
drafters' intent. ... In this case, ... Bajgar did not reveal his initial fraudulent transfer 
until he flIed his bankruptcy petition. In addition, Bajgar consulted with an 
experienced bankruptcy attorney at the time he executed the initial fraudulent transfer. 
It was not until he faced the prospect of being denied discharge pursuant to Section 
727(a)(2)(A) that Bajgar actually reconveyed the property.") 
Kestell v. Kestell (In re Kestell), 99 F.3d 146 (4th Cir. 1996) (affmns bankruptcy 
court's denial of discharge under § 727(a)(2)(B) then dismisses bankrupatcy case 
altogether. Bankruptcy court denied debtor's discharge for fraudulent concealment 
under § 727(a)(2)(B). Debtor concealed over $33,000 in accrued sick leave paid 
postpetition, and an income tax reimbursement of $13,000. The Fourth Circuit 
"affIrmed" but then seems to confuse the concepts of discharge and dismissal, 
concluding that "[a]lthough the bankruptcy court addressed this case under the 
fraudulent concealment of section 727(a)(2), we think this petition is more 
appropriately dismissed under sections 707(b) and 105(a)." Debtor testifIed at his 
meeting of creditors that he intended to reaffIrm all debts except the debt to his former 
spouse.) 
Equitable Bank v. Miller (In re Miller), 39 F.3d 301 (11th Cir. 1994) (that the "totality 
of the circumstances" surrounding a transfer were "highly suspect" did not justify 
district court's reversal of bankruptcy court's factual determination that debtors lacked 
requisite intent to hinder, delay or defraud under § 727(a)(2). Debtors' explanation 
of discrepancies in valuation of transferred assets was "plausible."· That debtors' 
"estimated values [were] at odds with other viable estimates ... is not dispositive 
evidence that [debtors] acted with fraudulent intent.") 
Barclays/American Business Credit. Inc. v. Adams (In re Adams), 31 F.3d 389 (6th 
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 115 S. Ct. 903, 130 L. Ed.2d 786 (1995) 
(property of the debtor for purposes of § 727(a)(2)(A) includes accounts receivable 
of corporation wholly-owned by individual debtor. Cites § 727(a)(7) in support of this 
proposition, because corporation was debtor in separate case.) 
Perdue v. Cantrell (In re Cantrell), 88 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 1996) (bankruptcy court 
properly dismissed complaint under §§ 523(a)(2) and 727(a)(2)(A) because statute of 
limitations had run prior to state court complaint, thus plaintiff had no prosecutable 
claim in the bankruptcy case). 
Bernard v. Sheaffer (In re Bernard), 96 F.3d 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (discharge properly 
denied based on "transfer" of money from debtor's bank account to personal safe. 
Within three weeks of service of a request for a protective order in state court 
litigation, debtors withdrew approximately $64,000 from money market and demand 
accounts. Debtor testifIed that "he had cashed out his [money market] account 
because an attorney had advised him to do so to evade attachment." He stacked the 
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cash in a safe in his home and later used it for a vacation during which he incurred 
substantial gambling losses. The Ninth Circuit held that debtors had transferred 
property with intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors. The debtors argued that the 
withdrawals were not "transfers" within the scope of § 727(a)(2). Rather, "they 
claim[ ed] they merely moved their assets from one of their own pockets to another --
they had not 'transferred' anything to anyone." The court rejected this argument 
under two theories. First, "'lack of injury to creditors is irrelevant for purposes of 
denying a discharge in bankruptcy.'" Second, "transfer" is defmed broadly under the 
Code. "If... depositing money into a bank account is a transfer, then later 
withdrawing money from that account should be a transfer, too -- it ought to be a two-
way street. ... [Moreover, the debtors] did not own money gathering dust in their 
bank accounts. 'As between the bank and the depositor such money becomes the 
property of the bank and the bank becomes the debtor of the depositor for the amount 
deposited.' . .. Instead of owning money sitting in their accounts, [debtors] owned 
claims against their bank. When they withdrew from their accounts, they exchanged 
debt for money. . .. [W]hen [debtors] made their withdrawals they parted with 
property, satisfying the Code's defmition of transfer."); Finalco. Inc. v. Roosevelt (In 
re Roosevelt), 87 F.3d 311 (9th Cir. 1996) (the question of when a transfer is "made" 
for § 727(a)(2) purposes is one of federal law. As between the "BFP rule," under 
which a transfer is not "made" for § 727(a)(2) purpose until the instrument of transfer 
is recorded, and the "party rule," under which a transfer is "made" for § 727(a)(2) 
purposes on the date the agreement between the parties is executed, the "party rule," 
is "more consistent with the purposes animating § 727(a)(2) [which focuses on the 
debtor's wrongdoing]."); Lawson v. Hughes (In re Lawson), 193 B.R. 520 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 1996) (for purposes of § 727(a)(2), the "question of continuing concealment, .. 
. , is based not on timing, but on the reality of the transfer between the parties .... 
[T]he debtor can conceal assets by transferring them to a cooperative creditor so long 
as the transfer allows the debtor to retain a secret benefit.") 
Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy), 201 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1996) ("Mere failure to volunteer information to a creditor is insufficient, ... , to 
constitute concealment." While debtor may have no duty to speak, "once [debtor] 
opened his mouth to set forth the facts, he thereby gave life to a duty to tell the truth." 
Misrepresentations in the course of settlement discussions with a creditor that assets 
had been used for cancer treatments when assets had really been transferred to off-
shore trust are actionable.) 
C. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3): 
" ... has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, or failed to keep' or preserve any 
recorded information, ... unless ... justified under all of the circumstances of the 
case." 
Gullickson v. Brown (In re Brown), 108 F.3d 1290, 1295 (10th Cir. 1997) (failure to 
keep records with respect to car collection was not a bar to discharge under 
§ 727(a)(3) because "the car collection was a hobby, not a business entered into for 
profit, and cash sales in this hobby were commonplace. Thus, the district court found 
that any failure to keep records was justified on the facts of the case. We agree.") 
In re Juzwiak, 89 F.3d 424 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Section 727(a)(3) requires as a 
precondition to discharge that debtors produce records which provide creditors with 
D -111 
enough infonnation to ascertain the debtor's fmancial condition and track his fmancial 
dealings with substantial completeness and accuracy for a reasonable period past to 
present. ... The provision ensures that trustees and creditors will receive sufficient 
information to enable them to trace the debtor's fmancial history; to ascertain the 
debtor's fmancial condition; and to reconstruct the debtor's fmancial transactions .... 
Records need not be kept in any special manner, nor is there any rigid standard of 
perfection in record-keeping mandated by § 727(a)(3) .... On the other hand, courts 
and creditors should not be required to speculate as to the fmancial history or 
condition of the debtor, nor should they be compelled to reconstruct the debtor's 
affairs." While the ultimate goal of § 727(a)(3) is to distinguish the honest from the 
dishonest debtor, "creditors need not prove that the debtor intended to defraud them 
in order to demonstrate a § 727(a)(3) violation." "The records furnished by [debtor] 
--checking account ledgers, canceled checks, bank statements, and a 1993 income tax 
return--do not enable [the creditor] to reconstruct [debtor's] grain sale transactions or 
to track his fmancial dealings for any period of time with any degree of completeness 
or accuracy." Where debtor "engaged in a steady stream oflarge scale transactions 
involving substantial sums of money," small scale bookkeeping was unacceptable. 
Debtor's method of bookkeeping placed the burden on the creditor to organize and 
reconstruct the debtor's business affairs. Section 727(a)(3), however, makes it the 
debtor's responsibility to "maintain and retain comprehensible records." Creditors are 
entitled to written documentation with regard to important business information--a 
debtor's testimony is not sufficient.) 
Cox v. Lansdowne (In re Cox), 904 F.2d 1399 (9th Cir. 1990) (court should consider 
whether one spouse's reliance on the other justifies a failure to keep records when a 
married couple shares the duty to maintain records.); Lansdowne v. Cox (In re Cox), 
41 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1994) (on remand, bankruptcy court found debtor's reliance 
on her husband unreasonable and denied her discharge under § 727(a)(3). Ninth 
Circuit reversed (again). Conduct the bankruptcy court viewed as a "self-imposed 
curtain of ignorance," the Circuit found "entirely consistent with '[debtor's] general 
reliance on [her spouse] to handle all business matters. '" Where there are no warning 
signals that recordkeeper is delinquent, the court must measure whether the reliance 
is objectively reasonable under the totality of circumstances.). 
D. 11 U.S.c. § 727(a)(4): 
" ... knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the case -- (A) made a false 
oath or account, ... " 
Gullickson v. Brown (In re Brown), 108 F.3d 1290, 1294 (10th Cir. 1997) (that the 
debtor came forward with evidence of an omitted car at the meeting of creditors is 
"strong evidence that there was no fraudulent intent in the omission." Although the 
debtor did not amend his schedules to reflect the omitted vehicle, "he did rectify the 
omission very early in the process and of his own accord. ") 
Desmond v. Varrasso (In re Varrasso), 37 F.3d 760 (1st Cir. 1994) (admitted omission 
from schedules of two assets of relatively small value was not sufficient grounds to 
grant summary judgment to trustee on discharge complaint. Debtors rectified 
omissions at § 341 meeting when questions refreshed debtors' recollection. The facts 
were consistent with either an inference of deliberateness or an inference of 
carelessness. "[T]he undisputed facts require a choice between competing inferences, 
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and since both inferences are plausible, the choice cannot be made under the banner 
of summary judgment. ") 
Garcia v. Coombs (In re Coombs), 193 B.R. 557 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) ("an 
essential element under § 727(a)(4)(A) is that debtor acted with an actual intent to 
defraud. . .. [T]here must be specific facts or circumstances which point toward 
fraud .... Neither sloppiness nor an absence of effort by the debtor supports, by itself, 
an inference of fraud. Courts which hold otherwise are simply devising a court-made 
prophylactic rule that the debtor must make substantial effort to provide accurate and 
complete schedules. . .. The essential point is that there must be something about 
adduced facts and circumstances which suggest that the debtor intended to defraud 
creditors or the estate. For instance, multiple omissions of material assets or 
information may well support an inference of fraud if the nature of the assets or 
transactions suggest that the debtor was aware of them at the time of preparing the 
schedules and that there was something about the assets or transactions which, because 
of their size or nature, a debtor might want to conceal." Omissions of money, 
accounts, pension and security deposit either were immateral, weren't property of 
estate or simply didn't indicate intent to hurt anyone.) 
Garcia v. Garcia (In re Garcia), 168 B.R. 403 (D. Ariz. 1994) (creditor can challenge 
homestead exemption under § 727(a)(4)(A) as a false oath or account, notwithstanding 
failure to timely object to exemptions under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(b)). 
Behrman Chiropractic Clinics Inc. v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 189 B.R. 985 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ala. 1995) (debtor's failure to account for medical equipment and transfer of x-
ray machine warrant denial of discharge. "The purpose of the false oath exception is 
not to punish debtors for mere inadvertence, but, rather to insure that adequate 
information is available to the trustee and all interested parties." What is adequate is 
not for the debtor to decide, rather, all property related to the debtor's business 
transactions and estate and all information concerning the discovery of assets, disposal 
of assets and business dealings must be disclosed without regard to the potential 
monetary benefit to the estate such property or information might yield.); Wade v. 
Wade (In re Wade), 189 B.R. 522 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (value of omitted assets 
may be considered to ascertain whether debtor defendant had intent or motivation to 
deceive and to assess materiality of omissions). 
Phillips v. Phillips (In re Phillips), 187 B.R. 363, 369 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) 
(collateral estoppel applies in § 727(a)(4)(A) action. Debtor estopped from claiming 
"book value" for stock schedules because in prior divorce, state court rejected debtor's 
lower valuation and made specific fmding regarding value.) 
E. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(5): 
" ... failed to explain satisfactorily, any loss of assets or deficiency of assets .... " 
In re D'Agnese, 86 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 1996) (Section 727(a)(5) "requires a 
satisfactory explanation for the whereabouts of a debtor's assets .... [AJ satisfactory 
explanation 'must consist of more than ... vague, indefmite and uncorroborated' 
assertions by the debtor." Bankruptcy court did not error in concluding that debtor 
failed to "specifically provide an explanation from which the court could determine 
how she disposed of the assets.") 
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Hawley v. Cement Indus. (In re Hawley), 51 F.3d 246 (11th Cir. 1995) (Section 
727(a)(5) does not require a creditor to "call upon a debtor to explain a loss of assets 
prior to filing an adversary proceeding. A denial of discharge under § 727(a)(5) 
requires only that the debtor fail to explain a loss of assets 'before determination of 
denial of discharge under this paragraph.' ... 'To be satisfactory, an explanation [of 
lost or diminished assets] must convince the judge.'" Debtor's signed fmancial 
statement dated June 15, 1989 listed assets of $l3,822,477. The Chapter 7 schedules 
filed in September, 1990 'showed less than $20,000 in assets. The debtor, a 
"sophisticated and experienced businessman" said he sold most ofhis assets "for cash" 
and did not keep records of the sales.) 
Mozeika y. Townsley (In re Townsley), 195 B.R. 54 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1996) (the 
initial burden of identifying (lost) assets rests with the plaintiff. "The simple showing 
of some amount of gross receipts by one who operated a business at a point ranging 
from a year to several months prior to his bankruptcy does not discharge the original 
burden of establishing the existence of assets.") 
Straub v. Straub (In re Straub), 192 B.R. 522 (Bankr' D.N.D. 1996) ("A cause of 
action advanced under § 727(a)(5) is not a substitute for one based upon alleged pre-
petition fraud, conversion or other malfeasance. Rather, its purpose is to deny a 
discharge to a debtor who refuses to cooperate with the trustee or creditors in their 
effort to trace property that should have been part of the estate." Plaintiff could not 
use § 727(a)(5) as grounds to deny debtor's discharge for alleged fraudulent 
conveyances ten, eight and six years before petition.) 
F. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(7): 
". .. the debtor has committed any act specified in [§§ 727(a)(2), (3), (4), (5) or 
(6)] ... within one year ... concerning an insider .... " 
In re Kreh1, 86 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 1996) (the defmition of "insider" in § 101(31) is 
illustrative only. "[T]he term also encompasses anyone with 'a sufficiently close 
relationship with the debtor that his conduct is made subject to closer scrutiny than 
those dealing at arm's length with the debtor.'" Debtor's insider status was not 
defeated by his resignation as an officer and director of a corporate entity in which he 
was the sole shareholder. "If insider status could automatically be shed through the 
largely ministerial act of resignation [section 727(a)(7) would become toothless]." 
"Access to inside information can be sufficient to confer insider status even where 
there is no legal right or ability to exercise control over a corporate entity.") 
IV. REVOCATION OF DISCHARGE: 11 U.S.C. § 727(d). (e) 
Barrv. Barr (In re Barr), 188 B.R. 565 (Bankr. N.D. ill. 1995) (complaint to revoke discharge 
sufficient to escape a motion to dismiss where plaintiffs offered the court's prior opinion in 
a dischargeability action that found debtors to have engaged in misconduct actionable under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). Plaintiff need only plead the identity of the person who made the 
alleged misrepresentation, the time, the place, the content of the misrepresentation, and the 
method by which the representation was communicated to plaintiff.) 
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Roost v. Reynolds (In re Reynolds), 189 B.R. 199 (Bankr. D. Or. 1995) ("The very wording 
of § 727 prevents application of the doctrine of equitable tolling. Note that an interested 
party may bring an action to revoke discharge only if ' ... the requesting party did not know 
of such fraud until after the granting of such discharge;' .... Yet, § 727(e)(I) requires that 
revocation of discharge be requested '. .. within one year after such discharge is granted;' 
if the doctrine of equitable tolling were to be applied, the one year period prescribed in 
§ 727 ( e)( 1) would not begin until the fraud were discovered by the requesting party. Yet the 
statute clearly indicates that the one year period of time begins to run upon entry of the 
discharge at a time, when, by its tenns, the requesting party is ignorant of the fraud .... [T]he 
doctrine of equitable tolling is fundamentally inconsistent with the provisions of § 727(d)(I) 
and § 727(e)(I)."); Davis v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 187 B.R. 984 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1995) 
(equitable tolling does not extend statute oflirnitation in § 727(e). Where case had been 
closed after entry of discharge and reopened within one year of closing, one year limitation 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is imperative for the practitioner to contemplate and understand the effect of bankruptcy 
in a potential divorce action. The failure to consider the impact of bankruptcy and divorce 
approaches malpractice. A determination of the rights and liabilities of the respective parties in 
a divorce proceeding may contain significant challenges. The diversity of the intent of the 
respective laws can certainly result in unanticipated outcomes, as the legal philosophy guiding 
each proceeding are quite diverse in nature. 
State court's governing divorce actions are consumed with the notion of balancing the 
assets, and liabilities of the parties and their children, while the bankruptcy court is concerned 
with providing the debtor a "fresh start." The dissolution of a marriage is greatly affected by 
bankruptcy. The intended rights of the parties by interactions of community property, tenancy 
by the entirety, often result in a devastatingly different result from those rights contemplated under 
the code. The practitioner in both community property states, and separate property states, must 
carefully consider the impact of the division of property, alimony, maintenance and the assets 
involved in the event that one of the parties files bankruptcy. 
The filing of any chapter proceeding triggers the automatic stay. 
I. THE AUTOMATIC STAY 
A. Stay Defined 
1. A temporary injunction prohibiting all creditors and other entities from 
attempting to collect a debt or obligation owed by the debtor, generally 
before the petition is filed. 
2. 11 U.S.C. §362 commands that all collection efforts should cease upon the 
filing of a voluntary or involuntary petition. 
B. Purpose 
1. To give the debtor a breathing spell from creditors and stop foreclosure 
action, collection efforts, creditor harassment, litigation including divorce 
proceedings. In re University Medical Center, 973 F.2d 1065, 1074 (3rd 
Cir. 1992). 
2. To prevent chaos upon the initiation of a case. 
C. Scope 
1. The stay becomes effective as soon as the petition is filed. 
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2. 
a. It is automatic and self executing; 
b. Notice is not required; 
c. Further proceedings are not necessary 
The stay protects against the pursuit of actions by ~ party, including: 
a. judicial, administrative or other proceedings against the debtor; 
b. enforcement of judgments; 
c. attempts to gain possession of or to exercise control over the estate; 
d. attempts to create, perfect or enforce liens against property of the 
estate; 
e. attempts to recover a claim against the debtor that arose pre-
petition; 
f. set offs; and 
g. the commencement or continuation of tax court proceedings. 
3. However, there are exceptions to these general rules. The stay does not 
operate against: 
a. the commencement or continuation of a criminal action or 
proceeding against the debtor; 
b. attempts to perfect, maintain or continue the perfection of an 
interest in property subject to the trustee's rights and powers and 
subject to the time provision of §547(e)(2)(A); 
c. an action or judgment obtained by the government in enforcing its 
policy or regulatory power; 
4. Duration 
a. 11 U.S.C. §362(c)(l) states that the stay of an act against property 
continues until such property is no longer property of the estate. 
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b. 11 U.S.C. §362(c)(2) states that the stay of any mb.er act continues 
until the earliest of: 
(1) the time the case is closed; 
(2) the time the case is dismissed; or 
(3) the time a discharge is granted or denied. 
D. Effect of the Automatic Stay in Divorce Proceedings 
1. The commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an automatic stay which 
prohibits the commencement or continuation of judicial proceeds that were 
commenced, or could have been commenced prior to the bankruptcy. 
2. As a result, divorce proceedings against the debtor are automatically stayed 
by the filing of the bankruptcy case. 
3. Since the automatic stay is generally not applicable to actions taken by the 
debtor, a divorce proceeding filed by the debtor is normally not stayed 
under Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
4. The specific statutory exception provided by Section 362(b)(2) of the 
Bankruptcy Code exempts from application of the automatic stay a 
proceeding for the collection of alimony, maintenance or support from 
property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate. 
5. Technically, even custody, adoption and visitation and domestic violence 
proceedings could be viewed as stayed but bankruptcy courts rarely 
interfere with such matters pending or filed in state courts. 
6. On the other hand, attempts by state courts to interfere with property rights 
of the bankruptcy estate will constitute a violation of the automatic stay. 
7. Relief from the automatic stay is routinely granted in the case of 
a. custody, 
b. domestic violence, or 
c. other matters in the state family court proceeding which are 
unrelated or remotely related to the bankruptcy case. 
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d. Relief is also usually granted to pursue current support payments. 
Exception to Stay after 1994 
1. 11 U.S.C. §362(b)(2) as amended, expands the exception and provides that 
the filing of a bankruptcy petition will not operate as a stay of: 
a. the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding for 
(1) the establishment of paternity, or 
(2) the establishment or modification of an order for alimony, 
maintenance or support, or 
(3) of the collection of alimony, maintenance or support from 
property that is not property of the estate 
F. Divorce Proceedings 
1. Conducted during the pendency of one of the parties I bankruptcy case will 
sometimes be bifurcated. 
a. Generally, the pendency of a bankruptcy case should not prevent 
dissolution of a marriage or the granting of child custody and 
support. 
2. The automatic stay may be modified thus allowing 
a. the grant of divorce 
b. a determination of child custody; while 
c. reserving property issues. See, In re Cunningham, 9 B.R. 70 
(Bankr. D. N.M. 1981), and In re Stamper, 17 B.R. 216 Bankr. 
(S.D. Ohio 1982). 
G. Stay Violation 
1. Modification of child support has been held to violate the stay. 
a. See, In re Stringer, 847 F.2d 549, 550 (9th Cir. 1988). 
2. Post-petition child support arrearage collection. 
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In re Price, 179 B.R. 209, 211-12 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1995) (distinguishing 
In re Pacana, 125 B.R. 19 (Bankr. App. 9th Cir. 1991) 
a. District attorney violated automatic stay by continuing wage 
assignment for the collection of child support arrearages after notice 
of filing of chapter 13 case, in which confirmed plan called for 
100% payment of child support arrearages. 
b. Although §1327(b) vests property of the estate in the debtor upon 
plan confirmation, unless the confirmation order or plan provides 
otherwise, the creditor in this case collected from the debtor's 
wages prior to plan confirmation. 
c. Since §362(b )(2) exception only allows for collection from non-
estate property, the creditor could not claim this exception from the 
stay for wages garnished prior to plan confirmation. 
d. The creditor is also barred from using §1327(b) to claim the 
§362(b )(2) exception for payments accepted subsequent to plan 
confirmation. 
e. The Trustee's order confirming debtor's plan specifically states that 
(1) "the property of the estate does not vest in the debtor upon 
confirmation of the plan. ' ... In the face of such language, it 
would appear that the property remains property of the 
estate until the case is closed, dismissed, or a discharge is 
granted or denied. ... Creditor has willfully violated the 
automatic stay by accepting payments from its wage 
assignment order after receiving notice of debtors' 
bankruptcy." Id. 
f. Because the district attorney did not file a proof of claim, sovereign 
immunity precluded monetary damages; however, declaratory and 
injunctive relief were allowed including an order that the district 
attorney cease accepting payments pursuant to its prepetition wage 
assignment. 
g. The court further determined that permitting the district attorney to 
.retain the funds already collected from the wage assignment was not 
prejudicial to the debtor or the bankruptcy estate because the plan 
called for payment in full of the prepetition child support arrearages 
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3. 
and the claim was non-dischargeable and continuing to accrue 
interest. 
Debolt v. Comerica Bank (In re Debolt), 177 B.R. 31, 40 (Bankr. W.D. 
Pa.1994) 
a. The trustee of an ERISA qualified pension plan did not violate the 
automatic stay by paying the debtor's ex-spouse benefits awarded 
in a prepetition divorce decree. 
b. However, pension trustee did violate the automatic stay by making 
payments of continuing support from the portion of the pension plan 
that remained property of the debtor and became property of the 
Chapter 13 estate. 
c. The pension trustee committed a willful violation, because it was 
notified of the bankruptcy case, but continued to make support 
payments from the debtor's portion of the pension fund. 
d. "Nonetheless, we will not award punitive damages on this occasion. 
e. Despite the technical violation of the stay, we find no evidence on 
this record of injury or actual damage to Debtor inasmuch as the 
support obligation is nondischargeable and debtor is in no position 
different from that he would have been in absent bankruptcy." Id. 
4. In re Mark Nelson, 994 F.2d 42 (1st Or. 1993) 
a. The debtor brought an adversary proceeding against former wife 
and wife's attorney for their alleged willful violation of the 
automatic stay. 
b. Upon appeal, the circuit court held that the debtor's former spouse 
did not willfully violate stay, and was not liable for sanctions, for 
seeking to enforce rights granted by the judgment of divorce against 
property, that the debtor had transferred to his father, prior to filing 
for bankruptcy, where the debtor failed to list sub-transfer on his 
bankruptcy schedules. 
H. Relief from Stay 
1. Carver v. Carver, 954 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1992) 
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a. A chapter 13 debtor sought to have former wife and her counsel 
held in contempt for violation of the automatic stay. The 
bankruptcy court imposed sanctions against the debtor's former wife 
and counsel. On appeal, the district court affirmed the holding of 
the bankruptcy court. 
b. The Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit reversed and held that the 
bankruptcy court should have abstained from hearing chapter 13 
debtor's claim for violation of the automatic stay, where alleged 
violation involved enforcement of debtor's divorce decree 
obligation. 
c. In this case, where the spouse sought to enforce the divorce decree 
obligation to pay the mortgage on former marital residence, the 
court determined that such action violated the automatic stay, only 
to the extent that the former wife sought collection of arrearage 
from debtor's wages, which were part of his chapter 13 estate. 
d. The court further held that the bankruptcy court should liberally 
grant relief from the automatic stay in situations involving collection 
of alimony, maintenance or support in order to avoid entangling 
federal court in family law matters left to state court. 
e. The alleged violation involved enforcement of debtor's divorce 
decree obligation. 
f. The purpose underlying the automatic stay provision would not have 
been served. 
g. The court concludes that it was clear that the bankruptcy court was 
being used as a weapon in an ongoing dispute, between the debtor 
and his former spouse. 
2. In re Ebel, 193 B.R. 572 (D. Col. 1996) 
a. A chapter 7 debtor's former spouse filed a complaint to force the 
trustee to abandon estate's alleged one-half interest in golf course, 
on the theory that an equitable distribution order entered by state's 
divorce court had deprived the debtor of any interest in the golf 
course. 
b. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado entered an 
order dismissing the complaint, and the former wife appealed. 
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c. The District Court reversed and remanded. 
d. On remand, the Bankruptc Court held that the bankruptcy court's 
prior order modifying the stay satisfied the equitable distribution 
order previously entered by the state divorce court, which awarded 
the golf course to the debtor's former spouse. 
e. Upon appeal, the District Court held that: 
(1) former wife's untimely motion to amend the bankruptcy 
court's order was properly treated as a motion to lift stay; 
and 
(2) the decision to grant requested relief from automatic stay 
was not an abuse of discretion. 
f. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit, the Court 
held, in an unpublished decision, that: 
(1) the District Court's affirmance of the relief granted to the 
former wife was reversed. 
(2) the case was remanded with instruction to the District Court 
and/or Bankruptcy Court to either conduct a hearing on the 
merits to fix the respective marital property interests in the 
golf course and driving range, or to defer the matter to state 
court for adjudication. 
3. In re Robbins, 964 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1992) 
a. The chapter 11 debtor's wife moved for lift of stay in order to allow 
the state court divorce action to continue. 
b. The U.S. District Court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order 
lifting stay. 
c. An appeal was taken and the court of appeals held that lifting of 
stay for cause, so that the state court could enter equitable 
distribution judgment was not an abuse of discretion. 
4. In re Brabham, 184 B.R. 476 (Bankr. D.S. C. 1995) 
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a. Former chapter 7 debtor moved to reopen her bankruptcy case in 
order to commence adversary proceeding against her former 
husband, for husband's alleged violation of discharge injunction in 
seeking to modify divorce court's equitable distribution award based 
on the debtor's discharge in bankruptcy. 
b. The bankruptcy court held that the husband violated discharge 
injunction when, following entry of wife's bankruptcy discharge, 
the husband sought to modify property settlement provisions of 
divorce decree. 
5. Exceptions to the automatic stay 
a. 11 U.S.C. §362(b)(2) exempts the following from the automatic 
stay 
(1) collection of alimony, maintenance or support from non 
estate property. 
n. PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE 
A. The bankruptcy court may take an active role in determining the status and 
ownership of the property of parties to a marriage. 
1. The property of a marriage formerly under the jurisdiction of the divorce 
court, becomes property of the estate under the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
bankruptcy court. 
2. This includes all community property and all of the filing spouses share of 
jointly owned property in a non-community property state. 
3. 11 U.S.C. §541 provides that property of the estate includes all interests of 
the debtor and the debtor' spouse in community property as of the 
commencement of the case. 
4. An estate is created with the filing of a petition. 
B. Property of the estate includes: 
1. Real and personal property. 












Property of the debtor that is in another person's possession. 
Awards from lawsuits. 
Any interest in property that the debtor acquires or becomes entitled to 
acquire within 180 days post-petition: 
a. By bequest, device, or inheritance. 
b. As a result of a property settlement agreement with debtor's spouse 
or per final divorce decree. 
c. As a beneficiary of a life insurance policy or a death benefit plan. 
C. Exemptions 
1. The debtor is entitled to certain exemptions. Exempted property cannot be 
reached by the trustee or creditors, with the exception of creditors holding 
liens against the property. 
2. There are state exemptions and federal exemptions available. The debtor 
must choose one of the two. Common exemptions include: 
a. Homestead exemption. 
b. Household goods. 
c. Motor vehicles. 
d. Tools of the trade. 
D. Applicable Case Law 
1. Debtor's pension is not considered property of the debtor's estate, as 
divorce decree creates constructive trust in favor of former wife. 
a. See, In re McCafferty, 96 F.3d 192; 65 U.S.L. W. 2239, 
Bankr.L.Rep. (6th Or. 1996) 
2. Entry of divorce decree post-petition, creates new property interest that 




a. Virginia law terminates co-ownership upon divorce. 
b. 
(1) See In re Cordova, 73 F.3d 38 (4th Cir. 1996). 
11 U.S.C. §541 includes in the bankruptcy estate a debtor's interest 
in entireties property. 
3. In re Ballard, 65 F.3d 367, 371 (4th Cir. 1995) 
Once a tenancy by the entirety terminates, the debtor and the bankruptcy 
estate are released "from all conditions of the tenancy conditions to 
preserve the unity of entireties property." Id. at 371-72. 
A. Liens and security obligations are not discharged in bankruptcy. 
1. When possible, property settlement obligations should be secured with 
property retained by the debtor's spouse. 
2. Agreements for one spouse to pay the obligations of the marriage are 
usually dischargeable as being in the nature of a property settlement. 
a. Although some courts in considering the financial ability of the non 
fIling spouse, have held that a duty to pay third party claims, to be 
in the nature of support rather than property settlement. 
B. Protection of the non-fIling spouse 
1. The non-fIling spouse should be protected from collection enforcement by 
creditors by securing a lien in the property retained by the debtor. 
2. Often, the family home is awarded to one spouse with an equalizing claim 
given to the other, 
3. A judicial lien is placed on the one-half interest owned by the spouse 
granted full ownership for the loss of ownership interest to the other 
spouse. 
a. However, 11 U.S.C. §522(t) of the bankruptcy code permits the 
debtor to avoid a judicial lien which impairs a homestead. 
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4. 
b. The Supreme Court in Farrey v. Sander/oot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991) 
held that 11 U. S. C. §522( t) of the bankruptcy code could not be 
used to void the divorce lien on the creditor spouse's former 
ownership interest in the family home. 
To the extent that the decree also creates a lien on the one-half interest 
owned by the spouse granted full ownership in the decree, section 522(t) 
may still be effective. 
a. See, Owen v. Owen 111, S. Ct. 1833 (1991) 
C. The liens securing an obligation are not discharged in bankruptcy. 
1. Wherever pos~ible, property settlement obligations should be secured with 
property retained by the debtor's spouse. 
2. Agreements for one spouse to pay the obligations of the marriage are 
usually dischargeable as being in the nature of a property settlement 
although some bankruptcy courts, in consideration of the financial ability 
of the non-filing spouse, have held that a duty to pay third-party claims to 
be in the nature of support rather than a property settlement. 
3. It is the better practice to protect the non-filing spouse from collection 
enforcement of creditors by securing a lien in the property retained by the 
debtor. 
4. Frequently, the family home is awarded to one spouse with an equalizing 
claim given to the other to compensate for the loss of his or her ownership 
interest. 
5. A dangerous practice prevalent in dissolution cases is the reliance on the 
decree itself as a judgment lien to secure that obligation. 
6. Section 522(t) of the Bankruptcy Code permits the debtor to avoid a 
judicial lien which impairs a homestead. 
a. The United State Supreme Court in the case of Farrey v. 
Sander/oot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991) ruled that Section 522(t) of the 
Bankruptcy Code could not be, used to void the divorce lien on the 






b. To the extent that the decree also creates a lien on the one-half 
interest owned by the spouse granted full ownership in the decree, 
Section 522(f) may still be effective. See Owen, supra .. 
The state court may proceed in further protecting its decree by conditioning 
the award of the home to one party, and the recipient spouse executing a 
mortgage or deed of trust to the other spouse to secure the amount of 
equalizing debt. 
8. In re Parrish, 7 F.3d. 76 (5th Cir. 1993) 
a. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that under Texas law, 
property inherited by husband during marriage and prior to divorce 
was his separate property, and thus the attaching to the property 
pursuant to state court divorce decree was avoidable under 
bankruptcy code provision, and 
b. thus allowed debtor to avoid the fixing of judicial lien on property 
made exempt as homestead. 
c. See also Mead V. Mead (In re Mead), 974 F.2d 990 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(1) A chapter 13 debtor' sought to avoid a lien on her homestead 
granted in favor of former husband in a divorce decree and 
reinstated by judgment in a fraud suit. 
(2) The bankruptcy court denied the debtor's motion and the 
district court affirmed. 
(3) The debtor appealed and the court of appeals affirming in 
part, held that reinstatement on grounds of fraud of lien 
which chapter 13 debtor's former husband had been granted 
in a divorce decree and which had been released by a quit 
claim deed, resulted in lien securing the same debt as the 
lien imposed in the divorce decree. 
(4) Therefore the debtor could not avoid reinstated lien on her 
homestead; 
(a) but a portion of the lien securing the prejudgment 




IV. TENANTS BY THE ENTIRETY 
A. Certain states have given statutory recognition to the concept of tenancy by the 
entireties. 
1. The existence of this property distinction means the existence of the 
indestructible right to survivorship derived from the former concept of 
husband and wife as a single legal entity. 
2. Neither husband or wife can individually sell his or her interest in the 
couple's real estate or any future interest. 
3. The property is immune from the reach of creditors to satisfy the individual 
debt of either spouse. 
4. Although the entirety estate may be reached by joint creditors, the estate 
may not be levied upon execution of a judgment against either spouse 
individually. 
5. In tenants by the entirety states, the debtor spouse has no power to transfer 
or alienate his interest in real property held by the entirety. 
B. The trustee may not alienate entireties property as the debtor's spouses' interest in 
the property is not vested in the bankruptcy estate. 
V. DOMESTIC RELATIONS OBLIGATIONS & THE CHAPTER 13 PLAN 
A. Confirmation may be denied on feasibility grounds pursuant to Section 1325 (a) (6) 
when the debtor's plan does not provide for alimony or support obligations 
B. Some courts have allowed plans paying less than 100 % of pre-petition arrearage, 
and the remainder being non-discharged at the end of the case. 
C. Most courts have concluded that a chapter 13 plan must make reasonable provisions 
for paying pre-petition arrearages on alimony, maintenance and support; and 
property settlement claims. 
D. Applicable case law 
1. Alimony, maintenance and support after October 22, 1994 




statutory language of both 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5) and §507(a) (7) (B) , 
and are therefore priority claims." 
In re Crable, 174 B.R. 62 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1994) 
a. Non-dischargeable judgment for pre petition child support arrearages 
accumulates post petition and post confirmation interest at the 
Kentucky statutory rate of 12 %; 
b. plan payment of arrearages without interest does not defeat the 
former spouse's right to postpetition and post-confirmation interest. 
c. Citing Bruning, and analogizing to student loans, child support 
arrearages are non-dischargeable, accrue post-petition and post-
confirmation interest and the accumulating interest is non-
dischargeable upon completion of payments. 
d. However, during the chapter 13 case, the arrearage claim holder 
cannot have an allowable claim for the post-petition (unmatured) 
interest. 
VI. nISCHARGEABILITY 
A. Under the Bankruptcy Code, there are various limitations regarding 
dischargeability of debt. 
B. 
1. Chapters 7, 11, 12 and 13 each contain restrictions on obtaining a general 
discharge. 1 
2. In addition, exceptions to the dischargeability of specific debts are covered 
by 11 U.S.C. §523(a), which is applicable to individuals under Chapters 
7, 11 and 12, and, 
3. to some extent, under chapter 13. 
In some instances debts that are not specifically excepted by bankruptcy law from 
discharge, are discharged in bankruptcy. 
1. See, In re Johnson, 323 F.2d 574 (3rd Cir. N.J. 1963). 






Debts to a spouse, former spouse or child of the debtor, for alimony, 
maintenance, or support, are non-dischargeable. 
Palimony obligations are not dischargeable. 
a. See, e.g., In re Doyle, 70 B.R. 106 (9th Cir. BAP 1986). 
The 1985 code clarified marital obligations and determined that property settlement 
obligations may no longer be dischargeable. 
1. See In re White, 84 B.R. 818, 821 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1988); In re 
Swiczkowsld, 84 B.R. 487, 489 (N.D. Ohio 1988) 
2. In re Robson, 10 B.R. 362, 369, (N.D. Ala. 1981) 
D. There are three categories of fmancial obligations emanating from divorce. These 
include: 
1. Alimony or spousal support 
2. Child support; and/or 
3. Property settlement obligations 
a. . The first two categories are prospective at the time of the divorce 
in that they access any obligation to provide temporary, and future 
support to a parties former spouse or children, based upon future 
need. 
2. Thus, contrary to the prospective aspect of alimony and support, property 
settlement issues involve retrospective consideration relating to dividing 
assets and liabilities accumulated during marriage. 
3. Property settlement obligations entail debts payable by former spouses to 
each other, or to third parties, where the obligated spouse has received 
marital assets in exchange for the responsibility to make certain payments, 
or where the division of marital liabilities requires that third party payments 
be made. 
E. 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5) does not make a distinction between spousal and child 
support, alimony, maintenance or support. 
1. They are all given equal status. 
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2. Historically, the code provided for nondischargeability of support only 
when granted in a separation agreement, divorce decree or property 
settlement. 
a. See, 11 U.S.c. §523 (a)(5), 1979. 
3. However, under the bankruptcy amendments of 1984 support became non-
dischargeable if provided for in any order of a court of record. 
a. 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5) 1984. 
4. Thus, in determining dischargeability, the bankruptcy court needs to make 
an independent determination as to the true nature of the financial 
obligation in question. 
5. Dischargeability is no longer controlled solely by the language of the 
divorce decree. 
a. See, e.g., Sampson v. Sampson (In re Sampson) 997 F.2d 717 (lOth 
Gir. 1993), and 
b. In re Mizen, 72 B.R. 251 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987). 
F. Various forms of what amounts to maintenance or support can be identified by 
many labels including alimony, property settlement, support, property settlement 
in lieu of alimony or any other related terms which are not dispositive for 
bankruptcy purposes. 
1. Traditional characteristics of true alimony include periodicity of payments, 
termination of the obligation upon death or remarriage of the obligee, 
spouse, and modifiability. 
2. Are support or maintenance payments modifiable? 
a. See Matter of Albin, 591 F.2d 94 (9th Cir. 1979); 
b. In re White 84 B.R. 818, 822 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988). 
3. The court in In re Midnet, 84 B.R. 776, 779 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988) 
identifies several factors to be considered in determining whether an 







a. A determination of what constitutes support 
or alimony should include whether the 
obligation is subject to contingency such as 
remarriage, or death, 
b. whether payment appears to balance disparate incomes, 
c. whether the obligation is payable in installments or in a lump sum, 
d. whether there are minor children, where there was in fact a need for 
support at the time it was awarded, 
e. the structure in terms of the final decree, 
f. whether the award is modifiable, 
g. the manner of enforcement of the award and debts. 
h. See also, Usher v. Usher, 442 F.Supp. 866 (N.D. Ga. 1977). 
4. The Sixth Circuit has held that Congress has apparently charged the 
bankruptcy court with a duty to form a federal bankruptcy common-law of 
domestic relations in order to determine what constitutes support or 
maintenance. 
a. See, In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983). 
b. It has been held that application of a federal law standard is 
appropriate since a federal law doctrine that of "the fresh start" is 
at issue. See In re Warner, 5 B.R. 434 (Bankr. D. Utah, 1980). 
G. A determination of whether support payments are intended as support and 
maintenance becomes a necessary issue in determining dischargeability of debt. 
1. Not all debts are discharged by filing bankruptcy. 
2. Payments in the nature of property settlements are discharged, however 
Section 523(a)(5) exempts from discharge a debt to a spouse, former 
spouse, or child of the debtor for alimony, to maintenance for, or support 
of both such spouse or child. 
3. In addition, a property settlement agreement which is in the nature of 
alimony, maintenance or support is also nondischargeable. 
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4. The bankruptcy court will not be bound by the labels given to the debts in 
a decree or settlement. Although the bankruptcy court is not bound by 
principles of state law regarding this matter, the bankruptcy court will give 
attention to the intent of the parties as expressed by the totality of the 
agreement for the divorce judgment. 
5. Although the bankruptcy court will look to the development of federal law, 
it may also look to state law for "guidance" in making its decision. 
6. Disputes over child support are infrequent as the obligation is not typically 
subject to confusion with property settlement payments. 
H. The fact that state law or an agreement characterizes payment as support or 
property settlement, or even the fact that state law does not recognize alimony or 
a duty of support, is not dispositive. 
1. Most courts have held that a debt for the divorce attorney I s fees is owed to 
the former spouse as a third-party beneficiary as well as to the attorney, and 
therefore may be nondischargeable, if it is in the nature of support. 
1. Bankruptcy Court decisions that analyze the characteristics of spousal support and 
of property settlement set forth a series of criteria to aid in determining the issue 
including the following:2 
1. Do the payments terminate after the remarriage of the other spouse? 
2. Are the payments made directly to the other spouse? 
3. What were the relative earnings of the parties? 
4. What was the extent and nature of the property of the marriage to be 
divided? 
5. Was there a business of professional practice involved? 
6. Do the payments appear to have a relationship to the property awarded to 
the spouse making the payments? 
7. Is the payment obligation enforceable by contempt? 
2 See, generally Section VIII infra. 
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8. 
9. 
Is the payment obligation subject to modification due to a change in 
economic circumstances of either spouse? 
What are the living expenses of the receiving spouse? 
10. What inferences can be drawn from the settlement documents, findings, or 
decree regarding the nature of the obligation? 
11. Whether payments are for a sum certain payable over a short period of 
time? 
12. What is the tax treatment of the obligation? 
13. The issue of whether a debt is in the nature of alimony or child support 
does not have to be determined by the Bankruptcy Courts. 
a. Both Bankruptcy Courts and State courts share concurrent 
jurisdiction over issues of alimony, support and maintenance. 
VII. ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS PURSUANT TO 11 U.S.C. 
§523(a)(5) ARE NON DISCHARGEABLE 
A. Generally a determination of whether marital debts are dischargeable is a matter 
of federal law. 
B. Bankruptcy Courts may look beyond the language of a divorce judgment and 
determine if alimony payments are actually intended as maintenance or support 
payments. 
1. In In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Gr. 1983) 
a. The Court held that the Bankruptcy Court should not merely rely on 
language in separation agreement to determine whether assumption 
of joint debts constituted non dischargeable support. 
b. The Court should examine party's intent and look at whether 
assumption has effect of providing necessary support. 
c. But see Forsdick v. Turgeon., 812 F.2d 801 (2nd Cir. 1987).3 
I 3See also In re Fitzgerald, 9 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 1993) where Judge Kennedy sought to clarify In re Calhoun ~ means test. 
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-;=; ~ § a. The court held that the debtor's promise to pay for son's graduate '~ 
-
education as part of a divorce settlement was intended as support 
and is non-dischargeable. 
3. In re Harrell, 754 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1985) 
a. The court held that the debtor's obligation to pay accrued alimony 
arrearages and postmaturity child support and education expenses 
are non-dischargeable, 
b. Notwithstanding the ex-wife's lack of need or state law which does 
not require debtor to support debtor's child after age of majority. 
=' 
4. In re Singer, 787 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1986) 
a. The court held that separation agreement indicates that periodic cash 
payments, which were not to exclude future maintenance or 
support, 
b. represents non-dischargeable debt in connection with alimony, 
maintenance or support. 
5. In re Goin, 808 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1987) 
a. The court held that four factors are necessary in determining 
whether a debt is support: (1) if the agreement fails to provide 
explicitly for spousal support, the court may presume that the 
property settlement is intended for support; (2) if there are minor 
children; (3) direct payments to the recipient; (4) an obligation that 
terminates upon re-marriage. 
b. See also Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1984); 
c. Matter of Benich, 811 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1987). 
6. In re Gianakas, 917 F.2d 759 (3rd Cir. 1990) 
a. The court held that the intent of parties at the time of agreement, 
determines whether property settlement agreement is in the nature 
of alimony, maintenance, or support. ~ 
E - 22 
7. In re Dvorak, 986 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1993) 
a. The court held that court ordered obligation to pay attorneys fees 
and guardian ad litem fees, incurred in connection with the post-
divorce child custody proceeding, was non-dischargeable support. 
c. Attorney fees may be non dischargeable 
1. In In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6, 8 (2nd Cir. 1981), the court held that attorney 
fees of wife which debtor agreed to pay pursuant to stipulation incorporated 
into divorce decree are properly characterized as alimony and support. 
2. In In re Silansky, 897 F.2d 743 (4th Cir. 1990), the court held that 
obligation to pay ex-spouse's attorneys fees incurred in divorce proceeding 
held non-dischargeable. 
3. In In re Rios, 901 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1990), the court held that §523(a)(5) 
should not be read literally, and debtor's attorneys fees from child support 
proceedings were held dischargeable. 
D. Pension Benefits 
1. In Bush v. Taylor, 893 F.2d 962 (8th Qr. 1990), the court held that former 
spouse's one-half share in debtor's pension benefits held by debtor is non-
dischargeable constructive trust for former spouse. 
E. Hold harmless agreements 
F. 
1. In re Robinson, 921 F.2d 252 (lOth Cir. 1990) 
a. The court held that when divorce decree requires debtor to hold 
spouse harmless on debt, refinancing of debt by spouse has no 
affect on debtor's duty. 
United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1986) 
a. The court held that: unmatured support claims are not allowable 
against assets of debtor's estate and may be only collected against 
debtor personally, either from exempt or post-petition assets. 
VIII. 11 U.S.C. §523(A)(15) 
A. Expansion of non-dischargeable debt 
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B. 
1. The 1994 Amendments added 11 U.S.C. §S23(a)(lS) to establish a new 
category of non-dischargeable marital related debts, thus expanding the 
support exceptions pursuant to §S23(a)(S). 
2. 11 U.S.c. §S23(a)(IS) establishes two new opportunities for recovery on 
behalf of a non-debtor spouse left with an unfulfilled property settlement 
debt, which are incurred as part of a divorce or separation agreement or 
those that do not qualify under 11 U.S.C. §S23(a)(S) as alimony, 
maintenance or support are dischargeable if 
a. the debtor has the ability to pay them; or 
b. if discharge would create a benefit which outweigh the detriment 
imposed upon the claimant. 
Bankruptcy Courts have disagreed as to burden of proof issues under 11 U.S.C. 
§S23(a)(IS) 
1. All agree that general black letter law is that an objecting creditor must 
establish non-dischargeability by a preponderance of the evidence. 
a. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 654 (1991). 
C. Some bankruptcy courts have held that the objecting creditor has the burden of 
persuasion of all material issues under 11 U.S.C. §S23(a)(IS). 
1. See, e.g., Kessler v. Butler (In re Butler), 186 B.R. 371 (Bankr. D. Vt. 
1995). 
a. In this case the court stated that practically speaking 11 U.S.C. 
§S23(a)(lS) calls for a creditor showing that the debtor can pay for 
his or her obligations despite the bankruptcy petitioner's plan. 
b. Some bankruptcy courts have determined that under 11 U.S.C. 
§S23(a)(lS) as with the dischargeability of student loans under 
§S23(a)(8) that the debtor has the burden of persuasion on certain 
material issues. 
c. First the creditor must show that he or she holds a claim incurred 
by the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation in connection 
with the separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a 
court of record. 










(1) See, e. g., Carroll v. Carroll (In re Carroll, 187 B. R. 197 
(Bankr. W.D. Missouri 1995). 
Upon such a showing the burden of proof will shift to the debtor who must 
prove either an inability to pay the debt under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(15) or 
that the discharge would result in a benefit to the debtor that outweighs the 
detrimental consequences to the debtor's spouse or children under 11 
U.S.C. §523(a)(15)(b). 
The court in In re Carroll stated that by its language 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(15) 
sets up a rebuttable presumption that any property settlement obligation 
arising from a divorce is non-dischargeable, unless the debtor can prove 
one of the above stated elements. 
a. Thus, once a former spouse brings a timely dischargeability action 
under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(15) the burden of proof shifts from the 
debtor. 
b. See, Becker v. Becker (In re Becker) 185 B.R. 567 (Bankr. W.D. 
Missouri, 1995). 
D. Some court have held that the exceptions to non-dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. 
§523(a)(15) should be pled as affirmative defenses. See, Hill v. Hill (In re Hill), 
184 B.R. 750 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995). 
1. Alternatively, it has been held that at least the burden of going forward 
shifts to the debtor if not the burden of proof. 
a. See Silvers v. Silvers (Inre Silvers) 187 B.R. 648 (Bankr. W.D. 
Missouri, 1995). 
2. There are essentially two defenses that the debtor may assert: 
a. the debtor may argue a reasonable inability to pay the obligation 
while supporting himself or herself, or 
b. the debtor may show that discharging the debt would result in a 
benefit to the debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences to 
the complaining spouse, former spouse or child of the debtor. See 
11 U.S. C. §523 (a)(15) (B). 
E. Debtor's ability to pay 
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1. 
2. 
A non-support divorce judgment obligation is dischargeable if paying the 
debt reduces the debtor's current income below that necessary for the 
support of a debtor and the debtor's dependents. 
a. In re Carroll, supra 
In the same vein, a debtor_engaged in the business is not required to expend 
funds necessary for the continuation, preservation or operation of the 
business. 
a. See, e.g., Woodwonh v. Woodwonh (In re Woodwonh), 187 B.R. 
174 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995). 
3. Thus the court must engage in a careful evaluation and analysis of the 
debtor's expenses, potential to earn income, both current and future. 
F. Hardship 
1. Even if a debtor is able to pay the obligation in question, the debt is 
dischargeable if discharge is more beneficial to the debtor and detrimental 
to the complaining party . 
. a. See, e.g., 1I U.S.c. §523(a)(1))(B), Florio v. Florio (In re Florio) 
187 B.R. 654 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995); In re Carroll, supra. 
2. The House Committee's Judicial Report relative to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(l5) 
states that the debt will also be discharged if the benefit to the debtor of 
. discharging the debt outweighs the harm to the obligee. 
a. For example, if a non-debtor spouse who suffers little detriment 
from the debtor's non-payment of an obligation required to be paid 
under a hold harmless agreement (perhaps because it could not be 
collected from the non-debtor's spouse, or because the non-debtor 
spouse could easily pay it) the obligation would be discharged. The 
benefits of the debtor's discharge should be sacrificed only if there 
would be substantial detriment to the non-debtor's spouse that 
outweighs the debtor's need for a fresh start. H.R. Rep. No. 103-
835, 103rd Congo 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1994 U.S. Code. Congo 
and Admin. News 3363; Woodwonh V. Woodwonh (In re 
Woodworth) 187 B.R. 174 Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995); Hill V. Hill (In 
re Hill), 184 B.R. 750 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995). 
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6. The court in Phillips v. Phillips (In re Phillips), 187 B.R. 363 (Rankr. 
M.D. Fla. 1995) said that 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(l5)(B) requires this court to 
exercise its pure equitable powers. To apply this section Congress 
intended, this court must in essence evaluate the lifestyles of the parties that 
measure the benefit of former husbands discharged against the degree of 
harm suffered by former wives. The legislative history essentially requires 
the court to make a value judgment in determining which party suffers the 
most. 
7. Is A Partial Discharge Possible? 
a. It is unclear whether or not Congress intended an all or nothing 
clause. 
b. Some scholars have argued that the phrase to the extent that 
precludes the court from issuing or limiting a discharge and that the 
court is mandate to issue an all or nothing result. 
c. See, e.g., In re Florio, supra. 
d. BuJ see, Comisky v. Comisky (In re Comisky) 183 B.R. 883 (Rankr. 
N.D. Cal. 1995) where a California Bankruptcy Court recently 
discharged part of the divorce decree obligation on grounds that the 
debtor did not have the ability to pay it all but accepted part on the 
basis that, over a reasonable period of time, the debtor could afford 
to pay part of the debt. 
(1) In addition the court allowed the debtor to pay in 
installments. 
IX. MISCELLANEOUS CASE LAW 
A. Bad Faith 
1. In re Huclifeldt, 39 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 1994) 
a. A motion was filed to dismiss debtor's chapter 7 case as bad faith 
filing. 
2. The bankruptcy court dismissed the case and the debtor appealed the Court 
of Appeals held that cause existed for dismissal of chapter 7 case which was 
filed for the purpose of frustrating the state court divorce decree. 
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B. Transfers 
1. Prepaid Support Obligations Recoverable by the Bankruptcy Estate 
a. In re Futoran, 76 F.3d 265 (9th Cir. 1996). 
(1) A chapter 7 debtor made a lump sum, prepetition payment 
to his former wife in exchange for the cancellation of the 
marital termination agreement, which obligated the debtor 
to make monthly support payments to his wife for up to five 
years. 
(2) The Ninth Circuit ruled that such debtors may not decrease 
the amount of their non-exempt assets by pre-paying support 
obligations that come due postpetition, reasoning that such 
obligations constitute antecedent debt, not new value, and 
are therefore preferential transfers recoverable by the trustee 
under Code §547. 
(3) The court also stated that equitable considerations do not 
preclude recovery by the trustee because that would frustrate 
the Code's goal of providing a "proportionate distribution of 
the debtor's assets among it creditors. " 
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SOME NUMBERS 
$1,4949,000 - budget for Bankruptcy Review Commission 
1028 - pages in the Report of the Bankruptcy Review Commission, October 20, 1997, Volume 1 
{not counting preface, page 918a, and "Individual Commissioners' Views"} 
o -people willing to take responsibility for choice of yellow cover of Bankruptcy Review 
Commission Report 
301 - pages in Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, July 1, 
1973, Part 1 {counting separate statement of Judge Weinfeld} 
100 - years since the publication of Dracula 
1,316,999 - cases filed in the 12 month period ending 6/30/97 
26.4% - increase in filings over the same period in 1996 
12,859 to 11,159 - decrease in Chapter 11 filings for this period 
36 - Joe Lee's years of service on the bankruptcy bench 
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SOME WORDS OF INSIGHT AND INSPIRATION 
After Marjorie fell asleep, he reached over to his nightstand 
and grabbed his Bankruptcy Code. Whenever he had a big case 
coming up, a confinnation hearing, a hearing on a lift-stay motion, 
or any other dispositive proceeding, instead of girding his loins and 
painting his face, he prepared himself, late at night, by studying the 
Code. After the clamor and smoke of the daily battles had cleared, 
after everyone else had gone to bed, after his opponents had gone 
home to weaken themselves with alcohol or distract themselves 
with women or children, after it was absolutely quiet, Randall sat 
up absorbed in the Code, the source of all his power. 
In any bankruptcy proceeding, no matter how big or how 
much money was involved, the parties usually ended up arguing 
over the meaning of a mere six or seven sections of the Code that 
were crucial to the disposition of assets in that particular case. 
Randall already knew most of those sections by heard, but early in 
his career he discovered that if, on the eve of battle, he read those 
crucial provisions, over and over, ten or twenty times, late into the 
night, and on into the morning, he often discovered some new 
relationship between them, some new bit of legislative history, or 
an obscure but creative judicial gloss on one of the clauses, which 
in turn affected the provision and its relationship to the other 
provisions in that section, and ultimately the relationship of the 
section to the other sections and to the Code itself, which in turn 
led to another theory of the case, and before he knew it -- almost as 
if by magic -- he discovered an entirely new method for destroying 
his client's adversaries and recapturing the assets that had 
wrongfully been taken on a fraudulent promise to repay. 
Randall was Magister Ludi, the Code was his glass-bead 
game. Everyone knew the sections and the provisions in the 
sections, but it was the relationships between them that only the 
masters understood. 
Richard Dooling, White Man's Grave, 194 (1994) 
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I. VALUATION AFTER RASH 
In June, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Associates Commercial 
Corporation v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997), brought to an end a five-year battle over $9,12S. In 
an 8-1 opinion, the Supreme Court held that when a debtor under Chapter 13 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") proposes to cram down a plan of reorganization over the 
objection of a secured creditor, the creditor's collateral must be valued at its replacement cost. 
Section S06(a) of the Code is the provision that deals with valuing secured claims. This 
section states: 
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in 
which the estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent 
of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such 
property, ... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value 
of such creditor's interest ... is less than the amount of such 
allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the 
purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of 
such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such 
disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest. 
In an en banc decision, the Fifth Circuit in In re Rash, 90 F.3d 1036 (Sth Cir. 1996) had 
held that the first sentence of Section S06(a) instructed courts to focus upon valuation from the 
creditor's perspective, using as a starting point the amount the creditor would receive if it 
exercised its state law remedies by repossessing and selling the collateral. 
The Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion by Justice Ginsberg, the court rejected the 
Fifth Circuit's approach to section S06 and stated that "[t]he full first sentence of § S06(a), in 
short, tells a court what it must evaluate, but it does not say more; it is not enlightening on how to 
value collateral." 117 S. Ct. at 188S (1997). The Court then looked to the second sentence of 
Section S06(a) for enlightenment on how value should be determined. Because value should be 
determined "in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of 
such property," a bankruptcy court must look to the proposed disposition or use of the property 
when considering the appropriate value for a particular piece of collateral. The Court concluded 
its opinion by stating: 
In sum, under § S06(a), the value of property retained because the 
debtor has exercised the § 132S(a)(S)(B) "cram down" option is the 
cost the debtor would incur to obtain a like asset for the same 
"proposed ... use." Id. at 1886. 
But the Court attached a footnote to this last sentence of the opinion which emphasized that 
detennining replacement value will be a fact intensive inquiry. 
Because this concluding footnote in the Rash decision is likely to be the focus of 
significant future litigation, it is set forth below in its entirety. 
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Our recognition that the replacement-value standard, not the 
foreclosure-value standard, governs in cram down cases leaves to 
bankruptcy courts, as triers of fact, identification of the best way of 
ascertaining replacement value on the basis of the evidence 
presented. Whether replacement value is the equivalent of retail 
value, wholesale value, or some other value will depend on the 
type of debtor and the nature of the property. We note, however, 
that replacement value, in this context, should not include certain 
items. For example, where the proper measure of the replacement 
value of a vehicle is its retail value, an adjustment to that value 
may be necessary: A creditor should not receive portions of the 
retail price, if any, that reflect the value of items the debtor does 
not receive when he retains his vehicle, items such as warranties, 
inventory storage, and reconditioning. Cf. 90 F.3d at 1051-52. 
Nor should the creditor gain from modifications to the property--
~, the addition of accessories to a vehicle--to which a creditor's 
lien would not extend under state law. 
Future litigation is likely to focus on the sentence that is underscored. More specifically, 
future litigation is likely to focus on the words in that sentence in bold print: - "inventory 
storage." Cf. In re Mulvania, 1997 WL 619201 (BAP) 9th Cir. 1997) ("this language [fn. 6] does 
not require a court to deduct costs of sale when determining the replacement value of a secured 
claim.") 
II. AUTOMATIC STAY 
"The dead shade tree gives no shelter." T.S. Eliot, The Waste Land 
(1922). Like a shade tree, the automatic stay which attends the 
initiation of bankruptcy proceedings must be nurtured if it is to 
retain its vitality. 
In re Soares, 107 F.3d 969,971 (1st Cir. 1997). 






When does stay become effective? 
What is affected by the stay? 
When does the stay become ineffective? 
How can a creditor effect relief from the stay? 
What are the effects of violating the stay? 
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B. Some Current Stay Problem Areas 
1. Does a creditor violate the automatic stay by dismissing an employee 
who has filed for bankruptcy relief? 
See sections 362(a)(3), 525 and In re Hutchins, 211 B.R. 325 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1997) (yes, IF 
debtor has employment contract that limits dismissal to cause). 
2. Is continued possession by a secured party who repossessed 
prepetition a violation of the automatic stay? 
See sections 362(a)(3), 542 and Charles Motors, Inc. v. Lewis,-211 B.R. 970 (U.S.D.C. N.D. AI. 
1997) (not property of the estate); In re Turner, 209 B.R. 558, 561 (Bankr. N.D. AI. 1997) 
(property of the estate); In re Brooks, 201 B.R. 738 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1997) (property of the 
estate); In re Massey, 210 B.R. 693 (Bankr. Md. 1997) (not stay violation until debtor provides 
section 542 adequate protection); Matter of Brown, 210 B.R. 878 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1997) (not 
"act"); see generally David Carlson, Turnover of Collateral in Bankrutpcy: Must' a Secured Party 
in Possession Volunteer? 6 J.Bankr. 1. & Prac. 483 (1997). 
3. Does the automatic stay end when property is abandoned? 
See sections 362(a)(5), 554; In re Adams, 212 B.R. 703 (Bankr. Mass. 1997). 
4. What is the effect of a provision in a prebankruptcy workout 
agreement that waives the automatic stay in the event of a subsequent 
bankruptcy? 
See In re Pease, 195 B.R. 431 (Bankr. Neb. 1996) (per se unenforceable); see generally Michael 
St. Patrick Baxter, Prepetition Waivers of the Automatic Stay: A Secured Lender's Guide, 52 
Bus. Law. 577 (1997). 
5. What is the applicability of Rash to stay litigation? 
6. When will the court "annul" the stay? 
See section 362(d); In re Soares, 107 F.3d 969 (1st Cir. 1997) ("Because the stay is a 
fundamental protection for all parties affected by the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, it should 
not be dismantled without good reason ... Thus, if congressional intent is to be honored and the 
integrity of the automatic stay preserved, retroactive relief should be the long-odds exception, not 
the general rule."); In re Stork, 212 B.R. 970 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1997) (prepetition purchaser who 
records postpetition is entitled to annulment of stay if it qualifies for protection under 549( c)). 
For a more complete consideration of the relationship between sections 362(d) and 549(c), see In 




III. LEASES AND OTHER EXECUTORY CONTRACTS 
365 
A. Gap Period Payment Obligations 
365(d)(3) 
1. 
The trustee shall timely perfonn all the obligations of the 
debtor, except those specified in section 365(b )(2), arising 
from and after the order for relief under any unexpired lease 
of nonresidential real property, until such lease is assumed or 
rejected, notwithstanding section 503(b)(I) of this title. The 
court may extend, for cause, the time for perfonnance of any 
such obligation that arises within 60 days after the date of the 
order for relief, but the time for perfonnance shall not be 
extended beyond such 60-day period. This subsection shall 
not be deemed to affect the trustee's obligations under the 
provisions of subsection (b) or (f) of this section. Acceptance 
of any such perfonnance does not constitute waiver or 
relinquishment of the lessor's rights under such lease or under 
this title. 
Is the debtor under a nonresidential real property lease required to 
pay rent in accordance with the terms of the lease until the lease is 
assumed or rejected? 
As a result of the reference in section 365(d)(3) to "notwithstanding section 
503(b)(l)," most courts have required gap period payments at the contract rate, regardless of the 
benefit to the estate. E.g., Norritech v. Geonex Corp., 204 B.R. 684 (Md. 1997); In re Twigland 
Fashions, Inc., 198 B.R. 199 (W.D. Texas 1996); Kirk Kennedy, The Case for Extending Super 
Administrative Expense Priority to Claims for Unpaid Rent Under Section 365(d)(3), Norton 
Bankruptcy Law Adviser (February 1996); contra In re Mr. Gatti's, Inc., 164B.R. 929 (Bankr. 
W.D. Texas 1994) (Kelly). 
2. Is the debtor required to pay prepetition taxes that become due under 
the lease postpetition? 
National Terminals Corp. v. Handy Andy Home Improvement Centers, Inc., 1997 
WL 619824 (U.S.D.C. N.D. Ill. 1997) held that the debtor was not obligated to make section 
365(d) payment on the taxes that accrued prepetition but became due under the lease postpetition. 
The court based this holding on the language of the lease and the language of the majority of the 
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opinions that have addressed this issue. See also Best Products Co. Inc., 206 B.R. 404 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. 1997) (Tice), contra. E.g., In re Krvstal Co., 194 B.R. 161 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996) 
(Cook). 
3. Is the debtor required to make section 365( d)(3) payments in cases 
where administrative solvency is questionable? 
In answering this question, courts have looked to the phrase "timely perform" in 
section 365(d)(3), have looked to the priority over administrative expenses expressly provided 
for in section 364, (but not section 365(d)(3)) and have looked to section 726(b). Compare, In re 
Tel-Central Communications, Inc., 212 B.R. 342, 347 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997) (after Chapter 7 
administrative expenses), with In re New Almacs, Inc., 196 B.R. 244 (N.D.N.Y. 1996), (the court 
concluded that section 365(d)(3) gives the court discretion as to the timing but not the priority of 
lease payments: "In the event that it is necessary to delay said payments, the Court wishes to 
make it clear that any such payments are to be made in full and are not dependent on the extent to 
which other administrative claims ... are paid. ") See generally In re Rich's Department Stores, 
Inc., 209 B.R. 810, 816 (Bankr. Mass 1997). 
B. Assumption 
In In re Klein Sleep Products, Inc., 78 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1996), the court reversed 
lower court rulings that rents due after surrender by the trustee would be treated as an unsecured 
claim and subject to the cap on rejection damages. The Second Circuit held that the rejection of 
an assumed lease gives rise to an administrative priority claim that is not subject to the limits of 
section 502(b)(6). See generally John Rapisardi, Landlords Take Delight: "Klein Sleep" Has 
Been Reversed, 4/19/96 NYLJ 1. Because of the consequences of an early assumption, In re 
Gateway Apparel, Inc., 210 B.R. 567 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1997) sustained a committee objection to 
the debtor's motion early in the case to assume leases. 
C. Nonmonetary Defaults 
Section 365(b )(2)(D) is set out below: 
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection [requiring cure of 
defaults] does not apply to a default that is a breach of a 
provision relating to 
(D) is the satisfaction of any penalty rate or provision 
relating to a default arising from any failure by the debtor to 
perform nonmonetary obligations under the executory 
contract or unexpired lease. 
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Prior to its Chapter 11 filing, debtor had defaulted on its GM dealer agreement by 
its failure to operate for more than 7 days. The debtor asserted that under section 365(b )(2)(D) it 
was not required to cure the default in order to assume and assign. GM contended that section 
365(b )(2)(D) only excused the payment of penalties arising from nonmonetary defaults. In In re 
Claremont Acquisition Corp., 186 B.R. 977 (C.D. Calif. 1995) reversed 113 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir 
1997), the district court concluded that a debtor does not have to cure preassumption 
nonmonetary defaults but does have to provide adequate assurance that it can perform these 
nonmonetary obligations in the future. In overruling the district court, the Ninth Circuit looked 
to (1) grammatical construction, (2) the structure of Section 365, and (3) legislative history. 113 
F.3d at 1034. See also Steven M. Goldman & Patricia Redmond, Does Reform Act Eliminate 
the Requirement that a Debtor Cure Nonmonetary Defaults When Assuming Executory 
Contracts? BCD Weekly News & Comment, October 24, 1995, at A3. 
IV. SETOFF 
553 
A. Prepetition Setoff 
A prepetition setoff can not be invalidated under section 547; section 553 
controls. See, In re Wild Bills, Inc., 206 B.R. 8 (Bankr Conn. 1997) (Shiff); In re Murphy, 203 
B.R. 972 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1997) (Lessen). 
B. Government Agencies 
In re HAL, Inc., 122 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 1997) held that the government can setoff 
a debtor airline's overpayment to the IRS of excise taxes against the claims of other federal 
agencies against the debtor: "the United States is a unitary creditor for purposes of bankruptcy 
[both sections 553 and 106."] This is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's decision in In re Doe, 58 
F.3d 494 (9th Cir. 1995). It is inconsistent with the 1995 decision of the Tenth Circuit in In re 
Turner, 59 F.3d 1041 (10th Cir. 1995), however, in 1996, the Tenth Circuit, siting en bane, 
overruled its 1995 decision, In re Turner, 84 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 1996). See also In re Pyramid 
Industries, 210 B.R. 445 (U.S.D:C. N.D. Ill. 1997). Even after "Turner 2", In re Lopes, 197 B.R. 
15 (Bankr. RI. 1996) (Votolato) held that the IRS and HUD lack section 553 "mutuality" -- that 
two different federal agencies can not be treated as a single unit for purposes of section 553. See 
also the concluding footnote in In re Guter! Special Steel Corp., 198 B.R. 128 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
1996), a case in which the federal Economic Development Administration (EDA) held a lien on 
contaminated land and an issue before the court was whether the EDA or the EPA would bear the 
cleanup costs: 
The discerning reader might think it odd to conclude that 
EDA, an agency of the federal government, would enjoy an 
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unfair windfall unless EDA reimburses EPA, another agency 
of the federal government, for the costs and expenses EP A 
incurs in cleaning up the site subject to EDA's security 
interest. We would not disagree with their assessment. 
However, we are constrained to employ such tortured, 
convoluted reasoning because, until very recently, different 
federal agencies refused to speak with a single voice and 
instead have elected to further their own parochial agendas. 
See generally Wilbur Foster, Federal Agencies as a "Unitary Creditor" for Setoffs in Bankruptcy 
Cases, 114 Banking L.J. 142 (Feb. 1997); Barry Zaretsky, The Federal Government As a 
Creditor, 9/21/95 NYLJ 3 (coLl). 
c. Discretion 
In re Pyramid, 210 B.R. 445 (U.S.D.C. N.D. Ill. 1997), the district court affirmed 
the bankruptcy court's discretionary disallowance of setoff, stating: 
As noted, section 553 does not require the bankruptcy court to allow 
or disallow a setoff. In fact, the bankruptcy court must exercise its 
equitable discretion in deciding to allow or disallow a setoff under 
section 553 .... The Hal court held that Congress allows discretionary 
use of setoff under section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy 
courts must take into account special considerations bearing on setoff 
as it arises in the bankruptcy context. They also must take into 
account the effects setoff may have on innocent third parties. Setoff 
should only be allowed where appropriate. Because allowing setoff 
is equitable and discretionary in nature, the bankruptcy court should 
disallow setoff if the rights of those other than the debtor and creditor 
are affected by the act: ... Here, the rights of those other than the 
SBA, Navy, and the contractor would be affected if the bankruptcy 
court allowed setoff. Allowing setoff would affect Subcontractors' 
right to payment for work that they completed on the Prime Contract. 
The bankruptcy court considered equitable principles, such as the 
equal treatment of creditors in similar positions, when it decided not 
to allow the Navy to offset its debt with the SBA. Allowing setoff 
would affect a percentage of Subcontractors' right to the Proceeds 
merely because of the "fortuitous" circumstances rendered especially 
probable where the competing creditor is an agency of the federal 
government. This problem is augmented in situations involving the 
federal government, as here, "given the pervasive nature of the 
government involvement in business (as debtor and creditor)." 
Consequently, the government's ubiquitous presence in the market 
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may inflict a unique level of violence to the principles of equity, at 
least where other creditors' interests are also at risk. In light of these 
considerations, the court fmds that the bankruptcy court did not abuse 
its discretion in disallowing setoff in the given circumstances. 
D. SetoffIReconpment 
The two major recoupment questions are (i) how is recoupment different from 
setoff and (ii) when is recoupment available. 
In re Newbery Corp., 95 F.3d 1392 (9th Cir. 1996) contains a (i) comprehensive 
comparison of setoff/recoupment, (ii) a discussion of various debtor defenses to recoupment, 
(iii) the Ninth Circuit's "same transaction" test and (iv) resolution of a priority contest between a 
recouping creditor and a secured party. C issued payment and performance bonds for D's 
construction projects and D entered into a general indemnity agreement for losses from any 
default by D on the construction projects. After D's default on the projects, C and D entered into 
a second agreement under which C would complete the projects. This second agreement allowed 
C to use D's equipment and required to C to pay rent for the use of the equipment to Citibank 
who held a security interest in D's assets. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that this second 
agreement specifically incorporated by reference the first agreement. 
Newbery also dealt with and rejected the argument that recoupment impairs the 
rights of secured party Citibank, stating: 
the purpose of the recoupment doctrine is merely to arrive at a just 
determination of the proper amount ofa plaintiffs claim. Accordingly, when 
a third party has a security interest in that very claim, application of the 
recoupment doctrine does not impair the security interest, but merely serves 
to determine the value of the claim in which the third party holds its interest. 
In this case, Citibank's security interest in the Pooled Assets is in reality 
merely a right to a portion of the unspecified proceeds ofNewbery's claim 
against Fireman's Fund. Because recoupment is designed merely to arrive at 
a proper calculation of the value of that claim, Citibank has little grounds to 
object to the application of the recoupment doctrine, even if application of 
that doctrine ultimately results in a determination that the property in which 
Citibank has a security interest is worthless. Accordingly, we reject 
Citibank's argument that application of recoupment here would impermissibly 
impair its security interest in the Pooled Assets. 
In United States v. Consumer Health Services of America, Inc., 108 F3d 390 
(D.C. Cir. 1997), the D.C. Circuit dealt with the issue of adjustment of postpetition Medicare 
reimbursements by prepetition Medicare overpayments. The court looked to the Medicare 
statute: 
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In determining whether the pre-petition and post-petition 
services should be thought of as one transaction, the key to us 
is the Medicare statute. Since it requires the Secretary to take 
into account pre-petition overpayments in order to calculate 
a post-petition claim -- as we have described above --
Congress rather clearly indicated that it wanted a provider's 
stream of services to be considered one transaction for 
purposes of any claim the government would have against the 
provider. 
Contra University Medical Center v. Sullivan, 973 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1992). 
Recently, the Second Circuit held that a utility's postpetition application of a prepetition 
deposit to the debtor's prepetition utility bill was a valid recoupment ["within a single contract or 
transaction of a single set of transactions"] and so not subject to the automatic stay. In re 
McMahon, 1997 WL 691072 (2d. Cir. 1997). 
v. CLASSIFICATION, 1122 
The Code is silent as to whether all legally similar claims, i.e., nonpriority unsecured 
claims, must be in the same class. The courts are not silent but speak In several voices (if not In 
tongues). There is language in reported cases suggesting that section 1122 permits separate 
classification of similar claims, absent gerrymandering; there is also language suggesting that 
section 1122 prohibits separate classification of similar claims. Most courts have probably taken 
a middle ground permitting separate classification of similar claims if there is a business 
justification. See generally Scott Nordberg, Classification of Claims Under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code,: The Fallacy ofInterest Based Classification, 63 Am.Bankr.L.J. 119 (1995); 
Bruce Markell, Clueless on Classification: Toward Removing Artificial Limits on Chapter 11 
Classification, 11 Bankr.Dev.J. 1 (1994-95). 
A. Secured Creditor's Deficiency Claim 
Most of the classification cases involve separate classification of a secured 
creditor's deficiency claim. In re Georgetown Ltd. Partnership, 209 B.R. 763 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 
1997) (Shulman) is a recent case permitting such classification (and providing a current review 
of case authority). See also In re Crosscreek Apartments, Ltd., 1997 WL 606517 (Bankr. B.D. 
Tenn. 1997) (unfair discrimination). Other courts prohibit or even require separate classification 
of a secured creditor's deficiency claim. Compare In re Barakat, 99 F.3d 1520, 1526 (9th Cir. 
1996); (prohibit) with In re Elmwood, 182 B.R. 845 (Bankr. Nev. 1995) (permit) with In re Gato 
Realty Trust Co., 183 B.R. 15 (Bankr. Mass. 1995) (require). 
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B. Valid Business Reason 
In cases involving classification of a secured creditor's deficiency claim, 
gerrymandering is generally the concern. What are the concerns if voting is not an issue -- i.e., 
there is a impaired assenting class? 
LTV plan placed workers compensation claims in a separate class and provided 
for full payment of that class while other creditors would receive common stock that would yield 
between 37 cents and 44 cents on the dollar. In re Chateaugay Corp., 89 F.3d 942 (2d Cir. 1996) 
approved the classification because of the valid business reason for it. 
In In re Graphic Communications, Inc., 200 B.R. 143 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996) 
(Rhodes), the debtor's plan placed Midwest in a different class from other unsecured claims and 
proposed to pay 10% to Midwest on its unsecured loan and 100% to unsecured trade creditors. 
The court first found that there was a "rational business reason for the separate classification of 
Midwest's claim. Unlike the Class III trade creditors, Midwest is a competitor of the debtor and 
is not currently doing business with the debtor." The court then found that the debtor failed to 
demonstrate that the discriminatory treatment of Midwest - 10% v. 100% - was reasonable. 
C. Relevance of 13 Case Law 
The Chapter 13 debtors in In re Davis, 209 B.R. 893 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997) 
(Schmetterer) filed a Chapter 13 plan that classified a landlord's back rent claim in a separate 
class to be paid 100% and all other unsecured claims in a class receiving 10%. In confirming the 
plan, the court stated: 
If any plan discriminated unfairly simply because one unsecured 
creditor was paid more than another, the "discriminates unfairly" 
language of section 1322(b)(1) would be meaningless. A certain 
amount of disparity of treatment among unsecured creditors in a 
Chapter 13 plan is permitted. Debtors here have demonstrated 
their urgent necessity for full payment of the rental arrearage in 
order to save their home and have some cash flow to pay even the 
10% to general unsecured creditors. While this treatment is 
certainly discriminatory, Debtors have shown that the 
discrimination is fair, even from the creditor's point of view. Ifthe 
Amended Plan fails, those creditors will likely receive nothing, as 
all of Debtors' available income will go to pay higher rent. They 
will not get the 45% dividend that Harrison projects. In this case, 
the 10% dividend offered is worth more to creditors than a 
speculative 45% dividend. 
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VI. CRAM DOWN INTEREST RATES 
A. Statutory Provisions 
1129(b)(2) 
For the pUl]Jose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair 
and equitable with respect to a class includes the following 
requirements: 
(A) With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides: 
(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing 
such claims, whether the property subject to such liens is 
retained by the debtor or transferred to another entity, to the 
extent of the allowed amount of such claims; and 
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on 
account of such claim deferred cash payments totaling at least 
the allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the 
effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder's 
interest in the estate's interest in such property; 
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any 
property that is subject to the liens securing such claims, free 
and clear of such liens, with such liens to attache to the 
proceeds of such sale, and the treatment of such liens on 
proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this subparagraph; or 
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable 
equivalent of such claims. 
122S(a)(S)(B) and (C) and 132S(a)(S)(B) and (e) 
(B)(i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien 
securing such claim; and 
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property 
to be distributed by the trustee or the debtor under the plan on 
account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of 
such claim; or 
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B. 
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such 
holder; and ... 
1997 Case Law From Circuits 
According to Judge Yacos, the "case law with regard to an appropriate discount 
rate for cramdown purposes has blossomed into a 'many-colored splendor' of conflicting and 
sometimes indecipherable formulas." In re Computer Optics. Inc., 126 B.R. 664, 671 (Bankr. 
N.H. 1991). The case law on methods of calculation of cram down interest rates is collected in 
reported cases such as In re River Valley Assoc., 161 B.R. 127, 135-36 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993), 
affd, 181 B.R. 795 (B.D. Pa. 1995) and law review commentary such as Judge John Pearson, 
Dillon Jackson & Tim Nohr, Ending the Judicial Snipe Hunt: The Search for the Cramdown 
Interest Rate, 4 ABI L. Rev. 35 (1996). 
While the reported decisions from the bankruptcy courts reflect diverse views, the 
Circuit Court opinions are essentially uniform. Eight of the circuits - Third, Fourth, Sixth, 
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh - have issued opinions approving a comparable loan 
or "coerced loan" approach to "present value", i.e., measuring cram down interest rate by what 
the secured creditor could have obtained had it foreclosed and reinvested the proceeds in loans of 
equivalent duration and risk. Two circuits, Eighth and Ninth, have recognized measuring cram 
down interest rate by a riskless base rate plus risk factors, as a possible alternative to the 
comparable loan approach. Only the Second Circuit has rejected the comparable loan approach. 
1. Second Circuit 
In In re Valenti, 105 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1997), a Chapter 13 car case, I presented the 
appellant's oral argument in Valenti; the appellant lost. Valenti is the only Circuit court decision 
on this question that I have argued. Valenti is the only appellate decision on this question that 
directly and expressly rejects comparable loans ("forced loans") as a possible measure of present 
value: 
We believe that courts adopting the "forced loan" approach 
misapprehend the "present value" function of the interest rate. 
The objective of section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) is to put the 
creditor in the same economic position that it would have 
been in had it received the value of its allowed claim 
immediately. The purpose is not to put the creditor in the 
same position that it would have been in had it arranged a 
"new" loan. 
Are the second and third sentences of the above quotation consistent? What if the creditor would 
have arranged a new loan if it had received the value of its allowed claim immediately? 
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In the Second Circuit's view, the "forced loan" approach necessarily and 
improperly includes a profit for the lender. Valenti instead "hold(s) that the market rate of 
interest under section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) should be fixed at the rate on a United States Treasury 
"=' instrument with a maturity equivalent to the repayment schedule under the debtor's 
reorganization plan "with a risk adjustment -- "a range of one to three per cent is reasonable in 
this Circuit." 
2. Fifth Circuit 
In Matter of Smithwick, 121 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1997), Chapter 13 debtors filed a 
plan that provided for a cram down interest rate of 11 %, based on a local rule which required a 
formula approach to Chapter 13 cram down interest -- 2% plus The Wall Street Journal prime 
rate. The bankruptcy court confirmed and the district court affirmed. In reversing, the Fifth 
Circuit adopted the coerced loan approach, with the rebuttable presumption that the contract rate 
is the rate for a new loan. In dictum, Judge Jones noted that Smithwick is "consistent with the 
approach we have taken in Chapter 11 cases." But cf. Financial Security i~ .. ssura.T).ce Inc. v. T-H 
New Orleans Limited Partnership, 116 F3d 790, 799 (5th Cir. 1997). 
VII. STATE IMMUNITY 
A. Possible Bankruptcy Proceedings Against State Government 
- 362 stay violations 
- 363 sale of property of the estate free and clear ofliens held by State 
- 505 determination of state tax liability 
- 510 subordination of State's claims 
- 522(f) avoidance of State lien on exempt property 
- 523 dischargeability of State claim 
- 544 to 548 avoidance of prepetition payment or other transfer to 
State 
- 549 avoidance of postpetition payment or other transfer to State 
- 28 U.S.C. 1452 removal of state court action by State agency against debtor 
B. Sovereign Immunity 
Sovereign immunity is a judicially created doctrine, derived from the common law 
premise that the king can do no wrong. There is no constitutional guarantee of sovereign 
immunity; there are not constitutional limitations on Congressional waiver of sovereign 
immunity. 
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c. Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity 
Because sovereign immunity is not constitutionally guaranteed, Congress can by 
statute eliminate or abrogate sovereign immunity. Section 106 abrogates sovereign immunity. 
United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30 (1992) addressed the effectiveness of 
an earlier version of section 106 and found that ineffective because the abrogation of sovereign 
immunity was not "unequivocally expressed." 503 U.S. at 354. The present, amended version of 
section 106 seems to be the kind of unequivocal expression required by the Court. 
D. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 
The Eleventh Amendment is not sovereign immunity. It is not based on the 
common law premise that the king can do no wrong and does not immunize the State from suit. 
Rather, it was adopted to protect the States from the interference of the federal judiciary and 
deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction over suits brought against unconsenting states 
E. Abrogation of Eleventh Amendment Immunity 
Congress can abrogate Eleventh Amendment "immunity" when it is legislating 
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment which was aimed at the States, came after the Eleventh 
Amendment and limited Eleventh Amendment immunity. After the Supreme Court's 1996 
decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v, Florida, 116 S.Ct. 416 (1996), a case involving the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act promulgated pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause of Article I 
of the Constitution, "Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed 
upon federal jurisdiction." 116 S.Ct. at 1128. 
F. Questions 
1. Does the Seminole decision impact bankruptcy? 
The Seminole decision has implications far beyond the regulation of Indians 
operating gambling venues in Florida. The majority's language and reasoning encompass all 
federal legislation enacted pursuant to Article I that attempts to abrogate the States' Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. (The bankruptcy clause is in Article I of the Constitution). 
Footnote 16 in the majority opinion and footnote 12 in the dissent suggest that 
Seminole impacts bankruptcy. In Light v. State Bar of California, 87 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 1996), 
states that Seminole "forecloses any argument that section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code abrogates 
the States' sovereign (11 th Amendment?) immunity." 
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There is some case authority that section 106 is a valid enactment pursuant to the 
privileges and immualties clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See In re Straight, 209 B.R. 540 
(U.S.D.C. Wy. 1997); In re Headrick, 200 B.R. 963 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996); contra, M,., In re 
Creative Goldsmiths of Washington D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140 (4th Cir. 1997); Matter of 
Fernandez, 123 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1997). 
2. Does the State waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity when it files 
a proof of claim? 
The Eleventh Amendment only provides a shield from federal court jurisdiction to 
"unconsenting states." Seminole, 116 S.Ct. at 1131. The Eleventh Amendment permits a state to 
consent to federal suits. Cases are divided as to whether a State consents to bankruptcy court 
jurisdiction and waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity by filing a proof of claim. Compare 
In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140 (4th Cir. 1997) (proof of 
claim not waiver); In re Sacred Heart Hospital of Norristown, 204 B.R. 132, 140-42 (E.D. Pa. 
1997)(Proof of claim not waiver) with In re Fennelly, 1997 WL 332169 (U.S.D.C. N.J. 1997) 
(claim as waiver). 
3. Which governmental authorities are "states" for purposes of the 
Eleventh Amendment? 
While sovereign immunity can apply to federal, state and local governmental 
entities, the Eleventh Amendment only applies to "states." It can be problematic to determine 
whether a governmental entity with both state and local characteristics is an arm of the state for 
purposes ofthe Eleventh Amendment. There is a helpful discussion of this problem in In re 
NVR L.P ., 206 B.R. 831, 844-48 (Bankr. Md. 1997) which holds that Maryland county clerks 
were protected by the Eleventh Amendment from a declaratory judgment motion in bankruptcy 
but only in their capacity as collectors of state taxes. 
4. Can the proceeding be brought against a particular state official? 
Seminole discusses the intricate body of Eleventh Amendment law governing the 
circumstances under which a federal suit against state officials will be allowed. In general, 
- the Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action against a public servant 
in his or her official capacity; 
- injunctive relief is not barred; 
- monetary relief that is "ancillary" to the prospective injunctive relief is 
not barred. 
Accordingly, it would seem that under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), a 
debtor could maintain an action in bankruptcy court against a state official the agency's 
continuing stay violation. Cf. Seminole, 116 S.Ct. at 1133. In re Zywiczynski, 210 B.R. 924 
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(Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1997). Matter of Guiding Light Corp., 1997 WL 610389 (Bankr. E.D. La. 
1997). 
5. Can the bankruptcy cause of action be brought against the State in 
state court? 
Recall that the Eleventh amendment only protects the State from federal court 
litigation; it does not protect the State from litigation in state courts. Congress can create a 
federal remedy against a state that is enforceable in state court. 
Under 28 U.S.C. 1334(b), state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over 
proceedings under title 11 or arising in or related to bankruptcy cases. Accordingly, it would 
seem that a bankruptcy trustee could bring a bankruptcy-related action against a state in state 
court. See generally Elizabeth Gibson, Sovereign Immunity in Bankruptcy: The Next Chapter, 
70 Am.Bankr. L.J. 195,203-208 (1996). 
VIII. BUYING CLAIMS AGAINST THE DEBTOR 
Rule 3001 (e) deals with transfers of claims against the debtor. There are also several 
recent cases that deal with questions arising from such transfers. 
A. Creditor's Buying Claims To Block Confirmation 
In In re Figter Ltd., 118 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 1997), a secured creditor purchased 21 
of the 34 unsecured claims against the debtor in a Chapter 11 apartment case. In refusing to 
disallow or designate the claims under section 1126(e), the court noted that the creditor had 
offered to purchase ail of the ciaims, was not the proponent of a competing claim, and was not a 
competing apartment owner. The standard in section 1126(e) is good faith. The Ninth Circuit 
found that the mere fact that the creditor/purchaser wanted to block confirmation of the debtor's 
plan was not, by itself, bad faith. Figter concluded: "[W]hen all is said and done, the bankruptcy 
court must simply approach each good faith determination with a perspicacity derived from the 
data of its informed practical experience in dealing with debtors and creditors." 
Accord In re Waterville Valley Town Square Associates, Ltd., 208 B.R. 90 (Bankr. N.H. 1997); 
In re Crosscreek Apartments Ltd., 211 B.R. 641 (Bankr. E.D.Tenn. 1997); In re Three Flint Hill 
Limited Partnership, 1997 WL 609193 (Md. 1997). In Crosscreek and Three Flint Hill, the 
creditor/purchaser was also a plan proponent. See generally Barry Zaretsky, Buying Claims to 
Block Plan Confirmation, 7/17/97 NYLJ 3. 
Figter also considered the debtor's argument that the creditor who purchased 21 claims 
was entitled to only one vote. The court rejected this argument; focusing on section 1126(c), the 
court concluded that a creditor who purchases 21 claims can vote 21 claims. 
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B. Insider's Purchase of Claims to Facilitate Confirmation 
See section 1129(a) (lO)("without including any acceptance of the plan by an 
insider"); In re Three Flint Hill Limited Partnership, 1997 WL 609193 (D.C. Md. 1997). 
c. Bankruptcy Consequences of Insiders Purchasing Claims Without Full 
Disclosure 
In re Olson, 191 B.R. 99 (Bankr. Minn. 1996) allowed such claims only to the 
amounts paid by the insiders and then subordinated that reduced claim. In re Papercraft 
Corporation, 211 B.R. 813 (W.D. Pa. 1997) held that the bankruptcy court was without authority 
to adopt a per se rule prohibiting claims purchases by insiders without full disclosure and 
limiting any claims purchased in violation of this rule to the amount paid. The court further 
indicates that" a rule already exists to address inequitable conduct by insiders' trading in a 
debtor's claim, section 510." 
D. Sua Sponte Disallowance? 
In re Olson, 120 B.R. 98 (8th Cir. 1997), involved insiders who purchased 11 of the 
claims against the estate and moved to dismiss the case. No creditor objected to the transfer. 
The bankruptcy court sua sponte ordered the clerk not to substitute the insiders for the selling 
creditors and declined to dismiss. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Comparing the prior and current 
versions of Rule 3001(e), the court stated, "The language ofthe rule is mandatory and directs the 
court to substitute the name of the transferee for that of the transferor in the absence of a timely 
objection from the transferor." A concluding footnote adds 
IX. 
Nor do we see any "'abuse of process" on the part of Viking here. 
Viking and the Olson children simply pursued their own economic 
self-interest. Ifthey made misrepresentations to their assignors, the 
wronged parties could have objected to the Bankruptcy Court or 
could have pursued their remedies under state law .... 
The claims transferors have taken neither of these steps. We think 
people should be allowed to decide for themselves whether to seek 
redress for an alleged injury. 
BUYING ASSETS FROM THE DEBTOR 
A. Breakup Fees 
Reported decisions on breakup fees are obviously fact-specific. Two recent 
decisions denied approval of breakup fees. In re Tiara Motorcoach Corp., 212 B.R. 133 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ind. 1997); In re Bidermann Industries U.S.A., Inc., 203 B.R. 547 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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For unreported cases in which bankruptcy fees have been approved, see The Daily Bankruptcy 
Review. Cf. Sather, Shakespeare for Lawyers: Stalking Horse, 15 ABU 37 (May 1996). 
B. Risk of Successor Liability Mter Chapter 11 Sales 
Section 363(f) authorizes the bankruptcy trustee or a debtor in possession to sell 
free and clear of "any interest in such property of an entity other than the debtor." Secured 
creditors have interests in property. 
Section 363(f) does not expressly authorize the sale of property free and clear of 
"claims." In re Fairchild Aircraft Com., 184 B.R. 910,918 (Bankr. W.D. Tx. 1995) held that a 
section 363(f)(3) does not extinguish in personam liabilities. 
Section 1141 (c) does expressly deal with claims - "free and clear of all claims." 
Accordingly, it would seem that a sale pursuant to a confIrmed plan may afford a buyer more 
protection that a section 363 sale. 
Arguably, the protection from successor liability of a purchaser pursuant to a plan 
is limited by the term "claim". ConfIrmation of a plan discharges "claims." It would seem that 
successor liability protection is similarly limited. See In re Schwinn Bicycle Co., 210 B.R. 747 
(Bankr. N.D. IlL 1997). See generally David Kuney, Successor Liability in Sales of a Debtor's 
Assets: The Problem of the "Mere Continuation Exception". 6 J. Bankr. 1. & Prac. 269 (March-
April 1997); Michael Reed, Successor Liability and Bankruptcy Sales, 51 Bus. Law. 653 (1996). 
C. Mootness 
The Second Circuit has concluded that it lacks jurisdiction to review an unstayed 
sale order except on the limited issue of whether the sale was made to a good faith purchaser. In 
re Gucci, 105 F.3d 837 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1552 (1997); see generally Martin I. 
Klein, Appellate Court Review of Bankruptcy Sales, 4117/97 NYLJ 1. There are also two 1997 
Second Circuit decisions holding that the purchaser was in "good faith." See In re Colony Hill 
Associates, 111 F3d 269 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Gucci, 1997 WL 594687 (2d Cir. 1997). see also 
Dick's Clothing & Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Phar-Mor, Inc., 212 B.R. 283 (N.D. Ohio 1997). 
Note the phrase "affect the validity" of the sale in section 363(m). A possible 
reading of section 363(m) is that an appeal from an unstayed sale may proceed for purposes other 
than affecting the validity of the sale. The Tenth Circuit seems to so read section 363(m) in In re 
BCD Corporation, 119 F3d 852 (10th Cir. 1997). The court there refused to rule that the appeal 
was moot, concluding that the debtor still had the sale proceeds so it could fashion appropriate 
equitable relief; the court then affIrmed the sale on the merits. 
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Chapter 1: Consumer Bankruptcy - System Administration 
1.1.1 National Filing System 
A national filing system should be established and maintained that 
would identify bankruptcy filings using social security numbers or 
other unique identifying numbers. 
1.1.2 Heightened Requirements for Accurate Information 
The Bankruptcy Code should direct trustees to perform random audits 
of debtors' schedules to verify the accuracy of the information listed. 
Cases would be selected for audit according to guidelines developed by 
the Executive Office for United States Trustees. 
1.1.3 False Claims 
Courts should be authorized to order creditors who file and fail to 
correct materially false claims in bankruptcy to pay costs and the 
debtors' attorneys' fees involved in correcting the claim. If a creditor 
knowingly filed a false claim, the court could impose appropriate 
additional sanctions. 
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1.1.4 Rule 9011 
The Commission endorses the amended Rule 9011 of the Federal Rules 
of Bankruptcy Procedure, to become effective on December 1, 1997, 
which will make an attorney's presentation to the court of any petition, 
pleading, written motion, or other paper a certification that the 
attorney made a reasonable inquiry into the accuracy of that 
information, and thus will help ensure that attorneys take 
responsibility for the information that they and their clients provide. 
1.1.5 Financial Education 
All debtors in both Chapter 7 and in Chapter 13 should have the 
opportunity to participate in a fmancial education program. 
Chapter 1: Consumer Bankruptcy - Property Exemptions 
1.2.1 Elimination o/Opt Out 
A consumer debtor who has filed a petition for relief under the 
Bankruptcy Code should be allowed to exempt property as provided 
in section 522 of the Code. Subsection (b)(I) and (2) of section 522 
should be repealed. 
1.2.2 Homestead Property 
The debtor should be able to exempt the debtor's aggregate interest as 
a fee owner, a joint tenant, or a tenant by the entirety, in real property 
or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses 
as a residence in the amount determined by the laws of the state in 
which the debtor resides, but not less than $20,000 and not more than 
$100,000. Subsection (m) of section 522 should be revised to reflect 
that all exemptions except for the homestead exemption shall apply 
separately to each debtor in a joint case. 
1.2.3 Nonhomestead Lump Sum Exemption 
With respect to property of the estate not otherwise exempt by other 
provisions, a debtor should be permitted to retain up to $20,000 in 
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should be permitted to exempt an additional $15,000 of property in 
any form. 
All professionally-prescribed medical devices and health aids necessary 
for the health and maintenance of the debtor or a dependent of the 
debtor should be exempt. 
Rights to Receive Benefits and Payments 
All funds held directly or indirectly in a trust that is exempt from 
federal income tax pursuant to sections 408 or 501(a) of the Internal 
Revenue Code should be exempt. 
1.2.6 Rights to Payments 
Rights to receive future payments (e.g., social security benefits, life 
insurance) should be exempt, and the debtor's right to receive an 
award under a crime victim's reparations law or payment for a 
personal bodily injury claim of the debtor or the debtor's dependent 
should be exempt. 
Chapter 1: Consumer Bankruptcy - Reaffirmation Agreements and 
the Treatment of Secured Debt 
1.3.1 11 U.S.c. § 524(c) should be amended to provide that a reaffirmation 
agreement is permitted, with court approval, only if the amount of the 
debt that the debtor seeks to reaffirm does not exceed the allowed 
secured claim, the lien is not avoidable under the provisions of title 11, 
no attorney fees, costs, or expenses have been added to the principal 
amount of the debt to be reaffirmed, the motion for approval of the 
agreement is accompanied by underlying contractual documents and 
all related security agreements or liens, together with evidence of their 
perfection, the debtor has provided all information requested in the 
motion for approval of the agreement, and the agreement conforms 
with all other requirements of subsection (c). 
Section 524( d) should be amended to delineate the circumstances 
under which a hearing is not required as a prerequisite to a court 
approving an agreement of the kind specified in section 524(c): a 
hearing will not be required when the debtor was represented by 
counsel in negotiations on the agreement and the debtor's attorney has 
signed the affidavit as provided in section 524 (c), and a party in 
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interest has not requested a judicial valuation of the collateral that is 
the subject of the agreement. if one or more of the foregoing 
requirements is not met, or in the court's discretion, the court shall 
conduct a hearing to determine whether an agreement that meets all 
of the requirements of subsection (c) should be approved. Court 
approval of an agreement signifies that the court has determined that 
the agreement is in the best interest of the debtor and the debtor's· 
dependents and does not impose undue hardship on the debtor and the 
debtor's dependents in light ofthe debtor's income and expenses. 
The Commission recommends that the Advisory Committee on 
Bankruptcy Rules ofthe Judicial Conference prescribe a form motion 
for approval of reaffirmation agreements that contains information 
enabling the court and the parties to determine the propriety of the 
agreement. Approval of the motion would not entail a separate order 
of the court. 
1.3.2 An additional subsection should be added to section 524 to provide 
that the court shall grant judgment in favor of an individual who has 
received a discharge under section 727,1141,1228, or 1328 ofthis title 
for costs and attorneys fees, plus treble damages, from a creditor who 
threatens, fIles suit, or otherwise seeks to collect any debt that was 
discharged in bankruptcy and was not the subject of an agreement in 
accordance with subsections ( c) and (d) of section 524. 
1.3.3 No Ride-Through 
1.3.4 
Section 521(2) should be amended to clarify that a debtor with 
consumer debts tbat are secured, as determined by the provisions of 
title 11, by property of the estate must redeem the property or obtain 
court approval of an agreement under section 524( c) oftitle 11 in order 
to retain the property postdischarge, except for a security interest in 
real or personal property that is the debtor's principal residence. 
Security Interests in Household Goods 
Household Goods Worth Less Than $500 
Section 522(t) should provide that a creditor claiming a purchase 
money security interest in exempt property held for personal or 
household use ofthe debtor or a dependent of the debtor in household 
furnishings, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, 
musical instruments, jewelry, implements, professional books, tools of 
the trade or professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a 
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member ofthe debtor's household must petition the bankruptcy court 
for continued recognition of the security interest. The court ~hall hold 
a hearing to value each item covered by the creditor's petition. If the 
value of the item is less than $500, the petition shall not be granted; if 
the value is $500 or greater, the security interest would be recognized 
and treated as a secured loan in Chapter 7 or Chapter 13. 
1.3.5 Characterization of Rent-to-Own Transactions 
Consumer rent-to-own transactions should be characterized in 
bankruptcy as installment sales contracts. 
Chapter 1: Consumer Bankruptcy - Discharge, Exceptions to 
Discharge and Objections to Discharge 
1.4.1 Credit Card Debt 
Except for credit card debts that are excepted from discharge under 
section 523(a)(2)(B) (for materially false written statements respecting 
the debtor's financial condition) and section 523(a)(14), (debts 
incurred to pay nondischargeable taxes to the United States), debts 
incurred on a credit card issued to the debtor that did not exceed the 
debtor's credit limit should be dischargeable unless they were incurred 
within 30 days before the order for relief under title 11. 
1.4.2 Debts Incurred to Pay Nondischargeable Federal Tax Obligations 
Section 523(a)(14) should remain unchanged to except from discharge 
debts incurred for federal taxes that would be nondischargeable under 
section 523(a)(I). 
1.4.3 Criminal Restitution Orders 
1.4.4 
Section 523(a)(13) should be expanded to apply to all criminal 
restitution orders. 
Family Support Obligations 
Sections 523(a)(5), (a)(15), and (a)(18) should be combined. The 
revised 523(a)(5) should provide that all debts actually in the nature of 
support, whether they have been denominated in a prior court order 
as alimony, maintenance, support, property settlements, or otherwise, 
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are nondischargeable. In addition, debts owed under state law to a 
sl.ate or municipality in the nature of support would be 
non dischargeable in all chapters. 
1.4.5 Dischargeability of Student Loans 
Section 523(a)(8) should be repealed. 
1.4.6 Issue Preclusive Effect of True Defaults 
For complaints to establish nondischargeability on grounds set forth 
in section 523(c), the Bankruptcy Code should clarify that issues that 
were not actually litigated and necessary to a prior judgment shall not 
be given preclusive effect. 
1.4.7 Vicarious Liability 
Section 523(c) should be amended such that intentional action by a 
wrongdoer who is not the debtor cannot be imputed to the debtor. 
1.4.8 Effect of Lack of Notice on Time to Bring Objection to Discharge 
Creditors that did not receive notice of a bankruptcy should get an 
extension of time to file an objection to or seek revocation of a 
discharge. 
1.4.9 Settlement and Dismissal of Objections to Discharge 
Section 727 should be amended to provide that (a) any complaint 
objecting to discharge may be dismissed on motion of the plaintiff only 
after giving notice to the United States trustee, the case trustee and all 
creditors entitled to notice, advising them of an opportunity to 
substitute as plaintiff in the action; (b) any motion to dismiss a 
complaint objecting to discharge must be accompanied by an affidavit 
of the moving party disclosing all consideration given or promised to 
be given by the debtor in connection with dismissal of the complaint; 
and (c) if the debtor has given or promised to give consideration in 
connection with dismissal of the complaint, the complaint may not be 
dismissed unless the consideration benefits the estate generally. 
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Chapter 1: Consumer Bankruptcy - Chapter 13 Repayment Plans 
1.5.1 Home Mortgages 
A Chapter 13 plan could not modify obligations on first mortgages and 
refinanced first mortgages, except to the extent currently permitted by 
the Bankruptcy Code. Section 1322(b )(2) should be amended to 
provide that the rights of a holder of a claim secured only by a junior 
security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal 
residence may not be modified to reduce the secured claim to less than 
the appraised value ofthe property at the time the security interest was 
made. 
1.5.2 Valuation of Collateral 
A creditor's secured claim in personal property should be determined 
by the property's wholesale price. 
A creditor's secured claim in real property should be determined by 
the property's fair market value, minus hypothetical costs of sale. 
1.5.3 Payments on secured debts that are subject to modification should be 
spread over the life of the plan, according to fixed criteria for interest 
rates. 
1.5.4 Unsecured Debt 
Payments on unsecured debt should be determined by guidelines based 
on a graduated percentage of the debtor's income, subject to upward 
adjustment to meet the section 1325(a)(4) requirement that creditors 
receive at least the present value of whatever they would have received 
in a Chapter 7. The trustee or an unsecured creditor should be 
authorized to file an objection to any plan that deviates from the 
guidelines, and a court would determine whether the deviation was 
appropriate in light of all the circumstances. 
1.5.5 Consequences of Incomplete Payment Plans 
The Bankruptcy Code should provide that a case under Chapter 13 
that otherwise meets the standards for dismissal shall be converted to 
Chapter 7 after notice and a hearing unless a party in interest objects 
on the basis that the debtor had been granted a discharge in a Chapter 
G-ll 
Bankruptcy: The Next Twentv Years 
7 case commenced within six years ofthe date on which the conversion 
would take place, in which case the Chapter 13 case w]l be dismissed. 
In addition, the debtor may object to conversion without grounds, in 
which case the Chapter 13 case will be dismissed. The standards for 
modification, dismissal, and discharge in Chapter 13 would not 
otherwise change. 
Section 362 should be amended to provide that the filing of a petition 
by an individual does not operate as a stay if the individual has filed 
two or more petitions for relief under title 11 within six years of filing 
the instant petition for relief and if the individual has been a debtor in 
a bankruptcy case within 180 days prior to the instant petition for 
relief. On the request of the debtor, after notice and a hearing, the 
court may impose a stay for cause shown, subject to such conditions 
and modifications as the court may impose. 
1.5.6 In Rem Orders 
Section 362 should be amended to provide that the filing of a petition 
by an individual does not operate as a stay with respect to property of 
the estate transferred by that individual to another individual who was 
a debtor under title 11 within 180 days of the filing of the instant 
petition, unless the court grants a stay with respect to such property 
after notice and a hearing on request of the debtor. 
After notice and a hearing, a bankruptcy court should be empowered 
to issue in rem orders barring the application of a future automatic 
stay to identified property of the estate for a period of up to six years 
when a party could show that the debtor had transferred such real 
property or leasehold interests or fractional shares of property or 
leasehold interests to avoid creditor foreclosure or eviction. A 
subsequent owner of the property or tenant of the leasehold who files 
for bankruptcy (or the same owner or holder in a subsequent filing) 
should be permitted to petition the bankruptcy court for the 
imposition of a stay to protect property of the estate, which the court 
would be required to grant to protect innocent parties who were not a 
part of a scheme to transfer the property to hinder foreclosure or 
eviction. 
1.5.7 Retention of the "Superdischarge" 
Congress should retain 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a), which permits a debtor 
who completes all payments under the plan to discharge all debts 
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provided for by the plan or disallowed under section 502 of title 11 
except for those listed in section 1328(a)(I) - (3). 
1.5.8 Debtors who choose Chapter 13 repayment plans should have their 
bankruptcy filings reported differently from those who do not. 
Debtors who complete voluntary debtor education programs should 
have that fact noted on their credit reports. 
1.5.9 Trustees should be encouraged to establish credit rehabilitation 
programs to help provide better, cheaper access to credit for those who 
participate in repayment plans. 
Chapter 2: Treatment of Mass Future Claims in Bankruptcy 
2.1.1 Definition of Mass Future Claim 
A defmition of "mass future claim" should be added as a subset of the 
definition of "claim" in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). "Mass future claim" 
should be defmed as a claim arising out of a right to payment, or 
equitable relief that gives rise to a right to payment that has or has not 
accrued under non bankruptcy law that is created by one or more acts 
or omissions of the debtor if: 
1) the act(s) or omission(s) occurred before or at the time of the order 
for relief; 
2) the act(s) or omission(s) may be sufficient to establish liability when 
injuries ultimately are manifested; 
3) at the time of the petition, the debtor has been subject to numerous 
demands for payment for injuries or damages arising from such acts 
. or omissions and is likely to be subject to substantial future demands 
for payment on similar grounds; 
4) the holders of such rights to payments are known or, if unknown, can 
be identified or described with reasonable certainty; and 
5) the amount of such liability is reasonably capable of estimation. 
The definition of "claim" in section 101(5) should be amended to add 
a definition of "holder of a mass future claim," which would be an 
entity that holds a mass future claim. 
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2.1.2 Protecting the Interests of Holders of Mass Future Claims 
The Bankruptcy Code should provide that a party in interest may 
petition the court for the appointment of a mass future claims 
representative. When a plan includes a class or classes of mass future 
claims, the Bankruptcy Code should authorize a court to order the 
appointment of a representative for each class of holders of mass future 
claims. A mass future claims representative shall serve until further 
order of the bankruptcy court. 
The Bankruptcy Code should provide that a mass future claims 
representative shall have the exclusive power to file a claim or claims 
on behalf of the class of mass future claims (and to determine whether 
or not to file a claim), to cast votes on behalf of the holders of mass 
future claims and to exercise all of the powers of a committee 
appointed pursuant to section 1102. However, a holder of a mass 
future claim may elect to represent his, her, or its own interests and 
may opt out of being represented by the mass future claims 
representative. 
The Bankruptcy Code should provide that prior to confirmation of a 
plan of reorganization, the fees and expenses of a mass future claims 
representative and his or her.-agents shall be administrative expenses 
under section S03. _ Following the confirmation of a plan of 
reorganization, and for so long as holders of mass future claims may 
exist, any continuing fees and expenses of a mass future claims 
representative and his or her agents shall be an expense of the fund 
established for the compensation of mass future claims. 
The Bankruptcy Code should" provide that a mass future claims 
representative shall serve until further orders of the bankruptcy court 
declare otherwise, shall serve as a fiduciary for the holders of future 
claims in such representative's class, and shall be subject to suit only in 
the district where the representative was appointed. 
2.1.3 Determination of Mass Future Claims 
Section S02 should provide that the court may estimate mass future 
claims and also may determine the amount of mass future claims prior 
to confirmation of a plan for purposes of distribution as well as 
allowance and voting. In addition, 28 U.S.C. § lS7(b)(2)(B) should 
specify that core proceedings include the estimation or determination 
of the amount of mass future claims. 
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2.1.4 Channeling Injunctions 
Section 524 should authorize courts to issue channeling injunctions. 
2.1.5 Plan Confirmation and Discharge; Successor Liability 
Sections 363 and 1123 should provide that the trustee may dispose of 
property free and clear of mass future claims when the trustee or plan 
proponent has satisfied the requirements for treating mass future 
claims. Upon approving the sale, the court could issue, and later 
enforce, an injunction to preclude holders from suing a successor/good 
faith purchaser. 
Chapter 2: Transnational Insolvency 
2.2.1 Adoption ofthe UNCITRAL Model Law for Cross-Border Insolvencies 
2.2.2 Retention of provisions for additional relief 
2.2.3 Amendment of title 28 to add jurisdiction over the Model Law 
provisions 
2.2.4 Conforming amendments to the definitions of foreign proceeding and 
foreign representative in section 101(23)-(24) 
2.2.5 Exclusion from the application of the Model Law of consumers 
resident in the United States if their debts are within the limits for 
Chapter 13 
2.2.6 Recognition vel non of foreign tax claims to be left to evolving caselaw 
and treaty negotiations 
2.2.7 28 U.S.C. § 1410 should be amended to provide that the various bases 
for venue may be used in the alternative as a matter of choice, i.e., the 
word "only" should be deleted from the section; additionally there 
should be a catch-all venue choice related to the interest of justice and 
convenience of the parties 
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2.3.1 Defining the term "General Partner" 
A "general partner" should be defined under 11 U.S.c. § 101 as any 
entity that as a result of an existing or former status as an actual or 
purported general partner in an existing, former, predecessor, or 
affiliated partnership, is liable under applicable nonbankruptcy law for 
one or more debts of the partnership. 
2.3.2 Consent of Former Partners 
The Bankruptcy Code and Rules should be amended to clarify that, 
notwithstanding Recommendation 1 (defining "general partner"), a 
former general partner of a partnership is not, absent a specific court 
order to the contrary, required to consent to a voluntary petition by a 
partnership, to be served with a petition or summons in an involuntary 
case against a partnership, or to perform the duties of disclosure or 
procedural duties imposed on a general partner of a debtor 
partnership. 
2.3.3 Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction 
2.3.4 
The court in which a partnership case is pending should have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.c. § 1334(b) to determine who is or may be 
liable as a general partner for the debts of the partnership and may 
determine the rights among the general partners with respect to the 
debts of the partnership. Such matters should constitute core 
proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). 
Liability of General Partner for Deficiency in Partnership Case 
If there is a deficiency of property of the partnership estate to pay in 
full all allowed claims in a case under title 11, the estate should have a 
claim against each general partner to the extent that, under applicable 
nonbankruptcy law, such general partner is personally liable for such 
deficiency. The amount ofthe deficiency claim should not be reduced 
on account of any right of contribution or indemnity among general 
partners. The claim should be estimated if its determination would 
unduly delay the administration ofthe case. Any action or proceeding 
to enforce liability under this section should be commenced no later 
than four years after the entry of the order for relief in the case 
concerning the partnership. 
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2.3.5 Power of the Court to Assure Payment of the Deficiency § 
=; ~ 
~ '21S Renumbered section 723(b) of the Bankruptcy Code should be 
~ 
amended to provide that the court in a partnership case may, after 
notice and a hearing, order any general partner that is not a debtor in 
a case under this title (1) to provide the estate, in such amount as the 
court shall determine to be appropriate under the circumstances, with 
indemnity for, or assurance of payment of, any deficiency recoverable 
from such general partner, or (2) not to incur obligations or transfer 
property except under specified circumstances. 
2.3.6 Trustee's Recovery against the Estate of a Debtor General Partner 
Renumbered section 723(c) of the Bankruptcy Code should be 
amended to provide that notwithstanding section 728( c), the trustee of 
-
a partnership has a claim against the estate of each general partner in 
--
such partnership that is a debtor in a case under title 11 for (1) the full 
amount of all claims allowed in the case concerning the partnership for 
which such general partner would otherwise be personally liable as a 
general partner under applicable nonbankruptcy law; and (2) 
administrative claims which have been assessed against such general 
partner. Notwithstanding section 502 of this title, there shall not be 
allowed in such partner's case a claim against the partner on which 
both the general partner and the partnership are liable, except to the 
extent that such claim is allowable and secured only by property of 
such general partner and not by property of such partnership. 
2.3.7 Repeal of the "Jingle Rule" in All General Partner Bankruptcy Cases 
Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code should be amended in order to 
provide that the claim of a trustee of a partnership debtor, or the claim 
of a creditor of a nondebtor partnership, is entitled to share in the 
distribution in a general partner's bankruptcy case in the same 
manner and to the same extent as any other claim of the same class of 
a creditor of such general partner. 
2.3.8 Allocation of Expenses of Administration of a Partnership Case 
Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code should be amended to provide that 
the expenses of administration of a partnership case under section 503 
of the Bankruptcy Code may be assessed against general partners or 
paid from the property constituting recoveries from general partners 
~ 
under this section and from other property of the estate in such 
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proportions as the court shall determine are fair and reasonable after 
notice and hearing. 
2.3.9 Distribution of Recoveries from General Partners 
Renumbered section 723 of the Bankruptcy Code -should be amended 
to provide that notwithstanding section 726 of the Bankruptcy Code 
(except as provided in Recommendation 2.3.8 above), the trustee 
should apply any recovery obtained from a general partner or the 
estate of a general partner only to the payment of deficiencies on claims 
for which such general partner is personally liable as a general partner 
under applicable nonbankruptcy law. Any property constituting 
recoveries from general partners or the estates of general partners 
under this Recommendation not applied to the proper deficiencies as 
herein provided or to administration expenses (as provided in 
Recommendation 2.3.8 above), should be equitably distributed by the 
trustee to such general partner or to such general partners' estates as 
may be ordered by the court after notice and hearing. 
2.3.10 Distribution of Property of the Partnership Estate 
Renumbered section 723 of the Bankruptcy Code should be amended 
to provide that notwithstanding section 726 of the Code, and except as 
set forth in Recommendation 2.3.8 above (treatment of expenses of 
administration), the trustee should distribute property of the 
partnership estate which is not recovered from general partners or the 
estates of debtor general partners to allowed claims against the 
partnership in accordance with otherwise applicable provisions of this 
title without considering distributions of property from general 
partners or general partners' estates. 
2.3.11 Trustee's Power to File Involuntary Cases 
Section 303(b )(3) of the Bankruptcy Code should be amended to 
permit the trustee of a partnership in a case commenced under title II 
to file an involuntary petition against a general partner without regard 
to the number of creditors, nature ofthe claims or dollar amount of the 
claims otherwise required under section 303(b)(I) and (2). 
2.3.12 Appointment of Committee of General Partners 
Chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code should be amended to provide 
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United States trustee to appoint a committee of general partners that 
is fairly representative of the interests of all general par+ners. 
2.3.13 General Partner Liability on Nonrecourse Partnership Debt under 11 
U.S.c. § 1111(b) 
Section 1111(b) of the Bankruptcy Code should be amended to clarify 
that, except as otherwise provided in a confirmed plan of a partnership 
debtor or the order confirming the plan, a general partner is not liable 
on a nonrecourse claim against the partnership except to the extent 
that the general partner is personally liable on such claim under 
applicable nonbankruptcy law. 
2.3.14 'Temporary' Injunction of Proceedings or Acts against Nondebtor 
General Partners 
The Bankruptcy Code should be amended to permit the court for 
cause, upon motion of a party in interest and after notice and hearing, 
to temporarily enjoin actions of creditors or general partners of a 
debtor partnership against nondebtor general partners or their 
property on account of partnership obligations. No injunction should 
be granted under this Recommendation unless the nondebtor general 
partner (1) consents to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court; (2) 
makes or undertakes to make the disclosures required by 
Recommendation 2.3.18 below; and (3) the order granting the 
injunction precludes the protected general partner from incurring 
obligations or transfers of property except under specified 
circumstances. 
2.3.15 Relieffrom the Temporary Injunction 
The Bankruptcy Code should be amended to provide that the court, 
upon request of a party in interest and after notice and hearing, may, 
for cause, grant· relief from the temporary injunction provided 
pursuant to Recommendation 2.3.14. The relief available would 
include the termination, annulment, modification or conditioning a 
continuation of the injunction. 
2.3.16 'Postconfirmation ' Injunction of Proceedings or Acts against Nondebtor 
General Partners Who Contribute to Plans 
The Bankruptcy Code should be amended to permit the court, in 
connection with the confirmation of a plan of reorganization in a 
partnership case, to enjoin partnership creditors and general partners 
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from actions or proceedings against a general partner or its property 
to collect on partnership-related claims where the general partner has 
contributed or made an enforceable commitment to contribute an 
amount to the payment of debts in accordance with the plan or the 
order confirming the plan. The court, after notice and hearing, must 
determine that the plan complies with otherwise applicable 
requirements for confirmation in light of the personal assets of the 
nondebtor contributing partners and that the injunction will not 
discriminate unfairly or inequitably· with respect to creditors of the 
partnership or the claims of the general partners for contribution or 
indemnity. 
2.3.17 Revocation of Injunction 
The Bankruptcy Code should be amended to provide that the 
injunction issued with respect to any nondebtor general partner under 
Recommendation 2.3.16 above should be terminated or revoked on the 
request of a party in interest if, after notice and hearing, the court 
determines (1) that the protected nondebtor general partner has failed 
to perform a material commitment under the plan; (2) that the order 
confirming the plan in which the injunction was issued is revoked 
under sections 1144 or 1230 of the Code; or (3) that the nondebtor 
general partner has procured the injunction by fraud. The 
Bankruptcy Code should be further amended to provide that a request 
for revocation for fraud under provision (3) should be made at any 
time within two years after the date of the entry of the confirmation 
order. 
2.3.18 Dut:y or Disclosure by Nondebtor General Partners 
The Bankruptcy Code should be amended to provide that, unless 
otherwise ordered by the court for cause, each nondebtor general 
partner shall, within 30 days after the entry of the order for relief in a 
partnership case or within such time as the court shall fix, produce 
information concerning such partner's financial condition and affairs 
similar to that provided by a debtor, together with such additional 
information and periodic reports as may be required by the court from 
time to time. 
2.3.19 Access to Disclosed Information 
The Bankruptcy Code should be amended to provide that the trustee, 
debtor in possession or other entity designated by the court in a 
partnership bankruptcy case should maintain and promptly provide 
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to parties in interest in the case, on reasonable request,certain 
important informatioll regarding the nondebtor general partners ofthe 
debtor partnership. 
Treatment of LLC Member or LLC Manager Under the Bankruptcy 
Code 
Debtor LLC members in member-managed LLCs should be treated 
like general partners under the Bankruptcy Code. Similarly, debtor 
managers of manager-managed LLC's should be treated like general 
partners under the Bankruptcy Code. This treatment should be 
limited to three aspects of the LLC member or LLC manager 
relationship: (1) continuity ofLLC after LLC member's or manager's 
bankruptcy filing; (2) transferability of LLC ownership interest; and 
(3) management rights in the LLC. 
2.3.21 Exclusion of a Partnership or LLC Relationship from Treatment under 
11 U.S.e. § 365 
The Bankruptcy Code should be amended to exclude partnership and 
LLC governing documents and relationships from treatment under 11 
U.S.C. § 365. A new section concerning partnership and LLC 
governing documents and relationships should be added to the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
2.3.22 Ipso Facto Provisions in Partnership or LLCGoverning Documents 
Rendered Unenforceable 
Ipso facto provisions relating to partnerships, LLCs, and the rights or 
interests of partners or LLC members or managers should not be 
enforceable under the Bankruptcy Code. Ipso facto provisions include 
any provision ina partnership agreement, LLC operating agreement, 
or applicable nonbankruptcy law that operates to terminate or modify 
the rights of a partner or LLC member based on insolvency, financial 
condition, commencement of a voluntary or involuntary case under 
title 11, or appointment of a trustee or custodian. Non-ipso facto 
provisions that limit a partner's or LLC member's rights, relationship, 
interest, or permit expUlsion on the basis of something other than 
insolvency, fmancial condition, commencement of a voluntary or 
involuntary case under title 11, or the appointment of a receiver would 
remain enforceable. 
G- 21 
Bankruptcy: TheNext Twenty Years 
2.3.23 Property of the Estate, Transferability, and Valuation of a Partnership 
or LLC Interest 
"Property of the estate" for a partner or LLC member should include 
all rights attendant with the partnership or LLC interest, including 
management rights, voting rights, and economic rights (including 
goodwill, the right to share in profits and losses, and any other right to 
payment). Except as provided below, the Recommendation does not 
alter the effect of section 541(a)(6), to the extent it is applicable. In the 
case of an individual partner or LLC member who (1) continues 
employment (in whatever capacity) with the partnership or LLC after 
the order for relief, and (2) whose estate receives or is more likely than 
not going to receive the "buyout price" as defined below, all 
partnership or LLC interest amounts arising, accruing, or payable 
after the order for relief are deemed to be on account of personal 
services rendered by the partner or LLC member and do not become 
property of the estate. There should be a presumption, in a case of an 
individual debtor, that the estate is more likely than not going to 
receive the" buyout price," upon which presumption the parties should 
be entitled to rely and function until the court orders to the contrary, 
after notice and hearing, on motion of the trustee or any party in 
interest. 
The court should have the power to authorize a sale under section 363 
of the partnership or LLC interest and order the admission of the 
buyer to the partnership or LLC with all rights and duties the debtor 
had, except that if the governing documents preclude transfer under 
a non-ipso facto provision, the anti-transfer clauses will be given effect, 
but only if the partnership or LLC pays the "buyout price" to the 
estate. The court should retain the power to (1) fashion reasonable 
payment terms which balance the needs of the estate for receipt of cash 
as rapidly as possible with the needs of the entity for liquidity and 
working capital to conduct its operations in a prudent manner; and (2) 
ensure receipt of the buyout price by the estate. 
The" buyout price" means the highest price (including a calculation or 
appraisal method), if any, provided in the governing documents in the 
case of a buyout of an interest not on account of the bankruptcy of, 
insolvency of, fmancial condition of, commencement of a voluntary or 
involuntary case under title 11 for, or appointment of a trustee or 
custodian for, a partner or LLC member or manager. If no such price 
is provided, the court should determine a fair buyout value. 
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Treatment of Partnership and LLC Management Rights 
During any period when an estate administered in a bankruptcy case 
includes a partnership or LLC interest, the management and voting 
rights of the partner or LLC member are to be exercised as follows: 
• A debtor in possession under Chapter 11 or a debtor 
under either Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 should exercise all 
management and voting rights, subject to the applicable 
non-ipso facto provisions of the partnership or LLC 
governing documents and applicable nonbankruptcy law, 
and the other applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code; 
• Where (a) there is more than one general partner or LLC 
managing entity and at least one of such partners or 
entities is not a debtor in a case under the Bankruptcy 
Code, and (b) a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 trustee has been 
appointed, then the tmstee should not exercise any 
management rights except to the extent necessary to 
constitute a quorum or to meet a minimum majority 
required by the governing documents or applicable 
nonbankruptcy law; 
• In all other cases where a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 trustee 
has been appointed, the trustee shall exercise all 
management and voting rights. 
Regardless ofthe foregoing, in all cases where (1) an individual debtor 
continues to function as a partner or member after the order for relief, 
and (2) the estate receives or is more likely than not going to receive, 
the" buyout price," then the individual should have the sole power to 
exercise management and voting rights attributable to periods after the 
order for relief. . 
2.3.25 11 U.S.e. § 523 and Imputed Conduct or Liability 
11 U.S.c. § 523 should be amended to provide that nothing in this 
section shall preclude the discharge of a . general partner from a debt 
(otherwise nondischargeable in a copartner's or agent's bankruptcy 
case) arising solely as a result of imputing to the general partner the 
conduct or liability of a copartner or agent. 
G- 23 
Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years 
2.3.26 Subordination of Claims Arising from tile Purchase or Sale of a 
Partnership Inf4?rest 
11 u.s.c. § 510(b) should be amended to subordinate the claims 
"arising from the rescission ofa purchase or sale" of their partnership 
interests or ""for damages arising from the purchase or sale" of their 
partnership interests to all claims and interests that are senior or equal 
to the claim or interest represented by such security or other interest 
in the bankruptcy case of a general partner. 
Chapter 2: General Issues in Chapter 11 
2.4.1 Clarifying the Meaning of "Rejection" 
The concept of "rejection" in section 365 should be replaced with 
'~election to breach." 
Section 365 should provide that a trustee's ability to elect to breach a 
contract of the debtor is not an avoiding power. 
Section 502(g) should be amended to provide that a claim arising from 
the election to breach shall be allowed or disallowed the same as if such 
claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition. 
2.4.2 Clarifying the Option of "Assumption" 
"Assumption" should be replaced with" election to perform" in section 
365. 
2.4.3 Interim Protection and Obligations of Nondebtor Parties 
A court should be authorized to grant an order governing temporary 
performance and/or providing protection of the interests of the 
nondebtor party until the court approves a decision to perform or 
breach a contract. 
Section 503(b) should include as an administrative expense losses 
reasonably and unavoidably sustained by a nondebtor party to a 
contract, a standard based on nonbankruptcy contract principles, 
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if such nondebtor party was acting in accordance with a court order 
governing temporary performance. 
Contracts Subject to Section 365; Eliminating the "Executory" 
Requirement 
Title 11 should be amended to delete all references to "executory" in 
section 365 and related provisions, and "executoriness" should be 
eliminated as a prerequisite to the trustee's election to assume or 
breach a contract 
Prebankruptcy Waivers of Bankruptcy Code Provisions 
Section 558 of the Bankruptcy Code shouid provide that except as 
otherwise provided in title 11, a clause in a contract or lease or a 
provision in a court order or plan of reorganization executed or issued 
prior to the commencement of a bankruptcy case does not waive, 
terminate, restrict, condition, or otherwise modify any rights or 
defenses provided by title 11. Any issue actually litigated or any issue 
resolved by consensual agreement between the debtor and a 
governmental unit in its police or regulatory capacity, whether 
embodied in a judgment, administrative order or settlement 
agreement, would be given preclusive effect. 
2.4.6 Prepackaged Plans of Reorganization; Section 341 Meeting of Creditors 
Section 341 should provide that upon the motion of any party in 
interest in a Chapter 11 case that entails a prepackaged plan of 
reorganization, the court may waive the requirement that the U.S. 
trustee convene a meeting of creditors. 
2.4.7 Authorization for Local Mediation Programs 
Congress should authorize judicial districts to enact local rules 
establishing mediation programs in which the court may order non-
binding, confidential mediation upon its own motion or upon the 
motion of any party in interest. The court may order mediation in an 
adversary proceeding, contested matter, or otherwise in a bankruptcy 
case, except that the court may not order mediation of a dispute arising 
in connection with the retention or payment of professionals or in 
connection with a motion for contempt, sanctions, or other judicial 
disciplinary matters. The court should have explicit statutory 
authority to approve the payment of persons performing mediation 
functions pursuant to the local rules of that district's mediation 
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program who satisfy the training requirements or standards set by the 
local rules ofthat district. The statute should provide further that the 
details of such mediation programs that are not provided herein may 
be determined by local rule. 
2.4.8 Court Review of Appointments to Creditors' Committees 
Subsection (a)(2) of 11 U.S.C. §1102, "Creditors' and equity security 
holders' committees," should be amended to read as follows: 
(2) On request of a party in interest and after notice and 
a hearing, the court may order a change in membership of 
a committee appointed under subsection (a) ofthis section 
if necessary to ensure adequate representation of creditors 
or of equity security holders. On request of a party in 
interest, the court may order the appointment of 
additional committees of creditors or of equity security 
holders if necessary to assure adequate representation of 
creditors or of equity security holders. The United States 
Trustee shall appoint any such committee. 
2.4.9 Employee Participation in Bankruptcy Cases 
Changes to the Official Forms, the U.S. Trustee program 
guidelines and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure, are recommended to the Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts, the Executive Office of the 
U.S. Trustee, and the Rules Committee, as appropriate, in 
order to improve identification of employment-related 
obligations and facilitate the participation by employee 
representatives in bankruptcy case$. The Official Forms 
for the bankruptcy petition, list of largest creditors, 
and/or schedules of liabilities should solicit more 
specific information regarding employee obligations. 
The U.S. Trustee program guidelines for the formation of 
creditors J coinmittees should be amended to provide 
better guidance regarding employee and benefit fund 
claims. The appointment of employee creditors J 
committees should be encouraged in appropriate 
circumstances as a mechanism to resolve claims and other 
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Enhancing the Efficacy of Examiners and Limiting the Grounds for 
Appointment of Examiners in Chapter 11 Cases 
Congress should amend section 327 to provide for the retention of 
professionals by examiners for cause under the same standards that 
govern the retention of other professionals. 
The Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial 
Conference should consider a recommendation that Federal Rule of 
Bankruptcy Procedure 2004(a) be amended to provide that "On 
motion of any party in interest or of an examiner appointed under 
section 1104 of title 11, the court may order the examination of any 
entity." 
Congress should eliminate section 1104(c)(2), which requires the court 
to order appointment of an examiner upon the request of a party in 
interest if the debtor's fixed, liquidated, unsecured debts, other than 
debts for goods, services, or taxes or owing to an insider, exceed 
$5,000,000. 
2.4.11 Valuation of Property 
A creditor's secured claim in personal property should be determined 
by the property's wholesale price. 
A creditor's secured claim in real property should be determined by 
the property's fair market value, minus hypothetical costs of sale. 
2.4.12 Clarifying The Conditions for Sales Free & Clear Under 11 U.S.c. § 
363(f) 
Congress should make clear that bankruptcy courts can authorize sales 
of property of the estate free of creditors' interests regardless of the 
relationship between the face amount of any liens and the value of the 
property sold. 
2.4.13 Release of Claims Against Nondebtor Parties 
Congress should amend sections 1123 and 524(e) to clarify that it is 
within the discretion of the court to allow a plan proponent to solicit 
releases of nondebtor liabilities. Creditors that agree in a separate 
document to release nondebtor parties will be bound by such releases, 
whereas creditors that decline to release their claims against nondebtor 
parties will not be bound to release their claims. 
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2.4.14 Exclusion 0/ Payroll Deductions/rom Property o/the Estate 
Congress should amend 11 U.S.c. § 541(b) to clarify that funds 
deducted from paid wages within 180 days prior to the date of the 
commencement of a case under title 11, held by a debtor/employer, and 
owed by employees to third parties, other than a federal, state or local 
taxing authority, do not fall within the definition of "property of the 
estate." 
2.4.15 Absolute Priority and Exclusivity 
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) should be amended to provide that the 
court may find a plan to be fair and equitable that provides for 
members of a junior class of claims or interests to purchase new 
interests in the reorganized debtor. 
11 U.S.C. § 1121 should be amended to provide that on the request of 
a party in interest, the court will terminate exclusivity if a debtor 
moves to confirm a non-consensual plan that provides for the 
participation of a holder of a junior claim or interest under 
1129(b)(2)(B) but does not satisfy the condition set forth in section 
1129(b )(2)(B)(i). 
2.4.16 Classification 0/ Claims 
Section 1122 should be amended to provide that a plan proponent may 
classify legally similar claims separately if, upon objection, the 
proponent can demonstrate that the classification is supported by a 
"rational business justification." 
2.4.17 Pre petition Solicitation/or a Prepackaged Plan 0/ Reorganization 
The standards and requirements provided in the Bankruptcy Code for 
postpetition solicitation should be applicable to solicitation for a plan 
of reorganization within 120 days prior to filing a Chapter 11 petition 
by a company that is subject to and in compliance with the public 
periodic reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. Notice of such prepetition solicitation should be served on the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. If a company solicits for a plan 
of reorganization but does not file for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy 
. requirements and standards should be applicable if the company does 
not complete an exchange offer or any other transaction on the basis 
of such solicitation. 
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2.4.18 Postpetition Solicitation/or a Prepackaged Plan 0/ Reorganization 
Section 1125(b) should be amended to provide that the acceptance or 
rejection of a plan may be solicited after the commencement of a case 
under title 11 but before the court approves a written disclosure 
statement from those classes that were solicited for the plan prior to 
the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 
2.4.19 Elimination 0/ Prohibition on Nonvoting Equity Securities 
Congress should amend section 1123( a)( 6) to eliminate the requirement 
that the charter of the reorganized corporate debtor prohibit the 
issuance' of nonvoting equity securities. Section 1123(a)(6) should 
otherwise remain unchanged. 
2.4.20 Postconfirmation Plan Modification 
11 U.S.C. § 1127(b) should be amended to permit modification after 
confirmation of a plan until the later of 1) substantial consummation 
or 2) two years after the date on which the order of confirmation is 
entered. All other restrictions on postconfirmation plan modification 
in section 1127(b) should remain unaltered. 
Chapter 2: Small Business Proposals 
2.5.1 Defining the term "Small Business" 
A "small business debtor" is any debtor in a case under Chapter 11 
(including any group of affiliated debtors) which has aggregate 
noncontingent, liquidated secured and unsecured debts' as of the 
petition date or order for relief of five million dollars ($5,000,000) or 
less and any single asset real estate debtor as defined in 11 U.S.C.§ 
101(51B), regardless of the amount of such debtor's liabilities. 
2.5.2 Flexible Rules/or Disclosure Statement and Plan 
Give the bankruptcy courts authority, after notice and hearing, to 
waive the requirements for, or simplify the content of, disclosure 
statements in small business cases where the benefits to creditors of 
fulfillment of full compliance with Bankruptcy Code § 1125 are 
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outweighed by cost and lack of meaningful benefit to creditors which 
would exist if the full requirements of § 1125 were imposed; 
The Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial 
Conference ("Rules Committee") shall be called upon to adopt, within 
a reasonable time after enactment, uniform safe-harbor standard 
forms of disclosure statements and plans of reorganization for small 
business debtors, after such experimentation on a local level as they 
deem appropriate. These forms would not preclude parties from using 
documents drafted by themselves or other forms, but would be 
propounded as one choice that plan proponents could make, which, if 
used and completed accurately in all material respects, would be 
presumptively deemed upon filing to comply with all applicable 
requirements of Bankruptcy Code §§ 1123 and 1125. The forms shall 
be designed to fulfill the most practical balance between (i) on the one 
hand, the reasonable needs of the courts, the_ U.S. Trustee, creditors 
and other parties in interest for reasonably complete information to 
arrive at an informed decision and (ii) on the other hand, appropriate 
affordability, lack of undue burden, economy and simplicity for 
debtors; and 
Repeal those provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 105(d) which are inconsistent 
with the proposals made herein, e.g., those setting deadlines for filing 
plans. 
Amend the Bankruptcy Code to expressly provide for combining 
approval of the disclosure statement with the hearing on confirmation 
of the plan. 
2.5.3 Reporting Requirements 
To create uniform national reporting requirements to permit U.S. 
Trustees, as well as creditors and the courts, better to monitor the 
activities of Chapter 11 debtors, the Rules Committee shall be called 
upon to adopt, with a reasonable time after enactment, amended rules 
requiring small business debtors to comply with the obligations 
imposed thereunder. The new rules will require debtors to file periodic 
financial and other reports, such as monthly operating reports, 
designed to embody, upon the basis of accounting and other reporting 
conventions to be determined by the Rules Committee, the best 
practical balance between (i) on the one hand, the reasonable needs of 
the court, the U.S. Trustee, and creditors for reasonably complete 
information and (ii) on the other hand, appropriate affordability, lack 
of undue burden, economy and simplicity for debtors. Specifically, the 
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Rules Committee, shall be called upon to prescribe uniform reporting 
as to: 
a. the debtor's profitability, i.e., approximately how much 
money the debtor has been earning or losing during current and 
relevant recent fIScal periods; 
b. whatthe reasonably approximate ranges ofprojected cash 
receipts and cash disbursements (including those required by law 
or contract and those that are discretionary but excluding 
prepetition debt not lawfully payable after the entry of order for 
reliet) for the debtor appear likely to be over a reasonable period 
in the future; 
c. how approximate actual cash receipts and disbursements 
compare with results from prior reports; 
d. whether the debtor is or is not (i) in compliance in all 
material respects with postpetition requirements imposed by the 
Bankruptcy Code and the Bankruptcy Rules and (ii) fIling tax 
returns and paying taxes and other administrative claims as 
required by applicable nonbankruptcy law as will be required by 
the amended statute and rules and, if not, what the failures are, 
how and when the debtor intends to remedy such failures and 
what the estimated costs thereof are; and 
e. such other matters applicable to small business debtors as 
may be called for in the best interests of debtors and creditors 
and the public interest in fair and efficient procedures under 
Chapter 11. 
2.5.4 Duties of the Debtor in Possession 
The debtor is required to: 
a. append to the voluntary petition or, in an involuntary 
case, to file within three days after the order for relief, either 
(A) (i) its most recent balance sheet, statement of operations and 
cash-flow statement and (ii) its most recent federal income tax 
return or (B) a statement made under penalty of perjury that no 
such financial statements have been prepared or that no· federal 
income tax return has been fIled or (C) both; 
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b. attend meetings, at which the debtor is represented by its 
senior management personnel and counsel, sch~duled by the 
court, the U.S. Trustee, or the Bankruptcy Administrator 
including, but not limited to initial debtor interviews, court-
ordered scheduling conferences, and meetings of creditors 
convened under 11 U.S.c. § 341; 
c. file all schedules and statements of financial affairs for 
small business debtors within the limits set by the Bankruptcy 
Rules, unless the court, upon notice to the U.S. Trustee and a 
hearing, grants an extension, which extension or extensions shall 
not, in any event, exceed thirty (30) days after the order for relief 
absent extraordinary and compelling circumstances; 
d. comply with postpetition obligations, including but not 
limited to the duties to: file tax returns, maintain appropriate and 
reasonable current insurance as is customary and appropriate to 
the industry, and timely pay all administrative expense tax 
claims, except those being contested by appropriate proceedings 
being diligently prosecuted; 
e. create within ten (10) business days ofthe entry of order 
for relief (or as soon thereafter as possible in case all banks 
contacted during the first ten (10) business days decline the 
business) separate deposit accounts with a bank or banks in 
which the debtor shall be required to timely deposit, until a plan 
is confirmed or the case is dismissed or converted or a trustee is 
appointed, after receipt, all taxes collected or withheld by it for 
governmental units. In compelling circumstances, the court may 
dispense with these requirements after notice and a hearing; 
f. allow the U.S. Trustee or its designated representative to 
inspect the debtor's business premises, books and records at 
reasonable times on reasonable prior written notice to the debtor. 
2.5.5 Deadlines Jor Plan Filing and Confirmation 
In small business cases only, require that the disclosure statement, if 
any, and plan must be filed within 90 days after the entry of order for 
relief, unless extended as permitted below. During this 90-day period, 
only the debtor may file a plan unless on request of a party in interest 
made during this period and after notice and a hearing, the court, for 
cause, orders otherwise. In small business cases only, require the plan 
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. to be confirmed within 150 days after the entry of order for relief, 
. unless extended as permitted below. 
Burden of Proof for Extensions of Deadlines 
Permit extensions of the deadlines for filing and approving disclosure 
statements, if any, and filing and confirming plans of reorganization 
only if the debtor, having duly noticed and appeared at the necessary 
extension hearing conducted and ruled upon prior to the expiration of 
the deadline, if any, and having carried the burdens of coming forward 
and persuasion, demonstrates by a preponderance ofthe evidence that 
it is more likely than not to confirm a plan of reorganization within a 
reasonable time. No such deadline may be extended unless a new 
deadline is imposed at the time the extension is granted. The 
Bankruptcy and Judicial Codes will require the U.S. Trustee, as the 
case may be, to be a recipient of notice of extension hearings and to 
participate actively therein, in order to assure, to the maximum extent 
feasible, that the interests of the public are protected when 
determinations are made as to whether small business debtors receive 
extensions and have proven by a preponderance of the evidence that 
it is more likely than not that they will confirm a plan within a 
reasonable time. 
2.5.7 Scheduling Conferences 
Require the bankruptcy court to promptly conduct at least one on-the-
record scheduling hearing, on notice to the U.S. Trustee and the 
debtor's 20 largest unsecured creditors to be sure that the deadlines 
discussed above are met except that no such hearing is required if an 
agreed order is filed by the debtor and U.S. Trustee and approved by 
the court after notice and hearing. The court shall also conduct such 
other scheduling hearings and status conferences as it deems fit and 
proper. Whenever possible, these hearings shall be schedules in 
conjunction with other mandatory events so as to minimize to the most 
reasonable practicable extent, the time of debtor personnel spent in 
court and at official meetings. 
2.5.8 Serial Filer Provisions 
Provide in the Bankruptcy Code that, with respect to any debtor (or 
any entity which has succeeded to substantially all the debtor's assets 
or business) which files a second case while another case is pending in 
which such debtor is the (or one of the) debtor(s) or in the event that 
it again becomes a debtor in a Chapter 11 case within two years after 
G- 33 
Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years 
an order of dismissal of a Chapter 11 case in which it was the debtor 
has become a final ortler or a Chapter 11 plan has been confirmed, 
shall not be entitled to the section 362(a) stay unless, after it has 
become a debtor, it bears the burdens of coming fonvard and of 
persuasion, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the new case 
has resulted from circumstances beyond the control of the debtor not 
foreseeable at the time the first case was filed and (2) it is more likely 
than not that it will confirm a feasible plan, but not a liquidating plan, 
. within a reasonable time. In cases involving such debtors when the 
owners have transferred the business to a new legal entity, owned and 
arranged by them, the section 362(a) stay would apply on filing but 
would be lifted on a verified, ex parte motion of the U.S. Trustee, with 
the right to have it reimposed upon a showing of (1) and (2) above. The 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governing injunctions applies to the 
court's award of a stay to the debtor. 
2.5.9 Expanded Grounds for Dismissal or Conversion and Appointment of 
Trustee 
a. Modify section 1112 to read as follows: 
(b )(1) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section or in 
section 1104(a)(3) ofthis title, on request of a party 
in interest or the U.S. Trustee, and after notice and 
a hearing, the court shall convert a case under this 
chapter to a case under Chapter 7 of this title or 
shall dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever 
is in the best interest of creditors and the estate, 
where movant establishes cause, except that such 
relief shall not be granted if the debtor or another 
party in interest objects and establishes both: 
(A) that it is more likely than not that a plan will be 
confirmed within a time as fixed by this title or by order 
of the court; and 
(B) if the cause is an act or omission of the debtor: 
(i) that there exists a reasonable justification for the 
act or omission; and 
(ii) that the act or omission will be cured within a 
reasonable time fixed by the court not to exceed 30 
days after the court decides the motion unless the 
movant expressly consents to a continuance for a 
specific period of time or there are compelling 
circumstances beyond the control of the debtor 
which justify an extension. 
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(2) For purposes of this subsection, cause includes: 
(A) substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the 
estate; 
(B) gross mismanagement of the estate; 
(C) failure to maintain appropriate insurance; 
(D) unauthorized use of cash collateral harmful to one or more 
creditors; 
(E) failure to comply with an order of the court; 
(F) failure timely to satisfy any filing or reporting 
requirement established by this title or by applicable rule; 
(G) failure to attend the section 341(a) meeting of creditors or 
an examination ordered under Bankruptcy Rule 2004; 
(H) failure timely to provide information or attend meetings 
reasonably requested by the U.S. Trustee or; 
(I) failure timely to pay taxes due after the order for relief or 
to fIle tax returns due after the order for relief; 
(J) failure to file or confirm a plan within the time fixed by 
this title or by order of the court; and 
(K) failure to pay any fees or charges required under Chapter 
123 of title 28. 
(3) . The court shall commence the hearing on any motion under this 
subsection within 30 days after fIling of the motion, and shall 
decide the motion within 15 days after commencement of the 
hearing, unless the movant expressly consents to a continuance 
fora specific period of time or compelling circumstances prevent 
the court from meeting the time limits established by this 
paragraph. 
b. Additional Grounds for Appointment of Trustee 
Add the following new section to 11 U.S.C. § 1104: 
(a)(3) where grounds exist to convert or dismiss the case 
under section 1112 of this title, but the court 
determines that the appointment of a Chapter 11 
trustee is in the best interests of creditors and the 
estate. 
2.5.10 Enhanced Powers of the United States Trustee and Bankruptcy 
Administrator 
Add a new subclause (e) to 11 U.S.C. § 341, and amend 28 U.S.C. § 586 
(the general statute governing the powers and duties of the U.S. 
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Trustee) and the Manual for Bankruptcy Administrators, (governing 
the duties of Bankruptcy Administrators) to require U.S. Trustees in 
every small business. debtor case (except where they, in their 
reasonable discretion determine that the conduct enumerated below is 
not advisable in the circumstances): 
(1)(a) to conduct an initial debtor interview ("IDI") with the 
debtor as soon as practicable after the entry of order for relief but 
prior to the first meeting scheduled under Bankruptcy Code § 
341{a). At the IDI, the U.S. Trustee shall, at a minimum, begin 
to investigate the debtor's viability, inquire about the debtor's 
business plan, explain the debtor's obligations to file monthly 
. operating reports and other required reports, attempt to develop 
an agreed scheduling order, and inform the debtor of other 
Chapter 11 obligations; 
(b) when determined by the U.S. Trustee to be 
appropriate and advisable, to visit the appropriate 
business premises of the debtor and ascertain the general 
state of the debtor's books and records and verify that the 
debtor has filed its tax returns. This visit should take 
place in connection with or reasonably promptly after the 
IDI (wherever possible, these events shall be combined 
with other events so as to minimize to the most reasonable 
practicable extent the amount of time of debtor personnel 
spent in court and at official meetings); and 
(c) to review and monitor diligently on a continuous 
basis each debtor's activities, with a view to identifying as 
promptly as possible those debtors which do not pass the 
test of being more likely than not to be able to confirm a 
Chapter 11 plan within a reasonable time; and 
(2) in cases where, upon the basis of continuing review, 
monitoring or otherwise, the U.S. Trustee finds material grounds 
for any relief under Bankruptcy Code § 1112, to move the court 
promptly for relief. 
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Chapter 2: Single Asset Proposals 
2.6.1 Change the Present Statutory Definition of" Single Asset Real Estate" in 
two ways. 
First, the $4 million debt limit should be eliminated from the 
definition of "single asset real estate" debtor subject to section 
362(d)(3). 
Second, the definition of "single asset real estate" should be more 
carefully worded to exclude cases in which the real property is 
used by a debtor in an active business. 
The defmition, as proposed, incorporating both concepts, would read 
as follows: 
undeveloped real property or other real property constituting a 
single property or project other than residential real property 
with fewer than 4 residential units on which is located a single 
development or project which property or project generates 
substantially all of the gross income of a debtor and on which no 
substantial business is being conducted by a debtor, or by a 
commonly controlled group of entities substantially all of which 
are concurrently Chapter 11 debtors, other than the business of 
operating the real property and activities incidental thereto. 
2.6.2 Amend Code Section 362(d)(3) in Three Particulars 
a. Make clear that payments required by section 362( d)(3) may 
be made from rents generated from the property. 
b. Provide that the interest rate with respect to which payments 
are calculated shall be the nondefault contract rate. 
c. Amend the statute to provide that the payments must be 
commenced or a plan filed on the later of 90 days after the 
petition date or 30 days after the court determines the debtor to 
be subject to section 362( d)(3). 
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2.6.3 Require Substantial Equity in order to Confirm a Lien-Stripping Plan 
Using the New Value Exception 
In cases where the secured creditor has not made the election 
under section 1111(b)(I)(a)(i), a plan must satisfy the following 
requirements to be confirmed under the new-value exception 
following rejection by a class that includes the unsecured portion 
of a claim secured by real property: (1) The new value 
contribution must pay down the secured portion ofthe claim on 
the effective date of the plan so that, giving effect to the 
confirmation ofthe plan, sufficient cash payments on the secured 
portion of the claim shall have been made so that the principal 
amount of debt secured by the property is no more than 80 
percent ofthe court-determined fair market value ofthe property 
as of the confirmation date; (2) the payment terms for the 
secured portion of the claim must both (i) satisfy all applicable 
requirements of section 1129 of the Code, and (ii) satisfy then-
prevailing market terms in the same locality regarding maturity 
date, amortization, interest rate, fixed-charge coverage and loan 
documentation; and (3) the new value contribution must be 
treated as an equity interest that is not convertible to or 
exchangeable for debt. 
Chapter 3: Jurisdiction 
3.1.1 Establishing the Bankruptcy Court under Article III of the Constitution 
The bankruptcy court should be established under Article III of the 
Constitution. 
3.1.2 Transition to an Article III Bankruptcy Court 
As of the enactment oflegislation to establish an Article III bankruptcy 
court, sitting bankruptcy judges should be permitted to finish their 
current fourteen year terms. As vacancies are created through attrition 
(including expiration of current statutory term, appointment as an 
Article III judge, resignation, retirement prior to end of term for any 
reason, or death), Article III bankruptcy judges should be appointed 
by the President upon the advice and consent ofthe Senate to fill those 
positions. Sitting bankruptcy judges should be permitted to apply for 
any Article III judgeship positions while remaining on the bench. 
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Nothing in the Recommendation will affect the length of the current 
term, salary, retirement benefits, or other attributes of sittinl! 
bankruptcy judges. 
During the transition period, bankruptcy jurisdiction should be 
treated in the following manner: as Article III bankruptcy judges are 
appointed, the jurisdiction provisions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157 
should be transferred on a district-by-district basis to the Article III 
bankruptcy judge sitting in that district. Consequently, bankruptcy 
jurisdiction would reside in the Article III bankruptcy judge, including 
the power to refer and withdraw cases and proceedings. While a 
district is without an Article III bankruptcy judge, the Judicial Council 
for that circuit should be authorized to: (1) determine the need for an 
Article III bankruptcy judge in that district, and (2) if necessary, 
designate an Article III bankruptcy judge from another district (within 
the circuit) to sit in that district. In the event the judicial council 
determines a need for an Article III bankruptcy judge and one has not 
yet been appointed to sit within that circuit, the Chief Justice, upon 
receiving a certificate of necessity from the chief judge of the circuit, 
should be authorized to designate an Article III bankruptcy judge from 
another circuit to fulfill the request. 
3.1.3 Bankruptcy Appellate Process 
The current system which provides two appeals, the first either to a 
district court or a bankruptcy appellate panel and the second to the 
U.S. Court of Appeals, as of right from final orders in bankruptcy 
cases should be changed to eliminate the first layer of review. 
3.1.4 Interlocutory Appeals of Bankruptcy Orders 
28 U.S.C. § 1293 should be added to provide, in addition to the appeal 
of final bankruptcy orders, for the appeal to the courts of appeals of 
interlocutory bankruptcy court orders under the following 
circumstances: (1) an order to increase or reduce the time to fIle a plan 
under section 1121(d); (2) an order granting, modifying, or refusing to 
grant an injunction or an order modifying or refusing to modify the 
automatic stay; (3) an order appointing or refusing to appoint a 
trustee, or authorizing the sale or other disposition of property of the 
estate; (4) where an order is certified by the bankruptcy judge that (x) 
it involves a controlling issue of law to which there is a substantial 
difference of opinion, and (y) immediate appeal of the order may 
materially advance resolution of the litigation, and leave to appeal is 
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granted by the court of appeals; and (5) with leave from the court of 
appeals, 
3.1.5 Venue Provisions under 28 U.S.C § 1408 
28 U.S.C. §1408(1) should be amended to prohibit corporate debtors 
from fIling for relief in a district based solely on the debtor's 
incorporation in the state where that district is located. 
The affiliate rule contained in 28 U.S.c. § 1408(2) should be amended 
to prohibit a corporate fIling in an improper venue unless such 
debtor's corporate parent is a debtor in a case under the Bankruptcy 
Code in that forum. Section 1408(2) should be amended as follows: 
(2) in which there is pending a case under titie 11 
concerning such person's affiliate, as defined in 
section 101(2)(A) of title 11, general partner, 
partnership, or a partnership controlled by the 
same general partner. 
The court's discretionary power to transfer venue in the interest of 
justice and for the convenience ofthe parties should not be restricted. 
Chapter 3: Procedure 
3.2.1 Minimum Amount to Commence a Preference Action under 11 U.S.C 
§ 547 
11 U.S.C. § 547 should provide that $5,000 is the minimum aggregate 
transfer to a noninsider creditor that must be sought in a nonconsumer 
debt preference avoidance action. 
3.2.2 Venue of Preference Actions under 28 u.S.C § 1409 
28 U.S.C. § 1409 should be amended to require that a preference 
recovery action against a noninsider seeking less than $10,000 must be 
brought in the bankruptcy court in the district where the creditor has 
its principal place of business. The Recommendation applies to 
nonconsumer debts only. 
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Ordinary Course of Business Exception Under 11 U.S. C § 547(c)(2)(B) 
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(B) should be amended to provide a disjunctive 
test for whether a payment is made in the ordinary course of the 
debtor's business if it is made according to ordinary business terms. 
The ordinary course of business defense to a preference recovery action 
under section 547( c)(2) should provide as follows: 
(2) to the extent that such transfer was in payment of a 
debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of 
business or financial affairs of the debtor and the 
transferee and such transfer was -
(A) made in the ordinary course of business or financial 
affairs of the debtor and the transferee; or 
(B) made according to ordinary business terms[.] 
3.2.4 Ad Valorem Tax Priority under 11 U.S.C § 724(b) 
11 U.S.C. § 724(b) should be amended to exempt from subordination 
properly perfected, nonavoidable liens on real or personal property of 
the estate arising in connection with an ad valorem tax. Section 724(b) 
should also require the trustee to marshal unencumbered assets of the 
bankruptcy estate and surcharge secured claims, if warranted by the 
circumstances, under section 506(c) prior to subordinating any tax 
liens under the statute. 
3.2.5 Burden of Proof for Tax Proceedings 
The Bankruptcy Code should be amended to clarify that the burden 
of proof/persuasion rules and concomitant presumptions in tax 
controversies which would be applicable under nonbankruptcy law are 
equally applicable in bankruptcy court proceedings to determine tax 
liabilities under 11 U.S.c. §§ 502 and 505. 
3.2.6 Exception of Tax Refunds Setoffs under 11 U.S.C § 362(b) 
11 U.S.C. § 362(b) of the Bankruptcy Code should be amended to 
allow a governmental unit to setoff an income tax refund that arose 
prior to the commencement of a Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 case against 
an 'undisputed' income tax liability of an individual debtor that arose 
prior to the commencement of the case. 
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Chapter 3: Administration 
3.3.1 United States Trustee Program 
The Director ofthe Executive Office for United States Trustees should 
hold the position of Assistant Attorney General. 
The United States Trustee regions should match the number, size and 
configuration of the federal judicial circuits. 
3.3.2 Personal Liability of Trustees 
3.3.3 
Trustees appointed iIi cases under Chapter 7, 11, 12 or 13 of the 
Bankruptcy Code should not be subject to suit in their individual 
capacity for acts taken within the scope of their duties as delineated in 
the Bankruptcy Code or by order ofthe court, as long as the applicable 
order was issued on notice to interested parties and there was full 
disclosure to the court. 
Chapter 7, 12 and 13 trustees only should be subject to suit in the 
trustee's representative capacity and subject to suit in the trustee's 
personal capacity only to the extent that the trustee acted with gross 
negligence in the performance ofthe trustee's fiduciary duties. Gross 
negligence should be defined as reckless indifference or deliberate 
disregard of the trustee's fiduciary duty. 
A Chapter 11 trustee of a corporate debtor only should be subject to 
suit in the trustee's representative capacity and subject to suit in the 
trustee's personal capacity only to the extent that the trustee has 
violated the standard of care applicable to officers and directors of a 
corporation in the state in which the Chapter 11 case is pending. 
Debtors in possession should remain subject to suit to the same extent 
as currently exists under state or federal law. 
Qualification of Professionals under 11 U.S.C § 1107(b) 
Section 1107(b) should be amended to provide that a person should not 
be disqualified for employment under § 327 solely because such person 
holds an insubstantial unsecured claim against or equity interest in the 
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National Admission to Practice 
Admission to practice in one bankruptcy court, usually by virtue of 
being admitted to practice in the relevant United States District Court, 
should entitle an attorney, on presentation ofa certificate of admission 
and good standing in another district court, to appear in the other 
bankruptcy court without the need for any other admission procedure. 
The Recommendation will not affect requirements (if any) to associate 
with local counsel. Similarly, the Recommendation will not change the 
requirements under state law governing the practice of law and the 
maintenance of an office for the practice oflaw. The Recommendation 
will only amend the local bankruptcy rule or practice requirements 
governing special admission of attorneys to the bankruptcy court who 
are otherwise not admitted to the bar of the district court in the 
district where the bankruptcy court is located to appear in a particular 
bankruptcy case. 
Fee Examiners 
The Bankruptcy Code should explicitly preclude the appointment of 
fee examiners as an improper delegation of the court's duty to review 
and award compensation under 11 U.S.C. § 330. The 
Recommendation does not affect the court's authority under 11 U.S.c. 
§ 1104(c) to appoint an examiner to investigate and report on certain 
aspects of a Chapter 11 case, for example, a potential fraudulent 
transfer or a particularly complicated claims estimation. 
3.3.6 Attorney Referral Services 
11 U.S.c. § 504 should be amended to permit an attorney compensated 
out of a bankruptcy estate to remit a percentage of such compensation 
to a bona fide, nonprofit, public service referral program. Such 
attorney referral program must be operating in accordance with state 
laws and ethical rules and guidelines governing referrals. The 
Recommendation does not affect the requirement that all 
compensation arrangements be disclosed in the application for 
retention under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014 and in the application for 
compensation under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2016(a). 
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Chapter 4: Data Compilation and Dissemination 
4.1.1 Establish as policy that all data held by bankruptcy clerks in electronic 
form, to the extent it reflects only public records as defined in 
Bankruptcy Code § 107, should be released in electronic form to the 
public, on demand. 
4.1.2 Establish and fund a pilot project to aggregate the data from sources, 
particularly bankruptcy clerks, and make that data available to the 
public in electronic form, on demand. 
4.1.3 Secure limited-duration appointment of a coordinator, who, with the 
head of the AO's office and the head of EOUST, would be charged 
with the duty of: 
(1) Making recommendations to increase the accuracy of the 
debtor's petitions, schedules and statements. 
(2) setting the data-collection goals. 
(3) coordinating the bankruptcy data-collection efforts of the 
central reporting agencies. 
(4) reporting on an annual basis to the Congress, the Chief 
Justice, and the President. 
4.1.4 Establish a bankruptcy data system in which (1) a single set of data 
definitions and forms are used to collect data nationwide and (2) all 
data for any particular case are aggregated in the same electronic 
record. 
4.1.5 Maximize the number of documents filed electronically and maximize 
open-to-the-public remote electronic access to all data for free, or at 
the lowest possible cost. 
Chapter 4: Taxation and the Bankruptcy Code 
4.2.1 Clarify provisions of the Bankruptcy Code on providing reasonable 
notice to governmental units. 
4.2.2 Amend the Bankruptcy Code to prescribe that to the extent that a tax 
claim presently is entitled to interest, such interest shall accrue at a 
stated statutory rate. 
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The Commission should submit to the Advisory Committee on 
Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial Conference ("Rules Committee") a 
recommendation that the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 
require that notices demanding the benefits of rapid examination 
under 11 U.S.C. § 505(b) be sent to the office specifically designated by 
the applicable taxing authority for such purpose, in any reasonable 
manner prescribed by such taxing authority. 
4.2.4 Conform §346 ofthe Bankruptcy Code to IRC 1398( d)(2) election; also 
conform local and state tax attributes that are transferred to the estate 
to those tax attributes that are transferred to the bankruptcy estate 
under IRC §1398. . 
4.2.5 Amend 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(8) and 523(a)(I) to provide for the tolling of 
relevant periods in the case of successive filings. Thus, in the event of 
successive bankruptcy filings, the time periods specified in §507(a)(8) 
shall be suspended during the period in which a governmental unit was 
prohibited from pursuing a claim by reason of the prior case. 
4.2.6 Amend 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(8)(ii) to toll the'240-day assessment period 
for both pre- and post assessment offers in compromise. 
4.2.7 Amend the Bankruptcy Code to require "small business debtors" to 
create and maintain separate bank accounts for trust fund taxes and 
nontax deductions from employee paychecks. Also, any proposal 
should provide for sanctions for failure to comply with this Bankruptcy 
Code requirement. 
4.2.8 Amend 11 U .S.c. § 1141 (d)(3) to exceptfrom discharge taxes unpaid by 
businesses entities, which nonpayment arose from fraud. 
4.2.9· Amend 11 U.S.C. §362(a)(8) to confine its application to proceedings 
before the Tax Court for tax periods ending on or prior to thefIling of 
the petition in the bankruptcy case and to permit appeals from Tax 
Court decisions. 
4.2.10 Application of the periodic payment provisions of §1129(a)(9)(C) to 
secured tax that would be entitled to priority absent their secured 
status. 
4.2.11 Amend 11 U.S.C. §545(2) to overmle cases that have penalized the 
government due to certain benefits for purchasers provided for in the 
lien provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. 
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4.2.12 Amend 11 U.S.C. §503 and 28 U.S.c. §960 to eliminate the need for a 
governmental unit to make a "request" to the debtor to pay tax 
liabilities that are entitled to payment as administrative expenses. 
4.2.13 Amend 11 U.S.C.§§502(a)(I) and 503(b)(I)(B) to provide that 
postpetition ad valorem real estate taxes should be characterized as an 
administrative expense whether secured or unsecured and such taxes 
should be payable as an ordinary course expense. 
4.2.14 Amend the Bankruptcy Code to overrule Investors of The Triangle v. 
Carolina Triangle Ltd. Partnership (In re Carolina Triangle Ltd. 
Partnership), 166 B.R. 411 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1994), and to ensure that 
postpetition ad valorem real-estate taxes are a reasonable and 
necessary cost of preservation of the estate. 
4.2.15 Amend the Bankruptcy Code to establish that ad valorem taxes are 
incurred by the estate and, therefore, are entitled to administrative 
expense priority status. 
4.2.16 & Amend the Bankruptcy Code to conform the treatment of state and 
4.2.17 local tax claims to that treatment provided for federal tax claims by, 
among others, amending 11 U.S.c. § 346 to conform state and local tax 
attributes to the federal list in IRC § 1398. 
4.2.18 Clarify IRC §1398 to provide that the bankruptcy estate's income is 
subject to alternative minimum tax and capital gains tax treatment if 
otherwise applicable. 
4.2.19 Amend the Bankruptcy Code to provide that the term "assessed or 
assessment" as used in 11 U.S.c. §§362(b)(9) and 507(a)(8) shall mean 
"that time at which a taxing authority may commence an action to 
collect the tax." 
4.2.20 Amend 11 U.S.C. §1125(b) to establish standards for tax disclosures in 
a Chapter 11 disclosure statement. 
4.2.21 Clarify 11 U.S.C. §726(a)(I) to provide that a taxing authority must 
file a claim for a priority tax before the final order approving the 
trustee's report is entered by the court. 
4.2.22 Conformity of Chapter 13 plans with provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code: Requirement to file returns. 
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4.2.23 Whether an income tax return prepared by the taxing authority should 
be considered a filed income tax return for purposes ofthe Bankruptcy 
Code. 
4.2.24 Dismissal and injunction against flling subsequent case where court 
determines that a Chapter 13 debtor is abusing the bankruptcy 
process. 
4.2.25 Create a method by which a trustee may obtain a safe harbor and 
certainty regarding the nature, amount, and consequences of debt 
discharged. 
4.2.26 Amend IRe §1398(e)(3) to provide that a debtor should be treated as 
an employee of the bankruptcy estate as to payments by the estate of 
estate assets to the debtor for services performed. 
4.2.27 & Tax treatment of the sale by the estate of a debtor's homestead: 
4.2.28 Availability of capital gain exclusion on sale of residence to the trustee 
of an individual debtor. 
4.2.29 Whether changes are needed in IRe §§108 and 382 with respect to the 
issuance of stock for debt. 
4.2.30 Whether IRe §1001 should be modified to provide for parallel tax 
treatment of recourse and nonrecourse debt. 
4.2.31 Tax treatment of abandonment of property by an estate to the debtor. 
4.2.32 Application of §505(b) discharge to estate as well as to the debtor, 
successor to the debtor, and trustee where taxing authority does not 
audit. 
4.2.33 Bifurcation for claim filing purposes of a corporate tax year that 
straddles the petition date. 
4.2.34 Requirement of periodic payment for deferred payments of tax under 
§1129(a)(9) and designation of interest rate used while making those 
deferred payments. 
4.2~35 Authority of bankruptcy courts to grant declaratory judgments on 
prospective tax issues in Chapter 11 plans of reorganization. 
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4.2.36 Whether payment of prepetition nonpecuniary loss tax penalties in 
Chapt~r 11, 12, and 13 cases should be subordinated to payment of 
general unsecured claims. 
4.2.37 Whether a substitute for return shall constitute a filed return for 
purposes of dischargeability issues. 
Chapter 4: Chapter 9 - Municipal Bankruptcy Relief 
4.3.1 Incorporation of the Securities Contract Liquidation Provisions - 11 
U.S.e. §§ 555, 556, 559 & 560 
The securities contract liquidation provisions in 11 U.S.C. §§ 555,556, 
559 & 560 should be applicable in Chapter 9 cases and should be 
added to the list contained in section 901(a). 
4.3.2 Chapter 9 Petition as Order for Relief 
Section 921(d) should be deleted. Section 921(c) authorizes the court 
to dismiss a Chapter 9 petition for (1) lack of good faith; or (2) failure 
to meet the requirements of title 11. Deletion of section 921(d) will 
eliminate the statutory . conflict between section 301 providing that a 
voluntary petition constitutes an order for relief and section 921(d) 
authorizing the court to order relief only ifthe petition is not dismissed 
under section 921(c). Deletion of section 921(d) will also conform 
Chapter 9 to all other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code where a 
voluntary petition is the order for relief. 
4.3.3 Eligibility of Municipalities to Serve on Creditors' Committees 
11 U.S.C. § 101(41) should be amended to permit municipalities to 
serve on creditors' committees in Chapter 9 cases under the provisions 
of 11 U.S.C. § 1102. 
4.3.4 Elimination of 11 U.S.e. § 921(b) 
Section 921(b) should be deleted. Bankruptcy judges should be 
, appointed to preside over Chapter 9 cases in the same manner as they 
are appointed to supervise all other cases under the Bankruptcy Code. 
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4.3.5 Inclusion of "Employees" in 11 U.S.e. § 922(a) 
11 U.S.C. § 922(a)(I) should be amended to provide stay protection to 
nonresident "employees" of municipalities that have filed for Chapter 
9 relief. Section 922(a)(I) should read: 
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the 
issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, 
administrative, or other action or proceeding against an 
officer, employee, or inhabitant of the debtor that seeks 
to enforce a claim against the debtor[.] 
4.3.6 Treatment of Municipal Obligations in Chapter 9 
Chapter 9 should be amended to provide comparable protection to all 
types of tax-exempt obligations sold in the municipal marketplace. The 
Recommendation will not affect the right of a municipality to use 
special revenues for the provision of necessary municipal services. 
Chapter 4: Chapter 12 - Bankruptcy Relief for Family Farmers 
4.4.1 Sunset Provision and Chapter 12 Eligibility 
The sunset provision should be eliminated. Chapter 12 should be made 
a permanent addition to the Bankruptcy Code. Section 101(18) should 
be amended to increase the aggregate debt limits to $2,500,000. The 
other eligibility requirements in section 101(18) should remain 
unchanged. 
4.4.2 Direct Payment Plans 
28 U.S.C. § 586(e) should be amended to clarify that the calculation of 
the standing trustee's percentage fee should be based upon the 
aggregate of those payments "made under the plan" on account of 
claims impaired or modified by operation of bankruptcy law regardless 
of who makes the payment. 
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I. VALUATION AFTER RASH 
In June, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Associates Commercial 
Corporation v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997), brought to an end a five-year battle over $9,125. In 
an 8-1 opinion, the Supreme Court held that when a debtor under Chapter 13 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") proposes to cram down a plan of reorganization over the 
objection of a secured creditor, the creditor's collateral must be valued at its replacement cost. 
Section 506(a) ofthe Code is the provision that deals with valuing secured claims. 
This section states: 
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which 
the estate has an interest . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the 
value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such 
property, ... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of 
such creditor's interest ... is less than the amount of such allowed 
claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the 
valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and 
in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a 
plan affecting such creditor's interest. 
In an en banc decision, the Fifth Circuit in In re Rash, 90 F.3d 1036 (5th Cir. 1996) had 
held that the first sentence of Section 506(a) instructed courts to focus upon valuation from the 
creditor's perspective, using as a starting point the. amount the creditor would receive if it 
exercised its state law remedies by repossessing and selling the collateral. 
The Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion by Justice Ginsberg, the court rejected the 
Fifth Circuit's approach to section 506 and stated that "[t]he full first sentence of § 506(a), in 
short, tells a court what it must evaluate, but it does not say more; it is not enlightening on how to 
value collateral." 117 S. Ct. at 1885 (1997). The Court then looked to the second sentence of 
Section 506(a) for enlightenment on how value should be determined. Because value should be 
determined "in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of 
such property," a bankruptcy court must look to the proposed disposition or use of the property 
when considering the appropriate value for a particular piece of collateral. 
The Court concluded its opinion by stating: 
In sum, under § 506(a), the value of property retained because the 
debtor has exercised the § 1325(a)(5)(B) "cram down" option is the 
cost the debtor would incur to obtain a like asset for the same 
"proposed ... use." Id. at 1886. 
But the Court attached a footnote to this last sentence of the opinion which emphasized that 
determining replacement value will be a fact intensive inquiry. 
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Because this concluding footnote in the Rash decision is likely to be the focus of 
significant future litigation, it is set forth below in its entirety. 
Our recognition that the replacement-value standard, not the 
foreclosure-value standard, governs in cram down cases leaves to 
banluuptcy courts, as triers of fact, identification of the best way of 
ascertaining replacement value on the basis of the evidence presented. 
Whether replacement value is the equivalent of retail value, wholesale 
value, or some other value will depend on the type of debtor and the 
nature of the property. We note, however, that replacement value, in 
this context, should not include certain items. For example, where 
the proper measure of the replacement value of a vehicle is its retail 
value, an adjustment to that value may be necessary: A creditor 
should not receive portions of the retail price, if any, that reflect the 
value of items the debtor does not receive when he retains his vehicle, 
items such as warranties, inventory storage, and reconditioning. Cf. 
90 F.3d at 1051-52. Nor should the creditor gain from modifications 
to the property--u, the addition of accessories to a vehicle--to which 
a creditor's lien would not extend under state law. 
Future litigation is likely to focus on the sentence that is underscored. More specifically, 
future litigation is likely to focus on the words in that sentence in bold print: - "inventory 
storage." Cf. In re Mulvania, 1997 WL 619201 (BAP) 9th Cir. 1997) ("this language [fn. 6] does 
not require a court to deduct costs of sale when determining the replacement value of a secured 
claim.") 
There have been four reported cram down valuations decisions since Rash: 
(1) In re Roberts, 210 B.R. 325 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1997) used NADA retail, relying 
on Rule 3001(f): "[T]he presumption of the prima facie validity of the Bank's claim in Rule 
3001(f) applies to this valuation hearing arising in the context of Chapter 13 plan confirmation. 
Debtor has the burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence to rebut that presumption." Id. 
at 328. 
(2) In In re McElroy, 210 B.R. 833 (Bankr. Or. 1997) considered expert testimony 
from a car appraiser and a used car dealer. The court stated "valuation should be based on prices 
paid in the market that is accessible to the debtors, which includes, without limitation, sales 
between private parties." The court concluded that the value of the car was $1,570. The Kelley 
Blue Book valued the car at $2,700 wholesale and $4,670 retail. 
(3) In re Russell, 211 B.R. 12 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1997) held that the replacement 
value was the $7,900 retail value in theNADA guide: "[T]he NADA retail value does not appear 
to include any extra value for items not retained by Mr. Russell." Id. at 13. "To require a 
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reduction of retail costs in detennining value, as some have suggested is required by footnote 6, 
would be inconsistent with the specific holding in Rash." Id. Judge Small found that the debtor's 
evidence that he could buy a similar car for less through newspaper ads was not credible. "The 
debtor introduced a single newspaper advertisement placed by a used car dealer for a similar 
automobile at an asking price of $7,500. The court does not find this evidence persuasive. 
Mr. Russell did not inspect the advertised automobile, and his knowledge of the automobile's 
condition came solely from the advertisement." Id. at 12. 
(4) In In re Franklin, 1997 WL 631343 (BanIa. M.D. Fla. 1997), the court concluded 
that Rash did not require it to change its practice of looking to the average of wholesale and retail 
"as a starting point. " 
II. CRAM DOWN INTEREST RATES 
A. Statutory Provisions 
1129(b)(2) 
For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair 
and equitable with respect to a class includes the following 
requirements: 
(A) With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides: 
(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing 
such claims, whether the property subject to such liens is 
retained by the debtor or transferred to another entity, to the 
extent of the allowed amount of such claims; and 
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on 
account of such claim deferred cash payments totaling at least 
the allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the 
effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder's 
interest in the estate's interest in such property; 
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any 
property that is subject to the liens securing such claims, free 
and clear of such liens, with such liens to attache to the 
proceeds of such sale, and the treatment of such liens on 
proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this subparagraph; or 
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(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable 
equivalent of such claims. 
122S(a)(S)(B) and (C) and 132S(a)(S)(B) and (C) 
(B)(i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien 
securing such claim; and 
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property 
to be distributed by the trustee or the debtor under the plan on 
account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of 
such claim; or 
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such 
holder; and ... 
B. 1997 Case Law From Circuits 
According to Judge Yacos, the "case law with regard to an appropriate discount 
rate for cramdown purposes has blossomed into a 'many-colored splendor' of conflicting and 
sometimes indecipherable formulas." In re Computer Optics, Inc., 126 B.R. 664, 671 (Bankr. 
N.H. 1991). The case law on methods of calculation of cram down interest rates is collected in 
reported cases such as In re River Valley Assoc., 161 B.R. 127, 135-36 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993), 
affd, 181 B.R. 795 (E.D. Pa. 1995) and law review commentary such as Judge John Pearson, 
Dillon Jackson & Tim Nohr, Ending the Judicial Snipe Hunt: The Search for the Cramdown 
Interest Rate, 4 ABI 1. Rev. 35 (1996). 
While the reported decisions from the bankruptcy courts reflect diverse views, the 
Circuit Court opinions are essentially uniform. Eight of the circuits - Third, Fourth, Sixth, 
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh - have issued opinions approving a comparable loan 
or "coerced loan" approach to "present value", i.e., measuring cram down interest rate by what 
the secured creditor could have obtained had it foreclosed and reinvested the proceeds in loans of 
equivalent duration and risk. Two circuits, Eighth and Ninth, have recognized measuring cram 
down interest rate by a riskless base rate plus risk factors, as a possible alternative to the 
comparable loan approach. Only the Second Circuit has rejected the comparable loan approach. 
1. Second Circuit 
In In re Valenti, 105 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1997), a Chapter 13 car case, I presented the 
appellant's oral argument in Valenti; the appellant lost. Valenti is the only Circuit court decision 
on this question that I have argued. Valenti is the only appellate decision on this question that 
directly and expressly rejects comparable loans ("forced loans") as a possible measure of present 
value: 
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We believe that courts adopting the "forced loan" approach 
misapprehend the "present value" function of the interest rate. 
The objective of section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) is to put the 
creditor in the same economic position that it would have 
been in had it received the value of its allowed claim 
immediately. The purpose is not to put the creditor in the 
same position that it would have been in had it arranged a 
"new" loan. 
Are the second and third sentences of the above quotation consistent? What if the creditor would 
have arranged a new loan if it had received the value of its allowed claim immediately? 
In the Second Circuit's view, the "forced loan" approach necessarily and 
improperly includes a profit for the lender. Valenti instead "hold(s) that the market rate of 
interest under section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) should be fixed at the rate on a United States Treasury 
instrument with a maturity equivalent to the repayment schedule under the debtor's 
reorganization plan "with a risk adjustment -- "a range of one to three per cent is reasonable in 
this Circuit." 
2. Fifth Circuit 
In Matter of Smithwick, 121 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1997), Chapter 13 debtors filed a 
plan that provided for a cram down interest rate of 11 %, based on a local rule which required a 
formula approach to Chapter 13 cram down interest -- 2% plus The Wall Street Journal prime 
rate. The bankruptcy court confirmed and the district court affirmed. In reversing, the Fifth 
Circuit adopted the coerced loan approach, with the rebuttable presumption that the contract rate 
is the rate for a new loan. In dictum, Judge Jones noted that Smithwick is "consistent with the 
approach we have taken in Chapter 11 cases." But cf. Financial Security Assurance Inc. v. T-H 
New Orleans Limited Partnership, 116 F3d 790, 799 (5th Cir. 1997). 
III. HOME MORTGAGE PLAN PROVISIONS 
A. Background 
(1) 1322(b)(2)("modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a 
claim secured only by a security interest in property that is the debtor's principal residence") 
(2) 1322(c)(1), (2) 
(3) Nobleman v. American Savings Bank, 608 U.S. 324 (1993) 
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(4) Margaret Culhane, Home Improvement? Home Mortgages and the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,29 Creighton L. Rev. 467 (1996). 
B. Strip Down v. Strip Off 
(1) F has a first mortgage on D's house to secure its $100,000 claim. If the 
value of the house is $20,000, can D's Chapter 11 or 13 plan strip F's secured claim to $20,000? 
(2) Same facts except that S has a second mortgage. Can D's Chapter 11 or 13 
plan strip off S's claim as an unsecured claim? The cases are divided. Compare In re Lam, 211 
B.R. 36 (BAP 9th Cir. 1997) (yes) and In re Cervelli, 1997 WL 662535 (Bankr. N.J. 1997) (yes) 
with In re Barnes, 207 B.R. 588 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997) (no) and In re Fraize, 208 B.R. 311 
(Bankr. N.H. 1997) (no); In re Mattson, 210 B.R. 157 (Bankr. Minn. 1997) (no) (relying on 
section 1322(c)(2) Judge Kressel in Mattson permits a strip off the second mortgage because the 
last payment under the mortgage was due before the final payment under the plan. Accord. In re 
Young, 199 B.R. 643 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996), contra In re Witt, 113 F.3d 508 (4th Cir. 1997). 
C. Home and Office 
M's $312,000 claim was secured by real property valued at $260,000 which D 
used both as his personal residence and office. Can D's Chapter 11 or 13 plan lien strip? See In 
re Livesay, 199 B.R. 705, 709 (BAP 9th Cir. 1996) (no) ("he [debtor] has not shown that this use 
has added significant value to the property or that the bank relied on the additional security 
offered by his home office. In the absence of that proof, we are not prepared to say the bank had 
sufficient security in assets that were not part of the debtor's principal residence that the bank 
should be denied the protection of section 1123(b)(5)") 
D. Multiple Family Residence 
M has a first mortgage on D's principal residence which is a two-family dwelling. 
Can D's Chapter 11 or 13 plan modify M's mortgage? What ifD and spouse and children live in 
one unit and D's brother-in-law lives in the other unit, rent-free? See Lomas Mortgage, Inc. v. 
Louis, 82 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996); In re De Costa, 204 B.R. 1,4 (Bankr. Mass. 1996); see also In re 
Brunson, 201 B.R. 351 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1996). 
E. "Secured Only" 
What constitutes additional collateral? The debtor's mortgage included "all 
buildings and improvements thereon; together with the hereditaments and appurtenances and all 
other rights thereunto belonging, or in anywise now or hereafter appertaining, and the reversion 
and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues, profits thereon, and all plumbing, 
heating and lighting fixtures, and equipment now or hereafter attached to or used in connection 
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with such premises. II Reversing the bankruptcy court, PNC Mortgage Co. v. Dicks 199 B.R. 674 
(N.D. Ind. 1996) held: 
The record on appeal from the bankruptcy court betrays no evidence 
that the PNC mortgage was drafted to secure consumer purchases 
unrelated to the debtor's home or to enable the debtor to engage in 
some form of business adventure. Rather, the evidence before the 
court leads inexorably to the conclusion that the items of collateral 
described in the PNC mortgage are nothing more than enhancements 
capable of becoming component parts of the debtor's principal 
residence, and that such items of collateral are of little independent 
value relative to the residence property. 
IV. OTHER CHAPTER 13 ISSUES 
A. Dismissal After Motion to Convert 
1307(b) 
On request of the debtor at any time, if the case has not been 
converted under section 706,1112,94 1208 of this title, the court shall 
dismiss a case under this chapter. Any waiver of the right to dismiss 
under this subsection is unenforceable. 
1307(c) 
Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, on request of a 
party in interest or the United States trustee and after notice and a 
hearing, the court may convert a case under this chapter to a case 
under chapter 7 of this title. 
In re Patton, 209 B.R. 98 (Bankr. E.D. Tn 1997) holds that a Chapter 13 debtor 
has an absolute right to dismiss. In so ruling, the court looks to (i) the "plain language" of 
section 1307(b)("shall") and section 1307(c)("may"), (ii) legislative history, (iii) purpose ofthe 
statute, and (iv) case law. 
In re Greenberg, 200 B.R. 763 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) also holds that the Chapter 
13 has an absolute right to dismiss. The court then adds "a dismissal with conditions does not 
violate the debtor's absolute right to dismiss." 
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In re Casteel, 207 B.R. 185 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1997) also grants the debtor's 
motion to dismiss but states in dictum that a Chapter 13 debtor who files his petition or plan in 
bad or otherwise abuses the bankruptcy process does not have a right to dismiss. 
B. Disposable Income 
1. Tithing 
D files for Chapter 13. They have regularly tithed 10% of their gross income to 
the church. Can D continue to tithe in this amount under the plan? In re Andrade, 1997 WL 
643802 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1997), held that some reasonable charitable contribution was 
permissible by tithing that equaled debtor's payments under the plan was not reasonable. In so 
ruling, the court reviews three lines of cases: (i) tithing protected by First Amendment, (ii) tithing 
never a "reasonably necessary" expense under section 1325(b) and (iii) reasonable tithing 
permissible. 
2. Live-in-Companions 
D has a Chapter 13 plan and a "live- in companion." Is this "companion'''s income 
included in "disposable income." In re Halper, 1997 WL 611681 (Bankr. N.J. 1997), a case 
under section 523(a)(15), held that "all income that flows into a debtor's immediate household is 
relevant to the determination of a debtor's ability to meet his obligations under a property 
settlement agreement." The court noted the relationship between sections 523(a)(15) and 
1325(b), concluded that most courts include a non-debtor's spouse's income under section 
1325(b), but conceded that it was not able to find a reported case that included the income of a 
live-in companion. See also section 523(a)(8). 
C. Vesting of Property On Confirmation 
1327(b),1306 
1327(b) 
Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming 
the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the 
estate in the debtor. 
1306 Property of the estate. 
(a) Property of the estate includes, in addition to the property 
specified in section 541 of this title--
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(1) all property of the kind specified in such section that the 
debtor acquires after the commencement of the case but before the 
case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 
11, or 12 of this title whichever occurs first; and 
(2) earnings from services performed by the debtor after the 
commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, 
or converted to a case under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title, 
whichever occurs first. 
Creditor objects to confirmation of 13 plan and moves to convert. The debtor 
then files a motion to dismiss. Does the debtor have an absolute right to dismiss? Recent cases 
suggest three somewhat different answers to the question. 
1. Plan Provision 
D's Chapter 13 plan provided that "all property shall remain property of the estate 
and shall vest in the debtor only upon dismissal, discharge, or conversion." After confirmation, 
the IRS levied against the debtor's wages to collect postconfirmation taxes. Looking to section 
1327(b) ("Except as otherwise provided in the plan", Matter of Clark, 207 B.R. 559 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 1997) holds that the IRS violated the automatic stay. 
2. No Plan Provision 
After confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan, the debtor incurred but ignored parking 
tickets. The City of Chicago towed and thrashed D's car. There was no provision in D's plan that 
property remain property of the estate. In reversing the bankruptcy court, the district court in In 
re Fisher, 203 B.R. 958 (N.D. Ill. 1997) held that property which was the debtor's property 
preconfrrmation vests in the debtor on confirmation and so the actions of the City of Chicago to 
collect on its postpetition claim did not violate the automatic stay. In dictum, the court reconciles 
sections 1327(b) and 1306 by concluding that property acquired postconfirmation is property of 
the estate. 
3. Limits on Plan Provisions 
In dictum in Matter of Heath, 115 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 1997) Judge Posner 
-:;d, compares a Chapter 13 plan provision that property remain property of the estate "to that of a 
; child, a mental incompetent or a married woman in the age of coverture" because "any dispute 
over that income, including the dispute with the comer grocer, would be for the trustee, not the 
debtor, to litigate." Id. at 523. Judge Posner concludes "It would presumably be an abuse of 
discretion for the bankruptcy judge to confirm a plan that retained more of the property in the 
hands of the trustee than was reasonably necessary to fulfill the plan, though we need not decide 
that in this case." Id. at 524. 
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D. Release of Lien on Payment of Amount of Secured Claim 
Section 349(b) 
(b) Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal of a 
case other than under section 742 of this title--
(1) reinstates--
(A) any proceeding or custodianship superseded under 
section 543 of this title; 
(B) any transfer avoided under section ... 
(C) any lien voided under section 506(d) of this title; 
(2) vacates any order, judgment, or transfer ordered, under 
section ... and 
(3) revests the property of the estate in the entity in which such 
property was vested immediately before the commencement of the 
case under this title. 
Section 1322(b )(2) 
(b) Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the plan 
may ... 
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a 
claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the 
debtor's principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or 
leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class of claims 
Section 1325(a)(5) 
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the 
plan--
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan; 
(B) (i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the 
lien securing such claim; and . 
H -10 
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to 
be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less 
thatn the allowed amount of such claim; 
The Chapter 13 plan provides "Upon payment of the secured portion of any claim, the 
property securing such claim shall vest in the debtors, free and clear of any lien, claim or interest 
of a secured creditor." An undersecured creditor with a lien on a vehicle worth approximately 
$16,500 securing a debt of $24,000 objects to confirmation, arguing that the provision violates 
section 1325(a)(5)(B) and circumvents section 349. Recent cases have resolved that argument 
differently. Compare In re Johnson, 1997 WL 655292 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997) (confirmed) and In 
re Zakowski, 1997 WL 637396 (Bankr. E.D. Wisc. 1997) (collateral can not vest in debtor free 
and clear lien prior to completion of plan and discharge). 
" [A] bankruptcy court is a court of equity" is not a mantra that 
makes the Bankruptcy Code dissolve. 
Matter of Milwaukee Cheese Wisconsin. Inc., 112 F.3d 845,858 (7th Cir. 1997). 
H-ll 

~ ___ J 
TAXES IN BANKRUPTCY 
Robert E. McKenzie 
McKenzie Be McKenzie, P. C. 
Chicago, minois 
Copyright 1996 &: 1997. Robert E. McKenzie. aU rights rese"ed 
SECTION I 
Portions Reprinted from 
REPRESENT A TlON BEFORE THE COLLECTION DIVISION OF THE IRS 
by 
ROBERT E. MCKENZIE, ESQ. 
Copyright 1996 
with permission from 
CLARK BOARDMAN CALLAGHAN 
155 Pfingsten Road, Deerfield, Illinois 60015 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
I. 
II. 
TAXES IN BANKRUPTCY 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 













Taxes And Bankruptcy .............................................................•........................................ 
Automatic Stay ......................................................................... ~ ........................................ . 
Assertion Of Trust Fund Recovery Penalty ................................................................... . 
Payments During Bankruptcy ........................................................................................ . 
Prebankruptcy Payments Of Trust Fund Taxes ........................................................... .. 
• Practice TIp ................................................................................................................... . 
Improper Postbankruptcy Payments Of Trust Fund Taxes ........................................ . 
Priority Taxes ..................................................................................................................... . 
Dischargeable Taxes .......................................................................................................... . 
• Comment ..................................................................................................................... .. 
Dischargeability Of Penalities ......................................................................................... . 
Cases Considering Section 523(a)(1)(C) ......................................................................... . 
A. In re Toti. 24 F. 3d, 806, (6th Cir., 1994) ........................................................... .. 
B. United States v. Childers. 846 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1988) ................................... .. 
C. In re Bruner, 1994 WL 461310(B. Ct., W.D. La., 1994) ................................... . 
D. In re Sumpter. 170 B.R. 908 (E.D. Mich. 1994) ............................................... .. 
E. In reHedgecock. 160 B.R. 380 (D. Or., 1993) .................................................. .. 
F. Haas v. Internal Revenue Service, 48 F. 3d 1153 (11 Cir. 1995) .................... .. 




















CHAPTER 13 .................................................................................................................................... 1-7 
2-1 Forced Payment Plan......................................................................................................... 1-7 
• Practice tip ..................................................................................................................... 1-7 
2-2 Partial Payment Of Liabilities .......................................................................................... 1-7 
2-3 Super Discharge ................................................................................................................. 1-7 
2-4 Post-Bankruptcy Actions .................................................................................................. 1-8 
III. SANCTIONS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE ............................................................... 1-9 
3-1 Litigating Tax Liabilities ................................................................................................... 1-9 
• Example ................ ~ ................................................. ;...................................................... 1-9 
3-2 Utigation Remedy ............................................................................................................. 1-9 
3-3 Advantages Of Utigating Before Bankruptcy Court .................................................... 1-10 
3-4 Summary .................................................. ,.......................................................................... 1-10 
3-5 Caveat .................................................................................................................................. 1-10 
APPENDIX A: CHECKUSTS (M. King, Discharging Taxes In Bankruptcy (1995». ................ 1-11 
• Checklist 1: Dischargeability-At-A-Glance; Personal Income Taxes .................................. 1-11 
- Chapter 7 ........................................................................................................................ 1-11 
- Chapter 13...................................................................................................................... 1-11 
• Checklist 2: Payroll Withholding Taxes .................................................................................. 1-12 
- Chapter 7 ........................................................................................................................ 1-12 
- Chapter 13...................................................................................................................... 1-12 
SECTION I 
• Checklist 3: Sales Taxes ............................................. ~ ........... ; .................................................. . 1-12 
- Chapters 7 and 13 ........................................................................................................ . 1-12 
• Checklist 4: Employment Taxes .............................................................................................. . 1-13 
---
- Chapters 7 and 13 ........................................................................................................ . 1-13 
• Checklist 5: Dischargeability-At-A-Glance; Penalties ......................................................... . 1-13 ~ 
-
- Chapter 7 ....................................................................................................................... . 1-13 
- Chapter 13 ..................................................................................................................... . 1-14 
APPENDIX B: DISPOSmON OF T AX PROPOSALS MADE TO THE 
NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION _ ..•••••••••••• _ ................... . 1-15 
SECTION I 
I. TAXES IN BANKRUPTCY 
1-1 Taxes and Bankruptcy 
In the event that the IRS is totally uncooperative during a collection negotiation and the 
taxpayer has no basis to seek injunctive relief, consideration should be given to 
recommending that the client seek the piOtections granted by the Bankruptcy Code. The 
Bankruptcy Code provides that upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition an Automatic Stay 
is entered prohibiting the continuation of litigation or efforts to collect any debt without the 
express approval of the Bankruptcy Court.' This Automatic Stay has been held to apply 
to the Internal Revenue Service.2 
1-2 Automatic Stay 
Therefore, the initiation of any type of bankruptcy proceeding will preclude the Internal 
Revenue Service from continuing to levy upon wages or other assets of the taxpayer. The 
Supreme Court has held that the IRS could be ordered to return property which had been 
seized prior to bankruptcy.3 Therefore, if the IRS seizes an asset, your client can still seek 
the intercession of the Bankruptcy Court to stop a sale and get his property back. 
1-3 Assertion of Trust Fund Recovery Penalty 
The Govemment has taken the position that Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code does not 
prohibit the assertion of the Trust Fund Recovery Penalty against responsible persons 
during the pendency of a Chapter 11 case. Most courts have upheld the IRS position. ~ 
1-4 Payments During Bankruptcy 
The Supreme Court has held that a bankruptcy court may approve a Chapter 11 plan of 
reorganization which provides that payments on behalf of the debtor are to be applied to 
trust fund taxes first.s The bankruptcy courts have the power to make such direction 
111 USC § 362. 
2Bostwick v. United States, 521 F2d 741 (CA81975). 
3United States v. Whiting Pool, Inc., 462 US 1988, 76 L Ed 2d 515 103 S Ct 2309 
(1983). 
·United States v. Huckabee Auto Co., 783 F2d 1546 (CA 11, 1986); In re Becker's Motor 
Transp., Inc., 632 F2d 242 (CA31980); In re Success Tool & Manufacturing Co., 62 BR 
221 (NO III 1986); United States v. A&B Heating & Air Conditioning. Inc. 823 F2d 462 
(CA 11, 1987); In re Idaho Agriguipment. Inc., 54 BR 116 (0 Idaho 1985); Brandt-Air Flay 
Corporation v. Long Island Trust Co., 843 F2d 90 (CA2 1988). 
SUnited States v. Energy Resources Co .. Inc., 495 US 545, 109 L Ed 2d 580, 110 S Ct 
2139 (1990). 
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pursuant to 11 USC.§ 305 which grants the power to enter any order necessary to the 
successful completion of a plan. The Supreme Court did not decide the issue of whether 
payments in a Ch~pter 11 bankruptcy are voluntary or involuntary. 
1-5 Prebankruptcy Payments of Trust Fund Taxes 
In Begier v. Internal Revenue Services the Supreme Court held that government may not 
be required to tum over prebankruptcy federal tax deposits to the bankruptcy estate. Such 
payments are a trust for the government and as such may not be determined to be 
preferential payments. 
PRACTICE TIP 
If your client is about to file for bankruptcy. it would be wise to pay as 
much as possible to trust fund taxes. The payments would benefit 
corporate officers by reducing the potential Trust Fund Recovery 
Penalty and would not be subject to a determination that they were 
preferential payments pursuant to the bankruptcy code. 
1-6 Improper Postbankruptcy Payments of Trust Fund Taxes 
The Supreme Court held in Nordic Village7 that even though a company officer improperly 
paid trust fund taxes subsequent to the filing of a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, the IRS was not 
subject to a judgment for return of the assets since the IRS enjoyed sovereign immunity. 
Therefore, the officer reduced his potential personal liability for a Trust Fund Recovery 
Penalty by improperly paying corporate trust fund taxes post Chapter 11 filing. The 1994 
revision of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the IRS may now be sued to recover a 
preference and reverses the holding in Nordic Village. 
1-7 Priority Taxes 
The Bankruptcy Code gives the following types of federal, state and local taxes priority: 
(1) Income taxes which are less than three years old, computed from the date 
the return was due, not the end of the tax year. Any income or gross receipts 
tax assessed within 240 days before the petition was filed are 
nondischargeable. The 240 day period is extended if the taxpayer makes an 
offer of settlement within 240 days after assessment of such tax. The key 
here is the date the tax was assessed and not the date of the return. In 
addition, any tax assessable after the date of the petition is not 
dischargeable; 
SBegier v. Internal Revenue Service, 496 US 53,110 L Ed 2d 46,100 S Ct 2258 (1990). 





(2) Any withholding tax (Trust Fund Taxes) for which the debtor is liable in any 
capacity. Thus, whether the debtor is liable for trust fund taxes as an 
employer or, pursuant to IRC § 6672, as a responsible officer of a 
corporation, the tax liability is not dischargeable regardless of the age of the 
debt; 
(3) Other employment related taxes if within three years of the filing date; 
(4) Excise taxes which are less than three years old; 
(5) Certain customs duties; and 
(6) Any compensatory penalty on any of the foregoing.8 
1-8 Dischargeable Taxes 
As a result of 11 USC §§ 523 and 507 the following taxes are dischargeable in Chapters 
7 and 11: 
(1) Tax penalties for nonfiling, late payment, late deposit and late estimated 
payments if the taxes to which they relate are dischargeable. 
(2) Income taxes which are: 
(a) Over three years old; 
(b) Have been filed at least two years prior to the petition; (11 USC 
523(a)(1 }(B» and/or 
(c) Have been assessed as an audit deficiency for at least 240 days (11 
USC 507(a)(8)(A». 
(3) Estate and gift taxes which are over three years old. 
COMMENT: A taxpayer must not have filed a fraudulent return or otherwise tried to 
willfully evade payment of the tax. (11 USC 523(a)(1 )(e» 
1-9 Dischargeability of Penalties 
Section 523(a)(7)(A} ("Subparagraph "A") of the Bankruptcy Code is generally viewed as 
a codification of the pre-Code position of the government regarding the dischargeability of 
penalties, Le. that all non-compensatory (Le. punitive) penalties are dischargeable only if 
811 USC § 507. 
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the related tax is dischargeable." However, Congress went further and made an additional 
category of tax penalties dischargeable under section 523(a)(7)(8) ("Subparagraph (8)"). 
Subparagraph (8) provides for a discharge of a tax penalty "imposed with respect to a 
transaction or event that occurred before three years before the date of the filing of the 
petition. " 
Courts addressing the interpretation of the interaction of the two subparagraphs have held 
that Subparagraph (8) as enacted is unambiguous as a matter of statutory construction and 
can discharge certain penalties even if the underlying tax is not discharged, thus overriding 
the general approach of Subparagraph (A).10 The analysis continues by addressing what 
is the "transaction or event" which begins the running of the three year period of 
Subparagraph (8). Courts have variously held that the "transaction or event" is the due 
date or the filing date of the return. Such "events" can easily pre-ciate a bankruptcy petition 
filing by more than three years, making penalties related to such tax years dischargeable.11 
This is of particular interest where there is a long-standing dispute with the IRS ending in 
an assessment of tax which is non-dischargeable but which relates to a year in which the 
due date or filing date precede the petition filing date by three years. 
1-10 Cases Considering Section 523(a)(1 )(C) 
A. In re Toti, 24 F3d. 806, (6th Cir., 1994). 
• nonfiler for the years 1974 through 1981 
• "he knew he was liable for the taxes and he had the wherewithal to pay his 
taxes during some" of the years in question 
• indicted and convicted of under section 7203 for criminal failure to file 
It failed to abide by his sentencing order by not filing returns in the future 
• failed to set aside any money to pay liabilities over the years; he failed to pay 
income taxes or file returns until he was forced to do so by the terms of his 
criminal sentence 
• had a· profitable business 
• had no other debts or obligations to service with his income 
The issue in this case was the proper standard to apply in determining 
dischargeability-criminal versus civil standard of willfulness. The District Court and the 
"Thus, Subparagraph (a) generally links the discharge of a penalty to the priority 
provisions of Section 507(a)(8) so that if an income tax is priority and non-dischargeable, 
then related penalties are also non dischargeable. It also makes non-dischargeable those 
penalties related to non-filed returns or late-filed returns under the two-year filing rule of 
Section 523(a)(1 )(b)(ii). Additionally, penalties related to fraud or willful evasion of tax 
under 523(a)(1 )(C) are also made non-dischargeable because the underlying tax would not 
be dischargeable. 
10McKay v. United States, 957 F .2d 689 (9th Cir. 1992); In re Roberts, 906 F .2d 1440 
(10th Cir. 1990); In re 8urns, 887 F.12d 1541 (11th Cir.1989). 
11However, the tax may be non-dischargeable because it is subject to the two year rule 
of Section 523(a)(1 )(8)(ii) and the 240-day assessment rule of Section 507(a)(8)(A)(ii). 
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Sixth Court held that the standard for 523{a){1 )(C) purposes was a civil standard and the 
IRS was not required to prove the discharge. The Courtacfopted the definition of "willfully 
attempted to evade" to mean the same thing as willful ~6rU:rS.C. § 6672-a "voluntary, 
Ctlmscious, and intentional evasion of tax liabilities." TOB was not an honest debtor and 
bbuld not receive a discharge because "he had the wherewithal to file his return and pay 
his taxes, but he did not fulfill his obligation." 
The District Court focused on the definition of the word "evade." This is not defined 
in the bankruptcy code and the dictionary definition is ''to fail to payor to minimize taxes in 
violation of the law." Thus, the debtor's attempt to block the collection of taxes which have 
already been assessed is sufficient to prevent the discharge. 
Bankruptcy Court Oecision-141 B.R. 126 (B.Ct. E.O. Mich. 1992). 
B. United States v. Childers, 846 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1988). 
• Debtor admitted that he made false statements in tax collection information 
forms which substantially underreported his income available to pay his tax 
liabilities. 
The debtor alleged in subsequent civil litigation with the United States that his tax 
liabilities were discharged in earlier 1982 chapter 7 case. The court concluded this could 
not be true because 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(1 )(C) exempts from discharge any debt for a tax 
with respect to which the debtor .... willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat 
such tax. 
C. In re Bruner, 1994 WL 461310 (B.Ct., W.O. La., 1994). 
• taxpayers filed joint returns in earlier years and knew they had to file 
• they were financially able to pay the liabilities they owed' 
The court relied on the Hass and Jones cases to state the following proof to the IRS 
to prove the nondischargeability of a tax liability: (i) the debtors had a duty under the law 
(ii) the debtors knew they had that duty and (iii) the debtors voluntarily and intentionally 
violated that duty. The proof of an affirmative act by the debtors is not required-the 
purpose of 523 is to prevent the use of the Bankruptcy Code as part of a dishonest scheme 
to evade tax liability, while at the same time providing relief to the honest debtor. If a 
person fails to file and pay his liability, then he is not an honest debtor entitled to a 
discharge. 
D. In re Sumpter, 170 B.R. 908 (E.O. Mich. 1994). 
• family trust case with fraudulent transfers to the trusts to avoid IRS/creditor 
claims 
• the debtor specifically admitted that the reason the assets were transferred 
to the trust was to prevent the tax liens from attaching to the realty. 
This court was the court that wrote the original Toti opinion and therefore continued 
its application of a civil standard based on the Jones case. Evasion of payment by way of 
fraudulent transfer falls within the scope of the term "in any manner" in the statute. 
Bankruptcy Court -136 B.R. 690(B.Ct. E.O. Mich. 1991) where is was also held that 
the transfers into trust to avoid the IRS collection prevented the granting of a discharge. 
E. In re Hedgecock, 160 B.R. 380(0. Or., 1993). 
• delinquent returns 
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• returns filed with no payments 
• no withholding and quarterly ES payments 
• income in each of the years was in excess of $100,000 
• constitutional tax protestors who sent tax protestor related letters to the IRS 
and generally refused to cooperate with IRS agents, attempted to revoke 
their social security numbers, refused to identify themselves to the IRS, hid 
documents relating to the filing of the income tax returns 
• criminally charged and convicted of failure to file 
The court agreed with the IRS that a civil test of willfulness is applicable and that test 
is the voluntary, conscious and intentional test suggested by the IRS-no evidence of an 
affirmative act is required under 11 U.S.C. §523. 
F. Haas v. IRS, 48 F.3d 1153 (11 Cir. 1995). 
• for the years 1977 through 1985 the debtors filed income tax returns but did 
not make any payments thereon 
• debtors did not conceal assets, engage in dubious transfers of assets, falsify 
or destroy books or records, or misstate the amount of income in the tax 
returns filed 
• the debtor simply used his income to pay personal and business expenses 
rather than pay the taxes that were due. 
The correct test for dischargeability is a civil and not a criminal standard. The IRS 
must prove the nondischargeability of a tax liability by showing: (i) the debtors had a duty 
under the law (ii) the debtors knew they had that duty and (iii) the debtors voluntarily and 
intentionally violated that duty. The section 523 test for willfulness is the same as that 
under 26 U.S.C. §6672 so the IRS need not prove any bad motive or a specific intent to 
defraud the government in order to succeed. Because Haas "chose not to pay the taxes 
and instead used his financial resources for other purposes. . .. Haas wilfully attempted 
to evade these taxes." 
("Summary of Section 523(a)(1 )(C) Litigation-Is There Really A Discharge For Tax 
Liabilities?" prepared for American Bar Association by Walter B. Thurmond, January 25, 
1995) 
1-11 Avoiding Unreasonable Revenue Officers 
If a tax is nondischargeable, a debtor remains liable for all pre-and post-petition interest 
upon that tax.12 If the tax which a debtor owes is not among thE' ones excepted from 
discharge by the Bankruptcy Code, the tax is dischargeable. Therefore, in given 
circumstances, it may be to the benefit of a taxpayer having limited nonexempt assets to 
file a bankruptcy and liquidate her tax liability as opposed to trying to deal with an 
unreasonable Revenue Officer. Even though a tax is discharged, the IRS may retain a lien 
claim on certain exempt pre-petition property. 
12Bruning V. United States, 317 F2d 229 (CA91963), petition for cert granted 375 US 
920, 11 L Ed 2d 164, 84 S Ct 264 (1963), rehearing 376 US 358, 11 L Ed 772, 84 S Ct 906 
(1963). 
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u. CHAPTER 13 
2-1 Forced Payment Plan 
Because approval is not required, a Chapter 13 bankruptcy gives an individual taxpayer 
the ability to force a payment plan upon the Internal Revenue Service over its objection. 
Instead of having to deal with an unreasonable Revenue Officer, the taxpayer presents 
his or her other case to a Federal Bankruptcy Judge who has the ability to force the IRS 
to accept extended payments. All of this makes a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy particularly 
attractive when the taxpayer has sufficient income to allow repayment of the IRS tax 
liability within five years. The major disadvantages of Chapter 13 are the adverse affect 
upon the taxpayer's credit rating and the administration fee taken by the trustee for 
collecting the plan payments. On the other hand, in most cases, the taxpayer may avoid 
paying interest to the IRS. 
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PRACTICE TIP 
A major benefit of a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy is that an individual 
taxpayer has the ability to force a payment plan upon the IRS. A 
disadvantage of Chapter 13 Bankruptcy is the adverse effect it has 
upon a taxpayer's credit rating. 
Partial Payment of Liabilities 
A Chapter 13 plan may provide for partial payment of Dischargeable Taxes. For example, 
if the taxpayer had limited assets and income, the plan might provide for a payment of 10% 
of Dischargeable taxes. In some districts judges will accept 0% plans for non-priority taxes. 
2-3 Super Discharge 
In order for income taxes to be dischargeable in a Chapter 7 case a debtor must have filed 
her tax returns for the years in question at least more than two years prior to filing the 
bankruptcy petition.13 In a Chapter 7 case a debtor who has not filed his returns at all, or 
has filed them within two years prior to the bankruptcy, cannot discharge those taxes even 
though the tax has been assessed more than 240 days. In a Chapter 13, however, if a tax 
meets all the other criteria for dischargeability, it may be wiped out or reduced in a Chapter 
13 plan.14 That a return need not be filed in order to make a tax dischargeable under 
Chapter 13 is apparent from a careful reading of the priority language of the Bankruptcy 
Code. A taxpayer's failure to file a return, or if she filed it less than two years prior to the 
bankruptcy, renders the tax nondischargeable under Chapter 7 pursuant to section 
13Bankruptcy Code §S23(a)(1 )(B)(ii). 
1~Bankruptcy Code §1322(a)(2) and 11 U.S.C. §1328(a). 
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523( a)( 1), but this code section does not apply in Chapter 13.15 Bankruptcy Code 
§ 1322( a)(2) requires only that the Chapter 13 plan provide for full payment of priority taxes 
under section 507(a)(8). Referring to section 507(a)(8), nowhere does the language 
include within the category of priority tax one for which a tax return was filed late or not 
filed. Hence, the failure to file a return does not render that tax a priority tax. Compare 
section 1322 with section 523 (exceptions to discharge) which renders tax for which no 
return was filed or which was filed less than two years prior, nondischargeable under 
Chapter 7 (section 727).18 
Where the taxpayer filed a fraudulent return and engaged in activity which is deemed to be 
willful evasion of a tax obligation, any tax arising in connection with such return or evasion 
is ordinarily not dischargeable in Chapter 7.17 The discharge available in Chapter 13 does 
not exclude the claims in this category (fraud or evasion), and therefore they are 
dischargeable to the extent any other secured or unsecured claim may be discharged, 
depending on the particular plan. As long as the Chapter 13 plan provides for full payment 
of priority claims provided by section 507, the discharge is allowable as to tax claims.18 
Section 507 does not include tax claims based on fraud or evasion; therefore, the plan 
need not provide for full payment of them, unless the tax claims fall within some other 
category provided in section 507.19 
Regardless of whether a tax obligation is found to be based on fraudulent returns, the 
debtor's dishonest prepetition conduct in regard to his tax obligations may be taken into 
consideration on the issue of bad faith.2O 
2-4 Post-Bankruptcy Actions 
Once a discharge has been entered by the Bankruptcy Court, submit a written request to 
Special Procedures Branch that the IRS abate the tax. The Service will abate the liability 
by preparing a Form 3870. The author has found that the iRS is very inefficient in 
preparing post-bankruptcy abatements. Many clients have had levies made on their wages 
or bank accounts after a bankruptcy. You must aggressively pursue abatement. If all else 
151n re Daniel, 170 B.R. 466 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994) at page 468 (exceptions to 
discharge do not apply to a §1328(a) discharge.) 
181n re Bailey Bradley, 36 B.R. 655 (Maryland 1984). 
17Bankruptcy Code §523(a)(1 )(C). 
18Bankruptcy Code §1322(a)(2). 
191n re Muina, 75 B.R. 192 (S.D. Florida 1987). 
20A discussion of factors to be considered in determining the good and bad faith of the 
plan may be seen in re Coburn, 1994 B.R. LEXIS 1875 (B.R. D. Oregon 1994). 
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fails, the client may request that the Bankruptcy Court hold the IRS in contempt of court.21 
Until the IRS begins protecting the rights of bankrupts, you should warn your clients that 
the IRS may take illegal levy action notwithstanding the bankruptcy. If the taxpayer has 
taken reasonable steps to notify the IRS of the bankruptcy and discharge, the taxpayer may 
have a potential cause of action for reckless violation of the Code [IRC § 7433]. 
III. SANCTIONS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
3·1 Litigating Tax Liabilities 
The Bankruptcy Courts can become a forum for litigating the amount of tax liabilities. If the 
taxpayer has failed to initiate a Tax Court case within 90 days of the Notice of Deficiency, 
he normally may not litigate a grossly overstated assessment unless the full balance is 
paid. If the taxpayer is financially unable to pay the deficiency, he has lost the ability to 
litigate a refund suit. A taxpayer with limited funds may, however, initiate a bankruptcy and 
object to the claim of the IRS. The Bankruptcy Court would then have jurisdiction to 
determine the liability. 
3-2 
EXAMPLE: 1. The author's client was a college professor who failed to petition 
to Tax Court within 90 days of a Notice of Deficiency. The IRS assessed a 
deficiency in excess of $45,000 disallowing most expenses and depreciation of a 
rental property for three years. A Revenue Officer arrived at the taxpayer's home 
and began demanding full payment of the taxes. The professor lacked the monies 
to pay the tax liabilities. The Revenue Officer refused his request for an audit 
reconsideration even though the deficiency was grossly overstated. The professor 
signed a payment agreement of about $400 per month. Because the payments 
were small, the liability continued to increase with accrued interest and penalties. 
Mer several years, the IRS demanded larger payments which the professor could 
not afford to pay. The professor filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. When the IRS filed 
its claim, an objection to claim was filed with the court. The IRS then reopened the 
audit and abated most of the improper deficiency. If the IRS had refused to reopen 
the audit, the Bankruptcy Court could have heard evidence and reduced the IRS 
claim. 
Litigation Remedy 
Any disputed tax may be litigated in Bankruptcy Court. The taxpayer could dispute 
employment tax audits, Trust Fund Recovery Penalties, other penalties and tax 
deficiencies. If the issue has been previously litigated before another judicial forum, the 
Bankruptcy Court would not have jurisdiction. If the taxpayer has never sought a court 
resolution, the matter may be litigated without paying the full liability. 
21ln re Price, 130 BR 259 (NO 1111991), 42 F 3d 1068 (CA 7 1994); In re Abernathy, 93-1 
USTC 11 50,108 (BC NO III 1993); In re Kolb, 137 BR 29 (NO III 1992). 
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3-3 Advantages of Litigating Before Bankruptcy Court 
Because of the automatic stay [11 USC § 362], the IRS may not take administrative 
collection actions during the pendency of a bankruptcy. The client may litigate a tax 
controversy without the fear of imminent seizures or levies. Many bankruptcy judges give 
the debtor every opportunity to prove his case and review tax controversies in an equitable 
manner. If your client has a legitimate tax dispute but cannot afford to pay the liability in 
order to litigate it, consider litigation in bankruptcy court. If the taxpayer prevails, she may 
choose to dismiss the bankruptcy if she has few other debts. 
3-4 Summary 
Although bankruptcy is not a cure-all, it may be a viable alternative to dealing with 
unreasonable Revenue Officers. In the proper circumstances, bankruptcy can be used to: 
(1) Eliminate tax liability; and/or 
(2) Reduce tax liability; and/or 
(3) Reduce penalties; and/or 
(4) Secure an extended plan for payment of the tax liabilities; and/or 
(5) Litigate tax controversies. 
3-5 Caveat 
Prior to the initiation of any of these proceedings, however, the practitioner should 
thoroughly research the applicable bankruptcy statutes and, of course, the client should be 
fully advised of the adverse effects of a bankruptcy on his credit rating. If you incorrectly 




DISCHARGEABILITY -AT -A-GLANCE 
PERSONAL INCOME TAXES 
CHAPTER 7 







The tax year in question is more than three years prior to filing the 
bankruptcy; 
The tax in question has been assessed more than 240 days prior to filing the 
bankruptcy; 
The tax return for the year in question was filed at least more than two years 
prior to the bankruptcy filing; 
The tax return in question was non-fraudulent and there is no showing of 
willful evasion of payment of a lawful tax; 
The claim is unsecured; (If secured, the tax is discharged as to the debtor 
personally (in personam liability) but the lien is still valid as to any property 
it has attached to (in rem liability). 
CHAPTER 13 
The personal income tax is dischargeable in Chapter 13 if (1) the tax claim is 
unsecured and the taxing entity fails to file a timely proof of claim, or (2) in the alternative, 





The tax year in question is more than three years prior to the filing of the 
bankruptcy; 
The tax in question has been assessed more than 240 days prior to filing the 
bankruptcy; 
The tax in question is pe'rsonal income tax; 
The tax claim is unsecured. (If secured, the tax is discharged as to the 
debtor personally (in personam liability) but the lien is still valid as to any 
property it has attached to (in rem liability). 
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CHECKLIST NO.2 
PAYROLL WITHHOLDING TAXES 
CHAPTER 7 
Payroll withholding taxes are never dischargeable (wiped out) in a Chapter 7 
(unless, of course, there are assets in the estate to liquidate and pay the claim). However, 
the question of whether or not the debtor is or is not the responsible officer and thus 
personally liable for the 100% penalty is a matter the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to 
determine. And the court has jurisdiction to determine the amount of the claim, unless it 
has already been adjudicated by a prior court of competent jurisdiction (i.e. the tax court). 
CHAPTER 13 
Payroll withhoiding taxes are ordinarily not dischargeable in a Chapter 13 adjustment 
of debts. However, where the taxing entity fails to file a timely proof of claim and the tax 
claim is unsecured, it is extinguished. 
CHECKLIST NO.3 
SALES TAXES 
CHAPTERS 7 and 13 
If the sales tax is a true sales tax (a tax imposed on the buyer and computed based 
on the amount of the purchase, where the tax is to be collected by the retailer and 
forwarded to the taxing entity) most courts hold that it is a nondischargeable trust fund tax. 
Where, however, the sales tax is actually an excise tax (a tax imposed on the retailer 
for the privilege of doing business, computed on the amount of the purchase) it is 
dischargeable if the event on which the tax arose is more than three years prior to the filing 
of the bankruptcy. It is important to note that what is called a sales tax in some states is 
actually an excise tax under bankruptcy law (such as, for example, California's so-called 
sales tax). The dischargeability of the tax does not depend on what it is called by the state, 
but rather by the actual nature of the tax as determined by the bankruptcy court. 
Note that where in a Chapter 13 the taxing entity fails to file a timely proof of claim 




CHAPTERS 7 and 13 
The employment tax (the employer's contribution to the payroll withholding) is 
dischargeable under certain circumstances. Such taxes may be dischargeable if over three 
years old, or if over 90 days old, or entirely dischargeable, depending on how the 
Bankruptcy Code is interpreted. Scarce case law leaves this issue unsettled. The one 
case extant which deals with this issue held that any such tax over 90 days old prior to 
bankruptcy is dischargeable. However, Collier's on Bankruptcy makes a flat statement that 
such taxes are dischargeable only if over 3 years old, without citing authority. 
CHECKLIST NO.5 
DISCHARGEABILITY -AT -A-GLANCE 
PENALTIES 
CHAPTER 7 
The majority rule is that penalties that are punitive in nature only (which includes 
most penalties such as penalties for non-filing, late-filing, non-payment, late-payment, etc.) 




The penalty is attached to a tax which is dischargeable; 
The transaction or event giving rise to the penalty is more than three years 
before the bankruptcy filing. 
A non-dischargeable penalty is one which is for reimbursement to the taxing entity 
for pecuniary loss, or is a penalty that represents the actual tax owed, such as the 100% 
penalty for payroll withholding. The typical penalties assessed against taxpayers are not 
in these categories. 
Note: The 240-day assessment period is not applicable to tax penalties. Hence, 
it makes no difference when the penalty was assessed, as long as it meets one of the two 
criteria listed above it is dischargeable. 
Note: The minority rule is that a penalty is dischargeable only if the tax is 
dischargeable, regardless of how old the penalty is. 
Note: Penalties, even in Chapter 7, are not priority claims, but are included in 
exceptions to discharge under § 507. 
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CHAPTER 13 
Penalties are not priority claims and are dischargeable to the same extent as general 
unsecured claims in Chapter 13, regardless of when the penalties were imposed. 
SOURCE: "DISCHARGING TAXES IN BANKRUPTCY" 
Chapters 7, 11 and 13 
Morgan D. King J.D. 
Kings Press, 1995 
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DISPOSITION OF TAX PROPOSALS MADE TO THE COMMISSION 
1. (100). The Justice Department and Commissioner Shepard proposed 
that section 724(b) of the Bankruptcy Code be repealed, thus affording secured status to all 
tax lien claims. Complete repeal was generally opposed by the private bar, although some 
commentators, including the ABA Task Force, would have dealt with the question by 
charging a secured creditor with the real property tax under section 506(c). The Commission 
ultimately gave the taxing authorities most, though not all, of what they wanted. Under the 
Commission proposal, "[B]ankruptcy Code section 724(b) should be amended to exempt from 
subordination properly perfected, nonavoidable liens on real or personal property of the 
estate arising in connection with an ad valorem tax. Section 724(b) should also require the 
trustee to marshall unencumbered assets of the bankruptcy estate and surcharge secured 
claims, if warranted by the circumstances, under section 506(c) prior to subordinating any 
tax liens under the statute." Very few people except the local taxing authorities will be 
happy with this proposal, and it can be anticipated that this will be a fertile ground for 
controversy before the appropriate committees of Congress. 
2. (104). The Government Working Group originally proposed that the 
deemed filed rule now applicable in chapters 9 and 11 be extended to other bankruptcy 
chapters. The ABA Task Force opposed the proposal and the Advisory Committee 
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recommended that it be dropped as unimportant. The Commission did not act on the 
proposal. 
3. (105, 106 and 109). Commissioner Shepard and various governmental 
taxing authorities pushed hard for more specific notice requirements to governmental units. 
In addition, Commissioner Shepard proposed some stiff sanctions for failure to comply with 
the notice requirements, including extending a governmental authority's time period to object 
to discharge or to move to revoke a discharge. Insofar as these proposals required more 
specific notice to governmental units sent to persons and places of their choosing, the 
proposals proved to be noncontroversial. The ABA Task Force supported them and the 
Advisory Committee unanimously approved a package of Justice Department rules changes 
embodying these proposals. The Commission sent these on to the Rules Committee for 
consideration. The ABA Task Force strenuously opposed Commissioner Shepard's sanctions 
as well as a proposal that would have specifically required an individual debtor to notify a 
governmental unit of a possible claim for trust fund taxes. These proposals were not part of 
the Justice Department's rules package and were not approved by either the Advisory 
Committee or the Commission. 
4. (107 and 108). Commissioner Shepard made several proposals 
requiring debtors to schedule the tax basis of their assets. These proposals were opposed by 
the ABA Task Force and by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. The 
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Advisory Committee recommended that they be withdrawn and the Commission did not act 
on them. 
5. (211). The Department of Justice, the IRS and Commissioner Shepard 
proposed that the burden of proof as to tax matters be the same in the bankruptcy court as in 
applicable nonbankruptcy tribunals. The ABA Task Force supported this position, although 
it proposed a narrow exception for situations in which a trustee was contesting the tax claim. 
The Commission adopted the proposals, but not the ABA Task Force's proposed exception. 
6. (212). Taxing authorities made a proposal that there be added as 
grounds for conversion or dismissal in chapter 11, 12 and 13 cases the failure to file 
prepetition tax returns, the failure to file postpetition tax returns and the failure to file 
postpetition returns and pay postpetition taxes. By a divided vote, the Advisory Committee 
recommended that this proposal be adopted. The Commission did not vote on it but it will 
be part of the Advisory Committee's report that is sent to Congress. 
7. (213). The IRS, the Department of Justice and Commissioner Shepard 
proposed repeal of the chapter 13 superdischarge. The ABA Task Force vigorously opposed 
such repeal. The Commission rejected outright repeal of the superdischarge. [By a vote of 
four to four it failed to act on a proposal by Commissioner Jones to except taxes attributable 
to a fraudulent return from the superdischarge.] 
8. (214). The governmental taxing authorities generally urged 
amendments to section 1129(a)(9)(C) which would have had the effect of requiring level 
1-19 
-"' 
payments of deferred taxes under section 1129 and to provide a statutory interest rate. These 
proposals were generally supported by the private bar, in particular the ABA Task Force. 
The Commission adopted these proposals by (a) requiring level payments without specifying 
the appropriate periodic intervals, (b) setting the normal tax deficiency rate under section 
6621(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code as the uniform rate and (c) providing that the six-
year deferral period run from the date of the order for relief, rather than from the date of 
assessment. The Commission thus essentially adopted the Advisory Committee's 
compromise. IRS was opposed to the 6621(a)(2) rate insofar as it deprived them of "hot" 
interest on large corporate underpayments. Cf. LR.C. § 6621(c). The ABA Task Force 
would h?v~ started the six-year period on the effective date of the plan rather than the date of 
the order for relief. On the other hand, taxes assessed before the petition date would now be 
subject to the full six-year stretch out beginning on the date of the order for relief, a change 
opposed by some of the local tax authorities. 
9. (215). The governmental taxing authorities sought the right to set off 
prepetition refunds against prepetition tax claims. Many districts now give governmental 
taxing authorities that right under local rules or standing orders. The IRS went further and 
requested that the Commission give it the right to set off postpetition refunds against 
prepetition tax claims. The ABA Task Force opposed all of these setoff proposals. The 
Commission adopted the government's proposals by allowing setoffs of prepetition refunds 
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· against prepetition liabilities, but did not adopt the IRS proposal to set off postpetition 
refunds against prepetition liabilities. 
10. (216). Commissioner Shepard proposed that debtors seeking prompt 
assessments under section 505(b) of the Bankruptcy Code comply with applicable notice 
requirements of taxing authorities. The ABA Task Force supported this proposal with the 
proviso that such local rules be filed in prominent places. The Commission adopted the 
proposal with safeguards of the type sought by the Task Force. 
11. (217). Commissioner Shepard proposed that section 1231(b) of the 
Bankruptcy Code be repealed, so that no separate taxable entity would be created upon the 
filing of a family farmer bankruptcy. This proposal was uniformly endorsed by all parties 
and was adopted by the Commission. 
12. (217A). The ABA Task Force proposed that the Bankruptcy Code be 
amended to provide debtors with a short year termination election for state and local tax 
purposes identical to that provided by section 1398(d)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code. The 
Commission adopted the Task Force's proposal. The Commission also .... [add all 1398 
rules] 
13. (218). The Government Working Group originally proposed that the 
Commission should submit to the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial 
Conference a recommendation that Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1007 require a 
debtor to disclose on schedules when initially filed whether or not any tax audits are pending, 
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and to file amended schedules and statements as necessary, with written notice thereof to 
state and local taxing authorities, to provide adequate notice to state taxing authorities and 
other creditors of a federal tax audit. Additionally, the Government Working Group 
proposal recommended that Bankruptcy Code section 523(a) be amended to provide that the 
failure to substantially comply with Bankruptcy Rule 1007 renders nondischargeable a state 
or local government claim associated with a debtor's noncompliance. The ABA Task Force 
agreed with the proposed amendments to Bankruptcy Rule 1007 but opposed the proposed 
amendment to Bankruptcy Code 523(a). Neither the Advisory Committee nor, in the end, 
the Commission, acted on this proposal. 
14. (219). Commissioner Shepard proposed that by statute or rule, parties 
seeking contempt sanctions against governmental units for violation of the automatic stay 
make a meaningful attempt to resolve the problem in a nonlitigious manner before filing such 
action and bear the burden or proof of such attempt. The ABA Task Force opposed this 
provision. The Advisory. Committee recommended that the proposal be withdrawn and the 
Commission did not act on it. 
15. (311). The IRS, the Department of Justice and Commissioner Shepard 
proposed statutory amendments that would toll the running of the priority tax periods of 
section 507(a)(8) for previous bankruptcy cases plus an additional six months. The ABA 
Task Force agreed that a suspension was appropriate for the time during which a previous 
bankruptcy case was pending, but opposed any additional period in excess of 30 days. The 
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Advisory Committee proposed an extension for the time during which a previous bankruptcy 
case was pending but did not deal with the add-on. The Commission adopted this proposal. 
16. (312). The tax authorities sought an amendment to the Bankruptcy 
code to "make clear" that on default under a confirmed plan, the taxing authority retains the 
rights of a governmental authority collecting taxes, and is not relegated to default remedies 
under the plan. The ABA Task Force opposed this proposal, but the Advisory Committee 
recommended it by a vote of seven to three. The Commission did not vote on this proposal, 
but it will be part of the Advisory Committee's report sent to Congress. 
17. (313, 313A). Governmental authorities sought to amend section 
507(a)(8)(ii) to provide a tolling of the 240-day period in a case where an offer in 
compromise is outstanding regardless of whether the offer was made before or after the 
assessment. The private bar supported this amendment, the Advisory Committee 
recommended it and the Commission adopted it as a consensus item. There was some effort 
on the part of the IRS to have the tolling principle apply to installment agreements as well as 
offers in compromise, but this was roundly opposed by the private bar. The Advisory 
Committee rejected the proposal. The Commission did not vote on this aspect of the 
proposal, but rejection thereof will be part of the Advisory Committee's report sent to 
Congress. 
18. (314). The IRS proposed that section 508 (a) (8) (A) (iii) be clarified so 
that priority will be denied for taxes attributable to fraudulent and unfiled returns only when 
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the taxing authority's ability to assess those taxes resulted solely from the taxpayer's fraud or 
failure to file. The proposal would provide priority status to those tax claims still assessable 
at the time of the filing of the petition for reasons that are totally unrelated to the debtor's 
fraud or failure to file. The ABA Task Force opposed this recommendation. The Advisory 
Committee adopted it by a vote of seven to three. The Commission did not vote on the 
proposal but it will be part of the Advisory Committee's report sent to Congress. 
19. (315). The Small Business Working Group proposed that companies on 
the small business track be required to establish and maintain a separate bank account for 
postpetition taxes and nontax deductions from employee paychecks. The ABA Task Force 
supported this proposal and the Commission adopted it. 
20. (321). One of the most hotly debated issues before the Commission 
was whether the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 
U.S. 545 (1990) should be repealed. Under the Energy Resources decision the bankruptcy 
judge may approve an allocation of tax payments under section 1129(a)(9)(C) to trust fund 
liabilities pursuant to the plan if the court finds that such an allocation is necessary for the 
success of the reorganization. All governmental taxing authorities supported repeal of 
Energy Resources. All private bar representatives opposed such repeal. With the two 
academic members siding with the private bar members, the Advisory Committee rejected 
repeal. In the rush of business, the Commission did not vote on the repeal of Energy 
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Resources but rejection thereof will be part of the Advisory Committee's report sent to 
Congress. 
21. (329 and 433). Commissioner Shepard had proposed that the tax 
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court be confined to the power of the appropriate 
nonbankruptcy tribunal. This would have imported into the bankruptcy court various local 
procedural rules, including periods of limitations and other bar dates. It would have required 
debtors to exhaust administrative remedies before showing up in bankruptcy court. Also, 
Commissioner Shepard would have explicitly barred bankruptcy courts from issuing 
declaratory judgments in tax matters. The ABA Task Force not only opposed all of 
Commissioner Shepard's proposals, but it also proposed explicitly giving declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction over the tax consequences of the plan of reorganization to the 
bankruptcy court. The Advisory Committee discarded the proposals that would have limited 
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, and the Commission never specifically took them up. 
The Commission, moreover, by a narrow four-three majority, adopted the Task Force's 
proposal to give declaratory judgment jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court. It can reasonably 
be anticipated that the governmental taxing authorities at all levels will oppose this proposal 
before the Congress. 
22. (331). The IRS proposed that a penalty computed with reference to a 
tax liability is discharged only when the underlying tax is discharged. Under present law, 
J penalties attributable to an old tax can be discharged even if the tax liability cannot be 
~ 
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discharged, for example, because the deficiency is attributable to fraud. The ABA Task 
Force opposed this proposal, and it was rejected by the Advisory Committee by a vote of six 
to four. The Commission did not vote on this proposal, but rejection thereof will be part of 
the Advisory Committee's report sent to Congress. 
23. (333). The governmental taxing authorities proposed that chapters 12 
and 13 contain provisions that a tax lien cannot be discharged before completion of plan 
payments. The ABA Task Force opposed this proposal and instead proposed that a debtor be 
permitted to buy off a tax lien to the extent of the government's secured claim once a value 
for the underlying property is determined in the case. Under the ABA Task Force's 
proposal, such lien would not be reinstated even if the case is subsequently dismissed or plan 
payments not made. The Advisory Committee was evenly divided on the government's 
proposal, and thus made no recommendation. It voted six to four to adopt the ABA Task 
Force proposal. The Commission did not vote on this proposal, but it will be part of the 
Advisory Committee's report sent to Congress. 
24. (334). Commissioner Shepard proposed that a trustee or debtor in 
possession not be able to avail himself of bona fide purchaser status for the purpose of 
avoiding federal tax liens. The ABA Task Force agreed with this proposal. The Advisory 
Committee adopted it unanimously and it was adopted as a consensus proposal by the 
Commission. 
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25. (335). The IRS and the Justice Department proposed to provide the 
same treatment under Bankruptcy Code section 507(a)(8) for non-trust fund excise and 
employment taxes as currently provided for income and gross receipts taxes. The effect of 
this proposal would have been to import the three-year and 240-day rules of section 507(a)(8) 
into the excise and employment tax arenas. The ABA Task Force opposed this proposal on 
the ground that the extension of these time periods was not needed with respect to these types 
of taxes. The Advisory Committee agreed with the ABA Task Force and rejected the 
proposal by a vote of six to four. The Commission did not vote on this proposal but 
rejection thereof will be part of the Advisory Committee's report sent to Congress. 
26. (339). Commissioner Shepard proposed that the bankruptcy court be 
required to abstain from determining dischargeability of any tax claim where there are no 
assets to administer or where the debtor's request for a determination of tax liability is not 
accompanied by a demonstration that the debtor has an interest in the property of the estate. 
The ABA Task Force opposed this proposal. The Advisory Committee recommended that 
this proposal be withdrawn and it was never acted on. 
27. (414). [Duty to file partnership tax returns] 
28. (414A). The ABA Task Force proposed that sections 728(c) and 
728(d) of the Bankruptcy Code be repealed. The Advisory Committee approved this 
proposal and the Commission also adopted it as a consensus recommendation. [cross-





29. (415A). The ABA Task Force proposed that the appropriate provisions 
of subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code be amended to provide that the basis of a 
bankrupt or insolvent partner in his partnership interest be increased to the extent of any 
amount of discharge of indebtedness income that is excluded from gross income under 
section 108(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code. The proposal sought to clarify that the 
decision of the Court of Appeals in Babin v. Commissioner, 23 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 1994) 
did not apply to taxable years after the effective date of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980. In 
the meetings of the Advisory Committee, the IRS representatives reported that the National 
Office agreed with the ABA Task Force, but stated that that was the result under present 
law, i.e., Babin does not apply after 1980. Although the Service has not issued a public 
announcement to this effect, the Service representatives unequivocally stated that they would 
entertain requests for technical advice in a proper case. The Advisory Committee, with the 
concurrence of the private representatives, dropped the ABA Task Force proposal. As such, 
Congress will not have to deal with the question of retroactivity of any amendment to the 
statute. 
30. (415B). The ABA Task Force submitted a proposal that would 
authorize the Bankruptcy Court to designate a trustee in a chapter 7 or chapter 11 case as the 
Tax Matters Partner under section 6231(a)(7) of the Internal Revenue Code. Neither the 
Advisory Committee nor the Commission acted on this proposal. 
31. (421-4). [postpetition taxes as ordinary course] 
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32. (425). The Commission entertained a number of proposals dealing with 
the tax consequences of abandonment. It adopted a proposal by the ABA Task Force treating 
abandonment as a disposition by the debtor immediately before the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition, but awaiting imposition of any tax liability until the property was ultimately 
disposed of. The proposal thus treats the tax liability resulting from an abandonment as a 
prepetition eighth priority tax claim, but allows the estate to use the debtor's tax attributes to 
reduce the liability and protect the debtor by allowing his nonexempt assets to be used by the 
bankruptcy estate in satisfaction of the liability. 
33. (432). Governmental taxing authorities sought repeal of the decisions 
in In re L. J. 0 'Neill Shoe Co., 64 F .2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1995) and In re Pacific-Atlantic 
Trading Co., 64 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1995), which required bifurcation of the tax liability 
attributable to the year of filing into administrative and prepetition liabilities. Such 
governmental taxing authorities sought to have the entire liability for the filing year treated as 
an administrative expense. The private bar was divided in its reponse to this proposal. The 
Commission adopted a compromise proposal which would generally treat the filing year 
liability of a corporation as an administrative expense, but give to the debtor an election 
similar to that given to individuals by section 1398(d)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, to 
terminate their taxable year on the day before bankruptcy. If the debtor makes such an 






return will be subject to the six-year stretch out under section 1129(a)(9)(C) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
34. (4312). The ABA Task Force proposed a fresh start NOL for a 
corporation emerging from chapter 11. Under the ABA proposal, an electing corporation 
would be treated as having sold all of its assets on the effective date for an amount equal to 
their fair market value in a manner similar to a section 338 election. The debtor would then 
be given a five-year NOL carryforward based upon a sect~on 382(1)(6) amount to the extent 
that NOLs were still available after absorbing gains from the deemed sale. This proposal 
was thought by the ABA Task Force to redress some of the perceived imbalance created by 
the repeal of the stock for debt exception in 1993. The Commission adopted ihis proposal. 
35. (438A). The ABA Task Force prcposed that section 505(b) protection 
be afforded to the estate as well as the trustee, the debt( ir and a successor to the debtor in 
cases where governmental authorities do not give notice of audit within the time period 
required by section 505(b), thus overruling Matter of F 1ndiller, 125 B.R. 805 (N.D.-Cal. 
1991); In re Rode, 119 B.R. 697 (Bankr. B.D.-Mo 19~iO); and Matter of West Texas 
Marketing Corp., 54 F.3d 1194 (5th Cir. 1995). Cominissioner Shepard had first proposed 
this amendment, but the Commission in its early action'; showed no signs of taking it up. 
The Advisory Committee, by a vote of six to three, ret ommended the proposal, and the 
Commission voted to adopt it. 
36. (441). [Filing returns as conditi ,1 for chapter 13 relief] 
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37. (441A). The IRS and Commissioner Shepard had proposed that a 
chapter 13 debtor be required to pay priority taxes even if no proof of claim was filed by a 
governmental taxing authority. The ABA Task Force opposed this proposal. By a vote of 
seven to two with one abstention, the Advisory Committee rejected the proposal. The 
Commission did not vote on the propos-al, but rejection thereof will be part of the report of 
the Advisory Committee sent to Congress. 
38. (S03A). Commissioner Shepard and the IRS proposed that priority 
taxes paid through a chapter 13 plan include interest on deferred payments in a manner 
similar to chapter 11 deferred payments. The ABA Task Force opposed this proposal. Bya 
vote of eight to two the Advisory Committee rejected the proposal. The Commission did not 
vote on this proposal, but rejection thereof will be part of the Advisory Committee report 
sent to Congress. 
39. (602). The ABA Task Force proposed' that section S23(a)(I)(C) of the 
Bankruptcy Code be amended to make clear that the term "willfully attempt in any manner to 
evade or defeat such tax" requires a showing by a taxing authority in the bankruptcy case of 
an affirmative act or acts of misconduct and a state of mind requirement. By a vote of seven 
to three, the Advisory Committee recommended the proposal. The Commission did not vote 
on this proposal, but it will be part of the Advisory Committee's report sent to Congress. 
40. (604A). The ABA Task Force proposed that section SOS and related 
provisions of the Bankruptcy COQe be amended to provide that whenever the common parent 
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of a consolidated group is under the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court, the Bankruptcy 
Court has jurisdiction to determine the tax liability of all members of the consolidated group 
in a proceeding to determine the tax liability of the cammon parent, and that payment 
provisions applicable to the common·parent, suchas.the priority of such tax liability under 
section 507(a)(8) and the deferred payment provisions of section 1129(a)(9)(C), apply equally 
to such members. Neither the Advisory Committee nor the Commission acted on this 
proposal. 
41. (701). The ABA Task Force proposed that Bankruptcy Code section 
1125(b) be amended to provide that the bankruptcy court shall not approve a disclosure 
statement unless it contains (a) a discussion of the material federal and state tax consequences 
of the plan to the debtor and any entity created pursuant to the plan, and (b) with respect to 
each class of claims or interests, a discussion of the material federal income tax 
consequences of the plan to a hypothetical investor typical of the holders of claims or 
interests of the relevant class. The Commission -jidopted this proposal. 
42. (703 and 704). The ABA Task Force proposed that nonpecuniary loss 
tax penalties be subordinated in chapter 11 to the claims of unsecured creditors and proposed 
to extend such subordination to administrative claims as well as to prepetition tax claims. 
The ABA Task Force proposals would have overruled the decisions of the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah Inc., 116 S.Ct. 2106 (1996) and 
United States v. Noland, 116 S.Ct. 1524 (1996). Governmental taxing authorities opposed 
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both of these proposals. The Commission adopted the ABA Task Force proposal with 
respect to prepetition tax penalties but did not take a position as to postpetition tax penalties. 
The Advisory Committee was evenly divided on the extension of subordination to such 
. postpetition penalties, and thus made no recommendation. 
43. (101). A number of taxing authorities proposed that in chapter.9 cases 
there should be required as a condition of confirmation that all prepetition taxes be paid in 
full in cash in a manner as set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a) (9) (C) (the six-year payout). The 
effect of this amendment would be only to require the payment of trust fund taxes in chapter 
9. The private bar largely ignored this proposal. The Advisory Committee adopted it as a 
consensus recommendation. Professor Lawrence King, an advisor to the Commission, raised 
constitutional objections to this proposal, and the Commission did not act on it. It thus 
became the only "consensus" recommendation of the Advisory Committee that was not 
approved by the Commission. The proposal will be part of the Advisory Committee's report 
sent to Congress. 
44. (325). The governmental taxing authorities sought an exception to 
section 1142(d)(3) to except from discharge taxes unpaid by a business debtor where the 
nonpayment arose from fraud. The Advisory Committee agreed and the Commission 
adopted the proposal as a consensus item. The proposal may not accomplish much, as there 
is no agreement on what constitutes fraud for this purpose. 
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45. (326). The governmental taxing authorities made a proposal to confine 
the automatic stay for Tax Court proceedings provided by section 362(a)(8) to tax periods 
ending on or prior to the filing of the petition in the bankruptcy case, and further, to permit 
appeals from Tax Court decisions. The amendment would overrule the decision of the Tax 
Court in Halpern v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 895 (1991). The Advisory Committee 
considered Halpern to be bad law and approved of the proposal. The Commission adopted it 
as a consensus item. 
46. (332). The governmental taxing authorities sought an amendment that 
would require secured tax claims to meet the payment provisions applicable to section 
1129(a)(9)(C). In the absence of an explicit provision, it is arguable that the debtor could 
stretch payment of a secured tax claim out over a period greater than six years. The 
Advisory Committee agreed with this proposal and it was adopted by the Commission as a 
consensus item. 
47. (435A). The Advisory Committee adopted a proposal that the time 
period for making a short year election under LR.C. section 1398(d)(2) (an by implication, 
Bankruptcy Code section 346, assuming that it is amended to conform with section 
1398(d)(2)) to provide that the time period commences on the date the order for relief is 
entered. The statue now measures such period from the date the petition is filed. This poses 
severe problems for debtors in involuntary cases who are contesting the petition. This 
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proved to be noncontroversial. The Advisory Committee recommended it and the 
Commission adopted it as a consensus item. 
48. (437). The Advisory Committee recommended that I.R.C. section 
1398 be amended to provide that the bankruptcy estate's income be subject to the special 
rates applicable to alternative minimum taxes and capital gains. Arguably, under present 
law, those provisions are not imported into LR.C. section 1398 because of the cross-
reference to I.R.C. section 1. This is clearly an oversight. The Commission adopted the 
recommendation as a consensus proposal. 
49. (505). [Meaning of "assessed" or "assessment"] 
50. (711). The Advisory Committee made an original proposal that section 
726(a)(I) be amended to provide that a tardily filed claim for a priority tax would be allowed 
if filed before the date on which the court approves the final report and accounting of the 
trustee, rather than the date on ~hich the trustee commences distribution, as under present 
law. This will prevent disruption of the distribution process in chapter 7. The proposal was 
noncontroversial and was adopted as a consensus item by the Commission. 
51. (513A). The Advisory Committee proposed that an income tax return 
prepared by a taxing authority not be considered a filed. income tax return for purposes of the 
Bankruptcy Code. The Commission adopted this as a consensus proposal [brief statements of 
the effect of this proposal]. 
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52. (700). The Advisory Committee proposed that sections 1307 and 1112 
of the Bankruptcy Code be amended to give bankruptcy judges discretion to dismiss cases 
with prejudice to refiling under chapter 13 or 11 for a period determined by the court. 
Among the factors that could be taken into account in exercising this discretion would be the 
extent to which new debts to creditors, including tax debts, have accrued during the present 
case or prior cases. The Commission adopted this proposal as a consensus item. 
53. (714). The Advisory Committee proposed that payments of estate 
assets to the debtor for services performed are to be treated as ordinary income to the debtor 
with a corresponding deduction to the estate, rather than as a distribution. This proposal was 
adopted by the Commission as a consensus item. 
54. (411 and 436A). [Sale of residence by trustee] 
55. (713). The Advisory Committee made a recommendation, which the 
Commission adopted as a consensus item, to overrule Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 
(1983). Use of property to satisfy a nonrecourse debt would have the same tax treatment as 
use of property to satisfy a nonrecourse debt, whether or not the taxpayer is in bankruptcy. 
Under present law, if the debt is recourse, the tax treatment of the transaction is bifurcated. 
The taxpayer recognizes gain or loss to the extent of any difference between the adjusted 
basis of the property surrendered and its fair market value. Any amount by which the debt 
exceeds such fair market value is treated as discharge of indebtedness income, to which the 
relief provisions of section 108 of the Internal Revenue Code and 346 of the Bankruptcy 
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Code can apply. On the other hand, if the debt is nonrecourse, any difference between the 
amount of the debt and the adjusted basis of the property is a gain from the sale or other 
disposition of the property, upon which a tax liability may arise. No exclusion from gross 
income is available because the income is not characterized as income from the discharge of 
indebtedness. The proposed change has far-reaching implications and will undoubtedly 
provoke a great deal of debate before the tax writing committees of Congress. 
56. (336). Commissioner Shepard proposed an amendment to the 
Bankruptcy Code that acts· taken in violation of the automatic stay be deemed voidable but 
not void. The Advisory Committee recommended that this proposal be withdrawn and the 
Commission did not act on it. 
57. (338). Commissioner Shepard proposed that the decision of the 
Supreme Court in Begier v. United States, _ U.S. _ (1990) be codified. Under Begier, a 
trust fund tax paid prior to filing cannot be recovered as a preference. The Advisory 
Committee recommended that the proposal be withdrawn, and the Commission did not act on 
it. Begier remains as the law. 
58. (412). The AdVISOry Committee briefly considered a proposal that no 
penalty tax be imposed on the withdrawal from Keogh plans or individual retirement 
accounts in bankruptcy. The Advisory Committee recommended that the proposal be 
withdrawn. The Commission did not act on it. 
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59. (428). Commissioner Shepard suggested an amendment that individual 
estates be permitted to switch to the accrual method of accounting so as to be able to deduct 
administrative expenses on the estate's final return. The Advisory Committee recommended 
that the proposal be withdrawn. The Commission did not act on it. 
60. (438B). Some governmental taxing authorities urged that section 
505(b) be amended to provide that a request for determination of administrative period taxes 
be made not more than once with respect to each taxing authority, and then only at the end 
of the case. Present law permits separate requests to be made in respect of each tax period 
or return during the case. The Advisory Committee rejected the proposal. The Commission 
did not act on this proposal, but the rejection is part of the Advisory Committee's report sent 
to Congress. 






FOR THE BANKRUPTCY PRACTITIONER 
Copyright 1997, Conrad K. Cyr 
Hon. Conrad K. Cyr 






Given the subject matter of this session, it is perhaps fitting that I begin with a modest 
disclaimer of sorts. Although Judge Lee and I have C Jorated for more than three decades in 
various and sundry educational and legislative reform ·;;;rforts having to do with bankruptcy law, 
procedure, and administration, as well as the ongoing effort to restructure the bankruptcy courts 
themselves, I can recall no prior occasion on which we were ever asked to discuss the subject of 
ethics. Whether that has to do with our demonstrated lack of qualifications, or is better explained by 
the recently heightened interest in the subject, I must leave to your judgment. However that may be, 
we have reacted on this occasion in much the same manner we did more than twenty-five years ago 
when we initially embarked on the enterprise to reform the federal bankruptcy laws and establish a 
bankruptcy court system appropriately suited to the needs of its increasingly important mission and 
its burgeoning dockets. Among the very first things we did back then in the early 1970s, in behalf 
of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, was to retain legislative counsel- the very same 
able and respected counsel who appears on this program with us today - Murray Drabkin, Esquire, 
a fine professional whose ethical standards and judgment are as steadfast as his legal acumen is keen. 
I have no doubt that Murray will keep Judge Lee and me on the straight and narrow throughout this 
program as well. 
Discussion 
By way of further preamble, let me explain that my present mission is to sketch out 
a broad framework for today's panel discussion, hopefully with a view to affording some sense not 
only of the breadth of the ethical uncertainties confronting present-day insolvency practitioners, but 
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of their inherent complexity and the difficulties involved in their resolution under existing generalized 
ethical codes and disciplinary rules originally designed to guide the practice of law in more traditional 
forms of civil litigation. 
The term "ethics," from the Greek "ethika," encompasses the moral principles and 
aspirations of a particular culture or profession, as informed by the moral code of the individual 
citizen or practitioner. Thus, the subject of ethics is not coextensive with either the applicable 
professional disciplinary rules or the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code or Bankruptcy Rules 
governing bankruptcy proceedings and adininistration, no matter how important and relevant those 
prescriptive rules and statutes may be for attorneys, accountants, and the various fiduciaries who 
engage in insolvency practice. Instead, the role of ethics is to guide professional conduct in 
circumstances where statutory, regulatory, and disciplinary standards are silent, ambiguous or 
conflicting. It is at such junctures that the ethical professional- in whatever field of practice - needs 
to consult available ethical precepts and any related sources which may reliably inform the 
determination as to whether the contemplated professional representation or service may' be 
undertaken and, if so, in what manner and on what terms. 
It is important to note also that the recently heightened formal attention to ethics 
education among insolvency practitioners likely has been spurred, at least in substantial part, by the 
peculiar e2q>osure iIJ.d vulnerability of insolvency practitioners to the numerous, serious ethical 
dilemmas brought on by unforeseen, and even unforeseeable, conflicts of interest, and by the shifting 
-
interests, that may develop during the course of a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code among the 
broadly-grouped multiple entities and interests commonly represented by trustees, receivers, debtors 
in possession, creditor committees, and by their respective counsel. This often ominous exposure and 
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vulnerability to ethical challenge, on the part of even the best-intentioned insolvency practitioner, is 
particularly acute in business reorganization proceedings. 1 Moreover, I would suggest that the 
attendant jeopardy derives, in very substantial measure, from the comparative dearth of sufficiently 
focused ethical canons and disciplinary precepts that even identify, let alone prescribe, appropriately 
particularized aspirational standards for the ethical guidance of professionals engaged in this area of 
insolvency practice. 
For these and other reasons, then, I would suggest that it is of paramount importance 
that greater attention be centered on the extraordinarily large void presently left to normative 
decisionmaking by the individual insolvency practitioner. All too frequently insolvency practitioners 
are confronted with the need to make predictive ethical assessments for which discernible guidance, 
if available through reference to any authoritative source at all, can seldom be considered definitive, 
given only the generalized prescriptive standards designed for application in conventional civil 
actions. Consequently, it often appears, as the current legal literature tends to confirm, see, ~, 
Appendix I, infra at p. a, that insolvency practitioners may be left with two unacceptably extreme 
options. 
First, there is what might be described as the "Prudent Pilgrim's Option," - founded 
on the bedrock rationale that "The game is not worth the candle!" - which holds that the contem-
plated representation or action ought never be ventured absent authoritative guidance in the form of 
a clear endorsement comparable to the lawyer's fondest and rarest ally, an opinion or ruling "on all 
fours." While the Prudent Pilgrim is almost certain to remain in good professional standing, 
lSee, ~, Phelan & Penn, Bankruptcy Ethics. An Oxymoron, 5 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 1 
(Spring 1997) ("It has been said that the most important thing to remember when participating in a 
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prosperity may prove elusive. On the other extreme, the "Imprudent Pioneer's Option" - which hues 
to the golden rule: "Nothing Ventured Nothing Gained!" - invites its adherents to conclude that 
what is not plainly prohibited may be freely undertaken. Although the Imprudent Pioneer, for a while 
at least, can be expected to prosper at the bar, there may well come the time when continued 
prosperity may require recourse to other pursuits. Notwithstanding their diametric opposition, 
however, it is nonetheless clear that the advocates of both schools of thought, as well as the vast 
majority of professionals who would espouse more moderate approaches, would stand to benefit 
greatly from a reasonably definitive and organized exploration of the "ethical wilderness" areas into 
which present-day insolvency practitioners at times may be called upon to venture during their 
professional practice. 
It is also important, however, not to exaggerate the dimensions of this ethical 
wilderness, especially since certain baseline normative guides to responsible professional behavior do 
exist, which may on occasion satisfactorily resolve any perceived void, or at least substantially 
alleviate any genuine ethical concerns regarding the appropriateness of a contemplated representation 
or action. We start with the barebones. First and foremost, as officers of the court, counsel are 
professionally obligated to explore and assess with due care the ethical propriety of any representation 
or action either in contemplation, or during the course of, a bankruptcy proceeding. Normally, at 
least three general sources should be consulted in search of normative standards to be applied in 
arriving at these professional assessments. First, any generally applicable disciplinary rules and 
standards relating to the practice of law within the particular geographic region, court, or field of 
practice; second, any aspirational standards, such as those espoused by the various organized bar 
groups. Finally, I would strongly urge that ethically responsible counsel should consult the internal 
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moral monitor which guides their conduct as members of an honorable profession which has been 
entrusted with the right of self-regulation. 
In the limited time remaining, I will discuss examples of unlikely extrinsic sources 
which seem to me to afford clear authoritative guidance in assessing the ethical propriety of actions 
by counsel in proceedings under, or in contemplation of, a bankruptcy proceeding. Appendix II and 
Appendix ill contain two rather recent federal enactments - sections 156 and 157 of Title 18, United 
States Code, respectively entitled "Knowing Disregard of Bankruptcy Law or Rule" (section 156) and 
Bankruptcy Fraud (section 157). On their face, these statutes purport simply to criminalize certain 
conduct undertaken in relation to debtors, creditors, and insolvent estates. Yet I think it is 
inescapable that these statutes inevitably fill any real or perceived ethical void in relation to their 
subject matter, at least pending their displacement by more finely tuned ethical prescriptions which 
might be adopted by the bench or the organized bar for specific application to the field of insolvency 
practice. Moreover,.these statutes are particularly noteworthy not so much for their literal reach in 
delineating the relevant ethical landscape as for their preemptive effect upon the role left to traditional 
ethical standards adopted and internally policed by the legal profession itself Since there can be no 
question that it is a baseline ethical commandment that all insolvency practitioners, most assuredly 
including attorneys, must comply with state and federal criminal laws, neither can there be any serious 
question that no less would be expected of lawyers by the courts or bar grievance committees. 
The first of these criminal statutes, Title 18 United States Code, section 156, applies 
exclusively to "bankruptcy petition preparers" - not including ~ debtor's attorney - who charge 
a fee for preparing a document for filing in a bankruptcy case, which document in turn results in the 
dismissal of a bankruptcy case due to a knowing attempt by the preparer to disregard any requirement 
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of the Bankruptcy Code or Rules. ~ Appendix II, at p. b, infra. At first glance it might be thought 
highly improbable that a criminal statute, by whose express terms attorneys for debtors are excluded 
from coverage, should be considered relevant either to the formulation or the application of ethical 
standards governing the practice oflaw by attorneys in the insolvency field. However, unless one is 
prepared to explain away or disregard both the language and the pertinent legislative history of this 
statute, there appears to be no alternative but to conclude that the only reason Congress excluded the 
debtor's attorney from coverage under this criminal statute is that attorneys - unlike the covered 
layperson "petition preparer" - ~ already subject to ethical regulation adequate to the task. See 
infra Appendix III, at p. d. Against this backdrop, even our Imprudent Pioneer surely would feel 
constrained to inquire how likely it is that attorneys who prepare bankruptcy documents will be held 
to a lesser ethical standard, by their professional peers on the grievance committee or ~ bankruptcy 
courts before which they practice, than the layperson preparer is required to meet in order to avoid 
criminal prosecution? See infra Exhibit III at p. d. 
In a related vein, it may be extremely important as well to anticipate the reach of 
another new criminal statute, Title 18, United States Code, section 157, which makes it a felony for 
any person - thus plainly encompassing bankruptcy professionals, including inter alia attorneys and 
accountants - to make a false statement, promise or claim, or file a petition or other document in a 
bankruptcy case, with intent to execute m: conceal a scheme to defraud, without regard to whether 
the scheme predated the initiation of the proceeding.· See 18 U.S.C. § 157 (1995). One would 
suppose, therefore, that it is reasonable to anticipate that this statute poses a powerful deterrent to 
fraudulent schemes involving counsel and debtors who would attempt, for example, to execute what 
later may be perceived by others to have been an overly aggressive asset divestiture plan antedating 
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the filing of a petition for relief under the Bankruptcy Code. This statute certainly appears to reject 
the longstanding laissez faire assumption that it is perfectly all right to devise and execute a 
prepetition asset divestiture plan designed to deprive unsecured creditors of their legal right to 
payment of their valid claims - as though it were merely the ethical counterpart of a testator's estate 
plan for minimizing estate or inheritance taxes. That the latter analogy is inapposite requires little 
demonstration: neither any potential heir nor tax claimant holds an enforceable claim against the 
testator at the time the estate plan is adopted. Whereas existing unsecured creditors hold enforceable 
claims at the time insolvent debtors divert their assets pursuant to prepetition asset-divestiture plans 
secretly implemented for the purpose of hindering their unsecured creditors from recovering their 
claims. Even though so-called creative asset-divestiture planning of this sort has been considered 
more a matter of astute legal maneuvering than of ethics, 18 U.S.C. § 157 appears to represent a 
sharp rejection of such "gamesmanship" in anticipation of bankruptcy. Thus, Congress apparently is 
siding with the layman's view that such efforts are malum in se, by rendering it malum prohibitum 
under 18 U.S.C. § 157. 
Once again, the significance of this recent legislative development lies not so much in 
the likelihood that it was designed to deter the prohibited conduct - recognizing in particular that 
sophisticated schemes to defraud can seldom be executed without expert professional advice and 
assistance -. but that it greatly heightens the prospect that legislative reformers, bent on conforming 
criminal statutes in this area more closely to the business mores of the community, may be 
emboldened to believe that existing professional standards can be raised by the bootstraps through 
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§ 156. Knowing disregard of bankruptcy law or rule 
(a) Definitions - In this section-
"bankruptcy petition preparer" means a person, other than the debtor's 
attorney or an employee of such an attorney, who prepares for compensation a 
document for filing. 
"document for filing" means a petition or any other document prepared for 
filing by a debtor in a United States bankruptcy court or a United States district court 
in connection with a case under this title. 
(b) Offense - If a bankruptcy case or related proceeding is dismissed because of a knowing 
attempt by a bankruptcy petition preparer in any manner to disregard the requirements of title 11, 
United States Code, or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the bankruptcy petition preparer 
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both. (Added Pub.L. 103-394, 
Title III, § 312(a)(I)(B), Oct. 22, 1994, 108 Stat. 4140.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
References in Text 
The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, referred to in subsec. (b), are set out in Title 11, 
Bankruptcy. 
Effective Date 
Section effective on Oct. 22, 1994, and not to apply with respect to cases commenced under 
Title 11 of the United States Code before Oct. 22, 1994, see section 702 ofPub.L. 103-394, set out 
as a note under section 101 of Title 11, Bankruptcy. 
Separability of Provisions 
If any provision of or amendment made by Pub.L. 103-394 or the application of such 
provision or amendment to any person or circumstance is held to be unconstitutional, the remaining 
provisions of and amendments made by Pub.L. 103-394 and the application of such provisions and 
amendments to any person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby, see section 701 ofPub.L. 
103-394, set out as a note under section 101 of Title 11, Bankruptcy. 
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Legislative History 
For legislative history and purpose ofPub.L. 103-394, see 1994 U.S. Code Congo and Adm. 
News p. 3340. 
§ 157. Bankruptcy fraud 
A person who, having devised or intending to devise a scheme or artifice to defraud and for 
the purpose of executing or concealing such a scheme or artifice or attempting to do so -
(1) files a petition under title 11; 
(2) files a document in a proceeding under title 11; or 
(3) makes a false or fraudulent representation, claim, or promise concerning or in 
relation to a proceeding under title 11, at any time before or after the filing of the petition, or 
in relation to a proceeding falsely asserted to be pending under such title, 
shall be filed under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. 
(Added Pub.L. 103-394, Title III, § 312(a)(I)(B), Oct. 22, 1994, 108 Stat. 4140.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Effective Date 
Section effective on Oct. 22, 1994, and not to apply with respect to cases commenced under 
Title 11 of the United States Code before Oct. 22, 1994, see section 702 ofPub.L. 103-394, set out 
as a note under section 101 of Title 11, Bankruptcy. 
Separability of Provisions 
If any provision of or amendment made by Pub.L. 103-394 or the application of such 
provision or amendment to any person or circumstances is held to be unconstitutional, the remaining 
provisions of and amendments made by Pub.L. 103-394 and the application of such provisions and 
amendments to any person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby, see section 701 ofPub.L. 
103-394, set out as a note under section 101 of Title 11, Bankruptcy. 
Legislative History 
For legislative history and purpose ofPub.L. 103-394, see 1994 U.S. Code Congo and Adm. 
News p. 3340. 
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AppendixW 
Section 308. Bankruptcy petition preparers. 
This section adds a new section to chapter 1 of title 11 United States Code to 
create standards and penalties pertaining to bankruptcy petition preparers. 
Bankruptcy petition preparers not employed or supervised by any attorney have 
proliferated across the country. While it is permissible for a petition preparer to 
provide services solely limited to typing, far too many of them also attempt to provide 
legal advice and legal services to debtors. These preparers often lack i® necessary 
legal training and ethics regulation to provide such services in adequate and 
appropriate manner. These services may take unfair advantage of persons who are 
ignorant of their rights both inside and outside the bankruptcy system. This section 
requires all bankruptcy preparation services to provide their relevant personal 
identifying information on the bankruptcy filing. It requires copies of all bankruptcy 
documents to be given to the debtor and signed by the debtor. The section ~ 
provides that if the petition is dismissed as the result of fraud or incompetence QIl i® 
preparer's account, or if the preparer commits an inappropriate ill deceptive act, i® 
debtor is entitled to receive actual damages, plus statutOlY damages of $2,000 ill 
twice the amount paid to the preparer, whichever is greater, plus reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs in seeking ~uch relief. The bankruptcy preparer is also subject to 
injunctive action preventing the preparer from further work in the bankruptcy 
preparation business. 
1994 U.S. Code Congo and Adm. News p. 3365. (Emphasis in text added.) 
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